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Abstract 
 
At the moment of the founding of the Second Republic in April 1931, the labour movement in 
Spain was dominated by  two organizations, namely the anarcho-syndicalist Confederación 
Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) and the socialist Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT). The 
Second Republic marked the first period in which the two organizations had concurrently 
operated openly since the Primo de Rivera dictatorship had made the CNT illegal at the same 
time as the UGT had agreed to cooperate with the General’s corporatist project. With the 
founding of the Republic, a long-standing organizational and ideological hostility between the 
two organizations was exacerbated by the fact of the UGT actively participating in the reform 
project  of  the  Republican-socialist  government  and  the  CNT  increasingly  opposing  that 
project.  However,  the Republic  progressively  became  polarized  between  left  and  right;  as 
fascist regimes came to the fore across Europe, increasingly large sectors of the Spanish left 
called for a unity of their forces to prevent a similar occurrence in Spain. The outbreak of the 
Civil War in July 1936 made this unity even more imperative. 
 
This thesis focuses on interactions between the CNT and the UGT between 1931 and 1936 
within  this  socio-political  context,  primarily  from  the  perspective  of  the  CNT.  The  thesis 
traces and analyses the evolution of CNT as a national actor’s overall position on the UGT 
from one of outright hostility to a stance of proposing a revolutionary alliance with it in 1936. 
The thesis also examines interactions between the two organizations in Catalonia, which was 
both the CNT's birthplace and stronghold and a region in which the UGT had historically 
garnered little support. In addition to highlighting the pivotal role that the Catalan CNT had in 
determining the CNT's national-level stance on the UGT throughout this period, the thesis 
explores  how  the  anarcho-syndicalist  movement  in  the  region  presented  its  socialist 
counterpart as the embodiment of a socialist- and state-sponsored project to destroy the CNT, 
and also examines the largely hostile encounters between CNT and UGT unions in workplaces 
and localities across the region.  
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General Introduction 
 
This  thesis  will  consider  the  relationship  and  interactions  between  the  Confederación 
Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) and Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) labour federations 
in Spain and Catalonia between the foundation of the Second Republic in April 1931 and 
the outbreak of the Civil War in July 1936.
1 One of the most well-known features of the 
history of the Spanish left during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is that it contained 
strong anarchist and syndicalist currents, which more than two decades before the founding 
of the Second Republic in 1931 began converging in the ‘anarcho-syndicalist’ CNT. In the 
context  of  the  labour  movements  of  other  European  countries  during  the  same  period, 
Spain was in this respect something of an anomaly. Whilst the anarchist and syndicalist 
movements of France, Germany and others were declining in the early twentieth century, 
those of Spain continued to gain ground. Consequently, whereas in much of Europe splits 
within  the  left  were  based  around  different  interpretations  of  Marxism,  in  Spain  there 
existed a still more fundamental distinction between Marxist-oriented organizations and 
those that defined themselves as anarchist and/or syndicalist. In the Second Republic, this 
divide had manifested itself on the level of organizations principally in the form of the 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and the UGT labour federation on the one hand, 
and the CNT and the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI), a collection of anarchist affinity 
groups, on the other.  
 
The CNT and the UGT were divided by a legacy of theoretical differences, over which 
opposing camps had been in dispute since the expulsion of Marxists from the Federación 
de  la  Región  Española  (FRE)  in  1872  by  the  followers  of  Mikhail  Bakunin.
2  The 
fundamental differences expressed by these ideological groupings in the 1870s formed the 
different foundations on which the CNT and the UGT were built.
3  
 
The CNT’s ultimate goal since the late 1910s, when anarchists came to stamp a decisive 
influence  on  the  organization,
4  was  the  implantation  of  ‘libertarian  communism’  or, 
synonymously,  ‘anarchist  communism’.
5  These  terms  signified  a  post-revolutionary 
structuring of society which would be faithful to the original aims of Bakunin and his 
followers  in  the  First  International.  Libertarian  or  anarchist  communism  required  the 
destruction  of  the  state,  which  was  consistent  with  the  basic  anarchist  principle  that  a 
central state, even one run by the proletariat, was intrinsically oppressive towards those 
who lived within it. Within the CNT there were different views as to how quickly and by 
what  means  revolution  could  be  achieved,  ranging  from  immediately  and  through  
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spontaneous uprisings that would set off an innate revolutionary instinct in the masses, all 
the way through to revolution being unachievable until the CNT had consolidated itself 
into an all-powerful organizational force in which all workers were enrolled. All currents 
of opinion within the CNT, however, were certain that revolutionary confrontation would 
be necessary to overthrow capitalism and the state. With the exception of small nuclei of 
communists who operated within the CNT, virtually all active cenetistas, whether through 
a commitment to anarchist or syndicalist principles, rejected the possibility of bringing 
about  proletarian  emancipation  through  participation  in  political  processes  or  political 
organizations. Politicians were regarded in CNT circles simply as advancing bourgeois and 
capitalist interests, and in the case of left-wing ones, tricking workers into supporting them 
through false claims, simply so they could acquire power and live off workers.
6 Instead of 
workers placing their hopes in politicians, they should, in the view of the syndicalist strand 
of principles that guided the CNT, organize themselves outside of the political sphere, and 
in unions. A key rational basis for this principle was that unions, unlike political parties, 
were controlled by workers and not politicians, and therefore were the real expression of 
proletarian interests.  On a day-to-day basis, unions would be used to fight against the 
material conditions imposed by capitalism, with the unions alone carrying out this function 
and rejecting solutions offered by the political system. In the long term, the unions would 
be used to coordinate production in the absence of a state and political system after the 
libertarian communist revolution had begun.
7 
 
The prevailing theoretical bases of the UGT diverged from those of the CNT in a number 
of crucial respects. Above all, the UGT, as a Marxist organization connected to a political 
party, rejected the anti-political and anti-statist principles of the CNT. The founder of both 
the  PSOE  and  the  UGT,  Pablo  Iglesias,  who  had  been  at  the  helm  of  the  socialist 
movement up until his death in 1925, was amongst those who had been expelled from the 
FRE by the Bakuninists.
8 The rejection of politics was seen by the socialists as entirely 
self-defeating  for  workers,  cutting  them  off  from  an  avenue  through  which  material 
improvements to their lives could be made, and from advances towards a society in which 
workers  controlled  the  means  of  production.  Although  there  were  different  currents  of 
opinion  within  the  socialist  movement  as  to  whether  the  PSOE  should  be  involved  in 
government  or  should  remain  outside  of  it  until  capitalism  had  been  overthrown,  the 
socialist movement nevertheless participated in the political process, both via the PSOE, 
whose leaders were also key figures within the UGT, and through participation in dispute 
negotiation  and  social  reform  initiatives  managed  by  government  institutions.  The 
socialists  had  traditionally  regarded  proletarian  revolution  as  a  long-term  project  to  be  
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achieved  gradually  and  in  line  with  a  deterministic  reading  of  the  Marxist  view  of 
historical change, and continued to do so in the Republic.
9  
 
The  Second  Republic  in  its  first  years  represented  an  unprecedented  period  of  rivalry 
between the CNT and the UGT, with the UGT operating in support of and within the 
government and the CNT increasingly opposed to it. The conflict between the CNT and the 
UGT during these years was an ongoing cause of deep concern to those who sought to 
build the new Republic. Following a debate on the matter in the Cortes on 29
th July 1931, 
Manuel Azaña remarked that the issue was ‘one of the most serious and intense’ questions 
facing the Republic.
10 At the same time, however, the political and social currents in Spain 
also  became  increasingly  polarized  between  left  and  right.  The  Marxist  left  and  left 
Republicans in particular witnessed the rise of fascist and authoritarian movements abroad, 
and saw them as foreshadowing what the domestic right had designs on bringing about in 
Spain, a fear borne out to a large extent by the open admiration for fascist regimes abroad 
that was expressed by different sectors of the Spanish right such as the Confederación 
Española de Derechas Autónomos (CEDA) and the Falange. In tandem with this CNT-
UGT hostility there was thus a counter-current towards a belief in the need for the left and 
the working classes to unite against this threat of fascism. This belief gained even greater 
momentum following the rebellion of October 1934 and in the context of increasingly open 
confrontation between left and right over the first half of 1936. The importance that was 
publicly attached to unity by the left would increase even further with the outbreak of the 
Civil War, especially as the organizations of the left became embroiled in infighting. 
 
This thesis will examine the way in which the CNT interacted with the UGT in the period 
1931-1936, approaching the subject from the CNT’s perspective. At the heart of the thesis 
is a goal of examining how far the CNT’s relationship with the UGT both at the national 
level  and  specifically  in  Catalonia  changed  in  response  to  the  overall  framework  of  a 
polarization  of  Spanish  political  organizations  and  different  sectors  of  society  into 
opposing camps that would ultimately create the conditions for the outbreak of what would 
prove to be a protracted, bloody and deeply tragic civil war. This is not simply a question 
of establishing the ostensible official position of the CNT on the UGT at the national level 
on the eve of the war, but also a matter of establishing the agendas that lay beneath this 
position and determining how much the basic mentalities of mutual hostility that cenetistas 
and ugetistas exhibited towards one another since the early months of the Republic had 
changed in response to the gathering storm clouds. To truly understand the many different 
fissures  within  the  Republican  side  during  the  war,  it  is  every  bit  as  important  to  
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understand their pre-war sources as it is to examine their intensification in the war itself. 
Indeed, without the context of the pre-war years, accounts of the infighting that plagued the 
Republic during the war will always be incomplete.  
 
The thesis will not merely determine the official positions adopted by the CNT towards the 
UGT and vice versa in their capacity as national actors and explain how and why they 
came  about  and  how  they  linked  to  the  organizations’  broader  agendas,  but  will  also 
examine the ulterior motives that hid behind these official positions, as well as the de facto 
positions the two organizations developed on one another on the national level through 
their  most  important  newspapers.  Beneath  these  layers  of  interaction,  the  thesis  will 
examine the deeper mentalities of CNT and UGT militants towards one another, which is 
to say what they regarded as being the essential qualities and characteristics of the other 
organization and its members.  
 
Much of the analysis of the thesis focuses on the interactions between the CNT and the 
UGT in Catalonia. In some respects this analysis draws on the national level of the CNT’s 
interactions with the  UGT, in that it considers what role the Catalan  CNT – by some 
distance the largest CNT grouping in Spain – played in determining the CNT’s national-
level stance on the UGT, as well as determining how the national dynamic of the CNT’s 
interactions with the UGT establishing the CNT’s stance on the UGT in the region. The 
focus  on  Catalonia  also  has  a  more  grassroots  dimension,  through  examining  how  the 
unions  of  the  two  movements  and  their  militants  interacted  with  one  another  as  they 
competed  to  further  their  movements  and  represent  the  interests  of  workers  across 
Catalonia. Above all, it will examine how the belief of the cenetistas of Catalonia that the 
CNT had a deep historical and even spiritual bond with the working classes of Catalonia 
shaped their interactions with UGT organizers and nascent UGT unions in workplaces and 
localities across the region. It is generally taken for granted in the historiography of the 
Second Republic that the UGT was at its weakest in Catalonia, where the proletariat were 
overwhelmingly  allied  to  the  CNT;  in  examining  interactions  between  the  two 
organizations in the region, this thesis will suggest that the notion of the proletariat in 
Catalonia almost unanimously backing the CNT and rejecting the UGT may need some 
revision.  
 
At present, there is no substantial piece of research into the subject of CNT-UGT relations. 
However, this is not to say that the literature that exists on the workers’ movement or 
indeed  more  general  narratives  of  the  Second  Republic  and  the  Civil  War  does  not  
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acknowledge this theme. On the contrary, amongst researchers into early twentieth-century 
Spain it is fairly widely acknowledged and often mentioned – though usually in passing – 
that the CNT and the UGT were, generally speaking and notwithstanding a few momentary 
exceptions in the 1910s, the most bitter of rivals as a consequence of their clashing ideas 
on the questions of revolution, the state, political participation and methods for dealing 
with employers. In making this observation, creators of general narratives and specialists in 
the left or the workers’ movement alike largely do not expand upon the subject in much 
greater depth. The acknowledgement of the enmity between the organizations has followed 
these lines since at least Gerald Brenan’s depiction of the two union movements in The 
Spanish Labyrinth, and has since made appearances in narratives of the Republic or earlier 
decades.
11 Raymond Carr’s study of Spain between 1808 and 1975, for example, depicts an 
enduring  animosity  between  the  two  labour  federations  that  was  both  a  legacy  of  the 
theoretical disagreements that had divided Marxists and anarchists since the nineteenth 
century and a product of the two organizations’ conflicting ideas regarding the handling of 
labour conflicts and the role of political organizations.
12 This appraisal of the dynamic of 
relations between the CNT and the UGT is certainly not incorrect; it is rather the case that 
because an overall dynamic of animosity was prevalent and can seemingly be attributed to 
glaring  differences  of  theoretical  and  practical  tenets,  not  much  in  the  way  of  further 
investigation of the subject has been forthcoming. 
 
As is to be expected, more explicitly CNT-centred studies provide a more comprehensive 
account of the CNT’s national-level stance on the UGT than do more generally focused 
studies of Spain in the early twentieth century. For example, Antonio Bar in La CNT en los 
años rojos provides a detailed consideration of the debates on the CNT’s relationship with 
the UGT as it was discussed at the main plenums and congresses of the organization during 
the 1910s, in which he traces the key positions that existed within the movement on the 
matter as well as how and why the one particular faction came to have a decisive say in the 
matter.
13 Works such as José Peirats’s seminal three volume La CNT en la revolución 
española provide information on the main resolutions passed on the UGT at CNT plenums 
and congresses, as well as the pacts into which the CNT entered with the UGT over the 
course of the Civil War.
14 However, the subject is somewhat secondary to other themes 
that the authors of these works have sought to address.  
 
At the same time, there are numerous studies that focus on the workers’ movement in 
specific towns and regions during the Republic and the Civil War. Because the CNT and 
the UGT’s unions co-existed in localities across Spain, a substantial proportion of these  
 
6
works provide details of the interactions between local CNT and UGT organisms.
15 Such 
works  provide  important  indications  as  to  the  extents  of  the  rivalries  and  occasional 
instances of cooperation between CNT and UGT militants in their geographical area of 
study. Just as importantly, these studies also illustrate very clearly how disputes between 
CNT and UGT unions during the Republic readily broke out as a result of the CNT’s 
commitment to direct action tactics clashing with the UGT’s reticence towards striking and 
preference  for  using  government-backed  arbitration  mechanisms  to  win  improvements. 
However,  because  of  their  local  focus  and  the  fact  that  the  question  of  CNT-UGT 
interactions is not central to these works, these studies are unable to offer a full insight into 
how these local interactions linked to the bigger picture of CNT-UGT relations, and nor do 
their authors seek to base the overall arguments and conclusions of their work around the 
question of CNT-UGT interactions. 
 
Although the CNT’s interactions with the UGT are rarely the specific subject of focus of 
historical research into the Second Republic, more recent years have seen crucial advances 
in the way in which the CNT has been studied. In addition to shedding crucial new light on 
the anarcho-syndicalist movement itself, the innovative approaches of these works have 
provided  important  advances  that  allow  the  CNT’s  interactions  with  the  UGT  to  be 
examined from a more multi-faceted perspective. 
 
The works of Eulàlia Vega on the CNT, which focus principally on the competing factions 
and  ideological  currents  in  the  CNT  during  the  Second  Republic,  represent  a  crucial 
advance in the way in which the CNT is studied and understood.
16 They approach their 
subject  matter  to  a  very  large  extent  through  an  examination  of  the  unions  and  local 
federations of which the CNT was comprised rather than simply the activities of its elite, 
and  consequently  demonstrate  the  importance  of  understanding  how  the  CNT  was 
structured and operated, especially at grassroots level. Factors such as the decision-making 
process within the CNT are brought to the fore, as are the way in which the crucial issue of 
the factional split was understood and manifested itself at the level of local federations and 
sindicatos únicos.  
 
In a similar vein Anna Monjo’s Militants is fundamental for understanding the internal 
dynamics of the CNT in terms of its decision-making processes.
17 Monjo systematically 
explores how the CNT was structured, how it made decisions and which cadres of the 
organization  had  in  practice  a  deciding  say  in  the  positions  formally  held  by  the 
organization as a whole. Her examination of this aspect of the CNT leads her to suggest  
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that the inclusive ‘direct democracy’ that the organization claimed to uphold, which was 
supposed  to  set  the  organization  apart  from  the  controlling  tendencies  of  political 
organizations over their bases, did not always function in practice. Instead, local leaders, 
upper  cadres  and  more  personally  influential  militants  in  practice  exerted  a  substantial 
degree of control over decision-making processes, not to mention a decisive influence over 
precisely what matters could be addressed internally through a control over meetings.
18 
Monjo  carries  out  the  equally  important  task  of  examining  the  militants  of  the  CNT 
themselves.  This  aspect  of  her  work  involves  identifying  the  different  categories  of 
militancy,  from  grassroots  labour  activists  to  oral  propagandists,  as  well  as  examining 
precisely  why  people  chose  to  join  the  CNT  and  participate  in  it,  particularly  at  the 
grassroots level. Her study demonstrates how those at the lowest end of the CNT, such as 
its representatives in individual workplaces and even the organisers of its sindicatos únicos 
often  participated  little  in  the  discussion  of  the  bigger  questions  that  confronted  the 
organization, and instead were focused on the narrow tasks such as collecting membership 
dues. 
  
The works of Monjo and Vega highlight the importance of examining the CNT – and in 
this case its position on the UGT – with an awareness of the dynamics of its decision-
making system and how the activities of its grassroots militants on a day-to-day basis tied 
in with the bigger goals that the movement articulated on the national level. The thesis is 
very much concerned with examining the issue of CNT-UGT interactions in relation to the 
internal mechanics of the CNT, namely how decisions were made on the UGT, how they 
were  transmitted  through  the  organization’s  hierarchy  and  which  cadres  played  a 
determining role in formulating positions on the UGT. A study of CNT-UGT interactions 
from the CNT’s perspective would be very much incomplete without an understanding of 
how the organization’s decision-making process operated.  
 
Monjo and Vega also demonstrate the importance of a constant awareness that the CNT 
was not merely a national or a regional actor, but that it was built fundamentally on the 
activities of grassroots militants in workplaces across Spain. Recognition of this requires 
the thesis to approach the question of CNT-UGT interactions in part from the level of the 
factory floor, recognising that it was in such contexts that the bulk of tangible CNT-UGT 
interactions took place. The work of Chris Ealham is also crucial in this regard. Ealham’s 
Anarchism and the City is geared towards delineating the customs, lifestyle and routines of 
the Barcelona proletariat – with a particular emphasis on the development of community 
structures and networks in the barris inhabited by the unskilled workforce – and using this  
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in part to help understand the attraction of the Barcelona working classes to the CNT.
19 
Ealham illustrates that the CNT was so popular in the city in large measure as a result of its 
ability to integrate itself into the culture of popular protest and mutual support of working-
class communities and to help promote the causes and preoccupations that underlay them. 
Perhaps more so than any other study, Ealham’s work highlights the extent to which an 
understanding  of  movements  such  as  the  CNT  can  be  improved  significantly  with  an 
awareness  of  their  operation  at  the  grassroots  level,  the  social  context  in  which  they 
operated on  a day-to-day  basis and the motivations of the individuals the organization 
hoped to represent, rather than simply focusing on their doctrinal positions and the actions 
of their leaderships. Again, this is an approach that will be adopted in this thesis to better 
understand the CNT’s interactions with the UGT, above all in the form of a case study of 
interactions between the two organizations in the town of Igualada. 
 
The work of Julián Casanova on the CNT also constitutes a major advance in the study of 
the anarcho-syndicalist movement. His Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain is 
concerned to a large degree with separating the rhetoric and discourse of the anarcho-
syndicalists from the reality of their actions; in many respects the work is an attempt to 
debunk the myths generated by CNT-FAI propaganda and passed into secondary literature 
by writers sympathetic to the anarchists.
20 Casanova’s work is a crucial advance in the 
political study of the CNT for a number of reasons. He painstakingly unpicks the discourse 
produced in CNT-FAI propaganda over the Second Republic and the Civil War, examining 
for example its superimposition of the idea of violent revolution as a panacea during the 
Second Republic, and its creation of a mystique and a myth regarding the CNT and its 
leading figures. His highly critical analysis of the anarcho-syndicalist movement is crucial 
as it draws attention to the centrality of rhetoric in the CNT’s modus operandi, as well as 
highlighting  the  failures  of  the  movement  that  have  often  been  masked  by  this 
representation of itself.  
 
The concepts of rhetoric and discourse are crucial to the question of the CNT’s interactions 
with the UGT because, to a large extent, the CNT’s stance on the UGT was articulated 
most regularly through the pages of the CNT press. It was here that the basic prevailing 
position amongst CNT militants – or at least those who controlled the means of public 
expression – were reproduced on a daily basis and in response to the wider developments 
of the Republic. A study of this discourse is thus fundamental to understanding what was 
the  CNT’s  prevailing  stance  on  the  UGT.  In  addition,  and  departing  from  Casanova’s 
examination of CNT discourse, this thesis will also take certain aspects of the CNT’s press  
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output as indicative of the more deeply ingrained mentality of cenetistas towards ugetistas. 
Looking  beyond  editorials  that  were  written  about,  for  example,  Largo  Caballero  in 
response to specific pieces of legislation, a detailed study of the CNT’s public discourse 
reveals recurring themes and assumptions that were made about the UGT. These were 
expressed  not  just  in  the  main  editorials  of  the  papers,  but  also  in  contributions  to 
Solidaridad Obrera and others by union juntas and even ordinary CNT members. 
 
The primary research for this thesis is based mainly on documents produced by the CNT 
and the socialist movement. The newspapers and internal bureaucratic documentation of 
the two organizations provide different but equally important facets of how the CNT and 
the UGT interacted with one another. On the one hand, the newspapers produced by the 
CNT and the UGT reveal how their leading figures wished the other labour federation, its 
members and its activities to be understood by the working classes, as well as revealing 
how militants from both organizations understood their rivals. A substantial proportion of 
interactions between the two organizations revolved around how they sought to construct 
an  interpretation  of  one  another  to  be  transmitted  to  the  working  classes;  as  such  the 
newspapers of the two movements constitute an essential source for examining CNT-UGT 
interactions.
21  They  also  provide  crucial  details  regarding  how  CNT  and  UGT  unions 
interacted with one another during the course of both large and small, localized labour 
conflicts, albeit through accounts which contain heavy organizational biases. On the other 
hand, the organizations’ internal minutes, correspondence and circulars provide an insight 
into the decision-making processes through which positions and strategies relating to the 
other labour federation – or individual unions within it, in the case of documents produced 
at the grassroots level – were formulated, not to mention a window through which strategic 
calculations that were not publicly articulated through the press can be viewed.  
 
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part one examines the national level of interactions 
between  the  CNT  and  the  UGT  between  1931  and  1934.  This  takes  the  form  of  two 
chapters which consider the official national-level position adopted by the CNT on the 
UGT (and vice versa) through their decision-making mechanisms and bodies, as well as 
the organizations’ stances on one another as expressed through the main newspapers of the 
movement. These factors are placed within the context of the key developments of the 
Second  Republic.  The  first  of  these  chapters  deals  with  the  period  of  the  Republican-
socialist  government;  the  second  focuses  on  the  period  between  the  November  1933 
election and the October 1934 rebellion, a crucial period in terms of both the escalation of 
hostilities between the left and the right and in terms of the development of discussions on  
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unity amongst the left.  Part one also  contains a chapter that focuses on the discursive 
output expressed by anarcho-syndicalists and socialists on one another between 1931 and 
October 1934. 
 
Part two switches the focus of the thesis to Catalonia in the period between the founding of 
the Republic and October 1934. This part of the thesis partly examines specific, on-the-
ground interactions between CNT  and UGT militants, whilst also considering how the 
CNT and UGT in the region interpreted one another’s movements in the region as a whole, 
as well as referring back to the national positions of the two organizations on one another. 
More specifically, the chapters in part two examine the attempts of CNT entities in the 
region to marginalize UGT unions, the rationale that underpinned these efforts, and the 
dynamics of labour conflicts in Barcelona in which the two organizations clashed. 
 
Part  three  focuses  on  the  post-October  1934  period,  going  as  far  as  the  eve  of  the 
nationalist uprising of July 1936, with the strands of the national level and Catalonia this 
time  being  interwoven.  Its  first  chapter  charts  the  change  of  the  CNT’s  national-level 
stance on the UGT to one of proposing an alliance, examining in particular the role of the 
Catalan region in the creation of this stance, and also considers grassroots instances of 
convergence between CNT and UGT organisms. The following chapter then examines the 
counter-currents against unity within the CNT that went against its official pro-alliance 
position, as well as focusing on instances of grassroots hostilities and manifestations of the 
anti-UGT mentality that had prevailed earlier in the Republic. Like in part one, the analysis 
within these chapters will be placed into the wider context of escalating social and political 
conflict that beset the Republic.  
 
The final main chapter of the thesis is a case study of interactions between the CNT and 
the UGT in the Catalan town of Igualada between 1931 and 1936. The case study examines 
the interactions between the two labour federations in much greater detail than in previous 
chapters, and also ties its analysis into the principal themes examined in the previous three 
parts of the thesis. This chapter is designed to highlight the significance of the question of 
CNT-UGT  interactions  to  cenetistas  who  were  on  the  front  line  of  organizing  and 
sustaining a local CNT movement, both in terms of how they viewed national relations 
between the two organizations and how they handled their own interactions with a local 
UGT counterpart.  
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The  thesis  then  ends  with  a  summary  of  its  overall  conclusions,  as  well  as  a  short 
consideration  of  the  impact  of  the  interactions  between  the  CNT  and  the  UGT  in  the 
Second Republic on how the CNT handled relations with the UGT during the Civil War.  
 
As  a  final  comment,  it  is  worth  stressing  that  examining  how  political  or  labour 
organizations interact with one another, even (or perhaps especially) if they seek to draw 
their  support  from  similar  sectors  of  society,  will  almost  inevitably  unearth  the  least 
savoury aspects of an organization’s behaviour. It is not without good reason that there is 
an  almost  universal  tendency  for  historians  and  contemporary  writers  to  refer  almost 
instinctively to two or more organizations operating in the same political or social space – 
whether it be Spain, France, Britain, or any other country – as ‘rivals’ or even ‘enemies’. 
Because this thesis focuses first and foremost on the CNT’s handling of its interactions 
with  the  UGT,  often  it  presents  a  critical  analysis  of  the  anarcho-syndicalist  labour 
federation. This should not be taken as indicative of an overall stance of criticism of the 
movement. Outside the realm of interactions with other organizations, the CNT’s unions 
and militants played a vital role in organizing and fighting for the concerns of some of the 
most exploited groups of Spanish industrial society, as studies by several authors such as 
Chris Ealham, have demonstrated.  
 
Nor should this thesis be interpreted as singling out the CNT for being responsible for a 
failure to create a united front of left-wing and democratic forces in a context of escalating 
political polarization. Were this study to have focussed on the UGT’s relationship with the 
CNT instead, it is highly likely that it would be equally critical of the socialist labour 
federation’s handling of relations with its anarcho-syndicalist counterpart, something that 
is  hinted  at  above  all  by  the  critical  and  groundbreaking  studies  of  the  socialists  put 
forward  by  Helen  Graham  and  Paul  Heywood,  who  outline  the  leadership  of  the 
movement’s repeated spurning of opportunities to build alliances through what Heywood 
describes as their ‘bureaucratic imperialism over the workers’ movement’.
22 This thesis 
merely presents one strand of what was, in reality, a failure by virtually all the actors of the 
Republic to come to the type of meaningful understanding that could have made a vital 
difference to the Republic’s ability to fight a war.  
 
                                                 
1 There is no single satisfactory term that describes both the CNT and the UGT. To refer to them as ‘unions’ 
in this thesis would potentially create confusion, since the thesis considers both the activities of the 
organizations as national actors, as well as the activities of the organizations’ individual unions. Although the 
UGT had a federal structure while the CNT was structured as a confederation, for the sake of clarity and  
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simplicity the term ‘labour federation’ is used throughout the thesis when referring to both the organizations 
as overall entities.  
2 George Esenwein, Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain, 1868-1898 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989), pp. 10-45 
3 A more detailed summary of the theoretical differences between the CNT and the socialists can be found in 
Javier Paniagua, ‘Republicans, Socialists and Anarchists: What Revolution Was That?’ in José A. Piqueras 
and Vicent Sanz Rozalén (eds.), A Social History of Spanish Labour: New Perspectives on Class, Politics 
and Gender (New York: Berghahn, 2007), pp. 241-256 
4 This process of the CNT increasingly formally subscribing to anarchist goals is explored in Antonio Bar, 
Syndicalism and Revolution in Spain: the ideology and syndical practice of the CNT in the period 1915-1919 
(New York: Gordon Press, 1981) 
5 Both terms were used at the CNT’s national congress of 1919 to describe the CNT’s ultimate goal. Marcos 
José Correa López, La ideología de la CNT a través de sus congresos (Cádiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1993), 
pp. 87-105; José Peirats, La CNT en La Revolución Española (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1971), p. 28 
6 As will be seen in this thesis, however, this did not prevent occasional cooperation with political figures and 
groups who were sympathetic to the CNT. 
7 For a succinct overall summary of the CNT’s ideological foundations, see Correa López, La ideología de la 
CNT a través de sus congresos, pp. 199-200  
8 Esenwein, Anarchist Ideology, p. 39 
9 For an account of the socialist movement’s theoretical underpinnings prior to the Second Republic, see Paul 
Heywood, Marxism and the Failure of Organised Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), pp. 1-108 
10 Manuel Azaña, Memorias políticas y de guerra (Barcelona: Crítica, 1978), vol. 1, p. 63; Julián Casanova, 
The Spanish Republic and Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 55-56 
11 Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Spanish 
Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 198, 224, 252, 224-272 
12 Raymond Carr, España 1808-1975 (Barcelona: Ariel, 1982), pp. 421-435 
13 Antonio Bar, La CNT en los años rojos (del sindicalismo revolucionario al anarcosindicalismo, 1910-
1926) (Madrid: Akal, 1981) 
14 Peirats, La CNT 
15 Some of the more notable examples include Angeles Barrio Alonso, Anarquismo y anarcosindicalismo en 
Asturias (1890/1936) (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno 1988); Aurora Bosch, Ugetistas y libertarios: Guerra civil y 
revolución en el País valenciano 1936-1939 (Valencia: Edicions Alfons El Magnànim, 1983); José Luis 
Gutiérrez Molina, Crisis burguesa y unidad obrera: el sindicalismo en Cádiz durante la Segunda República 
(Móstoles: Nossa y Jarra, 1994); Anna Monjo and Carme Vega, Els treballadors i la guerra civil. Història 
d’una indústria catalana col.lectivizada (Barcelona: Biblioteca Universal Empúries, 1986) 
16 Eulàlia Vega, Anarquistas y sindicalistas durante la Segunda República: La CNT y los sindicatos de 
oposición en el País Valenciano (Valencia: Edicions Alfons El Magnànim, 1987); Entre revolució i reforma: 
la CNT a Catalunya (1930-1936) (Lleida: Pagès Editors, 2004); El trentisme a Catalunya. Divergéncies 
ideològiques en la CNT (1930-1933) (Barcelona: Curial, 1980) 
17 Anna Monjo, Militants: democràcia i participació a la CNT als anys trenta (Barcelona: Laertes, 2005) 
18 Monjo, Militants, pp. 286-289, 297, 302-304 
19 Chris Ealham, Anarchism and the City: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Barcelona, 1898-1937 
(Oakland: AK Press, 2010) 
20 Julián Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain, 1931-1939 (London: Routledge, 2004) 
21 A more thorough discussion of the role of the press in the anarcho-syndicalist and socialist movements 
appears in chapter three. 
22 Heywood, Marxism, p. 138; Helen Graham, Socialism and War: The Spanish Socialist Party in Power and 
Crisis, 1936-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 47  Part One: The CNT and the UGT on the National Level, 1931-1934  
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Chapter One: The CNT, the UGT and the bienio reformista 
 
The final months of the monarchy 
 
The  CNT  began  to  emerge  and  regroup  from  the  clandestinity  imposed  by  Primo  de 
Rivera’s illegalization of the organization from the spring of 1930 onwards. As it did, its 
militants  were  eager  to  witness  the  fall  of  the  monarchy.  But  although  the  CNT 
participated in some anti-regime initiatives, it was a coalition of Republicans and socialists, 
formed following a meeting in San Sebastián in August 1930, that was the focal point of 
opposition to the ailing system and that would be in a position to take charge once Alfonso 
XIII had fled Spain after 14
th April 1931.
1 Initially, socialist participation at this event was 
limited to the more informal involvement of Indalecio Prieto and Fernando de los Ríos, 
two  of  the  most  prominent  members  of  the  PSOE.  At  first,  some  of  the  key  socialist 
leaders,  amongst  them  Julán  Besteiro  and  Francisco  Largo  Caballero,  were  wary  of 
creating  formal  ties  with  the  bourgeois  Republican  parties.
2  However,  by  October  an 
inkling developed amongst the sectors of the socialist leadership who had hitherto resisted 
the possibility of joining the San Sebastián conspirators that were they  not to join the 
movement, the socialist movement would be left behind.
3 By October 1930 the socialist 
leadership  had  agreed  to  throw  its  weight  behind  the  plans  of  the  San  Sebastián 
Republicans.
4 
 
In formally joining the movement conceived in San Sebastián, the socialists and the UGT 
became indirectly connected through it to the CNT, whose leaders had been courted by the 
Republican protagonists since the signing of the San Sebastián Pact.
5 The representative of 
the provisional government in Barcelona, the Republican Rafael Sánchez Guerra, kept in 
contact with, among others, Ángel Pestaña and Joan Peiró, perhaps the most prominent and 
still active figures of the CNT from its heyday of the late 1910s, with a view to convincing 
them to have the unions of the CNT support the military coup they planned with a general 
strike.
6 With some of the legal restrictions on its activity being removed in April 1930, 
CNT  unions  once  more  began  to  organize  and  expand,  especially  in  their  former 
strongholds such as Catalonia, and as such their support would be a boon for any group 
that wished to overthrow the political system.
7 Although public commitments to supporting 
Republican causes by some of the most prominent members of the CNT such as Pestaña 
were met with censure from the more radical sectors of the CNT that would go on to be 
characterized as ‘faístas’, there was no question that the anarcho-syndicalist movement 
favoured the collapse of the system.
8   
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However, the circumstances that to a certain degree tied the CNT and the UGT to the same 
goals  did  not  by  any  means  bring  about  any  rapprochement  between  the  two  labour 
federations. Relations between the CNT and the UGT had remained frozen in a state of 
animosity since 1923.
9 The coming of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, and in particular 
the  UGT’s  response  to  it,  had  massive  implications  for  the  overall  state  of  relations 
between the CNT and the UGT, not to mention on the CNT itself. Whilst the CNT was 
declared illegal by the new regime, and so were driven underground until the end of the 
decade, Primo de Rivera made overtures towards the socialist leadership to allow the UGT 
to avoid a similar fate by participating in the corporatist state framework he intended to set 
up. Although the wing of the socialist movement most closely aligned to Indalecio Prieto 
was  against  collaboration  with  the  regime,  Pablo  Iglesias,  Largo  Caballero  and  their 
supporters took the UGT into partnership with the dictator, with Largo taking up a position 
as a councillor in the government.
10  
 
Once  the  CNT  had  found  its  public  voice  through  the  re-establishment  of  its  press,  a 
hostility towards the UGT and the socialist movement was articulated, based around its 
collaboration  with  the  dictatorship.
11  The  view  was  also  put  forward  that  the  socialist 
leaders were in the present moment working towards the illegalization of the CNT, an 
argument  that  foreshadowed  the  anarcho-syndicalists’  interpretation  of  the  UGT’s 
objectives during the Second Republic.
12 The attacks were every bit as personal as they 
were  ideological.  Solidaridad  Obrera  mockingly  claimed  in  January  1931  that  an 
incarcerated Largo Caballero had been unable to leave his cell for fear of being confronted 
by other prisoners.
13 On other occasions, he was lampooned in such terms as the ‘perpetual 
secretary’ of the UGT, a reference to his decades-long activity in the leading committees of 
the labour federation.
14 As time progressed, the regularity of printed attacks increased. 
Such criticisms had been expressed in the anarchist or CNT press in 1928 and even before, 
but  were  by  late  1930  being  expressed  much  more  frequently  and  to  a  much  wider 
audience as a result of the remobilization of the organization.
15 
 
Of course, these criticisms were certainly not a one-way street, with pieces in the CNT 
press  often  being  written  in  response  to  public  criticisms  of  the  anarcho-syndicalist 
movement made by the leaders of the socialist movement.
16 At the same time, the socialist 
press also routinely mocked ‘anarchists’ and ‘syndicalists’ for a variety of reasons, above 
all for the apparent primitiveness of their ideas and their lack of open, unequivocal support 
for the anti-monarchy movement.
17 
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The CNT and the UGT thus entered the Republic largely divorced from one another’s 
activities and agendas. Although both were definitely on the same side of the divide that 
separated  the  old  establishment  from  the  anti-monarchy  movement,  there  was  no 
recognized communal purpose between the two labour federations. The CNT remained as 
hostile to the UGT in 1930 and early 1931 as it had throughout the Primo de Rivera era, 
and the two organizations acted virtually in isolation of one another even as they adhered 
to  the  same  anti-monarchist  cause,  even  during  the  failed  strike  movement  of  15
th 
December 1930 that formed a key component of the provisional government’s attempt to 
take  down  the  monarchy  and  install  itself  in  government.
18  Instead,  there  was  merely 
public  animosity  and  mockery,  articulated  through  the  pages  of  their  respective 
newspapers. The basic foundations of the war of words that would characterize the CNT 
and the UGT’s national-level relationship over the first years of the Republic had already 
been laid by April 1931. 
 
Once the December movement against the monarchy had failed, the CNT leaders to a large 
extent turned their attentions away from playing a role in the activities of the provisional 
government, and instead focused on rebuilding the CNT.
19 This was achieved with some 
success; as the dictablanda stuttered from one crisis to another, the monarchy collapsed 
following the 13
th April municipal elections and the provisional government took charge, 
the CNT entered the Republic as a movement whose membership base was expanding 
rapidly.
20  
 
The Republican-socialist government and the UGT 
 
The Republican-socialist government that was elected in June 1931 would set about trying 
to implement extensive reforms of labour conditions, agrarian questions and the role of the 
Catholic Church in public life; as is well-known these attempts were from the outset met 
with opposition from several sectors of society and embroiled the Azaña government in 
battles  with  both  left  and  right.  The  UGT  would  be  at  the  heart  of  supporting  the 
Republican-socialist government, with the hopes of its membership pinned to its ability to 
implement wholesale social reforms. 
 
The provisional government that had been waiting for the fall of the monarchy became the 
key protagonists in the government of the new Republic. Following their initial installation 
in  government  a  general  election  was  held,  at  which  the  Republican-socialist  coalition 
swept to victory. The PSOE was the largest party in the Cortes, winning 116 deputies.
21  
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The socialists occupied three seats in first the provisional government, as had been agreed 
upon in late 1930, and then again in the subsequent government of Manuel Azaña; this 
crucially included Francisco Largo Caballero occupying the position of Labour Minister in 
the name of the UGT.
22 As will become apparent, the position held by Largo and the 
initiatives he attempted to pursue through it would become in many respects the key focal 
point of the battle between the CNT and the UGT at the national level. The participation of 
the leader of the UGT and other prominent socialists in the government is the most obvious 
demonstration that socialism in its party-political and labour-union manifestations had a 
vested interest in defending and shaping the new Republic. The PSOE ratified socialist 
participation in government at a special congress held in July 1931,
23 which the UGT also 
formally approved at its October 1932 congress.
24  
 
The overall picture of the UGT’s membership levels during the first years of the Second 
Republic appears to be one of an initial surge followed by a decline from the latter part of 
1932. Having had roughly a quarter of a million members in 1930, by the end of 1931 the 
socialist labour federation had approximately one million members.
25 But by 1933, the 
overall figure had fallen to around 400000.
26 Both the rise and the fall came principally 
through the expansion of the UGT in the  countryside, with rural labourers joining the 
Federación  Nacional  de  Trabajadores  de  la  Tierra  (FNTT)  in  large  numbers  at  the 
beginning of the Republic. Membership of the FNTT increased from 36639 in June 1930 
to  392953  in  June  1932.
27  This  represented  a  fundamental  change  in  the  overall 
composition of the UGT, in which peasants had been a much smaller grouping. At the 
same time, however, the UGT’s presence in urban areas across the country continued to 
grow, albeit at a relatively more modest rate. When the decline did come within the urban 
movement, it appears to have been fairly uniform across different industries and regions, 
with unions often being ejected from the labour federation for non-payment of dues or 
simply  dissolving  themselves,  a  trend  that  undoubtedly  reflected  the  frustration  many 
workers  felt  with  the  lack  of  progress  delivered  during  the  tenure  of  the  Republican-
socialist government.
28 
 
For  the  Republican-socialist  government,  the  period  following  on  from  the  June  1931 
election was one in which the near impossibility of implementing the sweeping reforms it 
proposed  would  become  apparent  as  its  opponents  on  the  right  began  to  coalesce  and 
present  a  well-organized,  well-financed  and  more  coherent  threat.  The  social  groups 
represented by the ‘old’ Spain were horrified with the new government’s intentions for 
reform of the countryside, the armed forces and the Church. As Preston above all has  
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demonstrated, the legalist right placed obstacles in the passage of the government’s reform 
bills, ensuring they were delayed and watered down. Outside of parliamentary business the 
right-wing  press  continually  attacked  the  reforms  and  the  integrity  of  the  government 
itself.
29 It soon became apparent that the government lacked the control over the machinery 
of the state to implement the reforms it actually managed to pass through parliament. In the 
countryside  in  particular  the  legislation  designed  to  redistribute  land  was  hardly 
implemented due to an inability to enforce it at the local level, leading to confrontations 
between peasants and landowners and local authorities across the countryside.
30  
 
The  issue  of  state-backed  repression  became  an  increasingly  thorny  one,  over  which 
protests  were  voiced  most  strongly  by  the  anarcho-syndicalist  movement.  As  some 
commentators have pointed out, Miguel Maura took up his position as Minister of the 
Interior with a zeal for ensuring that the laws of the Republic were obeyed at all costs.
31 
Maura  himself  dedicates  an  entire  chapter  of  his  memoirs  to  outlining  the  threat  he 
believed the CNT posed to the Republic.
32 Moreover, the government also lacked control 
over the security apparatus it inherited from the monarchy.
33 Both these factors lead to it 
being tarnished with the same accusations of repression as the ancien régime. As early as 
May 1931, protesting workers in Pasajes, Guipúzcoa, were shot at by the Civil Guard, 
causing  eight  fatalities.  At  the  turn  of  the  year  massacres  were  committed  by  security 
forces in Castilblanco and Arnedo.
34 The setbacks suffered by the Republican-socialist 
government and its supporters continued throughout 1932 and 1933. The government was 
criticized  by  the  right  not  only  for  the  reforms  that  it  had  planned,  but  also  cynically 
capitalized on acts of repression meted out by the state security apparatus. The massacre by 
Assault Guards in Casas Viejas, Andalucía in response to an uprising there in January 
1933, in which several peasants were murdered in reprisal, was met with a barrage of 
outrage by politicians from across the political spectrum, including those of the right.
35 
 
The accumulated calamities suffered by the Republican-socialist coalition took their toll on 
the socialist movement’s commitment to the Republic, especially at grassroots level. Many 
within  the  socialist  camp  had  become  increasingly  disillusioned  with  the  process  of 
governing,  in  particular  the  failure  of  reform  to  take  effect  and  the  stigma  that  their 
movement suffered through being in a government whose security forces had committed 
such atrocities as Castilblanco and Casas Viejas.
36 When parliament was dissolved by the 
President  in  September  1933,  the  PSOE  in  many  areas  of  Spain  chose  to  fight  the 
subsequent election in isolation from Republican groups. The result was that the right,  
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whose consolidation into a coherent electoral bloc suited the Republic’s electoral system, 
swept to power as the divided Republicans and socialists floundered.
37 
 
The CNT and the Republic 
 
Workers enrolled in the CNT, and to a degree cenetista militants and leaders, were filled 
with a sense of optimism and elation upon the founding of the Republic, a position that 
retrospectively seems surprising given the rapidity with which the CNT would come to 
present a position of outright hostility to the Republican state.  The initial public reaction 
of the movement to the Republic itself was somewhat ambiguous. By as early as 18
th April 
Solidaridad Obrera had suggested from its front page that ‘it seems that the Republican 
government is betraying us’. At the same time, however, the very same issue of the paper 
also  suggested  that  the  Republic  itself  could  satisfy  some  or  the  working  classes’ 
immediate  demands.
38  But  the  general  consensus  in  the  CNT  at the  time  was  that  the 
Republic and the freedom it offered was not so much an endpoint as it was an opportunity 
for the movement to quickly spread and take root, and ultimately lead Spain to libertarian 
communism.
39 Between the different factions of the CNT there were diverging opinions on 
how quickly this final goal could be achieved, but in the initial months of the Republic 
these were less apparent. 
 
The cenetistas’ optimism at this juncture was undoubtedly buoyed considerably by the 
continued  renaissance  that  their  organization  was  experiencing.  The  collapse  of  the 
monarchy  initially  removed  any  remaining  restraints  on  open  CNT  activity,  and 
consequently stimulated an enormous push by militants to return the organization to the 
height of its strength of 1919 and beyond. Over the spring and summer of 1931, new CNT 
unions  and  local  federations  were  created  across  Spain,  and  old  ones  reformed.  This 
process of expansion was particularly notable in Catalonia, where the membership base of 
the CNT expanded dramatically, reaching a high of 291150 members in June 1931.
40 This 
expansion  was  accompanied  and  to  a  significant  degree  fed  by  an  increase  in  labour 
militancy against employers, especially in industrial Catalonia.
41  
 
A CNT national congress was convoked for June 1931 in Madrid. Overall, the congress 
reflected  the  general  optimism  in  the  CNT  camp  at  this  moment  in  time.  Important 
structural  changes  were  made  to  the  CNT,  such  as  an  agreement  to  create  national 
industrial  federations  to  organize  workers  operating  in  the  same  industries  across  the 
country.
42 However, the congress did also hint at the factional differences that would later  
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come to the fore and nearly destroy the organization.
43 Essentially at this point two overall 
positions within the CNT could be discerned. On the one hand, there were those who saw 
the  Republic  as  offering  the  CNT  time  and  freedom  to  expand  and  consolidate  as  an 
organization so that it could then proceed to carrying out its social revolution on strong 
foundations. This moderate – or merely reformist in the eyes of its enemies – faction would 
go on to coalesce into the treintista movement and ultimately split from the CNT in 1933. 
On the other, there were those who saw possibilities for immediate social revolution in the 
present  moment,  thus  meaning  no  temporary  coexistence  with  the  bourgeois  Republic 
would be necessary. This current, though much more heterodox than its single labelling of 
‘faísta’ would suggest, had by 1932 stolen the initiative from the moderates, setting off a 
process of self-destructive infighting as they attempted to assert a doctrinal purity over the 
CNT.
44  
 
For the most part the hopes of cenetistas regarding the possibilities of the new era proved 
to be quickly dashed. Instead, from the summer of 1931 onwards, the overall experience of 
the CNT as a national movement was one of embitterment and setbacks. The difficulties 
encountered by the CNT to a large extent resulted from it clashing with the new state. As 
the summer of 1931 progressed, the CNT’s anger came to be directed every bit as much at 
the  government  and  the  state  as  it  was  against  employers.  A  nationwide  telephone 
operators’ strike which began in July 1931 marked the point at which the CNT’s battle 
against employers came to overlap with, and in many respects be eclipsed by, a struggle 
with  the  government.  Initially  the  vast  majority  of  telephone  operators  adhered  to  the 
strike. However, the government had a vested interest in Telefónica, and was also aware 
that the conflict was outside of its control whilst in the hands of the CNT. The strike was 
declared illegal. There was a spate of violent confrontations between strikers and security 
forces, with the gravest incidents occurring in Seville. Most provocatively of all from the 
CNT’s  perspective,  the  UGT  undermined  the  strike  through  providing  replacement 
workers. The conflict was presented in Solidaridad Obrera, other CNT newspapers from 
around Spain and the pro-CNT La Tierra as representing an offensive by a reactionary 
government, backed by the UGT and in hock to American capital, against the CNT and the 
telephone operators.
45 
 
Although the CNT had already publicly been at loggerheads with the government, and 
particularly Largo Caballero’s Labour Ministry, the Telefónica strike marked something of 
a point of no return, after which the CNT placed itself on a permanent war footing against 
the government and, as an integral part of this, as will be discussed, against the UGT. With  
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Largo in charge as the Labour Minister, a raft of legislation relating to labour arbitration, 
creating a rigid legal framework for labour disputes was created, centred around arbitration 
bodies  known  as  jurados  mixtos,  which  would  replace  the  comités  paritarios  of  the 
dictatorship. These jurados mixtos were to be more comprehensively enforced and were 
intended to be the only legal method through which labour disputes could be channelled, 
and linked in with legislation specifying how strikes could be conducted. The jurados 
mixtos were one of the flagship policies of Largo Caballero’s Labour Ministry, and for the 
UGT leadership the implementation and usage of the jurados would be at the forefront of 
their labour relations strategy. Although militants lower down the hierarchy sometimes 
found the process of the jurados being set up and ensuring their settlements were enforced 
in the face of concerted employer opposition to be a frustrating experience, as a general 
rule  those  actively  involved  in  the  UGT  wholeheartedly  supported  the  notion  of  the 
jurados.
46  
 
The arbitration systems put in place were highly suited to the UGT’s methods for handling 
industrial  relations,  which  Santos  Juliá  succinctly  describes  as  an  approach  of 
‘management  unionism’.  As  Juliá  illustrates,  this  ‘management  unionism’  was 
characterized by UGT unions attempting to settle labour issues through committees and 
negotiation,  seeking  to  eliminate  the  conflict  element  of  dealings  with  employers.  The 
chances  of  success  of  such  an  approach  were  improved  immeasurably  by  the 
implementation  of  institutions  that  would  arbitrate  negotiations  between  workers  and 
employers. In addition to viewing the Republic as a golden opportunity to implant such 
systems, the socialist leadership had taken the  chance to be involved  with other state-
sponsored initiatives which might allow worker gains through less conflictive means; in 
the  1910s  it  had  participated  in  the  Instituto  de  Reformas  Sociales,  and  much  more 
controversially had been actively involved in Primo de Rivera's comités paritarios.
47 The 
UGT’s unions across Spain attempted to implement jurados mixtos in their spheres of 
activity,  much  to  the  disgust  of  their  CNT  counterparts,  who  frequently  opposed  their 
creation and the settlements they produced. In backing the jurados, UGT organizers were 
not just fulfilling their preferred method of handling industrial relations, but also lending 
their support to the socialists’ programme of social and labour legislation. 
 
As  has  been  commented  upon  by  various  authors,  Largo’s  initiatives  represented  to  a 
degree an illegalization of the CNT’s preferred methods of negotiating labour relations.
48 
The CNT’s approach to industrial relations had, since its foundation, been grounded in the 
principles of ‘direct action’. In many respects the tenets of direct action were squarely at  
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odds with the ‘management unionism’ of the UGT. For one thing, anarcho-syndicalism 
rejected the notion that workers should seek mediated solutions with employers; as Santos 
Juliá points out, such an approach was regarded as making concessions to the bourgeoisie 
and in turn stalling the course of proletarian emancipation. For the state to be in charge of 
these negotiations was, for an anarchist movement, doubly unacceptable.
49 The very notion 
of direct action was based upon workers having total control over their interactions with 
employers,  in  which  they  could  deploy  the  methods  they  thought  necessary  –  such  as 
strikes, picketing, boycotts or even sabotage – to make gains against the bourgeoisie. A 
legally regulated framework for labour negotiations would render this approach illegal. 
 
However, the CNT’s problems with the government did not simply stem from the narrow 
world  of  industrial  relations.  Within  a  year  of  the  Republic’s  foundation  a  cycle  of 
insurrection  being  followed  by  repression  which  then  incited  protest  against  the 
government had become established. By as early as June 1931, Solidaridad Obrera was 
complaining of ‘the Republican dictatorship’.
50 Its hostility towards the Second Republic 
and its government on the grounds of its repression of the CNT would only intensify as 
CNT strikes were declared illegal, protest actions were dealt with by heavy-handed law 
enforcers and its attempts at insurrections were met with widespread arrests and closures of 
CNT organisms across the country.  
 
The event that truly gave momentum to this cycle of insurrection and repression was the 
attempted  uprising  carried  out  by  miners  in  the  Alt  Llobregat  region  of  Catalonia  in 
January 1932. The uprising began in Figols, where miners disarmed the local authorities, 
before  spreading  to  neighbouring  localities.  It  was  ultimately  crushed  through  the 
intervention of the armed forces. Under the terms of the Ley de Defensa de la República – 
which  itself  was  inevitably  a  key  preoccupation  of  CNT  propaganda  –  the  cenetistas 
arrested at the end of January 1932 were sentenced to be deported.
51 The decision sparked 
enormous protests from the CNT press, and kick-started a concerted propaganda campaign 
against the government and its repression.
52  
 
The turn of the CNT towards such an insurrectionary stance was in part a result of the 
deepening of factional splits within the organization, with more radical elements beginning 
to  gain  the  initiative  in  deciding  the  propagandistic  stance  taken  by  the  CNT  and 
organizing protest campaigns and insurrections. When the Republic was founded, many of 
the key positions in the National Committee, the Catalan Regional Committee and the 
editorial board of Solidaridad Obrera were filled by moderates. However, following the  
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release of the treintista manifesto by prominent moderate figures in August which railed 
against the radical position that revolution would be brought about through spontaneous 
insurrection,  tensions  between  the  moderates  and  the  radicals  escalated.  The  faístas 
responded to the manifesto with a combination of angry condemnation and ridicule. The 
radicals of the movement proved to be far more adept at publicly attacking their moderate 
rivals. Moreover, the circumstances of the government’s attacks on the CNT movement, 
exemplified in key strikes such as the Telefónica conflict in the summer of 1931, played 
into the hands of the radicals. Under pressure from these criticisms, moderate figures such 
as Joan Peiró began to resign from their positions of responsibility from the end of 1931. 
On the union level, radicals also began to make progress in controlling sindicatos únicos, 
especially in Barcelona.
53 
 
The difficulties for the CNT as a national actor continued and intensified throughout the 
Republican-socialist biennium, grounded in the same two areas of repression in response to 
its protest movements and internal factional conflict. Another set of insurrections took 
place in January 1933, which again failed absolutely and led to arrests and imprisonments 
of militants. Of these, the rebellion in Casas Viejas and the massacre in response to it by 
the local security forces gave ample stimulus to the CNT’s protest campaign against the 
government, which more than ever was presented as an outright enemy of the working 
classes. Illegal strikes also continued to be called, with militants arrested, further sapping 
the strength of the organization.
54 
 
Over the course of 1932 and 1933 the factional war within the CNT intensified. When 
CNT  entities  led  by  moderates,  such  as  the  local  federation  of  Sabadell,  voiced  their 
protests against FAI control, the faístas were able to push through their expulsion from the 
CNT. By the spring of 1933 many unions dominated by moderates had formally seceded 
from the CNT and founded the Sindicatos de Oposición bloc of unions and the Federación 
Sindicalista Libertaria, which was in effect the moderates’ organizational equivalent of the 
FAI. Their leaders were drawn from the signatories of the treintista manifesto. In Levante 
they represented a majority of unions, whereas in Catalonia they constituted a significant 
minority.  It  is  estimated  that  the  treintista  unions  in  Catalonia  had  a  membership  of 
somewhere between 35000 and 50000, which though not a large enough figure to represent 
the dominant tendency amongst the Catalan working classes, nevertheless represented a 
significant dent on the CNT’s membership in the region.
55  
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As the name suggests, the Sindicatos de Oposición saw their organization as standing in 
opposition  to  what  they  viewed  as  the  aberration  of  the  CNT’s  principles  through  the 
faísta’s dominance of the organization; the treintistas viewed themselves as representing 
the real essence of the Confederation, and one day hoped to return to the fold. Accordingly, 
much of their press output during 1933 and 1934 was dedicated to attacking the faístas.
56  
The unions in the Sindicatos de Oposición for the most part adhered to the same tenets of 
direct action that formed the core of the CNT’s principles. However, the movement as a 
whole took a very critical view of their Barcelona CNT counterparts’ long, violent strike 
actions that were a consequence of their refusal to obstinately reject any settlement that 
was handed down by the jurados or the labour ministry.
57 However, the treintistas did not 
stay  united  for  long.  A  further  split  developed  within  their  ranks  as  a  result  of  Ángel 
Pestaña’s  advocacy  of  the  movement  breaking  the  taboo  of  participating  in  politics. 
Pestaña went on to form a political party, the Partido Sindicalista, which was rejected by 
the majority of the rest of the treintistas.
58 The Sindicatos de Oposición remained on the 
outside of the CNT, gaining no real additional momentum during 1933 and 1934, and then 
found  themselves  targeted  by  repression  following  October  1934,  having  participated, 
along with the Marxist left, in the October general strike in Barcelona.
59 It would only be 
in the spring of 1936, in the context of both the radicals and moderates realizing that they 
had  both  made  strategic  mistakes  that  had  only  damaged  the  Confederation,  that 
reconciliation came about. Even then, however, not all those who had left the CNT in the 
first years of the Republic returned; some, such as the Sabadell Local Federation, remained 
autonomous, and then joined the UGT during the Civil War.  
 
The functioning of the CNT’s organizational structure and the decision-making processes 
embedded  within  it  also  began  to  suffer  as  a  consequence  of  the  disintegration  of  the 
organization. Prior to the Republic, the full organizational structure and procedures of the 
Confederation had lain dormant for years. With the organization operating openly once 
more from 1931, however, its decision-making bodies and the configuration in which they 
were linked could – and indeed needed – to be re-established so that the organization could 
engage  with  the  political  and  social  circumstances  of  the  new  era  and  work  towards 
fulfilling the movements’ overall goals. The CNT’s militants viewed their organization as 
fundamentally different from – and superior to – the UGT due to their belief that whereas 
the  UGT  operated  according  to  a  strict  hierarchy,  at  the  top  of  which  sat  a  national 
executive with which a substantial degree of overall authority rested, the CNT was, in their 
eyes, a collection of autonomous regional groupings which collectively decided upon the 
path  that  the  organization  would  take.  In  practice,  however,  there  was  inevitably  an  
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element of hierarchy in terms of how the CNT operated, both because there ultimately had 
to be a level at which  a final decision was made and also because the reality of how 
decisions were made did often not match the anti-authoritarian ideals on which its structure 
was based.  
 
The fundamental unit of division in the CNT’s organizational structure was its regional 
confederations, of which there were ten during the Republic, each covering a different 
geographical area of Spain. Each region was headed by a regional committee, which acted 
as the coordinating body for the region and provided delegates to represent the region at 
national plenums. Grouped within each regional confederation were all of the sindicatos 
únicos and local federations – the focal points for unions in a given locality – that operated 
within  the  region.  Plenums  and  congresses  were  held  by  each  region,  at  which 
representatives  of  the  region’s  unions  and  local  federations  attended,  with  a  view  to 
formulating that region’s stance on whatever matters had been placed on the agenda for 
discussion, relating both to local and national matters. The representatives at these plenums 
and congresses attended holding positions that, if procedures had been followed correctly, 
had been agreed on through open assemblies of the organisms which they represented.
60 
The  overall  coordinating  body  of  the  CNT  was  its  National  Committee,  which  was 
comprised of delegates from the city in which it was based, this location being decided 
upon  at  national  congresses.  The  National  Committee  had  the  remit  of  organizing  the 
convocation of national plenums and congresses, which were the two forums at which 
decisions of a national nature were made, as well as serving as the central body through 
which  communications  between  regions  were  passed.  National  congresses  involved  a 
much wider participation of the grassroots, with all CNT unions and local federations able 
to  send  delegates.  Officially  national  congresses  were  to  be  held  every  year  and  were 
supposedly the only forum through which important decisions could be definitively made. 
National plenums, by contrast, were attended only by delegates from each region, with 
these delegates carrying stances on the plenum agenda that had been agreed upon through 
aforementioned plenums or congresses held within their region.  
 
Overall, then, the CNT was divided according to regions, with national-level decisions 
being  formulated  at  national  plenums  and  congresses  attended  by  militants  from  each 
region, rather than the organization having any permanent national bodies that had the 
power to make decisions in the name of the entire organization, as the UGT’s National 
Committee and National Executive could. On a day-to-day basis, union activity did not 
revolve around national questions, but rather local labour ones, and the handling of these  
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issues stayed within the CNT organisms of that region, rather than being passed onto a 
national  executive  or  national  industrial  federation.
61  And  because  the  positions  that 
regional delegates took to national plenums were meant to be the product of consultation 
with the unions and local federations of that region, the decisions taken at national level 
were,  if  the  chain  of  deliberation  functioned  correctly,  ultimately  an  expression  of  the 
organizations’ ordinary members. 
 
However, the decision-making process was highly susceptible to being disrupted if any 
links in this chain were damaged, as occurred with increasing frequency throughout the 
Republic. National congresses were supposed to occur on a yearly basis, and were meant to 
be  the  only  forum  in  which  truly  important  issues  affecting  the  CNT  as  a  national 
movement could be decided upon. However, national congresses took place only in 1931 
and  1936.  In  their  absence,  national  plenums,  which  were  easier  to  arrange  as  they 
involved the attendance of only small delegations of the leaders of each region, were relied 
upon for making national-level decisions.
62 However, the breakdown of decision-making 
mechanisms did not end there. Regional delegates frequently attended national plenums 
without carrying positions on the items on the agenda that had been agreed upon through 
regional plenums or congresses. It was a similar story within the regions themselves, where 
many  of  the  delegates  who  attended  regional  plenums  or  congresses  had  not  –  either 
through poor organization or the effects of repression – held meetings with the members of 
the organisms they represented to agree a stance on a given issue.  
 
As will be seen during the thesis, the breakages in the CNT’s decision-making system 
would have important consequences for how the organization developed a stance on the 
UGT. In the absence of issues being discussed according to procedure, corners came to be 
cut, and decisions on important matters were taken by those towards the top of the CNT 
hierarchy without the full consultation of the grassroots organisms and ordinary members 
of  the  CNT.  As  the  Republic  progressed,  as  Anna  Monjo  demonstrates,  the  CNT’s 
decision-making mechanisms eroded, leaving influential individual factions or individuals 
increasing options to impose their agendas on the organization as a whole.
63 Moreover, 
some regions, as will be demonstrated, saw fit to exploit the weaknesses in this complex 
decision-making process, or even brazenly tried to ignore established procedures to either 
force through their own positions or block those which they opposed. 
 
The overall changes in membership of the CNT between the start of the Republic and 1934 
vividly illustrate the initial optimism and confidence of the movement and the subsequent  
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difficulties it suffered. Looking at the overall membership of the CNT, it is clear that the 
organization experienced an enormous surge in membership in the earliest months of the 
Republic, which was a quickening of the momentum that had initially begun in 1930. The 
official national figure at the organization’s June 1931 congress was 535566 members. The 
lion’s share of these members came from Catalonia, with the organization also expanding 
rapidly in Andalucía.
64 By 1932, the overall trend was towards decline, though there are no 
overall membership figures until 1936. As with the membership surge, the erosion of the 
membership  base  occurred  principally  in  Catalonia  and  Andalucía.  In  Catalonia,  for 
example,  membership  fell  from  291150  in  June  1931  to  202354  in  March  1933,  with 
further falls still to come as a result of the treintista split.
65 It was a similar story in the 
Levant region; although the CNT here continued growing throughout 1931, reaching a 
peak of 99741 in January 1932,
66 by October of the same year that figure had fallen to 
72604,
67 and would drop as low as 23308 in February 1934, the decline exacerbated as in 
Catalonia by the treintistas’ formation of the Sindicatos de Oposición.
68  This is not to say 
that the CNT declined to the same extent across all of Spain. Regional membership figures 
compiled by historians reveal that in some regions the CNT’s membership base stayed 
relatively  constant,  and  sometimes  continued  to  increase.  In  Asturias,  for  example, 
membership of the CNT rose from 24881 in June 1931 to 30803 in July 1933.
69 The rapid 
gains made by the CNT in the Madrid construction sector contributed to the CNT growing 
in the capital over the period in question.
70 However, in spite of such gains the inescapable 
truth  for  the  CNT  leaders  was  that,  in  the  regions  that  constituted  the  overwhelming 
majority of the CNT’s national membership, the organization shrank significantly.  
 
In addition to demonstrating the rapid decline of the CNT, the above figures highlight the 
very  uneven  distribution  of  the  CNT’s  membership  throughout  Spain,  which  had 
significant consequences regarding how the organization as a national actor operated. In 
June 1931, fifty-four percent of the CNT’s members lived in Catalonia.
71 Although the 
CNT  was  comprised  of  ten  regional  confederations,  therefore,  in  practice  half  of  its 
members were concentrated in one single region. Andalucía was the next most important 
region in terms of its membership levels. It is possible that in 1932 its membership base 
eclipsed even that of Catalonia due to the fact that its decline in membership truly began in 
1933, whereas the CNT in Catalonia was already waning in late 1931, though the true 
membership figures of the Andalusian CNT are virtually impossible to ascertain given the 
fleeting and disorganized nature of many of its rural unions.
72 The Levant region initially 
accounted for a significant portion of the CNT’s membership, though its haemorrhaging of 
members reduced it by 1933 to being proportionally much less important. The remainder  
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of  the  CNT’s  ten  regional  confederations  therefore  accounted  for  a  relatively  small 
proportion  of  the  organization’s  overall  membership  base,  even  if  in  some,  such  as 
Asturias or Aragón, they  either rivalled or outnumbered the number of workers in the 
UGT.  
 
This highly uneven distribution of members inevitably had an impact on how the CNT 
operated as a national entity. As discussed, the organization was based on the premise of 
autonomous regional confederations that would collectively formulate the CNT’s national 
stances and goals. Unsurprisingly, however, the largest regions asserted a much greater 
level of influence when it came to the formulating the CNT’s overall goals and strategies. 
As will become clear later in the thesis, Andalucía and above all Catalonia often steered 
debates at national plenums in the directions that they wished them to go, especially with 
regard to discussions on alliances and the UGT that would take place in 1934 and 1936. 
However, this influence of the largest CNT regions on the rest of the organization was not 
confined to national plenums. On a day-to-day basis, the Catalan CNT, as the region with 
the greatest resources, produced Solidaridad Obrera, which was by far the CNT’s largest 
newspaper and de facto the organization’s national mouthpiece. The public interpretation 
of the Republic and the UGT that was put forward by the CNT was therefore largely that 
of the Catalan CNT. On a more intangible level, as Anna Monjo argues individual militants 
within the CNT had a disproportionate influence in accordance to the weight of their public 
profile and the level of importance accorded to them by other militants.
73 The leading 
figures of the Catalan and Andalusian regions inevitably acquired a cache and national-
level influence that was impossible for the leading militants of the smaller regions. Figures 
such as Buenaventura Durruti, Federica Montseny, Juan García Oliver and Joan Peiró, all 
based  in  Catalonia,  received  much  greater  exposure  in  Solidaridad  Obrera  and  were 
nationally-known, whereas the leaders of the CNT in Galicia or the Basque Country, for 
example, were not. 
 
The  combined  effects  of  government  repression,  factional  splits  and  the  faístas’ 
mismanagement of the CNT ensured that by the time the right had gained power in the 
1933 elections, the CNT was in disarray. Though the radicals were still able to cajole 
certain elements of the grassroots into carrying out ill-advised insurrections, and a vitriolic 
anti-Republic line was maintained from the pages of CNT and Solidaridad Obrera that 
promised  an  imminent  libertarian  revolution,  the  reality  was  that  the  CNT  was  badly 
damaged.  
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The confrontation between the CNT, the government and the UGT 
 
What, then, was the CNT’s public stance on the UGT as a national actor in this context? 
Put simply, it was one of unprecedented hostility, articulated through the pages of CNT 
and anarchist newspapers and through the speeches of leading CNT militants. The socialist 
labour federation was put at the heart of the CNT’s overall interpretation of the Republic, 
to  the  effect  that  the  UGT  was  presented  as  being  a  driving  force  behind  the  acts  of 
repression against the CNT, and that this was part of an overriding goal on the UGT’s part 
to destroy the CNT.   
 
The  fact  of  the  UGT  being  in  the  government  and  the  CNT  being  opposed  to  it,  a 
manifestation  of  the  two  movements’  clashing  theoretical  standpoints,  was  the  axis  on 
which the hostilities between the two organizations on the national level turned. The CNT 
press presented an overall interpretation of the UGT between April 1931 and November 
1933 of it having the overriding goal of destroying the CNT so that ‘the way will be clear 
for the UGT to try and recruit the proletariat, organizing it in its ranks and placing it under 
the tutelage of the state’.
74 From the earliest months of the Republic, Solidaridad Obrera 
and  other  CNT  papers  spoke  of  ‘the  UGT  offensive  against  the  CNT’.
75  Indeed,  even 
before the founding of the Republic, Solidaridad Obrera had argued that the provisional 
government would put the UGT to use for this purpose.
76 This argument was articulated 
repeatedly  by  anarcho-syndicalist  newspapers  in  relation  to  both  the  activities  of  the 
socialist  leadership  and  of  UGT  unions  across  the  country.    The  claim  was  even 
occasionally made that  local UGT leaders  attempted to arrange for the Civil Guard to 
murder cenetistas to this end.
77 The CNT press presented the overall dynamic of relations 
between the CNT and the UGT as being one of a battle whose winner would be ‘them or 
us’.
78  
 
The legislation and other initiatives spearheaded by the Labour Ministry, such as the laws 
regarding strikes, the regulation of unions and the implementation of arbitration systems 
and  government-appointed  officials  to  regulate  labour  disputes,  and  the  heavy-handed 
public  order  initiatives  of  the  Interior  Ministry,  above  all  the  Ley  de  Defensa  de  la 
República,  were  interpreted  as  being  designed  specifically  to  allow  the  CNT  to  be 
destroyed  and  the  UGT  to  replace  it.  For  example,  outlining  the  imposition  of  labour 
relations settlement in Andalucía by the Captain General which stipulated that revisions to 
bases  de  trabajo  had  to  be  submitted  and  negotiated  through  comités  paritarios, 
Solidaridad Obrera argued that   
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in Andalucía, as in Barcelona, the UGT wishes to impose, through the authorities that 
represent it in government, a system of organization that the CNT never has and never 
will accept. For this reason militants are incarcerated and unions are closed.
79  
 
Any possibility that socialist legislation was designed for reasons other than to destroy the 
anarcho-syndicalist movement was implicitly rejected by this stance. With regard to the 
Republic’s stance on public order, Solidaridad Obrera gave the following interpretation of 
the ley de defensa de la República: ‘it means that the socialists can remain alone, having as 
they wish the Spanish proletariat and the organizations of struggle against capital. Those 
organizations of open struggle against the state, let us just say that they will disappear’.
80  
 
This overall interpretation of the socialist movement’s goals in the new era was expressed 
above  all  through  the  notion  of  Francisco  Largo  Caballero,  the  most  publicly-known 
socialist figure, the Labour Minister and the General Secretary of the UGT, masterminding 
a plan to destroy the CNT. This plan was executed from above by the machinery of state, 
and from below by his command of the UGT. It was ‘Largo Caballero’s offensive against 
the CNT’.
81 In May 1931, for example, Solidaridad Obrera provided a summary of key 
conflicts across the country in which the CNT were involved. There was not necessarily 
any direct involvement from Largo in any of them, but each occurrence was presented as 
having been masterminded by Largo. His hand was seen behind an apparent pact between 
employers and the UGT in Zaragoza against the CNT. He was condemned for attempting 
to prevent the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) mediating in negotiations at the 
Barcelona port. And he was also seen as directly responsible for the incidents in Pasajes, 
San Sebastián, where in the view of Solidaridad Obrera ‘to protect the UGT a peaceful 
demonstration was dispersed with gunshots, killing people in the most vile and cowardly 
manner’. The verdict of the paper was that ‘the coercions of Largo Caballero have had and 
could have tragic consequences that in any other country in the world would be punished 
with  a  prison  sentence  and  the  death  penalty’.
82  Largo  quickly  took  on  the  role  of  an 
omnipotent despot who could strike out against the CNT anywhere  and everywhere, a 
notion that, as Julián Casanova has pointed out, was totally detached from the realities of 
how much control the socialists could have exerted at the local level from their position in 
government.
83 
 
These  core  arguments  regarding  the  UGT  were  not  simply  made  and  then  forgotten. 
Rather, they were repeated throughout the lifespan of the bienio reformista. On one level 
this repetition came about through editorials written in the aftermath of bouts of repression  
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suffered by the CNT following its various insurrections, or as new legislative initiatives 
were passed. Just as importantly, however, they and the more basic sentiment of an all-out 
fight for survival between the CNT and the UGT were recurrently expressed on a day-to-
day basis through the CNT’s press coverage of labour conflicts involving the CNT and/or 
the  UGT,  or  even  just  of  reports  on  the  activities  of  UGT  unions  from  across  Spain. 
Between April 1931 and the end of 1933 each week brought with it reports of new outrages 
committed by UGT organisms as they set about fulfilling the government and socialist 
movement’s anti-CNT agenda.  
 
To give some examples to convey the continual nature of these attacks on the UGT,
84 in 
August  1931,  CNT  shoemakers  in  Valencia  accused  the  Labour  Ministry  and  local 
employers of colluding in an attempt to sideline the CNT and establish the UGT in the 
sector.
85 In September, cenetistas in Córdoba published a lengthy article in the paper in 
which they attacked both their local UGT counterparts and the Spanish socialist movement 
in general for its collusion with the bourgeoisie and the yellow nature of its unions.
86 In 
October, a militant from Reinosa, Cantabria, recounted the apparently deceitful activities 
of the local socialist leadership in their attempts to ensure workers were not laid off from a 
local factory, with the contributor advising other local workers to ‘get away from anyone 
who has a whiff of socialism about them or is a member of the UGT’.
87 In November, 
CNT waiters in Játiva reported in the paper that a strike they had led had collapsed after 
the  UGT  provided  strike  breakers.
88  In  January  1932,  the  newspaper  reported  on  the 
collusion  of  local  UGT  leaders  and  employers  in  the  sugar  processing  industry  in 
Zaragoza, vehemently attacking their corrupt self-interest and selling-out of workers.
89 In 
March, members of the CNT’s barbers’ union in Madrid published a piece that exhorted 
barbers in the capital to abandon the UGT on the basis that its barbers’ union had done 
nothing but manipulate and betray them for the previous quarter of a century.
90  
 
Once CNT had gone into publication from 1932, thus giving the anarcho-syndicalist labour 
federation an officially ‘national’ mouthpiece for the first time, the coverage of CNT-UGT 
grassroots conflict outside of Catalonia increased. In November 1932, the paper accused 
the socialists’ mining union in Asturias of betraying workers through curtailing a strike 
action there.
91 In December, CNT reported, amongst several other conflicts over which it 
attacked  the  UGT,  on  the  intervention  of  socialist  leaders  in  Vitoria  in  an  attempt  to 
suppress a strike by the CNT-affiliated bakers there.
92 Also that month the paper alerted 
readers  to  a  case  of  the  UGT  in  Valladolid  preventing  CNT  workers  from  finding 
employment in local public works schemes.
93 In March 1933, the paper reported on the  
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‘treachery’ of the UGT’s mineworkers’ union in Asturias after it voted to end a strike in 
the region.
94 In April, apparent collusion between the local authorities and the UGT in 
Córdoba  against  the  CNT  led  to  the  paper  decrying  another  case  of  ‘eternal  socialist 
treachery’.
 95 In June the UGT in La Coruña was strongly criticized as ‘social fascists’ for 
‘betraying’ the CNT at the city’s port for refusing to back a CNT strike there.
96  
 
Of  course,  between  April  1931  and  November  1933  there  were  numerous  altercations 
between CNT and UGT unions across the length and breadth of Spain which were the 
product of local union leaders from the two organizations approaching labour questions 
from conflicting theoretical and practical approaches to industrial relations, rather than 
these conflicts simply being an interpretative spin of the two movements’ newspapers, as 
several important local studies of the union activity in this period illustrate,
97 as do the 
preoccupations of British diplomats with incidents such as clashes between the CNT and 
the UGT in the Río Tinto mines and at the port in Tenerife.
98 What is important to note, 
however, is that the CNT chose to draw attention to the UGT’s activities on a regular basis, 
even if the incident in question was relatively small or did not directly or indirectly involve 
a CNT counterpart, and with a scant regard for context. As a result, minor conflicts such as 
a  bakers’  strike  in  Vitoria  often  received  front-page  billing  in  CNT  papers  as  part  of 
attempts to publicly discredit the UGT. Similarly, conflicts run by the UGT, such as the 
general strike in Salamanca in December 1932, were given a running commentary that 
argued that the organization was trying to prevent the workers from carrying out the strike 
action and ‘manoeuvring with the goal of bursting the movement before it has borne its 
fruits’.
99 
 
Crucially, the idea that the UGT was acting from government and through its unions to 
destroy the CNT and replace it with the UGT was far from a secondary aspect of the 
CNT’s  overall  public  interpretation  of  the  Republic  and  the  Republican-socialist 
government.  The  Republic  was  a  ‘socialist  dictatorship’
100  that  dedicated  its  efforts  to 
creating ‘socialist laws against the workers’ and the CNT.
101 At the same time, the sheer 
frequency with which the socialists’ activities in government were referred to and with 
which the activities of UGT organisms across Spain were reported ensured that the UGT 
dominated the CNT’s ongoing interpretation of the Republic. The scheme of destroying the 
CNT and replacing it with UGT was presented as being a central component, at times even 
the  overriding  one,  of  the  project  of  the  Second  Republic.  The  UGT  and  its  apparent 
sectarian,  anti-worker  objectives  were  thus  at  the  very  heart  of  the  CNT’s  overall 
understanding of the new political and social era.    
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The repeated and consistent articulation of this stance on the UGT begs the question as to 
how such an interpretation came about. Given that the UGT occupied such a central role in 
the CNT’s narration of the Second Republic, it would be easy to assume that it was the 
product of some sort of formal decision emanating from within the CNT to deliberately 
target  the  UGT  with  the  intention  of  mobilizing  the  working  classes  against  a  rival. 
However, an examination of the proceedings of the CNT’s national plenums and national 
congress that took place during the first years of the Republic reveals that in this period the 
UGT was seldom a topic of discussion.  
 
To put the relevance of national plenums and congresses into context, according to the 
CNT’s established processes, it was at these meetings that national CNT principles, goals 
and strategies were formally discussed and implemented. They were the principal outlets 
for representatives of the different CNT regions (and representatives of different unions 
and local federations across Spain in the case of national congresses) to come together and 
reach a national consensus on issues that were deemed to be of primary importance to the 
CNT.  The  decisions  made  at  these  meetings  were  generally  taken  to  be  binding.  The 
organization’s  national  plenums  dealt  with  outstanding  ongoing  matters  between 
congresses,  which  were  supposed  to  be  the  forum  for  the  outstanding  practical  and 
theoretical issues facing the movement.
102 As such, it would be expected that if cenetistas 
wished to build a coherent public line on the UGT, formally discuss the implications of the 
CNT’s coexistence alongside the UGT in the new context of the Republic, or establish a 
strategy for CNT-UGT interactions, it would be carried out at these meetings. 
 
However, at neither the national congress of June 1931 nor in any of the national plenums 
held between the founding of the Republic and November 1933 was the issue of UGT in 
any shape a formal item of discussion on the agenda of the meetings, and nor did the issue 
of the CNT’s relationship with the UGT on the national level become a topic of discussion 
at the sessions of these meetings as they progressed. The main themes discussed at the 
national congress and early national plenums focused rather on a combination of how to 
expand  the  organization  and  administer  its  press,  with  the  playing  out  of  factional 
differences also playing a role.
103  
 
By 1932, the items of discussion at national plenums reflected the more insurrectional tone 
of the faístas who dominated the organization’s agenda, not to mention the preoccupation 
of cenetistas with the effects of repression on their organization and increasingly divisive 
factional battles. The December 1932 plenum, for example, was convoked to discuss the  
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possibility of a national strike by rail workers and the viability of it being backed by other 
strike and insurrectional activity around the country.
104 In January 1933 a national plenum 
was held in which the failure of these efforts were discussed, as well as how to launch a 
fightback campaign, especially with regard to the imprisonment of cenetistas.
105 At the 
January 1933 plenum an analysis of the UGT did not extend beyond the suggestion made 
by  the  delegate  for  the  central  region  regarding  a  propaganda  campaign  to  fight  back 
following the failure of the January 1933 insurrections, which should in his view target the 
socialists in government, ‘who are responsible for everything’.
106 At the June 1933 national 
plenum, in reporting on the course of the general strike of the previous month in their 
respective regions, delegates from some regions commented upon the position adopted by 
their UGT counterparts, often reporting on their refusal to participate and the effect this 
had on dampening popular participation in the strike. The Aragonese, for instance, reported 
on the efforts made by the UGT, ‘faithful to their trajectory of treachery’, to dampen the 
general strike by postponing the general strike they coincidentally had  planned for the 
same day.
107 
 
However, aside from tangential references to the stance of the UGT in the midst of CNT 
labour conflicts and protest actions, the socialist labour federation was certainly not a point 
of discussion, especially not in a sense of analyzing the relationship between it and the 
CNT. This non-discussion of the UGT during these forums for national policy and strategy 
formulation highlights two salient points. First of all, it demonstrates that the founding of 
the Republic did not, for the CNT, serve as a stimulus to re-evaluate its overall relationship 
to its socialist counterpart, whether with a view to deciding upon a strategy for decisively 
eclipsing  its  rival  or  for  seeking  some  form  of  rapprochement.  Given  the  respective 
positions occupied by the two labour federations, and above all the links of the UGT with 
the government and its reform program, it is hardly surprising that the CNT’s ongoing and 
longstanding  hostility  towards  the  UGT  intensified  with  the  founding  of  the  Republic, 
which had no bearing on the differences of theories, principles and goals that had divided 
the two ideological currents since the nineteenth century, and nor did it change a past in 
which the UGT had collaborated with Primo de Rivera and the CNT had been made illegal. 
However,  it  is  evident  that  this  increase  in  hostility  was  essentially  a  reflexive 
amplification of a position created during a previous social and political epoch. It is clear 
that  once  the  UGT  was  generally  perceived  to  be  an  enemy  by  cenetistas,  no  further 
consideration of the rival organization was required. The question of how to orientate the 
organization towards its biggest rival therefore slipped through the cracks of the decision-
making mechanisms.  
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Secondly, it is evident that the CNT’s placing of the UGT at the heart of its interpretation 
of the Republic was not part of a formally agreed-upon strategy by its members. Instead, it 
would appear that the articulation of the interpretation of the UGT was left to the writing 
and  editorial  teams  of  the  CNT  press  organs,  and  also  the  cenetistas  who  contributed 
articles to the papers, generally in a capacity in which their writings were not themselves a 
statement created through consultation with fellow cenetistas. The CNT’s public position 
on the UGT was therefore created in a largely non-consultative fashion. At the same time, 
however, there is nothing to suggest that there was any significant opposition within the 
movement to the public stance that was taken against the UGT – neither with regard to the 
propensity  to  attack  the  UGT,  nor  the  overall  interpretation  of  it  having  a  goal  of 
destroying the CNT – from within the movement. What prevailed as the CNT’s de facto 
stance on the UGT was something that was on the one hand created by a small proportion 
of  militants  writing  in  what  was  effectively  a  personal  capacity,  yet  at  the  same  time 
appears to have been unanimously endorsed by the rest of the movement. 
 
The socialists’ stance on the CNT 
 
The  socialist  movement  and  the  UGT  likewise  were  on  a  constant  footing  of  public 
opposition to the CNT throughout the first years of the Republic, though not to the same 
vitriolic  degree  exhibited  by  Solidaridad  Obrera  and  CNT.  Editorials  in  El  Socialista 
above  all  presented  the  CNT’s  disregard  for  the  Republic’s  social  legislation  and  its 
continued attempts at insurrection as at best ‘playing into the hands of the bourgeoisie’
108 
and at worst simply ‘counter-revolutionary’.
109 Whilst the socialist press overall presented 
less of a continual narrative based around attacking specific CNT strikes, it and local UGT 
leaderships  were  certainly  willing  to  make  their  position  clear  regarding  the  CNT’s 
activities. When El Socialista did comment on a CNT strike, it was usually to condemn it.  
Commenting on a CNT general strike in Granada in November 1932, for instance, the 
paper  condemned  what  it  viewed  as  a  crude  ‘importation’  of  Catalan  syndicalism, 
combined with forms of violent protest redolent of nineteenth-century Andalucía. In its 
news coverage of the conflict El Socialista dwelt in particular on the incidents of violence 
that  were  carried  out.
110  El  Socialista  warned  its  readers  that  a  CNT  general  strike  in 
Zaragoza in May 1933 was a ‘monarcho-anarchist plot’.
111  
 
The  deliberations  of  the  UGT  National  Committee  reveal  that  this  was  not  simply  a 
propagandistic spin, but a genuinely-held belief – though it hardly needs pointing out that 
the CNT were not carrying out their protest movements on behalf of the right – by the  
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labour federation’s leaders. In the December 1932 meeting of the National Committee, for 
example,  Julián  Besteiro  raised  as  a  point  for  urgent  discussion  that  ‘syndicalist  and 
communist elements, together with the extreme right, have the goal of overthrowing the 
Republic’. Other members of the Committee were similarly convinced that in the areas in 
which they were based the CNT was planning either to carry out an insurrection on behalf 
of the forces of reaction or destroy the local UGT organisms at their behest, including 
planning a series of assassinations of UGT members.
 112  
 
Like the CNT, the UGT’s own public opposition to the CNT was not the product of its 
most important decision-making forums, namely its national congress or the meetings of 
the National Committee. That said, the CNT did feature more heavily in the appraisals 
made of the Republic by socialists. At the PSOE extraordinary congress held in July 1931, 
the CNT’s activities were cited by both those who were in favour of and those who were 
opposed to ministerial participation in defence of their respective positions.
113 The issue of 
the organization’s stance on the CNT was also indirectly addressed at the UGT’s 1932 
national  congress,  through  a  debate  on  whether  to  amend  the  UGT’s  basic  position, 
established at its previous congress in 1928, that the organization would not enter into 
alliances with other organizations. However, no amendment was ultimately made, with the 
opinion of one delegate that ‘the simple fact’ of changing this position ‘means recognizing 
that there are other trustworthy organizations, and this is not correct’ seeming to reflect the 
perspective of the majority.
114 At the congress there was also a brief and fairly unanimous 
condemnation of ‘anarchist violence’ and the ‘murders of several of our comrades carried 
out by syndicalist elements’.
115  
 
It must be emphasized, however, that these discussions were a relatively minor aspect of 
the  congress  and  were  quickly  resolved  with  little  required  in  the  way  of  discussion. 
Instead, the bulk of the congress was dedicated to appraising the conduct of the Executive 
Commission, particularly during the December 1930 attempt to topple the monarchy; the 
statutes of the UGT; and the social program of the UGT with regards to matters such as 
education, workplace safety, working hours and so on. In proportional terms, then, the 
CNT was not a principal subject of discussion.
116  
 
More importantly, it must also be borne in mind that the UGT’s national congress did not 
take place until October 1932, approximately eighteen months after the Republic had been 
declared. By this time, the Republican-socialist government and its reform program had 
already run into considerable difficulties and opposition, and the CNT had become firmly  
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entrenched  in  its  hostility  to  both  the  government  and  the  UGT.  It  must  be  stressed, 
therefore, that in spite of the declaration of the Republic representing a watershed moment 
that  ought  to  have  prompted  an  immediate  analysis  and  re-evaluation  of  the  UGT’s 
relationship with the Republic and a whole host of other matters besides, the socialist 
labour federation had not convened such a forum of discussion since 1928. In turn, this 
meant that the forum for discussing the UGT's position on the CNT – and indeed any other 
organizations – going into the Republic was essentially the one carried over from the final 
years of the monarchy. The hostile line of El Socialista and other socialist newspapers 
towards ‘syndicalists’ and ‘anarchists’ during the Republic was therefore a continuation of 
the position developed in the previous decade (and indeed in decades prior to that), rather 
than being the product of a discussion of the CNT by representatives of the constituent 
parts of the UGT during the first moments of the Republic.  
 
Whilst an overall position on the CNT was not formulated through the UGT’s formally 
most  important  decision-making  forum,  an  examination  of  the  role  played  by  the 
organization’s  Executive  Commission  and  National  Committee  in  presiding  over  their 
organization through their regular meetings reveals that there was an overall, coherent line 
taken against the CNT. The National Committee retained a preoccupation with instances of 
violence  directed  against  UGT  members  and  organisms  by  the  CNT.  Members  of  the 
committee who were based in regions in which the CNT were strongest painted a picture to 
the rest of the committee of their memberships living in continual fear of attack from 
cenetistas, sometimes with the assent of the local authorities. For example, Luis Viesca, 
who as representative of the national sugar workers’ federation was based in Zaragoza, 
described instances of the CNT organizing lockouts of factories to prevent UGT members 
from working in them, and generally planning, in his view, a campaign of terror against 
UGT organisms and members.
117 Reports of CNT activity in Catalonia were no less bleak, 
with the UGT presented as being forced to fight every bit as much against the CNT as 
against intransigent employers.
118  
 
On  a  day-to-day  basis,  the  Executive  Commission  of  the  UGT  handled  queries  from 
individual  UGT  organisms  regarding  how  to  handle  their  CNT  counterparts.  UGT 
organisms would contact the commission with details of their problem with ‘anarchists’ 
and  ‘syndicalists’,  and  the  UGT  leaders  would  dispense  advice  or  attempt  to  offer  a 
solution, where they could. On several occasions, UGT grassroots entities wrote to the 
Commission to complain that syndicalists were attempting to take over the local UGT 
movement. For example, the Executive became concerned in September 1932 that UGT  
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organisms  in  Vigo,  Galicia,  were  ‘finding  themselves  influenced  by  communist  and 
syndicalist elements’, which, they were concerned, could lead to ‘unpleasant things’.
119 
Clearly, the leadership of the UGT was concerned throughout the Republic to ward off any 
possible anarcho-syndicalist interference in UGT organisms and ensure that the grassroots 
of  the  organization  remained  closely  aligned  to  the  agenda  of  the  socialist  movement. 
Based on the fact that these reports and denunciations were often made by local ugetistas, 
it would appear that this was every bit as much a concern for lower-level UGT organizers 
as it was for the leadership, rather than it having simply been a case of the UGT leaders 
keeping their grassroots under unwanted surveillance. 
 
Sometimes the UGT Executive Commission would use its position to attempt to elevate 
cases of CNT threats to UGT organisms to the authorities of the Republic. For example, in 
June 1931 a delegation from Valencia visited the UGT leadership to seek help for workers 
in the leather industry there; the delegation asked for the Commission to help ‘guarantee 
liberty of work in the face of syndicalist elements’. Wenceslao Carrillo made contact with 
the Civil Governor to try and ensure this.
120 The commission attempted to make a similar 
ministerial-level  intervention  on  the  request  of  UGT  workers  in  Málaga  who  were 
dismissed  from  an  olive  oil  manufacturer  and  replaced  by  CNT  workers,  who  were 
apparently operating in collusion with the owner of the business.
121 
 
However, the most common response made by the UGT Executive Commission to details 
of cenetista threats sent to it by the organization’s grassroots was to send out orators to the 
locality in question. Consequently, the UGT Executive’s principal strategy for fighting for 
territory with the anarcho-syndicalists around Spain seems to have been based on the belief 
that  the  best  –  or  perhaps  only  –  method  at  their  disposal  was  to  try  and  initiate  a 
propaganda war. So, for example, the head of the UGT’s local federation in Barcelona, 
Juan Sánchez Marin, contacted the Executive Commission to request that Pascual Tomás 
be sent to address a meeting they had planned, the object of which was to ‘counteract the 
work of syndicalist elements’ who were attempting to force UGT members at the port to 
abandon their union.
122 Both Tomás and Andrés Saborit were sent by the Commission. 
Towns that were far smaller than Barcelona also received this dispatch of UGT leaders as 
part of a propaganda counter-attack against local cenetistas. Localities such as Aranda de 
Duero, Burgos, and Alcira, Valencia, upon writing to receive support for their propaganda 
efforts to ‘counteract the work of the anarchists’
123 were offered prominent ugetistas such 
as Wenceslao Carrillo.
124  
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The overall strategy of the UGT national leadership on the CNT was thus one of fighting a 
defensive action against CNT unions across the country, based on an overall impression 
that CNT unions represented a significant threat to the survival of UGT organisms – not to 
mention militants – across the country. Far from corresponding to the CNT’s belief that the 
UGT’s  unions  would  be  used  to  destroy  the  CNT,  the  stance  taken  by  the  Executive 
Commission was in fact that of attempting to fight a defensive action against the threat of 
CNT unions. This is a counter-perspective to the overall question of the CNT and UGT’s 
stances on one another in the early  years of the Republic that has largely escaped the 
attention of commentators. As discussed, many writers have pointed out that the socialists’ 
legislation  from  government  placed  an  impediment  on  the  CNT’s  ability  to  function 
according to its principles. Others have argued, and certainly not inaccurately, that the 
socialist leaders were keen to ensure that the full weight of the state’s security apparatus 
was applied against the CNT when it broke the law, whether in the labour sphere or during 
insurrections.
125 This is certainly backed up by the public attitude taken by socialists over 
arrests and punishment of cenetistas, which occasionally was simply callous.
126  
 
However, it must also be taken into account that on a day-to-day basis, the UGT leadership 
did not approach the question of the CNT as though they had access to force to destroy 
outright  CNT  unions.  Rather,  their  primary  concern  was  for  the  survival  of  their  own 
unions,  which  they  viewed  as  under  threat  from  CNT  coercions,  against  which  they 
generally turned to measures such as sending mediators or propagandists to the area. This 
is not to argue that this was a particularly rational appraisal of the on-the-ground dynamic 
of interactions. It is the case, however, that the UGT’s leadership did not operate on the 
premise that it had the ability to destroy the CNT, but instead on the basis that it needed to 
minimize the effect of anarcho-syndicalist pressure or coercion on its grassroots.  
 
The Second Republic therefore did not bring with it any let-up in hostilities between the 
CNT and the UGT in terms of the way the two labour federations interacted as national 
actors. In fact, to the contrary, it brought hostilities between the two organizations to new 
levels through them placing themselves on opposite sides of the dividing line between 
defending the Republic and attacking it.  The CNT’s escalating confrontation with the new 
regime was inextricably linked with the anarcho-syndicalist labour federation intensifying 
its  public  stance  of  hostility  towards  the  UGT  on  the  national  level.  For  its  part,  the 
socialist movement likewise became increasingly hostile to the CNT from early on in the 
Republic, for the converse reason that the anarcho-syndicalists’ actions were interpreted by 
the movement as being counter-revolutionary. These were the prevailing positions that the  
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CNT and the UGT held on one another at the national level during the Republican-socialist 
biennium. However, the elections of November 1933 would change the foundations on 
which these positions were based, not to mention have far-reaching consequences upon 
what role the concept of unity –and in turn the position of the CNT and the UGT relative to 
one another – would have within the Spanish left. 
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Chapter Two: Alliance Initiatives and the CNT, November 1933-October 1934 
 
Socialist and anarcho-syndicalist responses to the 1933 elections 
 
In  the  November  1933  elections,  the  right  swept  to  power,  leaving  left  and  centrist 
Republicans and the socialists in opposition and with a substantially reduced number of 
deputies. A new government was formed, headed by Alejandro Lerroux and the Radicals, 
but  backed  by  the  more  hard-line  CEDA.  Precisely  what  the  Radicals’  agenda  in 
government was in 1934 is open to debate; for some, it was essentially an unscrupulous 
organism that was beholden to the anti-democratic ideals of the CEDA.
1 Others, most 
convincingly  Nigel  Townson,  have  suggested  that  the  Radicals  themselves  sought  to 
occupy a middle ground, through which a democratic state could have been consolidated.
2 
What is more important here than this debate amongst historians, however, is that the 
Republicans and socialists who were deposed from power, and indeed the majority of the 
Marxist left, viewed the election result as being a harbinger of an authoritarian counter-
revolution against the Republic and the working classes. The November 1933 elections 
thus ushered in a fundamentally different era in the politics and the society of the Republic. 
The hostilities between the Republicans and the left on the one hand and the right on the 
other – with the CNT taking on both sides of the divide – entered a new, more intense 
phase.   
 
The ascent of the right to power had a particularly significant effect on the socialists. The 
experience of the years in government had left varying degrees of acrimony amongst the 
different factions of the party and union. The Caballeristas and the socialist youth wing 
were  left  particularly  disillusioned  by  the  experience,  and  after  the  1933  election  the 
process of their radicalization, which would continue up until the outbreak of the Civil 
War, began to gather momentum.
3 The centre of the movement, led by Indalecio Prieto, 
meanwhile, was wary of the possible consequences of such an openly antagonistic stance 
towards the Republic.
4 There was no overall consensus within the movement as to what its 
stance on the Republic was, neither in the immediate aftermath of the election nor on the 
eve of the October insurrection. However, what prevailed was a public stance that was 
couched in the rhetoric of revolution against the current governing forces. El Socialista 
increasingly articulated such a line in its attacks on the government,
5 and Largo Caballero 
and his followers in particular made increasingly severe threats in speeches and newspaper 
articles.
6  
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The coming to power of the Lerroux government had little discernible impact on the public 
positions adopted by the CNT via the pages of Solidaridad Obrera, CNT and other official 
newspapers  of  CNT  organisms.  One  CNT  response  to  the  election  result  was  the 
organization of another uprising, which took place in December 1933 and was put down by 
the authorities with little difficulty.
7 However, this stand against the new government of 
the  right  did  not  mean  that  the  CNT  changed  its  position  on  the  rest  of  the  left. 
Communists and socialists alike continued to be attacked with equal vehemence by the 
anarcho-syndicalist press. Even before the November 1933 election, in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of parliament, Solidaridad Obrera revelled in the socialists’ loss of power and 
their indignant threats to revolt in the event of a victory of the right, declaring in one 
editorial that ‘they have lost their heads after losing their enchufes’.
8  The revolutionary 
posturing of the socialists in the run-up to the election was roundly ridiculed, with the 
sexagenarian  Largo  Caballero  being  mockingly  presented  as  ‘the  d’Artagnan  of 
socialism’.
9  
 
Once the Lerroux government had been formed, the interpretation put forward was that if 
the right represented some form of fascism, then what the Marxist left had to offer was an 
equally  and  possibly  more  dangerous  form  of  fascism.  This  perspective  was  arguably 
consistent with the anarchist principles of the movement, though this theoretical basis was 
to a large extent masked by its hyperbolic articulation. Crucially, the interpretation of the 
UGT and the socialists offered in the CNT press was a fundamental continuation of that 
which it had expressed between 1931 and 1933, even though some of the key aspects of 
the political scene around which it was based had disappeared. With the socialists out of 
government,  the  UGT  no  longer  had  a  privileged  link  to  the  Labour  Ministry.  The 
socialists’ overall relationship with the Republic changed completely as a result of the 
defeat.  The  UGT  no  longer  had  any  remit  to  defend  the  Republic  by  attempting  to 
minimize labour conflict and endorsing the idea of a República de los trabajadores, even if 
many of its leaders did continue to counsel against confrontation with employers and the 
state. Thus two of the key motivations of CNT hostility towards the UGT – its allegiance 
to state institutions and coercive apparatus and its defence of a bourgeois capitalist regime 
– were now part of the past. However, this certainly did not mean that the actions of the 
socialists  during  their  time  in  government  had  been  forgotten.  Instead,  articles  were 
produced that dwelt on the period of the Republican-socialist government, implying all the 
while that the socialists would return to the previous status quo if possible.
10 In July 1934, 
for example, a front-page editorial in Solidaridad Obrera suggested that Largo Caballero’s 
ambition was to install an Austrian or German-style system of fascism in Spain.
11   
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The development of the Alianza Obrera 
 
In  the  context  of  the  apparently  imminent  onset  of  fascism  that  the  November  1933 
election result was seen to represent amongst the left, a certain consensus emerged within 
Marxist organizations in Spain that some form of unity was required to form a defensive 
bloc. Although a pan-left unity on the national level was never achieved, talk of unity 
nevertheless  did  become  an  increasingly  prominent  feature  of  the  left’s  activities.  The 
alliance proposal that proved to be most enduring and generated the greatest debate on the 
matter of unity of the left was known as the Alianza Obrera, an initiative spearheaded by 
the dissident communists of the Bloque Obrero y Campesino (BOC), whose main base of 
operations  was  Catalonia.  Although  the  BOC  remained  throughout  the  Republic  a 
movement of secondary importance in terms of its size, it nevertheless gained popularity, 
above all in Catalonia, throughout the period. The movement’s distinguishing feature was 
that  its  leaders’  interpretation  of  Marxism  was  much  more  responsive  to  the  current 
political and social circumstances, rather than being bound by dogma or subordinated to 
the Comintern.
12  
 
The BOC’s appraisal of fascism and the strategies that needed to be adopted to fight it 
were one key manifestation of this dynamism. The BOC’s militants began warning of the 
threat of the authoritarian right from as early as 1932, a threat which, in the analysis of 
Joaquín Maurín, needed to be met with a pan-left alliance, the likes of which had not been 
attempted  before.
13  To  bloquista  leaders,  alliances  of  left-wing  organizations  could 
potentially be used to create sufficient collective strength so as to prevent the rise of the 
right  and  additionally  bring  about  proletarian  revolution.  An  initial  pact  was  signed 
between the BOC, the Unió Socialista de Catalunya (USC) and the treintista Federación 
Sindicalista  Libertaria  (FSL)  in  March  1933,  called  the  Alianza  Obrera  contra  el 
Fascismo.
14 The victory of the right in the 1933 elections made the idea of an anti-fascist 
front a far more pressing issue amongst the left. In December 1933, leaders of the BOC, 
the PSOE of Catalonia, the Catalan UGT, the FSL, the treintista unions, the Izquierda 
Comunista,  the  USC  and  the  Unió  de  Rabassaires  –  which  is  to  say  virtually  all  the 
organizations of the left in Catalonia other than the CNT, the FAI and the Partit Comunista 
de Catalunya - signed the agreement that created the Alianza Obrera of Catalonia. In its 
founding  manifesto  a  need  to  present  a  united  front  against  fascism  was  the  essential 
message.
15 
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The Alianza Obrera movement began to gain momentum in early 1934 as local Alianza 
Obrera  committees  were  set  up  in  dozens  of  localities  across  Catalonia,  and  regional 
agreements were signed in Valencia, Asturias and Aragón.
16 Just as important as the fact of 
the creation of these committees was the proliferation of debates on the idea of alianzas 
and frentes that occurred in the press organs and propaganda of organizations across the 
left. The BOC was unsurprisingly the most vocal in its promotion of  Alianza Obrera. 
However, the debate was certainly not restricted to bloquista circles. The left-wing (though 
anti-PSOE and UGT) La Tierra, For example, firmly backed the idea of left-wing unity, 
and gave editorial space to those in favour of it to put their case forward.
17  
 
The socialists’ view of alliances 
 
The socialist movement’s overall position on the question of alliances with the rest of the 
left was ostensibly in favour, but was also undercut by doubts and ulterior motives on the 
part of its national leadership. Based on the public pronouncements of Largo Caballero, 
and  the  general  handling  of  the  issue  in  El  Socialista,  it  outwardly  appeared  that  the 
socialists were working towards bringing about the unity of the Spanish proletariat to fight 
fascism. Largo Caballero’s publicized visit to Barcelona in February 1934 to meet with the 
leading  figures  involved  in  the  Alianza  Obrera  also  lent  weight  to  the  notion  that  the 
socialists were interested in participating in the alliance initiative. Largo reported back 
favourably on the initiative both through the press and to the UGT Executive Commission 
and National Committee.
18 Tellingly, El Socialista reported the socialist leader to be as 
much as anything satisfied with the receptiveness to the PSOE and UGT in the region. 
Behind the scenes the UGT Executive made the divisive stipulation that the UGT regional 
secretariat in Catalonia should instruct its members to support the PSOE and not the Unió 
Socialista de Catalunya as part of its approval of the alliance in the region.
19   
 
However,  the  national  leadership  of  the  socialists  was  by  no  means  unconditionally 
committed  to  the  spirit  of  Alianza  Obrera.  Significant  figures  within  the  National 
Committee displayed an innate suspicion towards any overtures from other organizations. 
Discussing  a  letter  from  the  treintista  leadership  in  late  1933,  for  example,  Díaz  Alor 
argued  that  the  UGT  should  under  no  circumstances  act  under  orders  from  other 
organizations, who ought to be aware that ‘they can collaborate with or follow us, but they 
should not hold the belief that we are going to follow them as they see fit’.
20 Even though 
the UGT agreed to offer some support to the idea of the Alianza Obrera following Largo’s 
visit to Barcelona, there was a clear sense amongst the UGT national leadership that the  
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initiative could not eclipse the discipline of the socialist movement’s organizations.
21 The 
UGT  Executive  feared  that  committing  the  socialist  labour  federation  to  a  generalized 
alliance  could  lead  to  ‘the  Unión  General  de  Trabajadores  being  erased  from  the 
imagination of our comrades’.
22  
 
In considering the question of unity and alliances, it is clear that the socialist leadership did 
not  consider  the  CNT  as  any  more  of  an  important  piece  in  the  jigsaw  than  other 
organizations, in spite of the fact of the anarcho-syndicalist labour federation being much 
larger than the other actors of the left. Instead, the socialists retained a suspicion of the 
integrity  of  the  CNT  movement.  In  the  UGT  National  Committee  and  the  Executive 
discussions  on  the  stance  to  be  taken  on  alliances,  the  CNT  were  barely  taken  into 
consideration as a significant factor. This was most likely due to a combination of the 
CNT’s own position of rejecting the Alianza Obrera outright, as will be discussed later in 
this chapter, and just as importantly due to the majority of the UGT leadership’s deeply 
held distrust of the CNT movement, which does not appear to have been tempered by the 
election of the right. Immediately prior to the election and in the weeks after it, some 
members  of  the  National  Committee  continued  to  report  on  the  apparently  violent 
tendencies of CNT militants in regions such as Aragón, viewing them as something that 
could provoke the forces of reaction and also as a threat directed at UGT activists.
23  
 
However, the public impression was given off that the socialists were interested in the 
CNT playing a part in the drive towards the Alianza Obrera. For example, in a speech to 
the youth wing of the socialist movement Largo stated that he was in favour of union with 
‘anarchists’,  and  also  praised  the  ‘anarchic’  spirit  of  the  Spanish  working  classes  that 
would lead them to reject fascism.
24 During 1934 El Socialista notably desisted in the sort 
of  public  criticisms  of  the  CNT  that  it  had  made  throughout  the  earlier  years  of  the 
Republic. The socialist press also drew attention to the CNT’s deliberations on Alianza 
Obrera  as  part  of  their  June  1934  national  plenum,  the  coverage  implying  that  it  was 
hopeful that the position of the pro-alliance regions would prevail.
25  
 
In spite of the provocative statements of Largo Caballero and others, privately the socialist 
leadership  were  fearful  of  actually  committing  their  movement  to  a  revolutionary 
confrontation with the government. In late 1933 and early 1934 the prevailing mood within 
the National Committee was that attempts to overthrow the government would usher in an 
authoritarian regime – Trifón Gómez argued that the activities of the CNT could lead to an 
Italian or German-style fascist dictatorship, ‘as did the communists’ in these two countries  
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– and so the UGT should ensure that its members did not participate in any such protest 
movements.
26 Although this position was held above all by the most reformist sections of 
the National Committee, even those factions of the socialist movement who were most 
vociferously espousing revolutionary threats over 1934 – in particular the Caballeristas – 
were at bottom unwilling to make good on them. As Paul Preston highlights, the socialist 
leaders  tried  to  make  sure  the  impetus  towards  Alianza  Obrera  developed  within  the 
cautious limitations of the outlook of the socialist leadership. Where socialists dominated 
Alianza Obrera committees, such as in Madrid, they sought to overrule any revolutionary 
initiatives by other members.
27 Accordingly, the National Committee and the Executive 
became alarmed with the activities of local Alianzas Obreras when they carried out protest 
actions that had not been initiated by the UGT, such as those that took place in Valencia 
and Barcelona.
28 As Preston also highlights, dissident communists involved in the Alianza 
became increasingly suspicious that the socialists’ motives for endorsing it were primarily 
to use it as a weapon in their posturing against the right rather than treating it as a genuine 
method of uniting the proletariat.
29 
 
Overall, therefore, the socialist leaders’ position on the Alianza Obrera was a somewhat 
opportunistic one, based around buying into the revolutionary edge of the movement and 
the popular support it garnered, whilst at the same time attempting to subvert it to the far 
less  revolutionary  outlook  that  lay  beneath  the  rhetoric  of  Largo  and  others.  As  Paul 
Heywood  suggests,  in  1934  the  socialist  leadership’s  interest  in  alliances  was 
fundamentally limited by their unwillingness to risk other organizations taking away their 
assumed position of leaders of the working classes.
30   
 
The CNT’s response to alliance initiatives 
 
Nevertheless, the public stance of the UGT with regard to unity was far more attuned to the 
general mood of the rest of the left than was that which prevailed within the CNT, which 
was one of outright rejection. To an extent, this stance must be seen as a continuation of 
the organization’s previous responses to alliance initiatives made in its direction, which to 
varying degrees amounted to attempts to win the CNT’s backing for a cause other than its 
own. In 1932, for example, the virulently anti-PSOE left-wing Republicans in the Cortes 
who  converged  around  La  Tierra,  in  particular  Eduardo  Barriobero,  spearheaded  an 
initiative called the Alianza de Izquierdas, a more radical alternative to the Republican-
socialist government. Part of this alianza’s strategy was to gain the support of the CNT.
 31 
Reflecting  the  anti-political  principles  of  the  movement,  Solidaridad  Obrera  roundly  
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rebuffed the advances of the Alianza de Izquierdas, suggesting they were an attempt to 
make the CNT an ‘appendage’ of politicians, ‘just as the UGT is of the socialists’.
32   
 
Even before the Alianza de Izquierdas, however, the CNT had already come into contact 
with another unity initiative, this time from the Communist Party’s activities in the labour 
movement.  In  line  with  the  Comintern’s  directives,  communists  in  Spain  adopted  the 
strategy of co-opting workers from the grassroots of rival organizations under the guise of 
a push towards unity.
33 With regard to the CNT, the communists’ initial attempt to do this 
was  carried  out  on  the  eve  of  the  Republic  by  the  creation  of  CNT  ‘reconstruction 
committees’ which had some success in Seville but failed elsewhere. The goal of these was 
to discredit the legitimate leadership of the CNT as ‘anarchists’ who had won control of 
the ‘glorious title of the CNT with the help of the fascist government of Berenguer’ so that 
the CNT grassroots would recognize the communists’ reconstruction committees as having 
authority over the CNT.
34 Following the failure of these attempts at ‘reconstruction’ the 
communists started agitating amongst CNT and UGT  grassroots for them to unite and 
reject  the  leaderships  of  their  respective  labour  federations.
35  All  these  efforts 
unsurprisingly met with the virulent criticism of the CNT press.
36 
 
Once public discussions of anti-fascist unity, and in particular the Alianza Obrera, gained 
momentum,  Solidaridad  Obrera  and  other  CNT  papers  were  compelled  to  express  a 
position on the matter. However, the dominant position that emanated from the CNT was 
an  unflinchingly  critical  one.  At  first,  the  anti-alliance  stance  of  Solidaridad  Obrera 
focused on the communists themselves and sought to highlight the form of communist 
movements across the world in attempting to hijack proletarian movements for their own 
ends. Solidaridad Obrera opined that communists could not possibly front efforts against 
fascism given that the Soviet Union was ‘the first fascist [regime] in the world’.
37 The 
paper warned workers not to be seduced by this alleged anti-fascist alliance initiative of the 
BOC  on  the  grounds  that  ‘all  workers  know  that  the  communists  are  nothing  but  a 
demagogic manifestation of the bourgeoisie and tend towards establishing a dictatorship as 
brutal and infamous as that of Hitler’.
38  
 
Solidaridad  Obrera  also  took  a  tone  that  the  idea  of  alliances  and  united  fronts  was 
becoming  increasingly  ubiquitous  but  still  essentially  meaningless,  with  the  paper 
commenting on 
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frente único for the struggle for material gains, frente único against fascism, frente único 
against dictatorships, frente único against war. This useful chorus has been transformed 
into something similar to those miraculous ointments that are useful for anything, and 
that, precisely for that reason, end up having no use at all.
39  
 
The  CNT  and  FAI’s  position  on  the  question  of  alliances  in  1933  was  thus  markedly 
different from all of the other actors on the left. Whilst each Marxist organization had its 
own  particular  stances  and  strategies  on  the  question  of  alliances,  all  espoused  some 
promotion  of  unity.  By  1933,  the  faísta  faction’s  monopoly  over  the  CNT’s  major 
committees and mouthpieces was fairly unassailable. The result was that the CNT’s public 
stance on the matter, expressed especially by Solidaridad Obrera, was the defiant belief 
that ‘in spite of pacts and agreements, the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo will never 
succumb!’
40  whilst  at  the  same  time  arguing  that,  in  the  words  of  one  faísta,  ‘the 
Confederation and the FAI would march at the vanguard of the proletariat’
41 in the event of 
a fascist grab for power, in contrast to the bogus anti-fascist credentials of those associated 
with the Alianza Obrera.  
 
The support shown publicly by the socialists towards left-wing unity led to the CNT press 
presenting the socialists as being the most significant piece of evidence of all in favour of 
its  argument  for  discounting  alliances.  For  instance,  in  February  1934  an  editorial  in 
Solidaridad Obrera affirmed that ‘to offer our hand to the socialists, we would have to step 
over the corpses of Casas Viejas’, not to mention reach agreement with those who had 
masterminded the jurados mixtos.
42 In the process of attacking the idea of alliance, the 
focus of Solidaridad Obrera therefore shifted to the socialists and became a part of the 
continuing attacks on them. 
 
Figures from the CNT also contributed to the ongoing debate in the pages of La Tierra, in 
most cases to reassert the idea of the CNT opposing alliances with other organizations. The 
veteran  anarchist  E.  Mateo  Soriano  was  one  such  contributor  to  the  debate.  He  cited 
precedents of treachery committed by the socialists, which included not just the Ley de 
Defensa and jurados mixtos laws, but also referred to ‘the years 1917, 19, 22, 30 and 31’.
43 
Opposition to any form of unity was echoed in the pages of La Tierra by amongst others 
Manuel Rivas, former General Secretary of the National Committee, for whom the only 
valid form of unity would come in the streets at the moment of revolution.
44  
 
However, certain sectors of the confederal movement did not support the line expressed in 
Solidaridad Obrera, and used the pages of La Tierra to argue for the CNT to consider the  
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possibilities offered by alliances. Indeed, their contributions to the debate would be a key 
cause for the question of the CNT’s relationship with the UGT to be discussed at CNT 
national plenums in 1934. The writings of Valeriano Orobón Fernández in La Tierra on 
29
th  and  30
th  January  1934  represented  the  most  original  thinking  within  the  CNT 
regarding the possibilities of alliance, even if they were initially loudly denounced by the 
faístas.  Orobón  Fernández  based  his  ideas  on  the  premise  that  fascism  represented  a 
uniquely serious threat to the Spanish proletariat that could not simply be dismissed by 
arguing that libertarian revolution would sweep it away. Orobón Fernández argued that the 
proletariat were aware of the threat it posed, and had, generally speaking, begun to become 
more predisposed to the idea of united proletarian action to prevent fascism and saw that 
‘the combative class union is today a question of life or death for the proletarian cause’, 
even if the convergence of grassroots around the same ideals compromised the tactical and 
organizational imperatives of individual organizations. He stressed that the fact of unity 
and the positive consequences it would bring were far more important than the precise 
mechanisms  that  brought  it  about,  arguing  that  ‘long  discussions  over  the  process  of 
approximation’  were  a  waste  of  time.
45  For  Orobón  Fernández,  anti-fascist  unity  and 
revolutionary unity went hand-in-hand, and the defeat of fascism could only be brought 
about through a united, revolutionary front. 
 
Orobón Fernández viewed the position of the communists as something of an irrelevancy, 
stating that ‘proletarian unity is ninety-nine percent feasible if only the CNT and the UGT 
want it’.
46 This perspective undoubtedly reflected an awareness on Orobón Fernández’s 
part that had he explicitly proposed the inclusion of political organizations in an alliance he 
would have been exposed to the accusation of betraying the most fundamental principles of 
the  movement.  He  also  addressed  the  issue  of  the  socialist  leadership.  For  Orobón 
Fernández, the socialist leaders would have to prove that Largo Caballero’s rhetoric was 
genuine  and  act  in  accordance  with  it,  rather  than  continue  with  the  ‘dealings  of  the 
Trifones, Besteiros and Saborits against the unity of workers and revolution’.
47  
 
Far from being an argument in favour of simply signing a pact with the socialist leadership 
or  a  cross-organizational  alliance  based  on  limited  anti-fascist  ends,  then,  Orobón 
Fernández believed that a ‘revolutionary’ form of unity in which the CNT could participate 
was possible, even if it would require a starting point of all organizations involved in it 
respecting one another’s ideological and theoretical canons.
48 The basic tenets of Orobón 
Fernández’s  position  were  repeated  in  the  La  Tierra  debates  by,  amongst  others,  the 
Asturian Acracio Bartolomé, who took a more hostile line towards those in the CNT who  
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dismissed any possibilities of alliance and also placed less emphasis on the need for the 
UGT leadership to change.
49   
 
However, what really proved to be the stimulus for a polemical discussion on alliances 
within the CNT was not the writings of Valeriano Orobón Fernández but a document from 
the CNT’s central region that was printed in La Tierra.
50 In this document, the central 
region’s  Regional  Committee  advocated  CNT  unions  collaborating  with  other  labour 
unions that were prepared to act in line with the CNT’s tactics of direct action. It also 
hinted that the matter of cooperation with other labour unions should be discussed openly 
within the CNT. The statement was interpreted by some elements of the movement as the 
region encouraging CNT unions to actively pursue alliances or even unification with other 
organizations, though the Regional Committee printed a clarification to deny this was the 
case.
51  
 
The  statement  became  one  of  the  aspects  of  the  discussion  of  alliances  at  the  CNT’s 
February 1934 national plenum. The central region of the CNT had requested at the same 
time as it had published its piece in La Tierra that the National Committee include  a 
discussion of the unity question at this national plenum.  However, from the outset of the 
plenum discussion the anti-alliance regions questioned the legitimacy of the issue even 
being considered, based on the conduct of the central region in publishing its opinions on 
the matter.
52  In spite of these objections, the matter was placed on the agenda for the 
plenum  and  was  the  subject  of  a  lengthy  discussion.  From  the  outset  the  question  of 
alliances at this plenum was framed almost exclusively in terms of the CNT and the UGT. 
Consideration of pro-unity political parties such as the BOC was excluded from the start, 
notwithstanding  occasional  references  to  political  groups  that  were  attempting  to  gain 
control over the workers’ movement. The theoretical grounding shared by most cenetistas 
would ensure, both in 1934 and again in 1936, that when the organization did discuss the 
questions of alliances and unity, the parameters of these discussions would be very heavily 
conditioned by anti-political principles and convictions. The wording of the question on 
the  agenda  was  ‘in  view  of  the  suggestions  that  the  UGT  has  been  making  about  the 
advisability of unifying working-class forces to carry out a revolutionary act, what position 
should the CNT adopt?’.
53 This tendency of the anarcho-syndicalist movement to discuss 
the question of unity exclusively in terms of the CNT and the UGT would be equally 
present in the months before the start of the Civil War, and undoubtedly reflects a fairly 
unanimous, unspoken consensus amongst CNT militants that an alliance could only ever 
be  even  contemplated  with  the  UGT,  and  not  with  any  political  organization.  The  
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paradoxical  effect  of  the  movement’s  anti-political  principles  was  that,  even  when  the 
depth of anti-UGT sentiment amongst many sectors of the CNT was as profound as it was 
in 1934, the socialist labour federation was, effectively by default, the only organization 
with which any form of cooperation could be considered. 
    
The three CNT regions that argued most strongly in favour of the CNT making itself open 
to the possibility of an alliance with the UGT were the central region, Asturias and Galicia, 
with more muted support also coming from the Balearics. Prior to the national plenum, the 
centre and Galicia had both held regional plenums at which the question of alliances was 
discussed,  and  both  accordingly  had  sent  their  delegates  to  the  national  plenum  with 
express instructions to argue in favour of the CNT making some sort of move towards a 
revolutionary alliance, although both regions were fairly vague as to how this would be 
brought about and on what terms. What is perhaps most significant about the propositions 
for a closer relationship with the UGT is that they were not inspired by local instances of 
cooperation with the UGT, but rather a belief that neither the CNT nor the working classes 
as a whole could achieve emancipation without the CNT and the UGT working in tandem, 
inspired in some cases by experiences of failure on the part of some regions following on 
from the UGT refusing to work with the CNT in recent strikes and uprisings. The central 
region, for example, explained to the plenum that the reason the attempts of their militants 
to  contribute  to  the  December  1933  uprising  failed  was  that  they  devoted  a 
disproportionate amount of time to attempting to gain the complicity of the UGT, and were 
in many cases held back by the indecision of local ugetistas. Similarly, the CNT leadership 
in Asturias found that their efforts to gain the support of their regional UGT counterparts 
were thwarted by the national leadership of the UGT and socialist politicians. This point 
was most strongly made by the delegate for the Balearics, who argued that in spite of ‘the 
thousands of betrayals of the UGT’ the unification of their forces for revolutionary ends 
was necessary to prevent fascism.
54 
 
However, the pro-alliance regions found themselves outnumbered and outmanoeuvred by 
the  regions  that  opposed  any  move  by  the  CNT  towards  a  pro-unity  position.  These 
regions, it must be pointed out, represented the more traditional CNT strongholds relative 
to the central region, Asturias and Galicia. Andalucía, Aragón, Catalonia and Levante all 
argued against the CNT changing its position of flat opposition to alliances. The bulk of 
the arguing against the pro-alliance regions was carried out by Andalucía, whose delegate 
focused  to  a  large  extent  on  the  procedural  irregularity  of  the  central  region  having 
managed to make the alliance question a subject of debate at the plenum. The position of  
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those regions that did engage in the debate itself to take on the pro-alliance regions was 
essentially that the CNT and the UGT’s aims were irreconcilable, and that any alliance 
would inevitably involve socialist politicians and as such would not work towards a true 
social revolution. A belief that the UGT’s leaders were not really interested in organizing a 
revolutionary front was likewise voiced.
55  
 
But it was the Catalan region which made the most decisive contribution to ensuring that 
no pro-alliance position was adopted. Its delegation argued that even discussing the matter 
would  represent  ‘an  outright  negation  of  our  principles’  and  repeatedly  threatened  to 
withdraw from the plenum if a discussion on it did take place, a threat that turned out to be 
a hollow one. The main additional contribution that the Catalan delegation made to the 
debate was to argue that the alliance movement in Catalonia was comprised of elements 
who  were  the  greatest  enemies  of  the  CNT.
56  The  conduct  of  the  Catalan  region  in 
discussing  relations  with  the  UGT  at  the  February  1934  plenum  could  be  considered 
another manifestation of the distortions of the CNT’s decision-making process that are 
highlighted by Anna Monjo in her arguments regarding the gaps between the CNT’s ideals 
of being an open democracy and the reality of how it actually operated.
57 It was able to 
counteract an open debate through attempting to interrupt procedures, ostensibly on the 
grounds of CNT principles, but in reality because it was virulently opposed to the pro-
alliance position. As will be seen in part three of the thesis, the Catalan region would once 
again take advantage of its influence and the failings of the decision-making procedures of 
the organization in 1936 to control the organization’s national-level stance on the UGT. 
  
A vote was taken at the plenum on whether the CNT should adopt a pro-alliance stance, 
the  result  being  against  such  a  position,  with  Andalucía,  Aragón,  Levante,  the  North 
(which comprised Cantabria and the Basque Country) and Navarre and La Rioja voting in 
this  direction.  Catalonia  abstained  on  the  grounds  of  its  original  opposition  to  the 
discussion taking place at all. However, a delegation was also formed to draft a public 
response on the matter of unity. There was a sense, even amongst those who opposed the 
notion of alliances most of all, including Catalonia, that the CNT needed to take a public 
stance on the matter. The AIT delegate at the plenum had also argued that such a public 
statement was necessary. The public statement that was produced argued that the CNT was 
 
willing, as always, to contribute all its forces to any revolutionary movement that works 
towards the emancipation of all the working classes, without this implying an agreement 
or pact with political parties or forces. Therefore the CNT calls upon the UGT to clearly 
and publicly indicate what its revolutionary aspirations are.
58  
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The resolution gave the appearance, then, of an organization whose majority did not hold 
the belief that the CNT and the UGT had irreconcilably different goals and did not believe 
that seeking to reach a set of common goals with the UGT amounted to a total negation of 
the CNT’s principles, which was precisely the prevailing view expressed at the plenum and 
which had been endorsed by the vote on the question of alliances. This very observation 
was made by the Asturian delegate at the following national plenum, held in June 1934.
59  
 
Accounts of the alliance discussions that took place amongst the left in the months prior to 
the  October  1934  uprising  have  tended  to  take  the  plenum’s  resolution  at  face  value, 
implying in the process that the CNT’s leaders were inclined towards an alliance with the 
UGT during these months.
60 However, the resolution of the plenum cannot be considered 
outside of the context of the actual decision-making process and debate on alliances that 
took place at the February 1934 plenum, which was fundamentally more important as it 
represented the actual stance of the CNT’s leaders towards the UGT. Although a statement 
indicating a willingness to work with the UGT had been released, a continued position of 
viewing all alliances as contradictory to CNT principles and a shared CNT-UGT revolution 
as being impossible prevailed. It is difficult not to see that the publication of the above 
statement as an attempt to present the CNT as not being opposed to the notion of unity that 
was gaining momentum in these months – or at the very least act as a salve for the pro-
alliance regions of the Confederation – and in the process attempting to deflect attention 
towards the UGT by suggesting that the ball was in the UGT’s court on the matter of 
alliance, whilst at the same time ensuring that the CNT could remain opposed to alliance 
initiatives. As much as serving ‘to gloss over disagreement’ as Julián Casanova argues the 
February  1934  plenum  agreement  did,  the  resolution  was  also  a  veneer  of  pro-unity 
sentiment that masked the deeply anti-alliance instincts of the CNT regions, and above all 
Catalonia, that held the most sway within the organization at the national level.
61 This 
confusing outcome to the plenum based around a public statement that indicated one thing 
and a dominant internal current of opinion that indicated quite another foreshadowed how 
the question of unity would also be dealt with in the months leading up to the Civil War.   
   
Although the February 1934 plenum was intended to put an end to the diverging opinions 
on alliances and bring about a unanimous position on the matter, at least until a national 
congress could be held,
62 the question of alliances resurfaced at the very next national 
plenum, held in June 1934. This time, however, the circumstances of the matter being 
raised  were  very  different.  For  barely  a  month  after  the  February  1934  plenum  the  
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cenetistas of Asturias had entered into a pact with their UGT counterparts, a development 
that was viewed by many other sectors of the CNT as sufficiently grave as to warrant the 
Asturians being called to account at a national plenum. The pact’s overriding goal was 
articulated as being the bringing about of social revolution in Spain through the overthrow 
of the current bourgeois-capitalist regime. The pact outlined the basic structuring of this 
revolutionary alliance, which would take the form of local committees across the province 
that  would  liaise  with  an  executive  committee,  all  of  which  would  be  comprised  of 
members of the CNT and the UGT. The pact was, then, an enormous departure from the 
dominant stance of the February 1934 plenum.
63 
 
At the June plenum the Asturian delegation made a highly unapologetic defence of their 
decision to enter into a pact with their UGT counterparts. The delegation pointed out that 
the Asturian CNT had a record of attempting to bring about unity with the UGT since as 
far back as the 1919 national congress, and also rejected outright the notion that alliance 
with the UGT amounted to a rejection of the CNT’s principles, or that it represented a 
dalliance with politicians, arguing instead that in view of current circumstances a pooling 
of CNT and UGT strength was the only way that any of the CNT’s goals could possibly be 
fulfilled. To lend weight to this line of argument, the delegate proceeded to highlight that 
in every region of Spain the CNT was either a minority force relative to the UGT, or in the 
case of regions such as Catalonia, was in the process of losing public support. Although the 
formal decision made at the plenum was that the Asturian CNT had broken the agreement 
of the previous plenum, it did not modify its stance and persevered with the pact.
64 
 
The entrenched anti-alliance position of many sectors of the movement was revealed by 
their scrutiny of the Asturians. It would appear that some delegations even believed that 
the Asturians having signed up to an Alianza Obrera in Asturias had meant that they had 
split  from  the  CNT  altogether.  It  was  formally  agreed  that  Asturias  had  broken  the 
agreement of the last plenum by entering into an alliance with the UGT. Catalonia was 
amongst the regions that most eagerly sought to censure the Asturians. In light of this 
outcome,  and  given  the  basic  content  of  the  Asturian  pact,  the  true  outcome  of  the 
February 1934 plenum – as opposed to the face-value outcome as suggested by the public 
statement released on the back of it – is worth re-visiting. The Asturian Alianza Obrera 
pact had as its first point the ‘triumph of the social revolution in Spain’. The pact also 
presented  itself  as  representing  ‘an  agreement  of  the  working  class  organizations  to 
coordinate their action against the bourgeois regime and abolish it’. In its fundamental 
aspects,  then,  the  pact  corresponded  to  the  type  of  joint  CNT-UGT  action  that  the  
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statement  of  February  1934  had  said  the  CNT  would  support.
65  That  regions  such  as 
Andalucía, Catalonia and Aragón would oppose the pact, focusing on very specific aspects 
of  the  wording  such  as  its  commitment  to  ‘socialist  and  federalist  principles’  – 
undoubtedly an attempt to reconcile socialist and anarcho-syndicalist principles as closely 
as possible – demonstrates that, to the anti-alliance regions, and in spite of attempts to 
make appearances to the contrary, these regions were opposed to cooperation of any sort 
with the UGT for instinctive, sectarian reasons as much as ones of theory and principle.
66   
 
Although it was also agreed that a national congress would take place as soon as possible 
so that the CNT could reach a final decision on alliances, the June 1934 plenum marked 
the  last  significant  internal  discussion  of  alliances  and  the  UGT  within  the  anarcho-
syndicalist  movement  until  1936.  As  has  been  seen,  there  was  a  highly  entrenched 
opposition from its key regions to the notion of entering into an agreement with the UGT, 
and  through  the  decision-making  process  this  became  the  official  stance  of  the 
organization. It was a stance that fitted in perfectly with the positions that had hitherto been 
adopted on the matter by CNT and Solidaridad Obrera, both of which continued their 
criticisms of all alliance initiatives, the socialists and the UGT, throughout the summer of 
1934.  
 
CNT-UGT cooperation in Madrid and Zaragoza 
 
A further complicating factor in the conflicting positions on alliances, in particular for the 
CNT in light of its prevailing stance of committed opposition to them, was the fact of some 
CNT  and  UGT  unions  in  different  locations  in  Spain  cooperating  with  one  another  in 
labour conflicts and protest strikes. In both Madrid and Zaragoza during 1934 CNT unions 
entered  into  strikes  jointly  with  their  UGT  counterparts,  something  that  would  have 
seemed  unthinkable  in  these  cities  just  a  year  previously.  However,  although  these 
initiatives  generated  some  celebrations  of  the  idea  of  worker  unity,  none  of  them  was 
viewed by either the socialists or the anarcho-syndicalists as heralding any possibilities for 
further ties between the CNT and the UGT. 
 
The  construction  strike  that  began  in  the  capital  in  February  1934  brought  about  a 
somewhat surprising convergence of CNT and UGT unions. Prior to this moment, relations 
between the CNT and the UGT in this sector had been deeply acrimonious since 1931. The 
CNT had repeatedly attempted to carry out strikes which the UGT attempted to undermine, 
and  there  were  what  amounted  to  turf  wars  over  which  union  represented  workers  at  
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particular construction sites. However, in an illustration of the growing disillusionment of 
many UGT members at the pace of reform, from late 1933 some UGT workers in the 
construction sector began to participate in CNT-led conflicts. A general strike began in the 
construction industry in February 1934, once again over the dismissal of workers. The 
strike was convoked jointly by the CNT and the UGT, the latter of whose members seem 
to have been keen to enter into the conflict in spite of the reticence of their leaders. After 
initial attempts at direct negotiation between employers and representatives of the CNT 
and UGT failed, the Labour Ministry stepped in and imposed a solution that included new 
working hours for the industry. During the strike joint public meetings of CNT and UGT 
construction workers were held, at which orators from both unions spoke. CNT and UGT 
representatives also attended the negotiations with employers and the government together, 
and joint statements were released by the strike committees of the two unions.
67 
 
A few months later, a general strike broke out in Zaragoza. It would prove to be one of the 
longest and most intense general strikes of the Republic. The CNT and the UGT struck 
jointly throughout. As the CNT press continued publishing articles that discounted the idea 
of the Alianza Obrera or attacked the UGT, its members in the Aragonese capital were 
joined with the UGT against the local authorities. That such a convergence of CNT and 
UGT would occur in Zaragoza was all the more remarkable given that since 1931, the two 
labour federations had  been in near perpetual conflict. The CNT on the one hand had 
viewed the UGT as having connived with the local authorities on several occasions to 
provide  strike  breakers  in  CNT  conflicts,
68  whilst  the  local  UGT  leaders  viewed 
themselves  and  their  members  as  living  in  continual  fear  of  attack  from  violent 
anarchists.
69 Now, however, the CNT and UGT were cooperating in the Aragonese capital, 
united against the repressive actions of the Civil Governor. 
 
The strike, called initially by the CNT to protest the arrest and torture of cenetistas by local 
security  forces, became  a joint initiative as a result of the equally draconian measures 
adopted  against  the  CNT  and  the  socialists  by  the  Civil  Governor,  whose  response  of 
declaring the strike illegal and launching a campaign to replace strikers caused the strike to 
become  indefinite.  The  strike  remarkably  held  until  mid-May.  During  that  time,  the 
strikers, both in the CNT and the UGT, were resolute in their position – it appears there 
was an enormous amount of popular support for the strike, fed by anger at the authorities 
and employers – just as the local authorities and then the national government remained 
intransigent towards the strikers. Police reinforcements were sent in, workers were arrested 
and beaten whilst in detention, and decrees were made to prevent workers gathering in  
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public.  The  length  and  steadfastness  of  the  strike  led  to  the  conflict  capturing  the 
imagination  and  support  of  the  working-class  public  across  Spain.  The  welfare  of  the 
strikers and their families became a national concern. As they began to run out of food by 
the middle of April, CNT and UGT organisms in other cities organized efforts to take in 
the children of those involved in the strike. In what became the abiding symbol of the 
conflict, thousands of children were shipped across Spain to be cared for by working-class 
families in other cities. As the level of public attention towards Zaragoza increased, the 
Civil Governor came under increasing pressure to drop the heavy-handed tactics he and the 
local security apparatus had adopted. A settlement was negotiated with the CNT and UGT 
strike  committees  which  reversed  the  earlier  fines  and  guaranteed  the  strikers  their 
previous jobs back.
70 
 
However, the fact of definite pieces of CNT-UGT cooperation did not affect the overall 
stance that the CNT presented on either the UGT or the idea of unity, and nor were these 
events interpreted in the socialist press as being a starting point for closer CNT-UGT ties 
in the immediate future. In Madrid, although the CNT and UGT unions involved did agree 
to  strike  jointly  with  joint  demands,  the  cooperation  was  largely  pragmatic  and 
circumstantial rather than being motivated by a desire by either labour federation to foster 
a broader form of unity. Although Solidaridad Obrera and El Socialista did mention that 
the  CNT  and  the  UGT  had  entered  jointly  into  the  construction  dispute,  including 
publishing their joint press releases and reporting details of the joint public meetings held 
during  the  conflicts,  no  significance  or  celebration  was  attached  to  this  cooperation. 
Instead,  the  emphasis  rested  on  highlighting  the  intransigence  of  the  employers  in  the 
disputes. Neither the CNT nor the UGT press were interested in attaching any significance 
to these instances of cooperation. It was a similar story with the socialist and anarcho-
syndicalist  coverage  of  the  Zaragoza  general  strike.  Of  course,  both  El  Socialista  and 
Solidaridad Obrera were effusive in their praise for the strikers and their families. Much 
was made by both papers of the solidarity between workers, in facing down the reactionary 
stances taken by the local authorities in the city. However, the coverage in El Socialista 
and Solidaridad Obrera neither lauded nor attributed any particular significance to the fact 
of the CNT and the UGT working together. Instead, the papers in their reporting of the 
Zaragoza general strike referred simply to the courage and solidarity of ‘workers’ rather 
than organizations. There appears to have simply been no interest on the part of the CNT 
or socialist press to draw attention to grassroots cooperation between their members.
71 And 
nor did such events engender any wider goodwill in terms of the CNT’s overall public 
stance on the UGT; although Solidaridad Obrera was suspended before the conclusion of  
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the Zaragoza strike and until the end of June, upon its return to publication it resumed 
precisely the same hostile line against alliances, the socialists and the UGT that it had been 
producing previously.
72 
 
Overall, and in spite of isolated instances of cooperation between CNT and UGT unions, 
the stance that prevailed within the CNT as a national movement since the end of 1933 on 
the matters of alliances and how to respond to the rise of the right led the organization to 
occupying a position of isolation relative to the rest of the left. Whereas by the autumn of 
1934 all other organizations on the left publicly viewed some form of alliance against 
fascism  as  being  necessary,  the  CNT  was  as  hostile  as  ever  to  all  other  proletarian 
organizations. In no small measure as a result of this, as will be seen in part three of the 
thesis,  during  the  October  insurrections  the  anarcho-syndicalist  labour  federation  as  a 
national  actor  appeared  deeply  impassive.  The  CNT,  which  had  repeatedly  proclaimed 
itself to be the only truly revolutionary movement in Spain, would fail to participate in 
what was by some distance the most significant moment of class struggle that had occurred 
in Spain for decades. 
 
                                                 
1 Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War, p. 127 
2 Nigel Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: centrist politics under the Second Republic, 1931-1936 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2000), pp. 347-359 
3 Heywood, Marxism, pp. 124-127; Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War, pp. 113-154 
4 Heywood, Marxism, p. 129; Paul Preston, ‘The Creation of the Popular Front in Spain’ in Paul Preston and 
Helen Graham (Eds.) The Popular Front in Europe (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 84-105 
5 Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War, p. 131 
6 An example of Largo’s new rhetoric is a speech he gave to the Arte de Imprimir union on 14
th January 1934 
(Francisco Largo Caballero, Discursos a los trabajadores (Madrid, 1934) pp. 135-162). For examples of El 
Socialista’s stance, see El Socialista, 03 January 1934, 27 September 1934 
7 Brademas points out that it was largely only the Aragonese CNT that sought to carry out an uprising, but 
just as had been the case with previous insurrections, once a minority had taken the initiative the National 
Committee felt compelled to throw its weight behind it. (Brademas, Anarcosindicalismo, pp. 112-116) 
8 Solidaridad Obrera, 17 October 1933 
9 Solidaridad Obrera, 04 October 1933 
10 For example, Solidaridad Obrera, 24 February 1934, 12 July 1934, 02 August 1934 
11 Solidaridad Obrera, 03 July 1934 
12 The most comprehensive accounts of the Alianza Obrera are Victor Alba, La Alianza Obrera: Historia y 
análisis de una táctica de unidad en España (Madrid: Júcar, 1977), pp. 44-116; Durgan, B.O.C, pp. 137-305 
13 Alba, La Alianza Obrera, p. 46; Durgan, B.O.C., pp. 154-203 
14 Durgan, B.O.C., p. 193 
15 Durgan, B.O.C., pp. 240-241 
16 Alba, La Alianza Obrera, pp. 95-98 
17 For example, La Tierra, 27 November 1933, 06, 29, 31 January, 01, 03 February 1934 
18  FPI AARD 260-3 ‘Memoria de la Comisión Ejecutiva de la UGT 04 febrero – 30 junio 1934’; El 
Socialista, 01 March 1934  
19 FPI AARD 256-3 Minutes of the meeting of the UGT Executive Commission, 01 March 1934 
20 FPI AARD 259-4 Minutes of the extraordinary meeting of the UGT National Committee, 24, 27 November 
1933 
21 FPI AARD 256-3 Minutes of the meeting of the UGT Executive Commission, 01 March 1934 
22 FPI AARD 256-3 Meeting of the UGT Executive Commission, 17 May 1934   
 
61
                                                                                                                                                    
23 FPI AARD 260-2 Minutes of the extraordinary meeting of the UGT National Committee, 31 December 
1933 
24 El Socialista, 21 April 1934 
25 El Socialista, 24 June 1934 
26 FPI AARD 260-2 Minutes of the extraordinary meeting of the UGT National Committee, 31 December 
1933 
27 Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War, pp. 153-154 
28 FPI AARD 260-3 ‘Memoria de la Comisión Ejecutiva de la UGT 04 febrero – 30 junio 1934’ 
29 Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War, pp. 156-157 
30 Heywood, Marxism, p. 138 
31 La Tierra, 08, 20 June 1932  
32 Solidaridad Obrera, 17 June 1932 
33 Heywood, Marxism, pp. 134-135 
34 FIM APCE V 69 Leaflet by the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo Comité Nacional de Reconstrucción 
addressed to ‘All the revolutionary unions and revolutionary opposition minorities of the reformist unions’, 
Seville, March 1931  
35 Unidad Sindical, 21 November 1931 
36 For example, Solidaridad Obrera, 24 December 1931 
37 Solidaridad Obrera, 29 March 1933 
38 Solidaridad Obrera, 29 March 1933 
39 Solidaridad Obrera, 27 June 1933 
40 Solidaridad Obrera, 08 July 1934 
41 Solidaridad Obrera, 03 August 1934 
42 Solidaridad Obrera, 14 February 1934 
43 La Tierra, 18 January 1934 
44 La Tierra, 15 February 1934 
45 La Tierra, 29 January 1934 
46 La Tierra, 29 January 1934 
47 La Tierra, 29 January 1934 
48 It is worth noting that precisely what form of ‘revolution’ this unity would achieve was not outlined in 
detail, beyond the implication that it would fulfil the ultimate goal of working-class emancipation 
49 La Tierra, 17 February 1934. There is a detailed discussion of Valeriano Orobón Fernández’s ideas in 
Antonio Liz, ‘La CNT y la Alianza Obrera’ in Viento Sur, 105 (October 2009), pp. 62-68  
50 The central region was comprised primarily of Madrid and the provinces of the two Castillas that were 
closest to the capital. 
51 La Tierra, 13 January 1934 
52 IISG CNT 93 B1.2 ‘Acta del pleno nacional de regionales celebrado el día 10 y siguientes del presente mes 
en Barcelona’ 
53 IISG CNT 93 B1.2 ‘Acta del pleno nacional de regionales celebrado el día 10 y siguientes del presente mes 
en Barcelona’ 
54 IISG CNT 93 B1.2 ‘Acta del pleno nacional de regionales celebrado el día 10 y siguientes del presente mes 
en Barcelona’ 
55 IISG CNT 93 B1.2 ‘Acta del pleno nacional de regionales celebrado el día 10 y siguientes del presente mes 
en Barcelona’ 
56 IISG CNT 93 B1.2 ‘Acta del pleno nacional de regionales celebrado el día 10 y siguientes del presente mes 
en Barcelona’ 
57 Monjo, Militants, pp. 49-50, 135, 206 
58 IISG CNT 93B1.2 ‘Acta del pleno nacional de regionales celebrado el día 10 y siguientes del presente mes 
en Barcelona’ 
59 IISG CNT 93B1.2 ‘Extracto del acta del Pleno Nacional de Regionales celebrado en Madrid en Junio de 
1934’  
60 For example, Victor Alba and Stephen Schwartz, Spanish Marxism versus Soviet Communism: a history of 
the POUM (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1988), p. 65; Barrio Alonso, Anarquismo, p. 394; Peirats, La CNT, 
vol. 1, p. 89; Vega, Entre revolució, p. 362  
61 Casanova, Anarchism, p. 85 
62 IISG CNT 93B1.2 ‘Acta del pleno nacional de regionales celebrado el día 10 y siguientes del presente mes 
en Barcelona’ 
63 Copy of the pact reproduced in José Luis Gutiérrez Molina, Cuadernos de la guerra civil 6: las relaciones 
CNT-UGT (Madrid: Fundación Salvador Seguí, 1989), pp. 25-26 
64 IISG CNT 93B1.2 ‘Extracto del acta del Pleno Nacional de Regionales celebrado en Madrid en Junio de 
1934’ 
65 Gutiérrez Molina, Cuadernos de la guerra civil 6, pp. 25-26  
 
62
                                                                                                                                                    
66 IISG CNT 93B1.2 ‘Extracto del acta del Pleno Nacional de Regionales celebrado en Madrid en Junio de 
1934’ 
67 ABC, 13, 15, 16 April 1934; El Socialista, 04, 06, 08, 16, 20 February 1934; Solidaridad, 13, 20 February 
1934; Juliá, Madrid, pp. 350-366; Sandra Souto Kustrín, «Y¿ Madrid? ¿Qué hace Madrid?» Movimiento 
revolucionario y acción colectiva (1933-1936) (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 2004), pp. 102-104  
68 Solidaridad Obrera, 29 May 1931, 01 August 1931, 01 January 1932, 12 October 1932; CNT, 17 June 
1933; Graham Kelsey, Anarchosyndicalism, Libertarian Communism and the State: The CNT in Zaragoza 
and Aragón 1930-1937 (Amsterdam: IISG, 1991), pp. 35-36, 49, 59, 60, 69-70 
69 Luis Viesca, the representative of the UGT’s sugar workers, repeatedly commented on threats and attacks 
made by CNT and/or FAI militants in Aragón at UGT National Committee meetings. See, for example, FPI 
AARD 260-1 Meeting of the UGT National Committee, 17 July 1933 
70 ABC, 05, 06, 07, 12, 20, 21, 27 April, 04, 08, 09 May 1934; El Socialista, 03, 05, 25 April 1934, 02, 05, 
06, 09, 11, 12 May 1934; Solidaridad Obrera, 15 April 1934, 08 May 1934; Kelsey, Anarchosyndicalism, 
pp. 106-117 
71 It is also worth considering that in both Madrid and Zaragoza, the unions of the two organizations were 
soon at loggerheads once more. Indeed, the ending of the construction strike in Madrid created a certain 
amount of mutual antipathy. Cenetistas complained at their meeting to vote on a return to work that the 
Socialists had not helped them ‘provoke a revolutionary general strike’ as they had originally wished, and 
had instead focused on bringing about a ‘pre-emptory solution’. (Solidaridad, 20 February 1934; see also 
Souto Kustrín, «Y¿ Madrid?», p. 125; Kelsey, Anarchosyndicalism, p. 117)  
72 For example, Solidaridad Obrera, 15 August, 04, 19 September 1934  
 
63
Chapter Three: Constructing a Rival: CNT and Socialist Discourses, 1931-1934 
 
Thus  far  this  thesis  has  examined  the  CNT’s  relationship  with  the  UGT  through 
considering the formal decision-making mechanisms of the two organizations, as well as 
through the articulation of opinions on the other labour federation in the main press organs 
belonging to the two labour federations. With regard to the CNT’s expression of a stance 
on the UGT and vice versa through press and other propaganda, this has been restricted to 
a focus on how a stance was formed in relation to ongoing political and social events. So, 
for example, the CNT’s stance on the UGT as outlined so far has been that the UGT was 
seeking  to  destroy  the  CNT  and  expand  itself  through  the  use  of  the  legislative  and 
coercive apparatus of the state. The socialists, on the other hand, interpreted the CNT’s 
activities  as  counter-revolutionary  as  they  were  seen  to  be  attacking  the  Republic  and 
doing the bidding of the reactionary right. 
 
A  more  detailed  study  of  the  anarcho-syndicalist  and  socialist  press  reveals  that  the 
hostilities between members of the two organizations went far beyond an interpretation of 
current events, and were in fact an articulation of a series of rigid and entrenched beliefs 
regarding the integrity and intentions of the active members of the opposing movement. 
Some aspects of these beliefs were grounded in the conflicting theoretical perspectives that 
separated the socialist and anarcho-syndicalist movements. To an extent, the hostilities 
between the CNT and the UGT based around these differences have been touched upon by 
historians and contemporary commentators.
1 It is known, for example, that the CNT, in 
line  with  its  anti-political  principles,  deplored  the  UGT’s  links  with  the  PSOE  and 
endorsement of politics and its use of paid union officials, not to mention its support for an 
‘authoritarian’ state. Consequently, it was common for editorials in CNT papers to refer in 
passing to the UGT in such terms as ‘the workerist appendage of the Socialist Party’,
2 or 
even for Solidaridad Obrera to devote whole articles lampooning the connections between 
the PSOE and the UGT under sarcastic headlines such as: ‘It seems that the UGT is not the 
same as the Socialist Party’.
3 Related to this, writers have also pointed out the anarcho-
syndicalists’ disdain for the socialists’ habit of accepting paid positions, both inside their 
organizations  and  in  government  posts,  with  the  accusation  of  enchufismo  being  made 
repeatedly.
4 Criticisms based on such differences were expressed in the CNT and socialist 
press throughout the first years of the Republic and served as a staple form of ammunition 
through which hostilities between the organizations could be perpetuated.  
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However,  there  was  also  another  layer  of  discourse  between  these  more  tangible 
differences that separated the CNT and the UGT and to a significant extent facilitated their 
ongoing hostilities. Chris Ealham has rightly highlighted how aspects of CNT discourse 
during the Republic mirrored those of the communists during the ‘Third Period’, such as 
the use of the term ‘social fascist’.
5 However, CNT discourse on the UGT was not merely a 
regurgitation of the negative epithets deployed by the communists. This layer of discourse 
revealed  a  highly  emotive  set  of  assumptions  and  beliefs  about  the  opposing  labour 
federation, grounded in notions and qualities such as ‘treachery’. This aspect of cenetistas’ 
understanding and representation of the UGT and vice versa has been examined in far less 
detail by historians, perhaps because it was based around such visceral, subjective concepts 
rather than more readily identifiable aspects of left-wing theory and practice.
6 However, as 
will be demonstrated in this chapter, this side of cenetistas’ and ugetistas’ understandings 
of one another was absolutely crucial in the Second Republic; not only did it constitute a 
highly significant proportion of how the two organizations attacked one another in public, 
but it also represented the articulation of a deeply entrenched mentality on the part of 
militants towards one another that cut substantially deeper than mere events or ideological 
or practical differences. 
 
Before  examining  the  representations  of  the  CNT  and  the  UGT  as  constructed  by  the 
discourse of the two organizations’ press organs, it would be worthwhile first to consider 
briefly how this discourse was created, disseminated and accessed by members of the two 
labour federations. Both the socialist movement and the anarchist and syndicalist currents 
of  which  the  CNT  was  primarily  comprised  had  a  long  and  established  tradition  of 
newspaper  publication  that  stretched  back  into  the  nineteenth  century.  The  ability  to 
publish and distribute a newspaper that fought an organization’s ideological corner and 
provided an orientation to its members and also convinced others to join the movement 
was of fundamental importance to most political groupings. The CNT and the PSOE-UGT 
were no different.
7 At all times throughout its history, a top priority of the CNT was to 
maintain  the  publication  of  a  newspaper,  with  Solidaridad  Obrera  having  been  the 
movement’s  key  publication  since  1907.
8  The  principal  functions  of  the  CNT  and  the 
socialists’ official newspapers were to put forward the movement’s ongoing interpretation 
of current events, promote the organization amongst workers, and also provide practical 
information  to  members  in  the  form  of  publishing  official  notifications  produced  by 
official bodies across the hierarchy, from union juntas to the leading committees. All these 
functions were central to allowing the CNT and the UGT to be able to mobilize their 
current memberships and gain new supporters.    
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Solidaridad Obrera was in practice the key daily national-level vehicle of expression for 
the CNT, in spite of the fact that the newspaper was controlled by the Catalan region. 
Although  CNT  began  publication  in  1932,  ostensibly  as  the  CNT’s  new  national 
newspaper, Solidaridad Obrera was far more strongly established and thus continued to be 
more influential.
9 The paper’s Catalan origin both reflected  and to a significant extent 
perpetuated the dominance of the Catalan region’s dominance over the movement as a 
whole. The paper’s editorial board and main team of writers were chosen through a ballot 
at Catalan regional plenums.
10 Its main body of staff and opinion-piece writers was thus 
drawn overwhelmingly from the Catalan region. A significant proportion of the paper’s 
content – though generally not its main opinion pieces and editorials – was created by 
contributions sent in by CNT militants operating at the grassroots level, relating to their 
own specific sphere of activities. Such items were for the most part reports by union juntas 
on the activities of their union, or by local federations on the activities of the CNT in the 
locality. The study of the CNT’s discourse on the UGT in this chapter is drawn as much 
from these types of article as it is from the paper’s main opinion pieces, in part to illustrate 
the grassroots’ perspective on the UGT. The cenetista construction of the UGT that is 
highlighted in this chapter and the mentality it represents was repeated as recurrently by 
local militant contributors to the paper as it was in the main opinion pieces written by the 
paper’s  writers.  Articles  that  examined  local  activities  outside  of  Catalonia  were  often 
written by local militants from the area in question. Solidaridad Obrera unsurprisingly had 
its highest readership levels in Catalonia, and had a peak average circulation of 46855 in 
August 1931,
11 but was also available outside of the region, being distributed to towns 
across the country where there was a CNT local federation.
12 Given that the focus of this 
thesis is on CNT-UGT interactions in Catalonia, and given also that Solidaridad Obrera 
was the most important and widely read of the CNT’s papers, it has been used as the 
primary source of study for CNT discourse on the UGT. Nevertheless, an examination of 
this paper is complimented by examples from the Madrid-based CNT, as well as some of 
the CNT’s other regional papers – most of which were relatively short-lived – to illustrate 
the continuity in discursive themes between the different papers.
13 
 
Examining a ugetista discourse is more problematic, given the substantial overlap between 
the PSOE and the UGT. It would be worth clarifying what distinction, if any, can be drawn 
between a ‘socialist’ discourse and a discourse that could be attributed specifically to the 
UGT.  The  UGT  lacked  a  widely-read  publication  that  was  presented  as  the  official 
mouthpiece of the UGT and the UGT alone. The socialist movement had more newspapers 
linked to it than did the CNT, in the form of regional newspapers holding pro-socialist  
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positions, often because they were either owned or edited by members of the PSOE.
14 The 
main  official  publication  of  the  socialist  movement  was  El  Socialista,  which  had  an 
average  circulation  during  the  Republic  of  approximately  40000  copies.
15  It  would  be 
impossible to differentiate whether an editorial or a piece of reportage on the CNT in the 
paper could be attributed solely to either the PSOE or the UGT, and as such it would be 
impossible to identify in the pages of El Socialista what could definitively be classed as 
discourse  specific  to  the  UGT.  But  the  UGT  did  have  a  select  range  of  its  own 
publications, in particular the Boletín de la Unión General de Trabajadores. The Boletín 
was a monthly publication that did not go on general sale in the same way that a daily 
newspaper such as El Socialista would. Rather than make an artifical distinction between 
‘socialist’ and ‘UGT’ discourse, this chapter will examine ‘socialist discourse’, it being 
understood that a UGT discourse that was differentiated from general socialist discourse 
cannot be satisfactorily identified, though the chapter will draw in particular on articles 
published in the Boletín.  
 
The CNT’s construction of the UGT hierarchy 
 
The overall picture of the UGT hierarchy presented in the CNT’s discourse divided the 
UGT into three basic categories, namely national leaders and ordinary workers, and also a 
more  hazily  defined  middle  category  of  union  leaders  who  operated  the  UGT’s 
organizational machinery and also had some form of local authority within the movement, 
but  who  did  not  hold  the  most  important  leadership  posts.  It  was  the  two  levels  of 
leadership that were most often dwelt on within the CNT press. On the national level, 
Francisco Largo Caballero was unsurprisingly the most frequently depicted UGT leader. 
Largo  made  almost  daily  appearances  in  the  CNT  press,  often  being  the  subject  of 
editorials but even more frequently being referred to in passing in the course of discussing 
other  aspects  of  the  UGT’s  activities,  whether  on  the  national  level  or  in  individual 
localities. These references were virtually always critical in nature.
16  
 
Attacks  on  the  Labour  Minister  drew  on  several  themes,  all  of  which  reflected  the 
criticisms made on either the UGT as a whole or of its leadership in general. The issue of 
Largo Caballero’s collaboration during the dictatorship was one theme that was referenced 
with particular regularity; it was certainly not uncommon for articles to introduce Largo 
Caballero  in  such  terms  as  the  ‘ex-counsellor  of  the  Bourbons’
17  at  some  point  when 
discussing his activities in the present.
18 Articles in the CNT press were quick to suggest he 
was personally responsible not just for the repression of CNT unions and their activities  
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through collaboration with the bourgeoisie and repressive laws, but also for the hardships 
suffered by the Spanish working classes in general. When CNT unions were closed by the 
authorities, it was often attributed to factors such as ‘Largo’s hatred of the CNT’.
19 His 
activities as Labour Minister ‘were more evil’ than those of any of the other members of 
the government.
20 It would not be an overstatement to suggest that the CNT press were 
obsessed with the Labour Minister, depicting him as having a hand in every misfortune the 
CNT – and indeed the working classes – suffered during the  years of the Republican-
socialist government. In CNT discourse, Francisco Largo Caballero effectively served as 
the personification of the UGT. It was Largo who was presented as having personally 
devised a plan to destroy the CNT for the benefit of the UGT. And because the UGT as a 
whole  was  seen  as  ‘Largo’s  edifice’
21  his  aims  were  by  extension  those  of  the  entire 
organization.  Like  many  of  the  elements  of  the  anarcho-syndicalists’  discursive 
construction of the UGT and its members, criticism of Largo was recurrent in the CNT 
press even before the Republic. Although prior to April 1931 he occupied no ministerial 
position, the attacks were fundamentally based on the same notions of his collaboration, 
his thirst for political power and his hatred of workers and the CNT.
22 
 
Other national UGT leaders played a supporting role to Largo in CNT discourse, and were 
presented  as  embodying  the  most  self-serving  and  exploitative  aspects  of  Spanish 
socialism. There was a grouping of roughly half a dozen socialist figures, the majority of 
whom currently or previously held high-level positions within the UGT, whose names 
were widely known as the leading figures of the socialist labour federation. In particular 
and in addition to Largo Caballero, the figures of Julián Besteiro, Andrés Saborit, Trifón 
Gómez, Wenceslao Carrillo and Manuel Cordero were the most publicly identifiable. As 
with Largo, this coverage was always critical. Cordero, in his capacity as editor of El 
Socialista, had committed ‘low and vile acts’
23 and was lampooned for holding ‘ten or 
twelve  posts’  as  was  seen  to  be  typical  of  enchufista  socialists.
24  Julián  Besteiro, 
meanwhile, spoke ‘like a perfect bourgeois’.
25 As with the attacks on Largo, this depiction 
of the UGT elite was equally present prior to the Republic.
26  
 
The  role  afforded  to  Trifón  Gómez  was  slightly  different,  as  his  primary  sphere  of 
activities was related more strictly to the labour movement in his capacity as leader of the 
UGT’s rail workers’ federation. Throughout the Republic the CNT’s Federación Nacional 
de la Industria Ferroviaria (FNIF) was constantly at loggerheads with the UGT’s Sindicato 
Nacional Ferroviario (SNF). The FNIF led various strikes across the country during the 
Republic, which were largely opposed by the SNF, in part due to the highly cautious,  
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reformist leadership of Trifón Gómez.
27 The substantial coverage afforded to the railways 
in  the  CNT  press  inevitably  led  to  the  socialist  labour  leader  making  more  frequent 
appearances within it.
28 Trifón Gómez was depicted as the embodiment of the socialist 
labour  leader  who  sought  to  ‘betray’
29  workers  through  his  reformist  stance  and  his 
collaboration with the bourgeoisie.
30  
   
In the mindset of cenetistas these individuals constituted an elite grouping of ‘leaders’ who 
were responsible for the reprehensible actions of the socialist movement from government. 
In September 1934, for example, CNT appraised the viability of alliance initiatives, and in 
so doing concluded that the socialist motives for calling for anti-fascist unity emanating 
‘from those who sowed police terror and massacred the working people’ could not be 
believed ‘if we bear in mind what the socialist leaders are and have been’.
31 Often this 
controlling class of the UGT was pointed out to the readership of CNT newspapers by way 
of calling on the names of these standout figures, the link between the names and their 
crimes  taken  to  be  automatically  made  by  readers.  The  UGT  as  a  national  actor  was 
controlled  by  ‘the  Corderos’
32  who  had  created  a  ‘Cordero-style  República  de 
trabajadores’.
33 Emphasising that workers themselves should control the struggle against 
capitalism and not submit to a class of leaders, cenetista employees of the Barcelona bus 
network argued that ‘emancipation is in us and not in their Largo, Cordero etc’.
34 The 
activities of the ‘Unión General de Traidores [General Traitors’ Union]’ were the work of 
‘individuals of the moral calibre of the Largos, Prietos, Saborits, Corderos, etc’.
35 Overall, 
then, the distrust exhibited by cenetistas towards the national leadership of the socialist 
movement  cut  very  deep;  it  was  not  merely  that  they  were  seen  to  have  adopted  an 
erroneous agenda in their capacity of leaders of the organization, but rather – and much 
more  emotively  –  that  they  were  simply  irredeemably  corrupted,  anti-CNT  and  anti-
worker. Although this perspective was based in part around the anti-political principles, 
specifically the rejection of figures who exerted a political control over an organization, to 
which  the  anarcho-syndicalist  movement  adhered,  it  is  evident  that  these  attacks  were 
much more than a mere articulation of anti-political theory, and were every bit as much 
grounded in suppositions of a lack of integrity and an instinctive loathing. 
 
However, if a clique of half a dozen individuals was seen ultimately to exercise overall 
control over the socialist labour federation for their own interests and for anti-worker ends, 
then their orders were carried out across the country by a far larger, nameless army of 
‘leaders’ who formed the next significant cadre in the CNT’s representation of the UGT 
hierarchy. This class of dirigentes conformed to the idea of the UGT’s union entities and  
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industrial federations being controlled by self-interested bureaucrats who took control of 
labour disputes out of the hands of workers, usually with the result of them suppressing 
workers’ inclinations towards striking and colluding with employers and authorities to the 
detriment  of  the  workers  themselves.  This  type  of  leader  would  frequently  appear  in 
reports in the CNT press in which the CNT and/or the UGT were involved, such as those 
outlined in chapter one.
36 Again, such a perspective existed in CNT discourse prior to the 
Republic, though was understandably expressed less frequently due to the more limited 
occurrence of labour conflicts prior to April 1931.
37 In such reports, workers were often 
‘miserably tricked by the socialist leaders’ who inhabited their local Casa del Pueblo, as 
was the case of construction workers in Zamora.
38 The strike of graphic arts workers in 
Madrid of 1934 had been initially undertaken by the CNT and the UGT together, when ‘the 
leaders  of  the  socialist  sector,  in  the  middle  of  the  struggle,  and  without  consulting 
anybody  and  especially  not  the  strikers,  declared  the  conflict  resolved’.
39  As  will  be 
elaborated on later in this chapter, deceived workers were often presented as ‘abandoning 
the  UGT  leaders’  after  those  leaders  had  stifled  their  conflicts  with  employers.
40  The 
attitude  exhibited  by  editorial  writers  and  local  militant  contributors  alike  revealed  the 
basic mindset that the individuals who ran the UGT were fundamentally motivated by a 
desire to deceive the working classes, rather than it simply being the case that the UGT 
pursued an erroneous strategy in industrial relations.   
 
The  final  grouping  within  the  UGT  hierarchy  was  ordinary  workers.  To  a  significant 
extent,  ordinary  UGT  members  presented  a  problem  for  the  CNT  press.  To  fully 
understand why, it is first necessary to be aware that, crucially, in the eyes of cenetistas, 
the CNT and the working classes were synonymous. It was repeatedly stated in editorials 
and local militant contributions that ‘authentic workers’
41 would ultimately realize that the 
CNT  was  the  only  organization  to  which  they  could  belong.
42  Furthermore,  in  CNT 
discourse  ‘the  working  classes’  and  synonymous  terms  were  often  substituted  for  ‘the 
CNT’ when dealing with the subject of the conspiracy against the CNT. For example, on 
some  occasions  Largo  Caballero’s  agenda  from  the  Labour  Ministry  was  designed  to 
destroy the CNT; but on other occasions it was the working classes who were ‘victims of 
the dictatorship exercised by Largo Caballero from his throne at the Labour Ministry’.
43 
Furthermore, the proletariat was often the subject of the most effusive praise in the CNT 
press  for  its  revolutionary  capacity,  as  was  the  CNT  itself.
44  As  will  be  discussed 
throughout  the  thesis,  this  assumption  of  CNT-working  class  synonymy  was  a  deeply 
significant factor in determining how cenetistas – especially in Catalonia – interacted with 
UGT counterparts.  
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However,  this  belief  also  created  the  need  to  explain  why  some  workers  did  gravitate 
towards the UGT. To a large extent, this was carried out through the concurrent belief, 
outlined above, that ordinary workers were ‘tricked’ by UGT leaders. As a result, some 
cenetistas simply believed that it was the case that UGT workers would come to their 
senses and see the UGT and its leaders for the intrinsically corrupt collective that they 
really were. A call by rail workers in Utrera, Andalucía, to their UGT counterparts through 
the  pages  of  Solidaridad  Obrera  sums  up  this  attitude  when  presented  in  its  most 
aggressive form. The authors called on their members to ‘try and win over and rescue our 
brothers in the UGT’. Addressing UGT members, they then asked of them:  
 
Can you in the UGT be proud of your leaders? No, no and no. Only enchufistas and those 
who aspire towards it militate in the Unión General de Trabajadores; the rest of them are 
esquiroles. Those who have not already abandoned their treacherous ranks, you must be 
ashamed and regretful of your actions as workers.
45 
 
The CNT press attempted to reinforce this idea with an aggressive promotion of the notion 
that  the  UGT  was  on  the  brink  of  collapse  as  a  result  of  workers  abandoning  the 
organization for the CNT,
46 a claim that was equally made prior to the founding of the 
Republic.
47 Such cases were often given prominent position within the CNT’s national 
papers, even if the numbers of members involved were relatively small. One such example 
is provided by a report from 30
th November 1932 edition of CNT, regarding the defection 
of UGT members in Motril, Andalucía, from the UGT to the CNT, which was given a 
prominent position on the second page of the edition under the heading ‘the decomposition 
of the UGT’. According to the report, three prominent cenetistas from Granada took the 
decision to visit Motril to attend a UGT assembly in the town. The three immediately met 
with the opposition of the organizers of the assembly, described as ‘the dozen lackeys of 
the socialist ministers who represent the badly depleted remains of the fossilized [Socialist] 
Party’. The socialist leaders managed to gain the backing of the Mayor to prevent the 
cenetistas  speaking  at  the  meeting.  However,  the  workers  gathered  at  the  meeting 
demanded that the three be allowed to speak, and the demands of the authorities and the 
socialist leaders were disregarded. The cenetistas then proceeded to address the meeting, 
and after doing so ‘several men from Motril, who having been fervent militants of the UGT 
and  the  Socialist  Party’  acknowledged  the  erroneous  nature  of  their  old  ideological 
principles. A mass conversion of the audience took place; ‘in the Motril Casa del Pueblo 
more than six thousand UGT membership cards were torn up and burned’. The retelling of 
the incident thus conformed perfectly to the notion that although socialist leaders may have 
attempted  to  work  with  the  authorities  to  hold  back  the  CNT,  the  masses  would  
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spontaneously and freely back the CNT against such manoeuvres and ultimately abandon 
the UGT for the CNT.
48   
 
Other incidents of workers abandoning the UGT for the CNT were presented in blunter, 
less elaborate terms, which nevertheless celebrated the victory of the CNT over the UGT 
which such incidents were seen to represent. In October 1932 the UGT membership of the 
village of Cala, Andalucía, abandoned the socialist labour federation en masse to join the 
CNT.  The  event  was  met  with  fanfare  from  Solidaridad  Obrera,  with  the  incident 
occupying a prominent spot on the back page. The defection in this single village was 
presented as being ‘another proof of the disappointments that the Spanish proletariat has 
been suffering at the hands of the UGT’. The article went on to explain that workers across 
Spain  were  abandoning  the  UGT  and  ‘fleeing  to  our  revolutionary  labour  federation 
because  it  is  clear  that  the  Unión  General  de  Trabajadores  does  not  represent  the 
aspirations of the workers’.
49 At times, the assertion that workers were abandoning the 
UGT  for  the  CNT  was  placed  in  more  general  terms  that  were  not  connected  to  any 
particular event. For example, on 3
rd June 1932 Solidaridad Obrera published an article on 
its  front  page  that  addressed  ‘the  crisis  of  the  UGT’.  The  editorial  declared  that  ‘the 
working multitudes are abandoning [the UGT], emancipating themselves from the tutelage 
of their leaders, who are comfortably aligned with the new regime’.
50 
 
The UGT and treachery 
 
Working in tandem with these constructions of the different groups within the UGT was a 
simultaneous understanding of what was the UGT as a whole’s most fundamental quality. 
In  anarchist  and  syndicalist  discourse,  the  most  essential  quality  of  the  UGT  and  the 
socialist  movement  was  treachery,  perpetuated  against  both  the  CNT  and  the  working 
classes. The accusation of treachery was made repeatedly in editorials in the CNT press 
and by CNT militants. Of course, on one level accusations of treachery or betrayal of the 
CNT and the working classes were made in direct relation to the present-day activities of 
the socialist leadership, with regard above all to the initiatives launched from government. 
However,  it  is  important  to  recognize  that  such  incidents  were  interpreted  by  many 
cenetistas – and were certainly presented in this fashion by the CNT press – as being 
merely  the  present-day  manifestation  of  a  virtually  unbroken  line  of  treachery.  For 
example, in focusing on the activities of the UGT in Extremadura in 1932, Solidaridad 
Obrera prefaced its commentary by asserting  
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that Largo Caballero, Cordero, de los Ríos et al go united with the parties that defend 
property, capitalism and the state to take on the just and human popular aspirations is not 
a secret to anybody. It is not once, twice nor three times, but hundreds of times that the 
social fascists have shamefully betrayed the Spanish proletariat.
51  
 
The Primo de Rivera dictatorship was one key period that was recurrently referred to in the 
CNT  press  throughout  the  Republic  by  militants  on  all  levels  of  the  organization’s 
hierarchy who wrote in the paper to demonstrate the previous record of treachery against 
the working classes of the socialists and the UGT leadership. Unsurprisingly, Largo was 
most  commonly  used  in  discussing  the  UGT’s  collaboration,  undoubtedly  due  to  a 
combination of his ubiquitous presence in the paper and the fact that he held the most high-
profile post under Primo de Rivera. Entire articles were devoted to outlining Largo’s role 
as a counsellor of state during the 1920s, published under large-print headlines such as 
‘Largo Caballero and Primo de Rivera’,
52 whilst many others made passing references to 
this collaboration. There is no question that the goal of such articles was to add to the ranks 
of the ‘many [who] still remember how the socialists acted during the six and a half years 
that this regime lasted for’.
53  
 
Whilst there was undoubtedly a strong element of such references to the Primo de Rivera 
dictatorship serving as a smear attack on the UGT due to the activities of the socialists 
from government in the present moment, there can be no doubt that they were also part of a 
belief that, throughout its history, the UGT had always played a role of holding back the 
working  classes.  A  front-page  editorial  published  in  Solidaridad  Obrera  in  July  1934 
provides one of the most complete manifestations of this interpretation. The point that the 
editorial  sought  to  make  was  that  the  revolutionary  rhetoric  emanating  from  socialist 
leaders such as Largo Caballero in these months was entirely hollow and merely designed 
to preserve the socialist movement now that it was out of government. However, in part to 
substantiate this position, the bulk of the editorial entailed narrating the history  of the 
socialist movement since the 1910s. The historical account began with the events of the 
summer of 1917, when ‘Spanish socialism was taught an important lesson’. As a result of 
the ‘cowardice that their leaders displayed that year the UGT was left reduced to such an 
emaciated labour federation that it strongly resembled a skeleton’. The account then moved 
on to the Primo de Rivera era, a period which, as mentioned, the CNT press tended to 
dwell  on  when  discussing  the  UGT:  ‘The  Primo  de  Rivera  dictatorship  saved  Spanish 
socialism.  Lacking scruples, its leaders clung on [to it] like limpets’. The approach of 
‘flattering’ the dictator was the ‘only path through which it [socialism] could expand’. This 
history  of  the  Spanish  socialists  then  arrived  at  the  Republic,  in  which  ‘the  socialists  
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attempted to continue making use of the monopoly that the dictator had granted them’. In 
the view of cenetistas, then, the overall history of Spanish socialism was a mixture of 
cowardice in the face of revolution, mixed with collusion with reactionary elements and 
abuse of power to fulfil an overriding goal of expanding the reach of the movement’s 
organisms.
54 
 
This interpretation of the socialists’ historical role within Spain drew the cenetista militants 
who contributed to the CNT press – and of course the writing and editorial staff of the 
movement’s papers – to hold and project a basic mentality that the UGT always had been 
and always would be treacherous. References to a timeless past of socialist misdeed and 
treachery spanned the majority of types of article published in Solidaridad Obrera, CNT 
and other CNT papers, including front-page editorials, reports of the activities of socialists 
in individual localities – both those produced by the papers’ central writing staffs and those 
submitted  by  local  contributors  –  and  reportage  on  political  events.
55  This  belief  in 
treachery as being an intrinsic and timeless quality of the UGT modus operandi was a 
direct continuation of a belief that was regularly expressed prior to the founding of the 
Republic.
56 It was not uncommon for either the UGT as a whole or the socialists in general 
to be referred to in such terms as ‘eternal enemies of the Confederation’
57 or as ‘eternal 
traitors’.
58  Likewise,  grassroots-level  confrontations  between  cenetistas  and  ugetistas 
would give the CNT press occasion to loudly proclaim ‘eternal socialist treason’,
59 or that 
‘the record of the UGT was always to betray the working class’.
60 These references to an 
eternal yesterday of deceit by the socialists reveal, in the mindsets of those who controlled 
production of the CNT’s discursive output,  just how deeply treachery was viewed as an 
intrinsic quality of socialism as a movement and as a doctrine. It was not merely the case 
that Spanish socialists had at various points betrayed the CNT movement; this treachery 
was in fact an obligatory and inevitable element of socialist activity. Such assertions must 
be regarded as qualitatively very different from an objective refutation of socialist ideology 
and methods. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the discursive construction of the UGT that has been 
outlined here cannot be dismissed as simply being a propaganda line against the socialist 
labour federation that was controlled by the editorial and writing staff of the movement’s 
newspapers.  As  mentioned,  a  substantial  amount  of  the  content  of  CNT  papers  was 
produced by grassroots-level militants. In every issue, Solidaridad Obrera, CNT and other 
CNT newspapers contained reports on the activities of the CNT and other items of interest 
to the working classes from localities across the length and breadth of Spain. Contributions  
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from grassroots cenetistas displayed the basic mentality, outlined above, that the UGT as 
an organization simply stood for treachery. When references to ‘treachery’, ‘traitors’ or 
some other ‘eternal’ characteristic appeared in the CNT press, as often as not they were 
contained  within  contributions  from  grassroots  militants  rather  than  editorials. 
Furthermore, local contributions to anarcho-syndicalist newspapers reveal that militants at 
this  level  often  endorsed  the  ‘political’  arguments  against  the  UGT,  such  as  that  the 
jurados  and  legislative  initiatives  were  designed  to  destroy  the  CNT,  and  these  freely 
mixed  with  this  underlying  anti-UGT  mentality,  as  well  as  the  entrenched  belief  in  a 
synergy between the CNT and the working classes.  
 
A report on Monzón, Aragón that appeared in Solidaridad Obrera in August 1931 serves 
as an example of the overall interpretation of the UGT’s agenda that was expressed by 
local militants in their depiction of events within their own locality. The incident the piece 
ostensibly reported on related to alleged attempts by employers in the sugar industry to 
force workers to join the UGT. The language adopted in the report  firmly framed the 
incident in national terms. ‘The ugetistas, allies of Lerroux,’ it began, ‘are trying to convert 
the towns of the Ribera del Cinca into a fiefdom of the UGT’. The piece outlined the 
agenda of the UGT as a whole: ‘from power [the UGT] practices the annulment of the 
class struggle and advocates class integration, preparing the stages of the fascistization of 
the state, of fascist infiltration in the social, economic and industrial life of Spain’. The 
militant  also  asserted  a  synonymy  between  the  CNT  and  the  working  classes.  Having 
established the threat that the UGT posed not just in Monzón but across all of Spain, the 
author  asserted  that  the  socialist  labour  federation  would  be  unsuccessful  because  ‘the 
compañeros  of  the  Comarcal  Federation  [of  the  CNT]  watch  over  the  interests  of  the 
workers and educate their revolutionary development’. Moreover, ‘the workers of Monzón, 
as in the rest of Spain, are convinced that there is only one revolutionary organization: the 
CNT’.
61 
 
Socialist discourse on the CNT 
 
It is of course important to be aware that the socialists themselves produced a discourse on 
the anarcho-syndicalist movement throughout the Republic. El Socialista and the Boletín 
de la Unión General de Trabajadores often printed editorials on the activities of the CNT, 
and there were even more frequent passing references to ‘anarchists’ and ‘syndicalists’. 
This discourse was no less critical – even if much less vitriolic in its articulation – and in 
fact mirrored many of the themes articulated in CNT discourse on the UGT. For example,  
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ugetistas  recurrently  expressed  the  belief  that  the  CNT  was  founded  on  a  dishonest 
minority exploiting an often misguided proletariat. One explanation given for the CNT’s 
membership base by the socialists, particularly with regard to Catalonia, was that those 
who joined the CNT were illiterate or in some other way lacking the education that would 
allow them to realize their error in joining  an anarcho-syndicalist union. For example, 
writing in the Boletín de la Unión General de Trabajadores, Salvador Vidal Rosell, one of 
the key socialist figures in Catalonia, explained that ‘textiles in Catalonia has always been 
one of the bastions of the anarchists, due to the enormous percentage of illiterates’ within 
the industry.
62  
   
However, the CNT’s membership base was not merely a product of ignorance, but also of 
coercion carried out by cenetista militants. To understand this element of the socialists’ 
representation of the CNT, it is first necessary to establish the nature of the individuals 
who ran the CNT, as constructed in UGT discourse. Where for the CNT the UGT was run 
by a class of dirigentes who duped workers into joining the UGT, for the socialists the 
CNT  was  run  by  a  gang  of  violent  pistoleros  who  used  threats  and  force  to  coerce 
individuals into the CNT.
63 On one level, the CNT was seen as being an organization that 
facilitated pistolerismo by allowing individuals to join its ranks whose interests did not 
extend beyond violence, whether it be on behalf of a union or an employer. This in itself 
‘made it impossible’ for the CNT ‘to represent the honourable working class’.
64 At the 
same time, however, the socialist press was littered with references to ‘the pistoleros of the 
anarchist Confederation’ who waged a campaign of violence against both their opponents 
and ordinary workers.
65 Those who followed the CNT’s protest actions were condemned to 
‘playing the sad role of victim, complying with meek diligence when faced with the pistols 
of the foremen of syndicalism’.
66 The socialist press were at pains to stress that the UGT 
would never adopt coercive methods to make workers join their organization, however 
much  it  was  in  the  best  interests  of  these  workers  to  join.  Instead,  this  tactic  was 
emphasized as being the preserve of the anarcho-syndicalists.
67 
 
Socialist  discourse  again  mirrored  that  of  the  anarcho-syndicalists  in  the  critically 
important respect that it argued a synonymy of the UGT and the working classes. It was 
stressed in the socialist press that ‘class-conscious workers’ would inevitably follow the 
UGT, just as the CNT claimed that ‘authentic’ or ‘revolutionary’ workers would join the 
CNT.
68 Such remarks made it clear that support for anarcho-syndicalism amounted to at 
best a lack of class consciousness, and perhaps even false consciousness. This belief in the 
UGT being the true representatives of the working classes was accompanied by an equally  
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strong belief in the innate superiorty of the UGT as an organization. The Boletín de la 
Unión General de Trabajadores once alluded, for example, to ‘the superiority of the Unión 
General de Trabajadores. A superiority and competence that they have never, not even in 
the heyday of anarcho-syndicalism, managed to equal’.
69  
 
Like the CNT in their discourse, the socialists argued that the CNT was an historically and 
intrinsically anti-worker entity. On one level, there were immediate antecedents that were 
called upon to discredit the CNT. In the first months of the Republic, attempts were made 
to attack the CNT for its actions in the final months of the Monarchy. The accusation was 
made on several occasions that the CNT had not only failed to participate in efforts to 
overthrow the old regime, but had actively sabotaged efforts to overthrow it, in the form of 
publishing an article in Solidaridad Obrera in November 1930 that contained details of the 
developing  conspiracy  against  General  Berenguer.  The  goal  of  the  accusation  was  to 
suggest that the CNT backed in some form the monarchy and had attempted to stop its 
overthrow.
70  This  accusation  of  support  for  the  old,  anti-worker  regime  mirrored  the 
references made in the CNT press to the collaboration of the UGT with Primo de Rivera in 
the  important  respect  that  both  accusations  attempted  to  use  the  past  activities  of  the 
corresponding labour federation as proof that they were backers of the repressive old order 
and as such anti-worker entities. 
  
However,  in  the  historical  narrative  of  the  labour  movement  as  contained  in  socialist 
discourse, the activities of the CNT press in November 1930 were merely one of the more 
recent in a succession of past attempts to derail the cause of the working classes. The 
history of the organization of the working classes was essentially presented as one in which 
anarchists and syndicalists had always played an interfering role. Indeed, anarchism itself – 
which,  it  must  be  stressed,  socialist  discourse  identified  the  CNT  as  its  present-day 
organizational  force  –  was  an  anachronism  that  ought  to  have  been  supplanted  by  the 
theoretically superior socialist movement. Anarchism persisted in Spain in the form of the 
CNT,  when  it  should  ‘no  longer  exist  except  in  museums  of  historical  artifacts’.
71 
Anarchism  and  the  CNT  were  thus  condemned  to  playing  a  retardant  role  throughout 
history and into the present. An extensive history of the UGT published in the Boletín de la 
Unión General de Trabajadores provides the most comprehensive example of this reading 
of the role of anarchists – including the CNT – in the Spanish workers’ movement. For the 
nineteenth  century,  anarchists  were  attributed  a  role  of  attempting,  without  success,  to 
sabotage the establishment of socialist organizations in Spain. Prior to the foundation of 
the  UGT,  ‘anarchists,  who  later  called  themselves  libertarians,  syndicalists  and  today  
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libertarian  communists’  had  attempted  to  fight  employers  without  creating  a  strong 
organizational  structure,  and  as  a  result  encountered  ‘continual  defeats’.  A  change  of 
tactics and strategy was necessary, ‘and this mission was that which the Unión General de 
Trabajadores came to fulfil’. In spite of this, these anarchist groups continued to harass the 
UGT. Anarchism, then, was presented as a historically nefarious parallel movement to that 
of the UGT, which should have faded away long ago but unfortunately had not.
72 
 
Undoubtedly in part to substantiate these ideas of the anarcho-synidcalist movement being 
a malign anachronism, the socialist press was keen to present the CNT’s activities as being 
indicative of an organization founded on a fundamentally flawed set of ideas, as a result of 
which it lurched from one failure to the other.
73 This mirrored the CNT press’s own claims 
that workers were abandoning the CNT in droves.
74 At times the focus of attention centred 
on age-old practical differences such as the question of the ongoing accurement of a strike 
fund, but unsurprisingly the main issue at stake was the role of arbitration bodies. For 
example, the Boletín de la Unión General de Trabajadores highlighted in August 1931 the 
course  of  a  conflict  in  the  Barcelona  metal  industry  by  the  ‘anarchist  union’.  The 
publication made a point of comparing the pay settlement the CNT had achieved after a 
strike that had lasted for a month, noting not just that it was a far lower amount than they 
had initially demanded, but that it represented a lower rate of pay for most categories of 
worker in that industry than their counterparts in Madrid – which is to say UGT members – 
were being paid.
75 Similarly, in November 1931 the CNT’s textile union in Valencia was 
ridiculed after it capitulated to employers after fourteen weeks of conflict. This ridicule 
took the form of printing a letter sent to the employers by the union, which, although 
claiming the union’s  request for talks did not  amount to ‘a confesion  of cowardice or 
exhaustion’ seem to suggest that the union wished to back down.
76 
 
Conclusions 
 
Overall, then, over the course of the period between the founding of the Republic and 
October 1934, the CNT and the UGT through their publications wrote copious amounts on 
one  another.  Their  competing  interpretations  of  one  another  took  the  form  of  fairly 
elaborate and repeatedly expressed constructions of the rival labour federation. In the case 
of the CNT the articulation of its interpretation of the UGT pervaded all levels of the 
CNT’s  journalistic  output,  from  front-page  editorials  all  the  way  down  to  local  union 
notices; moreover the CNT press gave disproportionate coverage to relatively minor events 
simply  because  they  involved  the  UGT.  Crucially,  the  discursive  output  of  both  the  
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anarcho-syndicalists  and  the  socialists  on  one  another  was  not  based  particularly  often 
around a critical application of their theoretical tenets. Rather, theoretical differences were 
articulated through vitriol, if they were articulated at all; much of the discourse was instead 
firmly in the realm of attacking the integrity of the other movement. The overriding feature 
of the discursive output of the two movements was their positioning of the other labour 
federation as having no legitimate role amongst the Spanish working classes, and indeed 
being a purely malign entity that prayed upon them, a judgement that, though inspired by 
theoretical premises, should not be assumed to be a logical or inevitable result of them. It 
would  not  be  inaccurate  to  characterize  these  discursive  outputs  as  being  as  much 
representative  of  a  mentality  held  by  either  group  on  one  another  as  they  were  an 
expression of theoretical or practical differences. As will be seen later in the thesis, for 
many  militants  of  both  organizations  these  mentalities  would  ultimately  prove  to  be 
impervious to being modified by changes in political and social circumstances. 
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Chapter Four: Catalonia and the Second Republic, 1931-1934  
 
Part one of the thesis examined the national level of the CNT’s interactions with the UGT. 
Part two of the thesis will turn its attention to the question of the CNT’s interactions with 
the UGT in Catalonia. As was established in part one, the Catalan region was a key player 
in determining the CNT’s national-level stance on the UGT through its participation in the 
organization’s decision-making process and its control of Solidaridad Obrera. However, in 
addition to the national level of CNT-UGT interactions, it is also crucial to consider how 
the  CNT  and  the  UGT  interacted  in  specific  regional  contexts,  both  because  different 
regions had their own social and political particularities, and also because it was at this 
level  that  the  national  level  of  relations  intersected  with  CNT  and  UGT  unions  and 
militants interacting with one another in the workplace. 
 
Catalonia  represents  a  particularly  intriguing  area  in  which  to  examine  CNT-UGT 
interactions in the Second Republic. There was a great disparity of strength between the 
two organizations here. For the CNT, Catalonia was its stronghold and birthplace; for the 
UGT  Catalonia  represented  a  failure  of  the  organization  to  connect  with  the  most 
proletarian region of the country. As will be highlighted in this part of the thesis, the CNT 
in Catalonia viewed the Catalan UGT as being of an even more reactionary stripe than it 
believed  the  rest  of  the  UGT  to  be;  this  in turn  had  a  profound  impact  on  how  CNT 
militants interacted with the UGT on the ground. 
 
The Republic in Catalonia 
 
The political scene of Catalonia was different from the national political level, primarily 
due to the different institutions that had a governmental role in the region and the different 
set of actors that dominated in the region. These were in turn a result of long-standing 
economic, social and cultural differences between Catalonia and the rest of Spain. Aside 
from the CNT and anarchism’s unique role here, undoubtedly the most prominent features 
of Catalan political and social life during the Second Republic were the fact of the region 
having political autonomy of one form or another during the Republic (with the exception 
of the period between October 1934 and the 1936 election), and the dominance throughout 
of the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. 
 
The ERC was a movement that was quite different from the Republican parties of the 
national political scene. Aside from the obvious dimension of its Catalan nationalism, as a  
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party it was also much more populist than Republican parties elsewhere. The ERC sought 
to appeal at the ballot box as much to Catalonia’s working classes as it did to the middle 
classes, even if its politicians were drawn principally from urban professionals. Courting 
the CNT was a particularly important method of attempting to fulfil this aim, with various 
claims  being  made  regarding  how  in  the  future  the  ERC  would  take  various  steps  to 
alleviate  poor  social  conditions  and  allow  worker  organizations  to  operate  freely.  Its 
attempt to have such a broad appeal had two principal results. Firstly, it ensured that the 
movement was highly popular, both in the final days of the monarchy and in the 1932 
Generalitat elections. Secondly, it meant that the party inevitably had to garner support 
based on a programme of sentiment rather than specific policies, and also set itself the 
rather difficult task, once in power, of bringing about the changes it had championed.
1  
 
The ERC swept to victory in the April 1931 municipal elections, gaining a share of the 
vote far beyond the expectations of even its own leaders. Francesc Macià’s first decisive 
move after the election result was to declare Catalonia a Republic within a federal Spain, a 
move  that  was  then  retracted  just  a  few  days  later  following  negotiations  with  the 
Republicans  in  Madrid.  Though  that  particular  difference  of  opinion  ended  amicably 
enough, it foreshadowed things to come over the course of the Republic in the respect that 
the  precise  division  of  jurisdiction  between  Madrid  and  Barcelona  was  the  subject  of 
ongoing disagreements, and where Madrid’s power ended and the Generalitat’s began was 
in practice never precisely defined.
2 Amongst other things, this uncertainty and rivalry had 
repercussions on the CNT and the UGT in the region due to both the central government 
and the Generalitat both making conflicting claims to the handling of labour conflicts in 
Catalonia, not to mention their own preferred labour federation. 
 
Aside  from  this  grappling  with  Madrid,  the  ERC  was  faced  with  a  further  quandary 
following  the  establishment  of  the  Republic, which  was  how  to  fulfil  the  expectations 
placed on it as a result of the very broad campaign message and the sweeping changes it 
promised to various sectors of Catalan society. As Rider points out, the ERC had two 
possible areas on which it could focus. It could either invest its efforts into creating the 
institutions of an autonomous Catalonia, or it could address the social issues to which it 
had alluded in the build-up to the elections. In the event it chose the former. This would 
have enormous repercussions with regard to its relationship with the CNT, in light of the 
overtures it had made to the anarcho-syndicalist movement. At the same time, however, 
progress was made, albeit slowly, in creating the institutions of autonomy, and each step of 
the way the ERC’s popularity was reaffirmed. Macià created a provisional government,  
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formed from elements of the majority of the Republican and socialist parties in Catalonia.
3 
The  process  to  create  more  permanent  autonomous  institutions  then  began.  Within 
Catalonia, the process ran relatively quickly. However, the process then became severely 
bogged  down  when  the  Cortes  in  Madrid  got  its  hands  on  the  draft  statute.  A  diluted 
version of the statute was approved there in September 1932.
4 The first and only regional 
election of the Second Republic was then held in November 1932, at which the ERC won 
an impressive absolute majority of sixty-one out of eighty-five seats.
5  
 
The  timing  and  results  of  elections  in  Catalonia,  in  which  a  left-Republican  party 
dominated all the way up until October 1934, thus created a key difference between the 
regional political sphere of Catalonia and the national level of politics. In Catalonia, going 
by the regional election at least, there was no rise of the right. Power was held throughout 
by  parties  with  fundamentally  Republican  ideals,  a  fact  that  would  place  the  regional 
government on a collision course with the state in October 1934. However, this broader 
success in the march towards autonomous institutions – or at the very least the continued 
popularity of the ERC in spite of the obstacles encountered along the way – could not 
change the fact that the ERC had neither a specific plan nor the administrative mechanisms 
at its disposal to make the sort of social and labour reforms that would have matched the 
expectations  of  the  CNT,  whose  membership  base  and  leadership  had  been  so  closely 
courted by the ERC in early 1931.
6 
 
Initially the ERC leaders were happy to make concessions to the CNT. Its crackdown on 
the Sindicatos Libres and its agreement with the CNT transport union in June to create a 
CNT closed shop at the Barcelona port, which will be discussed in the next chapter, are 
two key examples of this.
7 However, relations between the CNT and the ERC had become 
fairly acrimonious by the end of 1931. One of the key reasons for this was the flurry of 
CNT strikes that swept the region during the first year of the Republic and the ERC’s 
response to them from its new position of power. Whilst during the monarchy the CNT’s 
actions were viewed by the ERC as being a just response to a corrupt regime, the ERC was 
now itself the regime. In this new role, the party sought first and foremost to maintain 
order.
8 At the same time, civil governors of Barcelona, in particular José Oriol Anguera de 
Sojo, were more than willing to deploy the forces of order against CNT pickets.
9 In so 
doing, the ERC and the Generalitat, in the eyes of the CNT, had turned their back on the 
working classes and the CNT, choosing to defend its institutions once it had power rather 
than come good on the promises it had made to the working classes. As was the case with 
the relationship between the CNT and the Republican-socialist government on the national  
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stage, once a precedent of confrontation between the CNT and the Generalitat and the ERC 
was  established,  there  was  no  turning  back.
10  By  August  L’Opinió,  the  ERC’s  main 
mouthpiece, had begun to attack the CNT’s propensity for strikes, and would only become 
more  critical  as  the  months  passed.
11  At  the  same  time  the  CNT  through  Solidaridad 
Obrera attacked the Generalitat, the civil governors and the ERC with ever more severity. 
 
The CNT in Catalonia 
 
Catalonia was unquestionably the CNT’s heartland, though this is not something that can 
be  understood  simply  by  looking  at  the  raw  membership  figures  of  the  Confederation 
alone. As anarchists and syndicalists frequently asserted both during the 1930s and in the 
long years of exile afterwards, the CNT considered itself, and was considered by many 
workers in Catalonia themselves, to have  gone beyond the  confines of simply being a 
labour union. 
 
A  significant  factor  in  forging  the  CNT’s  popularity  in  Catalonia  was  the  role  of  the 
organization in defending working-class interests in the critical periods of the industrial 
expansion  brought  about  by  World  War  One  and  the  post-boom  stagnation.  As  Angel 
Smith argues, the organization’s steady growth in popularity, starting from approximately 
1916, and culminating in a huge surge in members in 1919, was grounded firmly in its 
ability to organize workers and defend their interests in the context of an escalating cost of 
living and in the face of deeply intransigent employers.
12 Under the leadership of Ángel 
Pestaña and Salvador Seguí, CNT unions in this period staged some highly disciplined, 
arduous  strikes  which  gained  the  widespread  backing  of  the  region’s  urban  workers, 
scoring some notable victories in the process. Above all, the La Canadiense conflict of 
1919 cemented the CNT’s reputation as the defenders of the working classes. Starting as a 
dispute  centred  around  the  dismissal  of  a  handful  of  employees  at  the  La  Canadiense 
electric company, there would be a steady escalation over the following month to the point 
where  nearly  three-quarters  of  Barcelona’s  industry  was  brought  to  a  standstill.  The 
conflict  represented  both  the  greatest  show  of  union  mobilization  and  working-class 
solidarity Spain had seen, and also ushered in  an era of unprecedented repression and 
reprisals by the authorities. The conflict was both the moment when the CNT would come 
to be viewed as representing the industrial working classes of Barcelona and also when the 
notion that governments and employers would stop at nothing to destroy the CNT would 
truly emerge.
13  
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Chris Ealham and Nick Rider have made the crucial contribution to our understanding of 
the labour movement in Barcelona of illustrating and explaining the depth of the CNT’s 
ties with the working classes through its integration into the cultural and social networks of 
working-class Barcelona, and, just as importantly, its willingness to address concerns – 
prior  to  the  faísta  dominance  of  the  organization,  at  least  –  that  arose  outside  of  the 
workplace  but  were  crucial  to  everyday  working-class  life.  Rider  demonstrates,  for 
example,  that  the  CNT  became  involved  in  particular  with  supporting  rent  strikes  in 
Barcelona  and  campaigning  against  the  conditions  of  housing  provided  by  slum 
landlords.
14 Similarly, Ealham highlights the importance of the CNT’s efforts to mobilize 
the unemployed and initiatives such as the creation by the Barcelona construction union of 
a Commission for Economic Defence to campaign for the working classes’ concerns over 
costs of living.
15 These initiatives were carried out through committees that were based in 
the hearts of working class districts, and were thus a focal point within them rather than an 
abstract bureaucratic entity.
16 Such practices took the CNT beyond being simply a vehicle 
for negotiating bases de trabajo and placed it at the centre of workers’ everyday concerns.  
 
Ealham  also  illustrates  that  such  integration  into  the  everyday  life  of  working-class 
Barcelona  allowed  the  CNT  to  be  kept  alive  during  the  Primo  de  Rivera  dictatorship, 
through its militants meeting in such institutions as the social and cultural clubs known as 
ateneus. This allowed the CNT’s militants to re-found its unions quickly, and the rapidity 
of the remobilization is a reflection of the commitment of the movement’s militants and the 
extent to which they were integrated with the Barcelona working classes.
17 
 
Whilst recognizing the unique manner in which the CNT was embedded into the social 
structures of working-class Barcelona and other industrial towns in the province, however, 
it is also important to recognize that its periods of membership growth and decline were 
very  rapid.  This  can  be  attributed  to  the  phenomenon  of  what  might  be  termed  more 
‘passive’ workers flocking to the CNT as it came out into the open. The Republic brought 
with it in Catalonia highly significant proportions of workers – sometimes over half of the 
workers in some unskilled industries – joining the sindicatos únicos. Regardless of what 
claims the Catalan UGT might have made about workers being coerced into joining the 
CNT, which will be discussed in this part of the thesis, such a mobilization simply could 
not have been propelled primarily through intimidation. Crucially, however, joining the 
CNT as it was preparing to redress grievances from the 1920s was one thing, but staying 
with the organization into the darker years of 1933 and 1934 was another matter. As Anna 
Monjo highlights, there was a fundamentally different level of involvement of ordinary  
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workers – those whose commitment to the organization did not extend beyond acquiring a 
membership  card,  or  in  some  cases  attempting  to  organize  a  CNT  section  in  their 
workplace – in the anarcho-syndicalist movement in Catalonia compared to that of the 
organization’s committed militants.
18 And as Eulàlia Vega argues, these ordinary workers 
often  did  not  live  up  to  the  expectations  of  the  organizing  militants  in  terms  of  their 
commitment  to  the  organization.
19  The  decline  in  membership  levels  over  these  years 
certainly  reflected  –  in  addition  to  the  repression  suffered  by  the  movement  –  that  a 
significant  proportion  of  workers  were  happy  to  back  the  CNT  when  it  was  on  the 
ascendant, but less interested in the movement in more difficult times.     
 
A final factor in considering the extent of the links between the CNT and the Catalan 
working classes is the role played by the propaganda output of the CNT press and the 
organization’s  militants.  The  CNT’s  propaganda  was  more  than  equal  to  the  task  of 
creating its own mythology for the movement; as Casanova argues convincingly, rhetoric 
became an increasingly central prop to the CNT’s attempts to mobilize workers during the 
Republic.
20 One of the most crucial facets of this, outlined in chapter three of this thesis, 
was the linkage made by the CNT through its press between itself and the working classes; 
Solidaridad Obrera, the paper of the Catalan CNT, was at the very forefront of making this 
argument that the CNT was the organizational embodiment of the working classes. As such 
it is difficult to know precisely where the genuine popularity of the movement stopped and 
the self-mythologizing began. 
 
The bulk of the CNT’s membership base in Catalonia was drawn from the unskilled sectors 
of Barcelona – with semi-skilled and skilled blue-collar and also lower-level service sector 
jobs  also  occupying  an  important  secondary  position  –  and  also  the  working-class 
populations of the industrial towns of Barcelona province. In the period prior to the onset 
of  decline,  the  largest  unions  in  Barcelona  were  the  construction  union,  with  24000 
members  in  June  1931;  the  textile  union,  with  30000;  the  metal  workers’  union,  with 
30000; and the transport union, with 18000 members. Even as the CNT in Catalonia had 
shed a third of its membership by early 1933, these sectors continued to be the biggest 
unions, with each continuing to have at least 10000 members even in late 1933. Certain 
non-industrial sectors also had a large proportion of workers affiliated to the CNT for a 
time. For example, at one point there were 7000 shop workers, though this figure had 
plummeted  to  just  1000  by  March  1933.  Likewise,  there  were  8000  Barcelona-based 
graphic arts workers in the organization in 1932.
21 Outside of Barcelona, the key industrial 
towns of the province, such as Terrassa, Badalona, Sabadell and Manresa, had similarly  
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large proportions of the local workforce belonging to the CNT, with the unskilled sectors 
likewise dominating their membership figures. Many smaller towns in the province also 
had membership figures in the thousands, though it is more difficult to break down these 
figures into individual industries.
22 Outside of Barcelona province, the CNT’s presence 
was much less strong. 
 
The broad outlines of the CNT’s changes in membership levels in Catalonia have been 
touched upon in chapter one. Indeed, as discussed, the rapid rise and subsequent decline in 
membership levels were most pronounced of all in Catalonia. The overall membership of 
the CNT in Catalonia had a peak of 291150 in June 1931; by March 1933 it was 202354, a 
figure that does not take into account the further substantial losses inflicted through the 
formal departure of the treintistas.
23 In absolute terms the greatest losses were suffered by 
the largest unions in Barcelona; the construction union had fallen to 10000 members by 
March 1933, while the textiles union had dropped to 20000 members. The BOC’s unions 
also began to make in-roads into several industries, to the irritation of the CNT, most 
notably  shop  workers  and  power  workers,  as  well  as  expanding  in  Gerona  and  Lleida 
following the expulsion from the CNT of unions led by bloquistas.
24 In proportional terms, 
these declines were matched and sometimes surpassed in smaller unions and in industrial 
towns outside of Barcelona. The membership of the CNT in Badalona, for example, fell 
from a peak of 13888 in June 1931 to 2860 in March 1933.
25   
 
The UGT in Catalonia 
 
Judging the fortunes of the Catalan UGT is a more difficult task than examining the CNT 
in the region, due to a combination of the movement leaving much less in the way of 
documentation behind and the lack of research that has been carried out into the socialist 
labour federation in Catalonia. Whilst it cannot be denied that the Catalan UGT was on the 
fringes of the labour movement in Catalonia for much of the Republic, it would be to the 
detriment of the historiography of the period to ignore the movement for a whole host of 
reasons. For one thing, doing so impedes the ability to understand the growth of the UGT 
in Catalonia during the Civil War. It also means that a sector of the Catalan workers’ 
movement whose affiliation was in the tens of thousands, and moreover whose numbers 
grew throughout the period, as will be examined in this part of the thesis, is missing from 
analysis of the subject area. 
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In the absence of analysis of the Catalan UGT, the CNT’s own perspective on the socialist 
labour federation in the region seems to have been adopted by some historians.
26 As will be 
examined in more detail in the next three chapters, this perspective was essentially that the 
UGT represented a rump of the reactionary elements of the urban workforce in Catalonia, 
and in the Second Republic was a haven for the pistoleros and yellow workers of the 
Sindicatos Libres. An evolution of this view with regard to the Civil War, endorsed by 
some historians such as Stanley Payne, was that the Catalan UGT became a refuge for the 
petite  bourgeoisie  of  the  region  as  they  sought  protection  from  the  CNT’s  social 
revolution.
27 Research produced by David Ballester and Pere Gabriel has demonstrated that 
individual aspects of the CNT’s attacks on the UGT are inaccurate. Gabriel’s research into 
the Catalan UGT demonstrates that it was substantially larger than is often acknowledged
28 
– the CNT repeatedly claimed that the UGT in Catalonia was miniscule – while David 
Ballester’s  work  reveals,  among  other  things,  that  the  Catalan  UGT  was  not  simply  a 
continuation of the Sindicatos Libres.
29 However, neither Gabriel nor Ballester in their 
writings seek specifically to address the CNT’s own interpretation of the Catalan UGT. 
The following chapters of the thesis will demonstrate that to a very significant extent the 
CNT’s portrayal of the Catalan UGT as an entity that acted as an agent and a vessel for the 
forces  of  reaction  and  that  was  instinctively  rejected  by  workers  does  not  stand  up  to 
scrutiny,  and  that  as  such  the  general  position  that  the  Catalan  UGT  occupies  in  the 
historiography is in need of reassessment.  
 
In Barcelona, the organization was formed of a combination of unions that catered to a 
specific skill-set, as well as some unions, considerably smaller than those of the CNT, 
which catered to the unskilled sectors that formed such a large proportion of the Barcelona 
workforce.  The  details  of  unions  from  Catalonia  that  entered  the  UGT  provide  some 
indication of this trend.
 Of the fifty-four UGT unions based in Barcelona whose entries to 
the socialist labour federation were recorded by the Executive Commission between April 
1931 and October 1934, a significant proportion catered to one relatively specific trade.
30 
Often these sorts of UGT unions in Barcelona represented the more skilled occupations 
within such fields, such as masons in the construction industry or electricians, though it 
would be an error to view the UGT’s unions in Barcelona as simply representing that of a 
labour aristocracy who wanted to separate from their counterparts. There were also UGT 
unions which, whilst catering to a specific occupation, did not cater to an especially skilled 
one. This was the case with the various unions that comprised the organizations of the port 
federation, which were split according to the goods that the workers handled in the loading 
and unloading process.
31   
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However, the UGT unions of Barcelona and Catalonia were certainly not only comprised 
of entities that represented individual occupations, whether of a skilled nature or otherwise. 
A large proportion of the UGT’s unions in Barcelona were either broad and industrial-
based, such as its metal and textile unions, or covered a limited set of occupations in which 
there was a significant number of workers, such as barbers and bakers. Indeed, the UGT 
tended  to  have  established  unions  in  Barcelona  in  these  areas  prior  to  the  Republic. 
However, these unions, especially the ones that catered for the most unskilled sector of the 
workforce, such as in the construction and textile industries, were generally much smaller 
than their CNT counterparts in 1931. For example, while the UGT’s bricklayers’ union had 
only a few thousand members, the CNT’s construction union had a peak of 24000. UGT 
unions tend to have been numerically stronger in the service sector, catering to semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers as much as the skilled. For example, although the UGT’s bakery 
union  was,  with  approximately  200  members,  smaller  than  the  CNT’s  own,  it  was 
nevertheless a stable union, representing a field of workers which, though not as unskilled 
and beset by unemployment as construction workers, did suffer low pay and fairly torrid 
working conditions. The UGT in Barcelona also had unions for waiters and grocery store 
workers,  occupations  which  were  similarly  outside  the  immediate  orbit  of  unskilled 
industrial labour but certainly important sectors of the Catalan workforce.
32  
 
The final category of employment that the UGT had in Barcelona and Catalonia was that 
of clerical and administrative workers, a group that had traditionally remained outside of 
the labour federations until the Second Republic. In fact, during the Republic, especially 
from  1933  onwards,  non-professional  white-collar  workers  were  one  of  the  most 
significant groups of new entrants to the UGT in Catalonia. The entry of the Barcelona 
bank workers’ union into the UGT in early 1934 brought with it nearly 3000 new members 
to the organization, the largest single union entry into the organization from Barcelona 
prior to October 1934. Pharmacy workers and local government employees also provided 
significant influxes of members to the Catalan UGT from 1933 onwards. This white-collar 
sector was one in which the CNT in Catalonia had not managed to achieve a significant 
foothold, and this would continue to be the case throughout the Republic.
33   
 
Overall, although the UGT was small relative to the CNT in Barcelona during the first 
years of the Republic, it nevertheless had an organizational presence in the majority of 
industries  and  skill  levels  in  the  city.  Admittedly  much  of  its  membership  was  either 
organized in niche professions or sectors in which the CNT had little influence, such as 
amongst office workers; but it also had unions, albeit generally small ones, in the industries  
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dominated by the CNT’s sindicatos únicos. Had it not done so, and had it been comprised 
of  unions  of  skilled,  niche  professions,  there  would  have  been  far  less  scope  for 
antagonism between the CNT and the UGT in the city. 
 
The overall trajectory of the Catalan UGT between 1931 and 1934 is a curious one of weak 
and  split  leadership  that  was  accompanied,  against  all  odds,  by  a  modest  growth.  The 
movement  in  Catalonia had  been  dogged  by  splits  at leadership  level  since  before  the 
Republic. One of the key dividing lines was the question of allegiance to the PSOE. On the 
one hand there were arch-PSOE loyalists, and on the other there were those who sided with 
the Unió Socialista de Catalunya, whose most fundamental difference with the PSOE was 
its pro-regionalist stance. The USC was a larger party than the tiny Catalan PSOE; in spite 
of efforts made within Catalonia to reconcile the two, the socialist leadership in Madrid put 
a halt to any rapprochement, leading in July 1934 to the UGT unions that were loyal to the 
USC, totalling approximately 20000 members, breaking from the UGT to form the Unió 
General de Sindicats Obrers de Catalunya (UGSOC).
34 The pro-USC unions constituted a 
significant  proportion  of  the  Catalan  UGT,  including  the  entire  Barcelona  Local 
Federation; as such the split left the UGT itself significantly reduced in size. Reconciliation 
would come about in April 1936.
35  
 
Given the infighting that took place amongst those involved at the top of the UGT in 
Catalonia, it is surprising that the organization actually grew during the Republic. The 
socialist labour federation had just under 17000 members in Catalonia in October 1931, but 
by April 1934 it had nearly 45000.
36 Whilst this still did not make the Catalan UGT as big 
as the CNT in the region, it must be placed in the context of the Catalan CNT losing a third 
of its membership during the same period. Whilst the CNT in Catalonia experienced an 
initial explosion in membership followed by a longer-term decline, the Catalan UGT by 
and large grew at a steady rate. There are no reliable figures for the CNT’s membership in 
1934, but given that it was down to 200000 in March 1933, it is not  unreasonable to 
assume that its membership levels were even lower by the spring of 1934. The disparity in 
membership between the CNT and the UGT in Catalonia in this period therefore shrank 
considerably.         
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Chapter Five: CNT Direct Action and the Marginalization of the Catalan UGT  
 
It should by this point be clear that between the beginning of the Republic and October 
1934, the basic position expressed publicly by the CNT regarding the UGT was one of 
outright opposition phrased in terms of accusations of treachery, plans to destroy the CNT 
and  attempts  to  manipulate  the  working  classes  at  the  behest  of  the  bourgeoisie.  The 
Catalan CNT’s stance on its socialist rival in the region was not merely a straightforward 
re-articulation of the national-level stance adopted towards the UGT. The cenetistas of 
Catalonia adopted a uniquely hostile position over the Catalan UGT. This opposition to the 
UGT did not only manifest itself in the form of vitriolic propaganda attacks on the UGT, 
but  also  took  the  form  of  physical  measures  that  were  carried  out  to  prevent  the 
establishment of UGT unions in the region.  
   
An examination of this campaign against the UGT is the principal focus of the following 
two chapters. This chapter will examine what might be termed the ‘practical’ side of the 
CNT’s  attempts  to  marginalize  the  UGT  in  Catalonia,  in  the  form  of  highlighting  the 
combinations of threats, boycotts and other forms of mobilization against the Catalan UGT 
that were attempted by the CNT. The subsequent chapter will then examine the discursive 
construction of the Catalan UGT that underpinned the CNT’s attempts to marginalize the 
socialist  labour  federation  in  the  region,  as  well  as  examine  how  far  this  construction 
reflected both the reality  of the Catalan UGT and also to what extent it represented  a 
satisfactory explanation of why CNT and UGT entities in the region came to blows.   
 
The practical dimensions of the marginalization of the Catalan UGT 
 
The newspapers of the Catalan UGT during the first years of the Republic, as Nick Rider 
points out, dedicated an extremely large proportion of their column inches to criticizing the 
activities of the CNT in the region.
1 The majority of this criticism, anchored firmly in the 
notions  of  violent  ‘anarchists’  and  ‘syndicalists’  that  were  discussed  in  chapter  three, 
centred  on  accusations  of  the  Catalan  CNT  systematically  trying  to  exclude  and 
marginalize the Catalan UGT and other unions from operating in Catalonia. The Catalan 
UGT’s papers repeatedly cried foul over instances of CNT unions and activists organizing 
boycotts  against  UGT  unions,  of  collusion  with  employers  to  effect  the  removal  of 
ugetistas from workplaces and of outright, unprovoked threats of violence against UGT 
activists  and  ordinary  workers.  The  first  issue  of  La  Internacional,  the  Catalan  UGT 
newspaper launched in June 1931, coincided with a violent altercation between cenetistas  
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and  ugetistas  at  the  Alena  wood  panel  factory;  the  paper’s  extensive  and  indignant 
coverage of the event set out its central message on the CNT from its very first issue. The 
incident  was  presented  as  part  of  a  widespread  trend  of  workers  ‘being  coerced  and 
attacked by those from the CNT, who wish to impose their will through any means on 
Catalan  workers’.
2  CNT-UGT  hostilities  in  Catalonia  were  for  the  Catalan  UGT 
fundamentally a question of freedom of workers to choose their union affiliations. The 
struggles between the CNT and the UGT at the Barcelona port, for example, which was the 
most high-profile battleground between the labour federations in the region, ‘boils down to 
an attack against freedom of union affiliation through the violent coercion of the CNT and 
the defence of it by the UGT’.
3  
 
Not all incidents reported in the Catalan UGT’s newspapers were the clear-cut cases of 
anti-UGT violence that they were reported to be. The example of the Alena factory, as will 
be seen in chapter six, was one such case of the Catalan UGT accusing the CNT of violent 
intimidation when in reality the event was far more complex. Nevertheless, although the 
press  of  the  Catalan  UGT  presented  virtually  all  CNT  activity  in  the  region  as  being 
directed at imposing itself on workers, there were unquestionably numerous cases of CNT 
militants and organisms in Catalonia attempting to use force, intimidation and rhetoric to 
try and neutralize their UGT rivals. To provide just one general example here, before going 
on to examine the specific ways in which CNT organisms attempted to sideline grassroots 
UGT  rivals,  the  ugetistas  of  Mataró  were  subject  to  various  forms  of  intimidation 
throughout the Republic. In addition to regular articles published in La Internacional on 
the subject,
4 the UGT’s local gas, water and electricity union sent a telegram to the Civil 
Governor in August 1932 to complain about ‘outrages committed by extremist elements in 
public  meetings  and  against  our  comrades’.
5  This  message  followed  on  from  similar 
complaints made by the leaders of the local UGT to the Executive Commission in May 
1932 following attempts made by the CNT in the textile industry, which included a strike, 
to force workers to leave the UGT and join the CNT.
6  
 
The most basic level of anarcho-syndicalist militants resorting to intimidation in Catalonia 
during the Republic appears to have simply taken the form of workers, most likely whilst 
at their workplace, being told to join the CNT, with this instruction being accompanied by 
some form of threat of consequences in the event of non-compliance. José Peirats, who 
was one of the CNT’s most committed servants in the post-Civil War decades of exile, 
recounts how his recruitment into the CNT in 1922 as a fourteen year-old came about 
through  him  being  summoned  to  the  offices  of  the  construction  union,  where  he  was  
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questioned about why he had not yet joined the union and warned that if he did not do so 
he would have to ‘abide by the consequences’.
7 Given the highly informal nature of this 
practice, it is almost impossible to gauge how widespread it was. Undoubtedly the general 
accusation made in the pages of La Internacional and Cataluña Obrera, the two official 
papers of the Catalan UGT, of CNT intimidation of workers was based on just such a 
practice. In itself, this type of activity was not so much directed at UGT members as it was 
at  all  workers  who  were  not  in  the  CNT  and  happened  to  be  working  in  a  sector  or 
workplace in which cenetistas saw fit to adopt this tactic. Nevertheless, it inevitably had an 
impact on the ability of individuals to join or remain in the UGT, and also served the 
purpose of preventing the spread of rivals such as the UGT as much as it did on gathering 
unaffiliated workers into the CNT. This is illustrated by the plight of the treasurer of the 
UGT’s  national  textile  federation,  which  was  based  in  Barcelona,  who  wrote  to  the 
Executive Commission to plead that he be allowed to remain as a member of the UGT in 
spite of the fact that ‘due to anarchist coercions he has had to accept the membership card 
of the Confederation, without which he would have been prevented from working’.
8  
 
However, whilst there was an unquantifiable level of workers being informally pressured 
to join the CNT, there were times when the amount of workers involved was sufficiently 
large  and  the  actions  of  the  cenetistas  involved  were  sufficiently  aggressive  for  the 
incidents to come to public attention. Such cases tended to come about not from CNT 
militants attempting to induct unaffiliated workers, but from when they attempted to force 
them  out  of  the  UGT  and  into  the  CNT.  Such  a  case  occurred  at  a  textile  factory  in 
Manlleu, where a UGT union had existed since before the founding of the Republic. In 
June 1931, cenetistas in the town made threats against workers in one factory there to warn 
them off from the UGT. A public meeting was held by the CNT in the town, during the 
course of which one of the speakers, according to the socialist press, asserted that the UGT 
needed to be removed from the town. The next day, two cenetistas who had come to the 
town  from  Barcelona  entered  a  local  factory  in  which  the  workers,  who  totalled 
approximately seventy, were members of the UGT’s local textiles union, and ordered the 
workers there to leave the UGT and join the CNT. When the workers did not comply, the 
cenetistas left the workplace, only to return later the same day, this time threatening to 
burn down the factory, and then returning a third time, when, after failing to stop work 
there, they gave the employees fifteen days to leave the UGT and join the CNT.
9 The 
socialist  press  made  much  of  the  incident,  with  El  Socialista  referring  to  it  on  three 
separate occasions in the course of publishing editorials that focused on CNT violence.
10  
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The case of Manlleu was one of many in which the UGT, rather than unaffiliated workers 
in general, were targeted by the CNT within a particular workplace, locality or industry. 
Whilst in some cases, such as Manlleu, the attempts involved the simple use of threats, in 
others  the  CNT  organized  boycotts  and  strikes  to  force  out  the  UGT  presence  in  a 
particular  sector.  Undoubtedly  the  most  high-profile  examples  of  this  occurred  at  the 
Barcelona port during 1931. Here on the 28
th May 1931, the CNT’s transport union held an 
assembly, at which the port sections agreed that they would from then on refuse to work 
with individuals who were not in the CNT.
11 The Catalan government quickly stepped in, 
bringing about a temporary resolution to the matter that enraged the ugetistas. Francesc 
Macià declared on 9
th June that only CNT members would be allowed to work in the 
loading and unloading of goods at the port.
12 Through La Internacional the UGT presented 
this development as proof of Generalitat favouritism towards the CNT, motivated in part 
by a desire to win votes from CNT members and in part by a fear of the consequences of 
not  acquiescing  to  the  CNT.
13  The  UGT  port  federation  was  therefore  temporarily 
sidelined, with its members joining the CNT’s transport union so that they could continue 
working. Therefore partly with the help of the new Catalan government, the CNT was able 
– temporarily at least, as will be examined in chapter seven – to force the removal of the 
UGT from the Barcelona port. 
 
However, this was not the last instance of the CNT resorting to such methods to remove 
the UGT at the port. The initial monopoly granted to the CNT transport union at the docks 
was soon broken after it held a strike at the port almost immediately afterwards.
14 The 
UGT’s  port  federation,  perhaps  unsurprisingly  given  the  CNT  boycott  against  it  the 
previous month, provided workers to replace the strikers,
15 and it is likely that those UGT 
members who had joined the CNT in June to continue working then returned to the UGT. 
Following the conclusion of the CNT strike at the end of July, an uneasy truce prevailed at 
the port in the following months. The animosities over the port between the CNT and the 
UGT,  which  now  had  a  worker  presence  at  the  port  once  more,  though  admittedly  a 
reduced one, were articulated through the newspapers of the two organizations, as they had 
been since May, with Desiderio Trilles, the leader of the UGT port federation, accusing the 
CNT of routinely threatening and intimidating UGT members and non-affiliated workers 
through the pages of La Internacional.
16 But in October 1931 these hostilities gained a 
practical dimension once more, when the members of the port section of the CNT transport 
union voted in favour of refusing to work with non-CNT workers. There can be no doubt 
that  this  decision  was  more  motivated  by  seeking  to  remove  the  UGT  than  it  was  by 
making unaffiliated workers join the CNT.
17   
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This time, however, there would be no endorsement of this position from the Generalitat; 
much of the goodwill between it and the anarcho-syndicalists had been destroyed by the 
CNT’s July strike. Instead, what was effectively a form of strike broke out. Cenetistas who 
worked on board ships refused to hand over wood to ugetista dockers; similar cases of 
refusal to engage in work that involved contact with UGT members occurred in other 
sectors. The strike had a significant impact on the Barcelona economy, with industrial 
concerns in the region running out of primary materials. In spite of the disruption it caused, 
however, through a combination of the regional authorities taking a highly intransigent 
stance  against  the  boycott  and  the  UGT  somewhat  unsurprisingly  willing  to  provide 
members to replace CNT workers in a strike that was directed against itself, the boycott 
effort effectively collapsed by the end of October. Nevertheless, the CNT’s transport union 
had been willing to carry out a month-long strike to the principal objective of excluding the 
UGT from the port.
18  
 
The events at the port over 1931 were the most large-scale example of what was repeated 
on the smaller level of workplaces in Barcelona during the first years of the Republic. For 
example, in September 1932, the CNT textiles union carried out a strike against the Casa 
Sans, in protest at ‘the frequent provocations of the few workers affiliated to the Unión 
General  de  Trabajadores’  who  had  allegedly  been  hired  as  the  product  of  collusion 
between socialists, the employer and the authorities.
19 As will be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter, Solidaridad Obrera played a crucial role in mobilizing workers behind 
such conflicts through going to lengthy efforts to demonize the UGT workers involved. 
The cenetistas from Sants who conducted the campaign asserted that ‘the workers want, as 
is natural and normal, the dismissal of these shameful individuals [the UGT workers] who, 
unconsciously or through bad faith, are playing into the bourgeoisie’s hands and bring 
disquiet to all of the textile industry’.
20 It is difficult to find specific examples of the UGT 
members’ bad conduct being referred to by the cenetistas. The account of the strike given 
in  La  Vanguardia  paints  a  different  picture,  according  to  which  a  proportion  of  the 
factory’s two hundred workers did not wish to support the strike, and consequently the 
police  were  dispatched  to  protect  the  workers  through  the  picket  line,  something  that 
further angered cenetistas.
21 In some workplaces, therefore, the CNT militants regarded a 
UGT presence as sufficiently grave as to warrant initiating a strike to force their exclusion.   
 
Attacks on UGT organisms were not just restricted to the workplace. On various occasions 
between April 1931 and October 1934, CNT militants adopted the tactic of disrupting UGT 
meetings.  In  towns  outside  of  Barcelona,  the  tactic  could  be  used  to  try  and  halt  the  
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presence of the UGT altogether, owing to the smaller size of the locality. For example, in 
Terrassa on 5
th August 1932, the UGT attempted to hold a propaganda meeting in the 
town, with Desiderio Trilles, the leader of the UGT unions at the Barcelona port and a 
deeply unpopular figure amongst cenetistas, as one of the main speakers. According to the 
account given by local cenetistas in Solidaridad Obrera, there was an impressive turnout 
of workers at the event, who were there solely to heckle the speakers. Some individuals in 
the crowd started throwing chairs and stones at the orators, with one being struck on the 
head by a stone. After an hour, the police arrived, which according to the CNT account 
was indicative of ‘the official support that the socialenchufistas receive’.
22 Five cenetistas 
were arrested.
23 This response to the UGT propaganda meeting reflected the general modus 
operandi of the faísta elements of the CNT in Terrassa, who also attended meetings of 
treintistas in the town to shout down the orators.
24 
 
In Barcelona the tactic of disrupting meetings tended to be carried out at the union level to 
try  and  prevent  the  spread  of  the  UGT  within  a  particular  sector.  In  April  1934,  for 
example, cenetista bus employees attempted to disrupt a meeting at the Casa del Pueblo of 
their UGT counterparts. Their intention in doing this was to ‘unmask the Judas of the 
buses’ that was the UGT.  In writing about the incident, one of the cenetista participants 
explained  that  the  CNT  in  carrying  out  such  actions  ‘defends  like  a  man  what  that 
miserable [organization] stamps on and sells to the company like a coward: the dignity of 
the worker’. The departing cenetistas were met by members of the Guardia de Asalto, 
whom the ugetistas had called to report the disturbance; this aspect of the incident was 
used to create the headline: ‘In the UGT they incite the arrest of workers’.
25  
 
Above all, however, the main thrust of efforts to marginalize the UGT in Catalonia was 
carried out by mobilizing workers against the socialist labour federation through the CNT 
press, orators at public meetings and other forms of propaganda. As will be discussed 
further in the next chapter, the examples of attacks on UGT entities outlined above were 
not limited to physical acts of disruption. Inevitably, they were underpinned by an anti-
UGT rationale that was put forward by cenetistas to explain their attacks on the UGT. In 
some  cases,  in  particular  ongoing  boycotts  against  UGT  workers,  this  recourse  to 
aggressively asserted anti-UGT arguments was an integral part of sustaining the practical 
dimension of the attacks on the UGT by ensuring workers stayed motivated to support the 
actions. However, attacking UGT organisms through the press was in itself a regularly 
used method by cenetistas in their efforts to mobilize workers in their area of activity 
against their UGT rivals.   
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Throughout the first four years of the Republic, this use of Solidaridad Obrera and other 
CNT and anarchist and/or syndicalist papers by grassroots cenetistas was the most publicly 
visible  aspect  of  the  CNT’s  attacks  on  the  Catalan  UGT,  and  was  highly  widespread. 
Solidaridad Obrera’s union and local notices sections, which were generally comprised of 
messages  by  members  of  union  juntas  or  local  federations,  very  frequently  contained 
instances of attacks on a UGT rival. Militants from outside of Barcelona were apt to use 
Solidaridad Obrera to turn workers against UGT presences in their locality. For example, 
in February 1933, the cenetistas of Caldes de Montbui published an article in Solidaridad 
Obrera recounting an altercation at a local foundry between a foreman named Ignacio 
Martínez and the CNT-affiliated workers at the factory. Martínez had, according to the 
contributor, ‘wielded a pistol, cockily threatening some workers’. The report focused on 
the wider threat that the UGT posed to the workers of Caldes de Montbui, based on the 
premise that it housed individuals such as Martínez:  
 
We know what individuals of Ignacio Martínez’s kind propose to do in this town. We 
know that they want to impose the UGT (General Traitors’ Union) with the collaboration 
and help of the socialist ministers. Here, people of Caldes, is who those of the UGT are.
26  
 
CNT unions in Barcelona were equally prepared to use Solidaridad Obrera to mobilize 
workers  against  their  UGT  rivals.  In  the  most  important  sectors  of  the  Barcelona 
workforce, such as the port and the construction industry, these campaigns occupied much 
of the front pages and headlines of the paper, thus elevating them to the level of an attack 
on all UGT entities in the region. Such attacks will be explored in more detail later in the 
next chapter. However, union juntas in Barcelona also used the press to mobilize their 
members against the UGT in their sector of activity in a bid to stop the socialist labour 
federation gaining a foothold there. The public anti-UGT stance taken by the CNT’s wood 
workers’ union at the start of the Republic is an example of the zero-tolerance stance taken 
to the possible enrolment of workers in the industry in the UGT that was put forward 
through Solidaridad Obrera. In early June 1931 the union placed an article in the paper in 
which it warned its members to remain vigilant against the possibility of attempts to recruit 
UGT members in their workplaces. A specific workshop in the wood working industry was 
then  given  as  an  example  of  the  threat  the  UGT  posed,  in  which  the  CNT  workers 
boycotted their single UGT colleague to force his removal. The following description was 
given of the individual in question, having named the workplace being discussed: 
 
In [the workshop] there are eight workers, all of whom belong to the wood workers’ 
union.  Only  one  of  them  refuses  to  accept  the  card.  This  individual  is  an  agent  
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provocateur of the UGT. He works like a condemned man, out of step from the normal 
and  human  rhythm  of  the  other  comrades  in  the  workshop.  Furthermore  he  coarsely 
insults our organization and makes rude remarks of the most repugnant vulgarity.
27 
 
According to the article, the workshop owner, having taken on board the opposition of the 
other  workers  to  this  individual,  proceeded  to  dismiss  him.  However,  the  ugetista, 
‘emboldened and supported’ by the UGT, returned to the workshop, in possession of some 
form of stamped certificate that apparently required him to be rehired. The seven cenetistas 
abandoned work in protest. The UGT worker then returned to the workshop once more, 
according to the cenetistas’ report, accompanied by policemen, to order the owner to rehire 
the worker and instruct him to, ‘if necessary, ask the reformist and yellow UGT for new 
personnel’.  Wood  workers  were  warned  to  be  vigilant  against  similar  ‘socialist 
machinations’.
28 
 
The version of events put forwards by the CNT junta reveals how some cenetistas wished 
ugetistas who worked in their industry to be treated and perceived by CNT members. The 
account  of  the  incident,  based  as  it  was  on  the  unrealistic  claim  that  individual  UGT 
workers  had  almost  limitless  access  to  the  support  of  the  authorities,  was  designed  to 
present the idea that UGT workers were inevitably a source of trouble and needed to be 
forced out by their CNT colleagues. The worker was depicted as a traitor of the highest 
order,  and  the  central  implication  of  the  article  was  that  other  UGT  members  in  their 
workplaces  were  the  same.  The  leaders  of  the  CNT  wood  workers’  union  –  and  their 
attitude was mirrored by other union leaders as well – therefore adopted a tactic of trying 
to force out individual UGT workers by mobilizing ordinary CNT members against them 
through the CNT press. 
 
Therefore during the first four years of the Republic, many CNT militants in Barcelona and 
elsewhere in Catalonia took aggressive steps to neutralize UGT presences in their area of 
labour militancy. Whilst this was linked to the more widespread tendency amongst some 
cenetistas of seeking to pressurize non-affiliated workers into the Confederation, it is clear 
that, when faced with a UGT presence, many CNT militants would resort to methods that 
went far beyond these usual pressure tactics. Although it would be unwise to suggest that 
these methods were universally adopted by cenetistas in Catalonia against the UGT, it is 
clear  that  they  were  relatively  widespread,  and  certainly  do  not  appear  to  have  been 
discouraged by anyone in the Catalan anarcho-syndicalist movement. As such, it would be 
worth  exploring  the  extent  to  which  these  activities  against  the  UGT  represented  a  
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deliberate  policy  that  had  been  agreed  upon  through  the  CNT’s  decision-making 
mechanisms. 
 
The CNT decision-making process on the Catalan UGT 
 
The non-discussion of the UGT at national-level plenums as outlined in chapter one was 
just as notable in Catalonia. Here, across the regional plenums held between 1931 and 
1934, the issue of the UGT was also virtually absent from discussions in terms of the UGT 
on the national level. Instead, aside from routine administrative issues, the key issues of 
debate related either to the factional battle that was progressively tearing the Catalan CNT 
apart, or appraisals of the CNT’s past and future protest actions and the debilitating effects 
of  government  repression  of  the  organization.  This  latter  category  of  debate  did  on 
occasion refer to the socialist movement and the role it was playing from government, but 
overall there was very little discussion of the activities of the UGT in Catalonia.
29  
 
In general, a similar lack of formal discussion of the Catalan UGT and how the CNT 
should react to it – including discussion of methods to halt the growth of UGT organisms – 
was also a feature of discussions that took place at the meetings of the Barcelona Local 
Federation  and  of  CNT  unions  in  the  city.
30  The  main  features  of  discussion  of  the 
construction union’s junta meetings in 1933 related to attempting to mobilize and organize 
workers in the industry in the face of restrictions placed by the authorities on the union and 
an appreciable loss of interest among a significant proportion of unskilled workers in the 
industry. The UGT construction rival was mentioned tangentially as a result of workers at 
the hospital militar being enrolled in the socialist labour federation and thus participating 
in the jurados mixtos, but no discussion was made of how to respond to this, or indeed 
whether to respond at all.
31 The decisions by the transport unions to boycott non-CNT 
workers in 1931 were a product of assemblies of the CNT transport union.
32 The case of 
the port, however, seems to represent the only significant example of a union coherently 
formulating a strategy against the UGT in this fashion. Generally speaking, neither at the 
level of regional plenums nor at local federation level was a coherent strategy formulated 
on UGT unions. Thus the instances of attacks on UGT unions in Barcelona and elsewhere 
in Catalonia cannot be considered as being part of a pre-formulated campaign or some 
other official policy of attacking the UGT wherever they appeared in the region. 
 
However, though the Catalan UGT was rarely the subject of discussion at the regional and 
Barcelona-level decision-making processes, and accordingly no official stance nor strategy  
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was  formulated  on  it,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  a  sizeable  majority  of  committed 
cenetistas shared precisely the same sentiment on the Catalan UGT, namely that it was the 
embodiment  of  reaction  and  an  integral  part  of  the  efforts  of  the  bourgeoisie  and  the 
government  to  destroy  the  CNT.
33  One  particular  incident  at  the  May  1932  regional 
plenum  illustrates  the  unanimously  felt  nature  of  this  sentiment  amongst  Catalan 
cenetistas.  At this plenum, the Catalan UGT was brought up in response to a manifesto 
published in El Obrero, a recently launched paper that was in fact an initiative of former 
members  of  the  Sindicatos  Libres  who  were  trying  to  rebuild  their  shattered  labour 
federation, and had no  connections with the  UGT. To unanimous  applause, a delegate 
spoke in response to the manifesto, arguing that cenetistas in Catalonia were as under 
threat  from  pistoleros  as  they  had  been  during  the  monarchy,  and  asserted  that  these 
pistoleros  were  now  enrolled  in  the  UGT  following  the  dissolution  of  the  Sindicatos 
Libres.
34 
  
On the one hand, then, there seems to have been a unanimously-held perspective amongst 
local and regional CNT leaders that the UGT in Catalonia represented an irredeemably 
reactionary force and was at the forefront of the government’s alleged campaign to destroy 
the CNT. This interpretation was expressed as a deep antipathy towards the Catalan UGT. 
On the other hand, however, this shared sentiment was not converted at any point into a 
plan formulated at regional level, nor at city level in the case of Barcelona, on how to 
neutralize  the  Catalan UGT.  Yet  as  has  already  been  established  in  this  chapter,  CNT 
militants across the region frequently attempted to mobilize workers against their UGT 
counterpart  and  even  individual  UGT  workers,  as  well  as  deploying  physically 
confrontational measures against them. In the absence of an explicitly formulated plan to 
take on the Catalan UGT in this manner, it must be assumed that the decision to take such 
actions  against  UGT  entities  was  principally  a  product  of  individual  and  localized 
initiatives. And because an anti-UGT mentality was so widespread amongst cenetistas, a 
large proportion of them adopted similar methods when dealing with a UGT presence in 
their sphere of activity. It would appear, then, that from the start of the Second Republic, 
adopting methods of intimidation against the Catalan UGT was automatically assumed by 
CNT militants at both grassroots levels and at the top of the regional hierarchy to be a 
valid, even established practice.   
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The effect of anti-UGT attacks on the Catalan UGT’s membership levels 
 
It is difficult to gauge how much success the CNT had in preventing the spread of the UGT 
in Catalonia. The growth or contraction of an organization such as the Catalan UGT is 
based on myriad factors, and was not simply determined by the existence of the CNT and 
its stance towards its socialist rival. Consequently, the changes in membership figures for 
the Catalan UGT cannot be interpreted as simply being a result of the success or failure of 
the CNT’s attacks on its rival. Nevertheless, an examination of the growth of the Catalan 
UGT  between  1931  and  1934,  and  placing  this  examination  into  the  context  of  the 
difficulties encountered by the CNT over the same period, does provide some clues to the 
extent to which the CNT was able to halt the socialist labour federation in the region.  
 
The pattern of growth and decline of the CNT in Catalonia is relatively well established, 
even if the precise figures are debatable as a result of poor record keeping and the overly 
optimistic figures kept by the organization.
35 However, for the UGT the figures are far less 
clear,  due  to  a  mixture  of  it  having  been  a  much  smaller  entity,  the  relative  lack  of 
documentation on which to base the estimates and the lack of attention paid by historians 
to the Catalan UGT. Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter four, Pere Gabriel highlights 
that the organization progressed from having 17000 members in October 1931 to 45000 in 
April 1934, nearly a tripling of its membership base. Although in absolute terms these 
numbers still made it smaller than the CNT, the fact that the Catalan UGT continued to 
grow while the CNT declined is worth investigating in more detail.
36  
 
The method that has been adopted here is to base the figures for new members and unions 
to the UGT from Catalonia on the new entries received and approved by the Executive 
Commission of the UGT in Madrid during the period in question, which appear in the 
minutes of the Commission’s regular meetings. Admittedly, this is not a perfect measure of 
the Catalan UGT’s growth. It only allows growth to be measured according to the starting 
membership  figures  provided  by  a  union  at  the  moment  of  its  entry;  a  substantial 
proportion of unions did not provide this figure at all. Any subsequent growth in these 
unions  is  therefore  not  recorded.  By  the  same  token,  the  growth  of  UGT  unions  in 
Catalonia that existed prior to the Republic is also not recorded. This is important to bear 
in  mind,  given  that  the  UGT’s  unions  in  many  of  the  most  important  industries  in 
Catalonia, such as construction and textiles, were created prior to the Republic. The figures 
used here therefore represent one indicator in the pace of growth of the Catalan UGT, 
rather  than  representing  its  overall  changes  in  membership  size.  The  following  graphs  
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indicate the number of unions from Catalonia that joined the UGT each year between 1931 
and 1934, as well as the total number of members held by these unions when they joined 
the UGT: 
 
Figure 1: Total number of new unions to the UGT from Catalonia, 1931 to 1934
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Data source: Actas de la Comisión Ejecutiva de la Unión General de Trabajadores, 1931-
1934 
Figure 2: Total number of new members to the UGT from new unions from Catalonia, 1931 
to 1934
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Data source: Actas de la Comisión Ejecutiva de la Unión General de Trabajadores, 1931-
1934 
 
As can be seen, the years 1933 and 1934 saw a marked increase in new unions – and by 
extension new members – to the UGT from Catalonia relative to 1931 and 1932. Though 
the number of new unions entering the organization fell slightly between 1931 and 1934, 
the total number of members within these unions rose considerably and it must also be 
borne in mind that the figures for 1934 only go as far as the beginning of October 1934 
rather than for a full year.  
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Andy Durgan is one of the few writers to highlight the growth of the UGT in Catalonia 
during  the  Second  Republic,  especially  with  regard  to  the  post-October  1934  period.
37 
However,  the  Catalan  UGT  was  experiencing  discernible  growth  even  before  October 
1934, and what is apparent about the timing of these increases is that they coincide with 
what were the two most calamitous years for the CNT. From 1933 onwards the level of 
repression enacted upon the CNT in Catalonia was even greater than in the two preceding 
years, with many of its unions experiencing prolonged bouts of enforced closure, not to 
mention many of its organizing militants languishing in jail. By 1933 the CNT had also 
lost  much  of  the  membership  base  that  it  had  picked  up  in  1930  and  1931.  Just  as 
importantly,  1933  was  also  the  year  in  which  the  factional  battle  between  faístas  and 
treintistas became a formal schism, leading to the rupture of many CNT unions. The above 
figures for new entrants to the UGT from Catalonia suggest that the UGT in the region 
benefited from these setbacks suffered by the CNT. 
 
It would appear that the CNT’s difficulties allowed the UGT to have space to establish a 
small but increasing union presence. At the beginning of the Republic, the prospect of 
joining the UGT would have been an intimidating one for many workers who worked in an 
industry or workplace with a dominant CNT presence. The workers would have been in a 
minority that would have been seen to have rejected the CNT, an organization which, as 
outlined in chapter three, aggressively promoted itself as the only valid representative of 
the  working  classes  in  the  region.  At  the  same  time,  the  workers  would  have  put 
themselves  at  risk  of  being  subjected  to  the  practices  that  have  been  outlined  in  this 
chapter. Even if they were not threatened with a boycott or directly intimidated in some 
other way, they would have been tarred with the CNT’s discourse on the Catalan UGT that 
emanated from the pages of Solidaridad Obrera and  from the mouths  of cenetistas at 
public  meetings.  For  an  ordinary  worker  who  did  not  have  any  particular  ideological 
preferences in this context, there would have been no benefits to joining the UGT, only 
stigma.  
 
However, the events of the Republic led to a combination of CNT unions losing their 
ability to sustain their anti-UGT initiatives in industries and the workplace, as well as its 
successive failed attempts at insurrection and ill-conceived strike actions turning many 
workers away from the organization, even if this was not in most cases accompanied by a 
simultaneous growth in enthusiasm for a particular alternative to the CNT. The detention 
of  active  and  committed  CNT  militants  meant  that  there  were  fewer  cenetistas  in 
workplaces  who  might  attempt  to  intimidate  non-CNT  members  or  actively  stigmatize  
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members of other unions. The arrest of militants and the prolonged closure of CNT unions 
meant  that  ordinary  CNT  members  would  have  gone  for  longer  periods  without  the 
guidance of the organization’s militants. The closure of unions also led to more passive 
workers leaving the union, meaning fewer instances of workplaces or industries in which 
an imperious majority of CNT workers could be used as an argument to demand that the 
remaining workers join the CNT. At the same time, the turning away from the CNT that 
was brought about by its failed strikes and insurrections, in addition to meaning that fewer 
workers were as disposed to the CNT’s general message as they had been previously, also 
meant that the specifics of its message, including the assertions that the UGT was a union 
of strike breakers, pistoleros and reaction and was undertaking a campaign to destroy the 
CNT, would have undoubtedly become less powerful, especially as they were repeated in 
the same fashion and at the same intensity irrespective of other events. 
 
This  is  not  to  say  that  workers  then  immediately  flocked  to  UGT  unions.  The  UGT 
continued to be a fringe movement in Catalonia in these years, even if among some sectors 
of workers and in some localities it garnered a significant following. Nevertheless, it would 
certainly appear that as the CNT suffered the cumulative effects of repression, the Catalan 
UGT began to grow, and it is highly likely that this was at very least in part a result of the 
Catalan  UGT’s  activists,  or  workers  that  bought  into  the  UGT’s  methods,  finding 
themselves increasingly freed from the constraints placed upon them by cenetistas. 
 
The decline of CNT unions in the region allowing their UGT rivals to flourish can also be 
seen  in  some  individual  localities  and  industries  that  are  not  covered  by  the  statistics 
above.  In  Barcelona,  the  port  was  undoubtedly  the  most  notable  example  of  the  UGT 
expanding after its CNT counterpart had first attempted to extinguish it but was then itself 
nearly  destroyed  through  its  clashes  with  the  authorities.  Initially  the  UGT’s  port 
federation had a minority presence at the port – though certainly not as small as the CNT 
claimed it was – before temporarily disappearing all together as a result of the CNT’s 
Macià-backed monopoly. For a short time, therefore, the CNT’s attempts to prevent the 
presence of the UGT in the industry succeeded. However, the CNT’s subsequent prolonged 
strike action allowed UGT workers to return to the sector, with the CNT’s closed shop 
rescinded. The second CNT attempt to marginalize the UGT at the docks in the form of its 
October 1931 boycott then backfired as a result of the uncompromising stance of the Civil 
Governor, José Anguera de Sojo, and the UGT’s inevitable decision to offer workers to 
break a boycott aimed at itself. The October 1931 strike was highly damaging to the CNT’s 
port section; not only did it lead to heavy-handed measures against it such as the arrest of  
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militants  during  the  conflict,  but  having  had  the  objective  of  excluding  the  UGT,  by 
November the UGT had a greater union presence at the port than ever. 
 
Matters did not improve for the CNT at the port over the course of 1932. The attempted 
revolutionary  activity  of  early  1932  led  to  further  repressions  against  CNT  unions  in 
Barcelona. Francesc Arín, the President of the transport union, was detained. The factional 
disputes within the CNT also manifested themselves in the transport union, with Arín and 
the treintista junta of the union being replaced by a faísta one in June 1932.
38 As Ibarz 
points out, there was a general trend of port workers drifting away from the CNT after the 
October boycott and over the course of 1932. Those dockers who remained in the CNT 
appear to have been less committed to the CNT’s overall project, a point argued by Ibarz 
through highlighting their non-participation in the January 1932 unrest and subsequent 
CNT protest actions.
39 The CNT, by 1933 a minority force at the port, attempted another 
strike there in  April to  implement an eight-hour day  and a new system of contracting 
workers. The strike was neutralized by the authorities, partly through the allowance of 
strike breakers, partly through repression of the CNT and partly through members of Estat 
Català manning the city’s transport services after CNT transport workers initiated a support 
strike.
40  
 
Over the course of the Second Republic, then, the CNT at the port repeatedly attempted to 
marginalize  the  UGT,  utilizing  methods  that  brought  it  into  confrontations  with  the 
authorities, through which the CNT emerged each time as the worse off party. As it did 
this, its ability to prevent the UGT was  compromised, and also drove  the UGT’s port 
leaders and the authorities more closely together. As it became increasingly weakened, the 
CNT’s ability to dominate the port and demand that all workers there join the organization 
diminished rapidly, and at the same time the UGT became increasingly popular amongst 
port workers without resorting to closed shop tactics or intimidation.
41 
 
The passage of some workers into the UGT as a result of the setbacks suffered by the CNT 
is illustrated at the workplace level by the aftermath of the failure of a CNT strike by dyers 
and other fabric treatment workers in Barcelona during the summer of 1934. Following the 
failed strike, the junta of the section wrote to its factory delegates for information on the 
consequences of the strike for the workforce of each factory. The available reports show 
that  CNT  membership  of  these  workplaces  was  by  this  point  less  than  half  of  the 
workforce, often far less.
42 In some cases, it appears a significant proportion of workers in 
some workplaces had joined the UGT by this stage. The delegate for the Casa Pagès i  
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Pagès reported that in that workplace there were thirty-five workers, fifteen of which were 
in the CNT, eleven in the UGT, and nine were unaffiliated. According to the delegate’s 
report, the twenty non-CNT workers had all previously been CNT members. The delegate 
also identified seven members of the workforce who had ‘most stood out through their 
anti-confederal activities’; six of these individuals were listed as UGT members.
43  
 
Terrassa is an example of a CNT stronghold in which attempts were made to set up a UGT 
presence, only for it to be met with extreme hostility from the CNT. Ultimately, however, 
it would appear that by late 1932, the socialist labour federation had managed to gain some 
sort of foothold in the city, undoubtedly in no small measure due to the significant bouts of 
repression experienced by the CNT’s unions in the town.
44 In June 1932, CNT militants 
from  Terrassa  published  an  article  in  Soldiaridad  Obrera  providing  information  on 
attempts  made  by  the  UGT  to  organize  in  the  town.  According  to  the  article,  a  UGT 
presence there had begun in the summer 1931, as a result of ‘a few individuals of shameful 
reputation, who in previous eras belonged to the Sindicatos Libres, and in agreement with 
the bosses, founded the Unión General de Trabajadores’.
45 The article was an attempt to 
mobilize  local  workers  in  the  town  against  the  convocation  of  jurados  mixtos.  This 
development appears to have spurred on the local cenetistas to take more direct methods to 
exclude  the  UGT,  because,  as  mentioned  previously  in  this  chapter,  in  August  1932 
cenetistas forcibly brought a UGT public meeting in the town to an end, injuring one of the 
speakers in the process. The local militants writing in Solidaridad Obrera attempted to 
present  the  meeting  as  an  utter  failure,  at  which  the  whole  audience  harangued  the 
orators.
46 
 
However, just over a year later the Terrassa UGT held a series of public events in the town 
in  conjunction  with  the  local  socialist  youth,  at  which  some  of  the  key  figures  of  the 
socialist  movement  in  Catalonia  spoke,  including  Rafel  Vidiella.
47  The  fact  that  high-
profile ugetistas from Barcelona were involved in the meetings would suggest to a certain 
degree that the UGT movement in Terrassa was not simply the product of esquiroles that 
had organized with employers to destroy the CNT, as local cenetistas had suggested. By 
the  accounts  available,  these  latter  propaganda  events  were  not  subject  to  the  same 
coercions as that which took place in August 1932. That this was the case must be put 
down, to a large extent, to the fact that by the time the socialists held these events the CNT 
in Terrassa was in disarray, partly through the extent of the factional split in the local 
organization and partly because so many of its militants were in jail and its unions closed. 
The Terrassa CNT had been one of the most committed local federations to the CNT’s  
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insurrections and protests against the state. To give a few examples, in February 1932 
anarcho-syndicalists took over the town hall by force,
48 and a large cache of arms was 
found by the authorities at the CNT’s local headquarters in January 1933 after the uprising 
attempt, both of which events were met with closures of  the CNT’s local unions and 
imprisonment of the local movement’s key militants.
49 The cenetistas of Terrassa, writing 
in Solidaridad Obrera in October 1933, argued that the UGT had gained a presence in the 
town because the local authorities had closed its unions and arrested its militants as part of 
a  project  to  allow  the  UGT  to  expand  in  the  town,  in  line  with  the  CNT’s  overall 
interpretation of the Republic.
50 It seems rather to be the case, however, that the cenetistas’ 
repression was linked squarely to their insurrectionary efforts; this repression seems to 
have badly damaged the organization of the local movement, allowing the UGT a space in 
which to operate more freely.   
 
In  the  period  between  the  founding  of  the  Republic  and  October  1934  there  was  a 
concerted effort by CNT militants across Catalonia to marginalize UGT rivals and prevent 
workers from joining the UGT. These efforts to marginalize took many forms, including 
verbal and physical harassment and boycotts, but above all a use of the CNT’s press organs 
to  mobilize  workers  against  the  Catalan  UGT.  Through  the  press,  the  impression  was 
created that workers needed to be on guard against a predatory UGT presence in their 
workplaces,  which  the  CNT  would  protect  them  from.  The  belief  of  the  socialist 
leadership, outlined in chapter one, that their unions and activists were fighting a continual 
defensive action against the threats of cenetistas certainly seems to have been a valid one 
with regard to Catalonia. An examination of the fortunes of the Catalan UGT during these 
years suggests that the CNT were initially fairly successful in preventing the growth of the 
socialist labour federation, but as the anarcho-syndicalist movement began to disintegrate 
the UGT was able to make some modest gains, indicating that a proportion of the Catalan 
workforce had previously been prevented from joining the UGT directly as a result of the 
CNT’s campaign against it.  
 
In attacking the Catalan UGT in the fashion outlined in this chapter, Catalan cenetistas 
exhibited a mentality that their organization was the only one that could represent the 
working classes in Catalonia, and that UGT workers as much as the organization’s leaders 
were  inherently  yellow.  This  was  a  perspective  that  went  beyond  the  general-level 
interpretation  of  the  UGT  movement,  outlined  in  chapter  three,  which  by  and  large 
interpreted  the  UGT’s  ordinary  workers  as  merely  misguided.  This  widely-adopted 
approach of attacking Catalan UGT organisms  and members was not the product of  a  
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regional-level decision making process. Rather, it appears that it was fairly unanimously 
accepted  that  it  was  an  acceptable  course  of  action  to  take  against  the  Catalan  UGT. 
Precisely why this was will be revealed in the next chapter’s examination of anarcho-
syndicalist discourse of the Catalan UGT.  
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Chapter Six: Largo and the Libres: The CNT’s Construction of the Catalan UGT 
 
Although,  as  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  widespread  marginalization  of  the 
Catalan UGT by cenetistas was not the product of a formal CNT initiative, this did not 
mean that efforts to marginalize the Catalan UGT were not underpinned by any sort of 
rationale. In fact, an examination of the Catalan CNT’s interpretation of the Catalan UGT 
reveals that according to the outlook of the cenetistas of the region, there were highly 
pressing reasons for the UGT to be stopped at all costs in Catalonia, which the CNT press 
sought to continually emphasize to the working classes of the region. This interpretation of 
the Catalan UGT is the subject of this chapter.  
 
Largo’s master plan 
 
As was outlined in chapter one, the CNT presented a public stance from the first weeks of 
the Republic that the socialist leadership, and above all Largo Caballero, had an agenda of 
destroying the CNT via their position in government and then implanting the UGT in its 
place.  Amongst  cenetistas  in  Catalonia,  the  belief  existed  –  and  was  one  of  the  most 
prominent  features  of  the  regional  movement’s  press  attacks  on  the  socialists  –  that 
Catalonia was at the top of Largo and the socialist leaders’ list of targets for this plan. In an 
editorial published on 29
th May, Barcelona was identified as being one of the main areas in 
which the UGT general secretary was carrying out his ‘offensive against the CNT’.
1 The 
hostilities between the CNT and the UGT at the Barcelona port was the event through 
which  this  overall  interpretation  of  Largo’s  designs  on  Catalonia  was  expressed.  The 
rivalry  of  the  two  organizations  at  the  port  was  in  fact  based  upon  a  foundation  of 
cenetistas being at loggerheads with rival autonomous unions since the 1910s. Whilst the 
CNT was illegal during the Primo de Rivera years, these autonomous unions continued to 
operate.  In  1929  the  various  unions  of  the  port  joined  together  in  the  Federación  de 
Entidades Obreras del Puerto (FEOP). According to Ibarz, this convergence was a result of 
the port unions having worked together in various labour conflicts during the 1920s, such 
as their campaign to bring about an eight-hour working day at the port, and also the fact 
that they all participated in the comités paritarios. The re-mobilization of the CNT from 
1930 onwards reignited this rivalry. At the outset of the Republic, the CNT transport union 
rapidly  expanded  at  the  port,  with  a  majority  of  port  workers  –  especially  the  most 
unskilled ones – joining the CNT.
2 What would go on to be viewed as a key battleground 
between  Largo  and  the  CNT  during  the  Republic  was,  to  a  significant  extent,  a  well-
established enmity even before the FEOP sought entry to the UGT.  
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Undoubtedly motivated in no small measure by the CNT’s rapid remobilization at the port, 
the  leaders  of  the  FEOP  travelled  to  Madrid  to  meet  Largo  Caballero.  Following  this 
meeting, their unions held assemblies, at which votes were passed to affiliate to the UGT.
3 
Attempts were then made to present the case to workers at the port for them to affiliate to 
the  Federation.  The  majority  of  dockers  involved  in  cotton  and  wood,  as  well  as  the 
controllers, joined UGT entities. In other sectors, a minority of workers joined the socialist 
labour federation.
4 
 
The FEOP’s joining of the UGT instantly changed the CNT’s presentation of its battles at 
the  port.  Initially,  the  organization  presented  the  move  to  join  the  UGT  as  being  a 
desperate measure to win official protection. ‘The [CNT] transport union has the backing 
of almost all the workers of the port’, Solidaridad Obrera argued, also declaring that ‘the 
leadership and support of Largo Caballero from the Labour Ministry will be worth nothing. 
We, the workers of the CNT, are stronger than the opportunists of the comité paritario, and 
we  will  triumph’.
5  However,  this  initial  reaction  was  soon  accompanied  by  a  repeated 
assertion that the FEOP’s joining of the UGT was part of a plan by Largo to destroy the 
CNT. The paper argued that Largo’s insistence on his ministry having jurisdiction over 
handling of labour issues in Catalonia rather than the Catalan government was motivated 
by a wish to impose the UGT at the port, declaring it had been ‘chosen as the place of 
choice for the warlike efforts of the Unión General de Trabajadores’.
6 Just a few days after 
these claims were made, the CNT transport union, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
declared its boycott against non-CNT workers at the port. 
 
However, the belief that Largo was master-minding a plan to destroy the CNT was not 
limited to the port. The idea was quickly embraced by many CNT unions, and repeatedly 
and vociferously expressed through the pages of Solidaridad Obrera. In the first months of 
the Republic, some CNT unions in Barcelona interpreted the presence of the UGT in their 
industry as corresponding to this overall plan that was attributed to Largo. In early June 
1931,  for  example,  the  CNT’s  wood  workers’  union  placed  an  article  in  Solidaridad 
Obrera  in  which  it  warned  its  members  to  remain  vigilant  against  the  possibility  of 
attempts to recruit UGT members in their workplaces. The appeal was firmly grounded in 
the  premise  that  the  UGT  was  undertaking  a  campaign  to  destroy  the  CNT,  and  was 
recruiting the most reactionary elements of the Barcelona workforce to help it to achieve 
this  aim.  ‘The  Unión  General  de  Trabajadores  is  beginning  its  offensive  against  the 
Confederación  Nacional  del  Trabajo’,  the  message  began,  before  claiming  Largo  was 
attempting to ‘drag workers towards his reformist organization’.
7   
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The actions of UGT unions in Catalonia, when they conflicted with those of CNT unions, 
were  also  interpreted  as  corresponding  to  this  agenda.  For  instance,  in  June  1931,  the 
CNT’s union of cinema workers declared its intention to carry out a strike if the set of 
bases that it had sent to the Civil Governor were not accepted within eight days. The 
corresponding UGT union refused to back the strike call on the grounds that they believed 
it would be used as a pretext by employers in the industry to lay off workers. It would 
appear that the CNT union ultimately did not strike after agreeing to negotiate with the 
employers’ association.
8 Nevertheless, the CNT union published an article in Solidaridad 
Obrera in which it attacked its UGT counterpart not only for refusing to back the strike, 
but also for its members allegedly declaring their intention to occupy  the posts of the 
striking cenetistas. The CNT cinema workers judged that ‘only those who are in the UGT 
could operate in this way, at the unconditional service of Largo Caballero, playing the 
repugnant role of yellows and traitors to the cause of the workers’.
9  
 
As the Republic progressed and CNT unions ran into difficulties as they clashed with the 
authorities during labour conflicts or other protest actions, the setbacks they had suffered 
were explained squarely in terms of Largo’s plan. Such a perspective was put forward by 
the CNT’s transport union. The union had suffered various defeats since the founding of 
the Republic, such as the transport strike of October 1931, which had started at the port in 
an attempt to impose a CNT closed shop there but had ended with several other non-port 
sections  striking  in  support.
10  The  leading  militants  of  the  CNT’s  transport  union  in 
Barcelona were of the mindset that their organization was being targeted by Largo with the 
goal of destroying it. The expression of their belief in July 1932 that they had been in the 
midst of a ‘battle to the death’
11 that the UGT general secretary had been waging against 
the CNT since the start of the Republic came on the back of the protracted and damaging 
strikes that the union had entered into. From the articles published by the transport workers 
in Solidaridad Obrera, it is evident that its organizers felt their union needed to be on a 
perpetual war footing against attempts emanating from the Ministry of Labour to destroy 
the CNT.
12 
 
It is important to scrutinize this argument that the Catalan UGT represented a conduit 
through which Largo could destroy the CNT. It is taken for granted in contemporary and 
historical accounts of the Second Republic that the UGT general secretary harboured a 
great deal of animosity towards the CNT. His accommodation of the FEOP leaders at the 
start of the Republic must be viewed in part as a marriage of convenience, through which  
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both  parties  would  benefit  through  having  the  same  agenda  of  wishing  to  introduce 
arbitration systems at the docks. A mutual antipathy towards the CNT – and obviously a 
recognition that it would prevent the establishment of arbitration – did undoubtedly unite 
the governing socialists and the leaders of the union. The difficulty comes in determining 
whether  this  collaboration  was  motivated  first  and  foremost  by  this  shared  agenda  of 
implementing an arbitration system, or rather by a simple hatred of the CNT. Certainly in 
the eyes of cenetistas it was the latter, and this was the interpretation that they presented to 
workers in Barcelona.  
 
On the part of the FEOP leaders, it is difficult to establish which factor motivated them 
most, though it is highly likely that it was some combination of the two. What is certain is 
that the FEOP organizers’ antipathy towards the CNT was based around a belief that the 
CNT’s methods were inimical to the interests of workers. The proceedings of meetings of 
worker entities at the port that decided to join the UGT from May 1931 offer an insight 
into why some unions decided against joining the CNT. One of the key arguments cited in 
favour of joining the UGT over the CNT that was expressed by the cotton, wood and salted 
fish sections was that the socialist labour federation would ‘totally respect our structuring 
and independence’.
13 By contrast, the idea was expressed by the leaders of these entities 
that  under  the  CNT  not  only  would  their  union  become  subsumed  into  the  transport 
sindicato único, which also contained all the urban transport workers, whose sectors were 
unconnected to the port, but that they would also lose any control of their organization and 
how it operated, to the Barcelona CNT as a whole.
14  
 
At the heart of these port unions joining the UGT and not the CNT, therefore, was a wish 
to be able to ensure the workers of the unions had control over their ability to negotiate and 
call strikes, rather than being ‘steamrollered’ by the junta of the transport union.
15 This fear 
reflected a long-standing suspicion of the CNT on the part of the non-CNT port unions, 
who according to Ibarz had for over a decade viewed the CNT’s militants at the port as 
outsiders who lacked an understanding of the particularities of labour issues there.
16 This is 
not to say that the leaders of the sections did not endorse the idea of workers being grouped 
together in a single entity, with the ‘necessity that all workers have of grouping themselves 
together  to  defend  our  interests’  being  expressed  as  the  fundamental  premise  for  the 
argument that the unions needed to join either the CNT or the UGT.
17 It rather seems to 
have been the case that, while workers did need to be able to present a united front against 
the bourgeoisie overall, when it came to the matter of settling material conditions within a 
given industry, the independence of workers within that industry to chart their own path  
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through industrial relations with their employers was paramount. At the same time, at these 
meetings of the port unions the view appears to have been taken that the leaders of the 
CNT were fundamentally ‘mistaken’ with regards to their overall goals, and that there 
would simply be no escaping the imposition of these were the union to be affiliated to the 
CNT.
18 Rather than being motivated primarily by a wish to destroy the CNT, then, it would 
appear  that  the  FEOP’s  activists  and  members  chose  to  join  the  UGT  principally  to 
conserve their method of union organization rather than submit to that of the CNT.
19 
 
With regard to the designs of the UGT national leadership on Catalonia, the CNT’s line 
that the organization was undertaking an all-out assault on the CNT through the creation of 
UGT  unions  does  not  receive  any  corroboration  if  the  support  given  to  Catalan  UGT 
unions by the national leadership is given any attention. The socialist leadership in Madrid 
were throughout the Republic largely indifferent to the fortunes of their labour federation 
in Catalonia. This is illustrated by their attitude to requests for assistance from regional 
UGT leaders. On 20
th July 1931 the Executive Commission of the UGT received a request 
from the Barcelona Local Federation of the UGT for 5000 membership cards. The Local 
Federation  stated  that  the  request  was  made  because  a  large  number  of  unions  had 
requested to join the organization. However, the Local Federation advised that it could not 
afford to pay for the cards up front, as was standard UGT regulation, but would pay for 
them  within  forty-five  days.  The  request  was  denied  by  the  Executive  Commission.
20 
Similar rebuttals were experienced by the leaders of the UGT’s bakery union in Barcelona 
when  they  requested  additional  membership  cards  from  their  national  industrial 
federation.
21 This stance punctures the CNT’s argument that the socialist leadership had a 
special interest in its organization replacing the anarcho-syndicalist labour federation in 
Catalonia. Had this been the case, the national leadership would have surely shown some 
flexibility in its procedures to ensure that ugetistas in the CNT’s stronghold at least had the 
means to allow the organization to take on members there. Instead, it insisted upon an 
adherence the organization’s standard rules, which were designed to ensure the solvency of 
the  organization  but  were  desperately  unsuited  to  fighting  the  CNT  for  members  in 
Catalonia. Whilst the CNT were able to issue over 100000 membership cards in a single 
month in Catalonia, a practice that left the organization with substantial deficits through 
the disparity between cards issued and dues paid, the UGT had to send off to Madrid for 
much smaller quantities, with payment upfront.
 22  
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The Catalan UGT as successors to the Sindicatos Libres 
 
The postulation of a Largo master plan was used to explain the general presence of UGT 
organisms  in  the  region;  a  different  argument  was  put  forward  to  explain  the  fact  of 
workers in the region becoming UGT activists or simply holding a UGT membership card. 
This argument revolved around the assertion that the membership of the UGT in Catalonia 
was based around the Sindicatos Libres. 
 
The Sindicatos Libres had been formed at the end of the 1910s, in direct response to the 
CNT, which at the time was at the height of its powers in Catalonia and was the scourge of 
the authorities and employers. Even after its unions rapidly dissolved with the founding of 
the Republic, they and the era in which they burst onto the scene of the Catalan labour 
movement left a long lasting, deep imprint in the imaginations of cenetistas. Certainly in 
the first months of the Second Republic amongst Republicans and the left in Catalonia the 
name of the Libres was associated principally with the idea of gunmen given immunity by 
Severiano Martínez Anido, the Military Governor of Barcelona between 1919 and 1922, to 
murder CNT militants, especially after the publication in 1931 of Pere Foix’s exposé of 
links  between  Libres  gunmen  and  Martínez  Anido,  which  was  also  serialized  in 
L’Opinió.
23  
 
Consensus exists that in its earliest days the Libres was founded and led by virulently anti-
left  individuals,  often  with  Carlist  connections.  However,  the  organization  expanded 
considerably  beyond  this  founding  nucleus,  especially  after  the  CNT  was  driven 
underground  by  Primo  de  Rivera.  For  much  of  the  1920s,  it  was  the  most  important 
organization through which material claims were made by Barcelona workers, with even 
Ángel Pestaña acknowledging its role as a vehicle for protecting the material interests of 
workers.
24 As Colin Winston highlights, in the mid to late-1920s the Libres was a much 
more  heterogeneous  organization,  comprised  of  a  relatively  smaller  proportion  of 
reactionary individuals, with many of its unions focused instead on reformist unionism and 
exhibiting  no  particular  political  agenda.
25  What is  important  here,  however,  is  that  in 
cenetista discourse, the Sindicatos Libres continued to stand for nothing more and nothing 
less than an anti-CNT hit squad of pistoleros and strike breakers. For an organization to be 
associated with pistolerismo was the gravest accusation that could be made. And this was 
precisely the claim that was made in the CNT press of the UGT in Catalonia during the 
Second Republic. 
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From  the  outset  of  the  Republic,  the  CNT  in  Catalonia  made  repeated  claims  in  its 
newspapers that the unions of the Catalan UGT that were being formed in the region were 
a continuation of the Sindicatos Libres. This claim partly took the form of arguing that the 
leaders and ordinary members of new Catalan UGT unions had essentially reformed their 
old Libres union in the UGT, and as such were attempting to continue the yellow and 
reactionary practices of the Libres. But above all the claim centred around the accusation 
that the pistoleros of the Libres had also found a home in the Catalan UGT, from which 
they would continue to murder CNT militants and even ordinary workers. This depiction of 
the Catalan UGT in its entirety was often made from editorials in Solidaridad Obrera, such 
as one in June 1931 in which the paper argued that ‘the CNT has not only refused to allow 
in pistoleros, but has rejected organizations that had belonged to the Sindicatos Libres. The 
UGT has accepted them en bloc’.
26  
 
The CNT often accused UGT entities that set up in Catalonia of being comprised of former 
Libres unions. For example, during 1932, moves were made by some tram workers to set 
up a UGT section. In keeping with its reputation as one of the most militant CNT unions, 
the  transport  union  responded  to  these  moves  by  attempting  to  mobilize  tram  workers 
against the individuals concerned. The UGT tram workers’ section was initially set up in 
April  1932,  but  appears  to  have  remained  inoperative  in  its  first  months.
27  On  7
th 
September  1932,  the  tram  workers  section  of  the  transport  union  placed  an  article  in 
Solidaridad Obrera in which it warned workers to be on alert against attempts being made 
by the ugetistas to allow the UGT to be a recognized union in the sector. The names, jobs 
and card numbers of all those implicated in the efforts to set up a UGT section were 
printed  as  part  of  the  article.
28  One  of  the  named  individuals  was  Eduardo  Gómez 
Benedicto, who would go on to become the Catalan representative in the UGT’s national 
transport federation.
29 The authors also argued that the UGT was simply a replacement of 
the  Sindicatos  Libres,  and  also  suggested  that  those  involved  had  made  threatening 
suggestions that force would be used to establish a UGT presence.
30 A similar stance was 
taken by the Barcelona wood worker’s union, who warned their members that members of 
the  Sindicatos  Libres  ‘have  found  refuge  and  enrolled  in  the  social  reformist  ranks, 
protected by the power of the government’. These individuals had been leading members 
of ‘the gang that Martínez Anido created’ and were ‘agents provocateurs at the service of 
the politico-socialist class’.
31  
 
Of course, the CNT were not the only entity in Catalonia for which the Sindicatos Libres 
and the era of pistolerismo had left a lasting impression. The Libres were also a recurrent  
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theme in the Catalan socialist press, to a large extent in response to the CNT’s accusations 
against  the  Catalan  UGT.  UGT  activists  found  themselves  using  the  pages  of  La 
Internacional  to  repeatedly  refute  accusations  that  their  organization  was  a  haven  for 
former Libres gunmen and activists. In June 1931, the paper claimed that the Barcelona 
UGT  would  take  Solidaridad  Obrera  to  court  over  its  accusations  that  the  UGT  in 
Catalonia had recruited the pistoleros of the Libres.
32 Desiderio Trilles, the leader of the 
UGT  at  the  port,  also  refuted  these  accusations  in  his  regular  columns  on  the  battles 
between the CNT and the UGT.
33 Adolfo Simó, a leading figure in the UGT’s bakery 
union, also offered a detailed refutation of the accusations specific to the industry. Simó 
observed  that  ‘every  time  a  group  of  workers  outside  of  the  dictatorial  ranks  of  the 
Confederation refuses to follow those of the único, they are “pistoleros of the Libres”’ 
according  to  the  CNT  press.
34  A  similar  refutation  was  made  by  the  UGT’s  public 
entertainment union.
35 
 
At the same time as refuting the idea that the Catalan UGT was a re-branded version of the 
Libres, La Internacional also levelled counter-accusations at the CNT over the question of 
pistoleros. In socialist discourse, as discussed in chapter three, violence was an integral 
aspect of the CNT’s activities as its militants attempted to impose their union on workers. 
In its reports of CNT attacks on UGT members, the Catalan UGT’s papers averred that 
these incidents represented an attempt on the CNT’s part to plunge the region to a return to 
the pistolero heyday of Martínez Anido. In June 1931, a piece in the paper claimed the 
Libres was a product of the CNT’s attempts to use violence to make workers join the 
union,  and  that  the  CNT’s  activities  in  1931,  citing  assassinations  of  ugetistas  in 
Barcelona,  Sabadell  and  Badalona,  were  an  attempt  to  return  Catalonia  to  the  same 
dynamic of violence.
36 
   
The truth of exactly where the violent elements of the Libres actually did go is virtually 
impossible to ascertain. Clearly workers who had been in the Libres did variously join the 
CNT and the UGT. Nevertheless, it is certainly worth giving some critical consideration to 
the  CNT’s  claims  regarding  the  Catalan  UGT.  On  the  one  hand,  some  incidents  of 
altercations  between  CNT  and  UGT  militants  and  workers  do  hint  at  some  unsavoury 
characters being associated with the activities of the Catalan UGT, even if there is no way 
of proving that they had definitely been in the Sindicatos Libres prior to the Republic. A 
shootout that took place outside the Alena box and wood panel factory in June 1931, which 
will be examined in more detail later in this chapter, is perhaps the most prominent of 
these. Here, gunmen shot at CNT members who were picketing factory employees who  
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had recently joined the UGT. At the same time, however, it must be recognized that the 
CNT press also made assertions of UGT-Libres and/or pistoleros connections that were 
much more dubious. La Internacional responded to a claim made in Solidaridad Obrera 
that the UGT people involved in a violent altercation with CNT workers in Blanes were 
also ex-Libres pistoleros by highlighting that there had never been a Libres presence in 
Blanes,  viewing  Solidaridad  Obrera’s  accusations  as  indicative  of  their  campaign  to 
delegitimize the Catalan UGT through linking it to the Libres.
37  
    
It is also important to consider that, in addition to the Catalan UGT vigorously refuting any 
connections  between  the  labour  federation  and  the  Libres,  the  Catalan  UGT  was 
historically an enemy of the Libres, as Colin Winston highlights.
38 La Internacional in its 
rebuttal of the accusations made against the Catalan UGT by the CNT interpreted the era 
of  Libres  dominance  in  Catalonia  as  a  dark  period  for  the  workers’  movement  in  the 
region. Moreover, the Libres’ own papers during the 1920s were highly critical of the 
PSOE  and  UGT.
39  There  is  also  evidence  to  suggest  that  Catalan  UGT’s  public 
condemnation of the Libres was not merely posturing. For example, the minutes of the 
UGT’s  metal  union  meetings  suggest  that  its  leaders  took  accusations  that  any  of  its 
members had been militants in the Libres very seriously. In February 1932, a member of 
the junta warned his colleagues that a former ‘action man’ of the Libres was attempting to 
join the union. It was agreed by the junta to reject his request, and subsequently agreed that 
prospective members had to provide their previous union card before being allowed to 
join.
40 
 
The twin strands of discourse that the UGT in Catalonia was both a direct product of Largo 
Caballero’s project to implant the UGT and destroy the CNT in Catalonia and also an 
organization comprised of the former pistoleros of the Sindicatos Libres quickly fused 
together into one. It became commonplace for editorials and reports in Solidaridad Obrera 
to identify UGT organisms in Catalonia as corresponding to both of the above traits. The 
activities  of  the  UGT  at  the  port,  for  example,  were  depicted  at  times  as  being 
simultaneously  agents  of  Largo  and  representing  a  continuation  of  the  Libres  and 
harbouring pistoleros.
41 Having previously been portrayed as being at the ‘unconditional 
service of Largo Caballero’,
42 the cinema workers affiliated to the UGT in Barcelona were 
subsequently  depicted  as  being  ‘the  leaders  and  collaborators  of  the  awful  Sindicatos 
Libres’, who, upon the collapse of the Libres ‘sought refuge within the UGT, which had 
also benefited from the favours of the dictatorship’.
43 
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The  most  obvious  pay-off  for  the  CNT  of  the  depiction  of  UGT  unions  as  being  a 
continuation of the Sindicatos Libres and also a creation of an anti-CNT and anti-working 
classes Labour Minister was the delegitimizing value that they brought with them, which in 
turn would serve the overall objective of extinguishing a UGT presence in the region. The 
Libres as an organization was a byword in CNT discourse for the bourgeoisie attempting to 
destroy working-class organization and for pistolerismo carried out against representatives 
of the working class. To depict the Catalan UGT in this fashion therefore drew on a very 
powerful, well-established aspect of the workers’ movement in Catalonia and allowed it to 
be put to use to present the Catalan UGT as every bit as reactionary and dangerous to 
workers as was the Libres. The Second Republic may have represented a massive change 
to the political structure of Spain and Catalonia, but in CNT discourse the working classes 
and the CNT continued to be locked in precisely the same struggle against the same groups 
and organizations as they had been in the late 1910s and the 1920s.   
 
Likewise, because the theory of Largo’s master plan was expounded when newly affiliated 
Catalan UGT organisms were discussed in Solidaridad Obrera, the idea was presented to 
workers that any organization that joined the Catalan UGT was playing an integral role in 
fulfilling the anti-CNT agenda of the Labour Ministry. Rather than merely being workers 
that sought a different vehicle for defending their material and social interests, they were 
presented as being aligned to forces outwith Catalonia that were attempting to destroy the 
main workers’ organization. The result was that in Catalonia, UGT unions being created or 
unions affiliating to the socialist labour federation were presented through the anarcho-
syndicalist  movement  as  an  advance  of  the  bourgeois-socialist  offensive  against  the 
workers, as well as another move by them against the CNT. 
 
A case study: the Alena factory, Barcelona, June 1931 
 
Through these linkages to Largo and the Libres, the Catalan UGT was thus presented as 
being a combination of the worst of the present and the worst of the past. The overall 
validity of these two interpretations has been questioned here. However, it is important to 
examine how these accusations worked in relation to specific incidents. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to judge all claims made against the Catalan UGT by the CNT, on the grounds 
that so much additional information on any given incident is required to assess its validity. 
All  too  often,  such  supplementary  evidence  does  not  exist.  However,  in  June  1931,  a 
violent confrontation took place between CNT and UGT members in Catalonia, which, 
because of the numbers involved, received a substantial amount of press attention. The  
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incident in question occurred on 9
th June 1931, at the entrance of the Alena wood panel 
factory, where eight cenetistas, two ugetistas and one unaffiliated individual were injured, 
the majority of them by gunshot wound. The CNT reacted to the incident by arguing that it 
represented a fusion of Largo Caballero attempting to use the UGT to destroy the CNT in 
the region and former Libres pistoleros carrying out these attacks on his behalf. Whereas 
the majority of articles in the CNT press that asserted a Libres pistolero-UGT connection 
were not backed with any substantiating proof, the Alena incident, along with a similar 
outbreak  of  violence  later  that  month  in  Blanes,  represented  the  two  most  compelling 
pieces of evidence that the CNT press were able to present of connections between Libres 
violence and the Catalan UGT’s activities. A detailed reconstruction of the incident – and 
its antecedents – highlights how the interpretations of one another’s movements offered by 
the  CNT  and  the  UGT  in  Catalonia  do  not  satisfactorily  explain  the  hostilities  that 
sometimes occurred between their members.    
 
The Alena factory usually employed around 150 workers.
44 In the months immediately 
prior to the founding of the Republic, all of the workers in the factory had been members 
of the CNT.
45 Conflict between the union and the management initially took the form of 
the CNT’s factory delegate, Manuel Carlos Miralles, being dismissed, apparently for ‘bad 
behaviour’. That Miralles may have been dismissed for his activities as a cenetista cannot 
be ruled out, but neither can it be taken for granted. Following the intervention of the CNT 
wood workers’ union, Miralles was reinstated. Shortly after this incident, the management 
announced  that  the  entire  factory  would  be  temporarily  shut  for  renovation  work.  The 
workforce was temporarily dismissed, to be informed of the reopening of the factory at a 
later date so that they could return to work.
46  
 
However, in May the employer decided that it would initially only take on a proportion of 
the workforce, with the remaining workers being re-contracted in phases.
47 The CNT wood 
workers’ union was opposed to this move, believing it to have been a manoeuvre designed 
to phase out undesirable workers. The sacking of Miralles would undoubtedly have been 
one antecedent that raised this suspicion. However – and this was a point that the UGT 
were eager to stress after the bloodshed – that all the workers would be readmitted had 
been agreed in a settlement reached by the employers and the Delegación Regional del 
Trabajo.
48 The workers that had been invited back, totalling sixty-five, did not wish to 
support the CNT’s proposal to declare a strike at the workplace to demand that all workers 
be rehired at once, so they left the CNT and joined the UGT. The precise circumstances of 
how and why they chose to join the UGT, rather than simply leave the CNT, are not one  
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hundred  percent  clear.  According  to  the  CNT  it  was  indicative  of  the  socialist  labour 
federation being an instrument of employers.
49  
 
Upon learning of the return to work of these sixty-five workers and their enrolment in the 
UGT, cenetistas – both of the wood workers’ union as well as, it would appear, those from 
other industries, in particular construction – began to organize a picket at the entrance of 
the factory, composed of both militants and the CNT’s members who formerly worked at 
the  factory.  The  goals  of  the  picket  were  principally  to  agitate  for  the  rehiring  of  all 
workers  and  prevent  their  positions  being  taken  by  others,  though  censuring  the  UGT 
workers must have also been a motivation. For a few days the UGT workers continued to 
work as normal, in spite of the picket.  
 
On the 9
th the CNT picket arrived at the factory entrance over an hour early, and upon the 
arrival of the UGT workers, individuals from both sides quickly entered into confrontation 
before shots began to be fired. The majority of people attached to both groups quickly fled, 
leaving behind a smaller group of fighters. Two key points of controversy were which 
group made the first move towards violence, and which side was armed. The nature of the 
casualties would suggest that if the cenetistas were armed at all, they were exceptionally 
poor shots. Of the eleven casualties, six of the eight cenetistas received gunshot wounds, 
whereas  the  two  ugetistas’  wounds  were  from  blows  from  sticks  or  other  objects.
50 
Solidaridad Obrera openly accused the two injured ugetistas of having been pistoleros of 
the Libres in the past.
51 Whilst it has not been possible to corroborate this, it would appear 
that one of the two men, Manuel Pedra Lorente, did have a violent past, having wounded a 
neighbour with a knife during an argument in 1925,
52 and having also been detained in 
early 1931 for insulting a police officer.
53 Nevertheless, the cenetistas did exaggerate the 
extent  of  the  shootout,  claiming  that  several  men  had  barricaded  themselves  in  a  bar 
opposite the factory, from which they fired shots at the cenetistas, an accusation that was 
refuted by the owner of the bar. 
 
Solidaridad  Obrera  on  its  front  page  announced  that  ‘the  pistoleros  of  the  Sindicatos 
Libres,  recruited  by  the  Unión  General  de  Trabajadores,  shoot  at  our  comrades’    and 
repeated  on  several  occasions  in  its  coverage  words  to  this  effect.
54  The  incident  was 
displayed as proof that the Catalan UGT had a deliberate strategy of hiring pistoleros to 
murder cenetistas. The paper even made the claim that people who lived near the UGT’s 
headquarters had overheard someone in the building saying ‘“we need to kill a few of the 
Confederation’s people to spread panic”’,
55 a claim that should be taken with a very large  
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dose of scepticism. The paper presented the incident as a calculated attack by gunmen on a 
peaceful demonstration. The other crucial point of emphasis aside from the aforementioned 
link with the Sindicatos  Libres that was  asserted was the argument that blame for the 
whole  incident  should  be  directed  squarely  at  Largo  and  the  leaders  of  the  UGT  in 
Catalonia. The editorial on the front page of Solidaridad Obrera argued that the initial split 
of the factory’s workforce and the ensuing conflict were ‘the consequences of the policy 
that Largo is directing from the Ministry of Labour’. A statement in the paper by the CNT 
wood workers’ union went even further, arguing that ‘the secretary of the UGT and of the 
Socialist Party, installed in the Labour Ministry, can order workers of the Confederation to 
be  murdered’.  Furthermore,  the  paper  argued,  ‘the  leaders  of  the  Unión  General  de 
Trabajadores  know  that  without  recourse  to  violence,  the  Confederación  Nacional  del 
Trabajo would manage to organize all workers in Catalonia and leave them with nobody’.
56  
 
On the part of the Catalan UGT, the response to the incident was equally one of depicting 
it as an outrage, though one planned and executed by violent cenetistas, not the UGT.  
According to La Internacional, the UGT workers were merely going about their business, 
‘fulfilling the decision of the Delegación Regional del Trabajo that they and the employer 
agreed upon’, only to find themselves in the days immediately prior to the fight ‘coerced 
and attacked by those from the CNT, who wish to impose their will through all means on 
Catalan workers’. The ‘inept and sectarian authorities’ of the city were blamed for having 
failed to protect the UGT workers against the threats of the cenetistas. This interpretation 
of  the  incident  was  placed  into  the  context  of  their  wider  allegations  of  cenetistas 
threatening workers at the port to make them join the CNT. The only acknowledgement 
that UGT members had any connection to the violence outside the factory took the form of 
arguing that it was understandable that they would defend themselves in the face of such 
sustained attacks and without the support of the authorities.
57  
 
For both CNT and UGT, then, the incident was an individual manifestation of their wider 
interpretations of the agenda of their rivals. Whilst there are elements of linkage to the 
wider activities and positions taken up by the two labour federations, however, certain key 
points relating specifically to the case in question should not be obscured by the anarcho-
syndicalist and socialist interpretations. One of the most important of these is the role 
played by the workers of the factory themselves, independent of the activities of union 
militants. It would appear that all of those who were given the opportunity to return to 
work did so, joining the UGT in the process. They totalled sixty-five workers out of a total 
workforce of about 150; in other words over forty percent of the total workforce. This  
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would suggest that the primary motivation of many of the individuals in the factory was 
not rooted in commitments to a particular union, but simply being able to work. It was this 
which caused them to switch unions, rather than a rejection of anarcho-syndicalism or a 
commitment to UGT principles. The workers appear to have been happy to remain in the 
CNT and have it represent their interests until the moment when being in it actually came 
into conflict with their ability to work. To a significant proportion of the workers involved, 
the CNT’s attempts to present the Catalan UGT as something of a bogeyman was not a 
sufficiently persuasive argument to prevent them from joining it, something that would 
indicate that by no means did all workers – and indeed (former) CNT members – share 
cenetista militants’ loathing of the UGT.  
 
It must also be borne in mind that, whilst it appears those connected with the UGT were 
aggressors, those at the vanguard of the CNT picket were not connected with the Alena 
workplace at all. Many of those injured in the fighting were militants of the construction 
union, and not the wood workers’ union, and were therefore not even employed at the 
workplace, let alone connected to it through their sindicato único.
58 Their stake in the 
conflict was therefore more organizational and ideological than it was material. Quite what 
form the picket would have taken without their protagonism can only be speculated on, but 
their  presence  as  outsiders  to  the  conflict  leading  the  demonstrations  against  the  UGT 
workers can only have raised tensions, and possibly brought them further into the realm of 
a more sectarian conflict. In contrast, the two injured ugetistas – who Solidaridad Obrera 
asserted were pistoleros – were employees at the factory.
59 This composition of the two 
groups brings us to the question of the motivations of those who attacked. Although the 
balance of probabilities would indicate that the UGT workers were aggressors, the idea that 
they were gunmen who had turned up specifically to attack cenetistas and had no specific 
interest in the workplace dispute needs to be called into question. Certainly the two injured 
ugetistas had a specific interest in the factory. Looking at it from their perspective, and 
particularly that of a seemingly volatile character such as Pedra Lorente, the previous days 
of insults they would have received from the pickets and in Solidaridad Obrera may have 
been sufficient provocation to attack, rather than a more principled hatred of the CNT in 
general.  Although  the  possibility  that  pistoleros  were  on  the  scene  with  the  specific 
intention of murdering any cenetistas in their path cannot be discounted, the two injured 
ugetistas seem to have had a far more personal stake in the event, detached from the long-
standing battle between Libres and cenetistas.  
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What certainly can be discounted in examining this incident are the accusations made in 
the CNT press that the event was either part of a wider policy of Largo, or had been 
ordered  by  him  or  any  UGT  leader  in  Catalonia.  There  is  simply  no  evidence  for  the 
accusations, and the idea that Largo would have the ability or the inclination to order the 
assassination  of  such  low-ranking  cenetistas  is  simply  not  credible.  This  aspect  of  the 
CNT’s presentation of the event needs to be seen as an attempt to graft the organization’s 
wider stance on the UGT – in particular its representation of the socialist labour federation 
as having a plan to destroy the CNT using violence and the machinery of state – onto a 
localized incident, the roots of which were not planted in a direct rivalry between the CNT 
and the UGT. The Catalan UGT were equally open to grafting their wider position on the 
CNT onto the event. For their part, this required a fairly selective presentation of it, with 
La Internacional failing to address the fact that it appears to have been ugetistas firing the 
shots. Although the men doing the shooting may not have been gunmen from the Libres, 
they had certainly chosen to escalate the confrontation onto the level of violence.   
 
However,  because  the  cenetista  delegate  of  the  factory,  the  wood  workers’  union  and 
Solidaridad Obrera all refused to accept that all the workers would be re-employed, as 
agreed upon through the Delegación Regional del Trabajo, and instead chose to adopt a 
picketing footing, the conflict did take on a dimension that fitted in with the CNT’s wider 
stance on the Republic in the respect that it corresponded to the organization’s refusal to 
accept  government arbitration. And it also  appears to have been through adopting this 
posture that the workers who did wish to return to work ultimately came to join the UGT. 
It was therefore through the CNT’s position of deciding to fight against the Delegación 
Regional  del  Trabajo  that  the  conflict  came  to  take  on  a  dimension  of  CNT-UGT 
organizational  rivalry,  even  if  it  was  fundamentally  grounded  in  factors  that  were 
independent of this split, in particular the wish of one part of the workforce to return to 
work. Once the two sets of workers were split between the CNT and the UGT as a result of 
the CNT’s stance, however, and especially after the altercation, the whole incident came to 
be  seen  as  a  straight  case  of  CNT-UGT  rivalry,  enmeshed  in  the  wider  stances  and 
representations adopted by the CNT and the UGT on their rivals, with the original, non-
sectarian aspects of the incident quickly becoming obscured. As will be seen in the next 
chapter, the conflict at the Alena was certainly not the only one that would take place in 
Barcelona during these  years that would  also become a CNT-UGT  conflict due to the 
question of arbitration.   
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Chapter Seven: CNT-UGT Hostilities and Labour Conflicts 
 
Bound  up  closely  with  the  CNT’s  attempts  to  mobilize  workers  against  the  UGT  in 
Catalonia and provide a delegitimizing interpretation of the organization was the series of 
labour conflicts that occurred in the region in which both the CNT and the UGT had a 
union presence in the industrial sector in question. Some of the largest and most significant 
strikes that took place in Barcelona between 1931 and 1934 had a central component of 
CNT-UGT conflict, as did many others of a lesser importance. This chapter will examine 
the  dynamics  of  labour  conflicts  in  which  the  CNT  and  the  UGT  clashed  during  this 
period. 
 
The jurados mixtos 
 
The single most important stimulus for confrontation between the CNT and the UGT in 
Catalonia between 1931 and 1934 during labour conflicts was the question of the jurados 
mixtos. As was discussed in part one, the CNT were particularly opposed to this aspect of 
the UGT’s national agenda, presenting the jurados as an attack on direct action and indeed 
on the CNT itself. In Catalonia and especially Barcelona, this opposition to the jurados and 
other forms of arbitration in industrial relations took on a real and practical dimension, 
often  with  violent  and  acrimonious  consequences.  Although  the  UGT  was  small  in 
Barcelona, jurados mixtos would play a role in a surprising amount of the most significant 
industrial conflicts in the city during this period, much to the chagrin of cenetistas.  
 
The jurados mixtos played a key, not to mention highly divisive role in two of the most 
prolonged  labour  conflicts  that  occurred  in  Barcelona  during  this  era,  namely  the 
carpenters’ strike of late 1932 and the construction strike of April 1933. In late 1932, what 
would prove to be one of Barcelona’s most protracted strikes of the Republican era broke 
out  in  the  carpentry  trade,  initiated  by  the  wood  workers’  union.  The  strike,  as  Vega 
highlights, was indicative of the turn towards greater violence that occurred in CNT strikes 
from  the  latter  half  of  1932  onwards.  The  strike  was  called  to  bring  about  the 
implementation of new bases de trabajo for carpenters, which included a reduced working 
day to help remedy the high unemployment in the sector. Whilst the CNT wood workers’ 
union pursued the new bases through a protracted strike that would go on for three months, 
the UGT minority in the sector negotiated a set of bases for the industry through a jurado 
mixto. The formula agreed upon in the jurado was a working week of forty-eight hours – 
four more than the CNT proposed – and similar salary increases to those contained within  
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the CNT’s agreement. Both the CNT and employers rejected the terms drawn up in the 
jurado. The CNT strike therefore continued. The strike intersected with the January 1933 
insurrection, which led to the union being closed and many of its militants being arrested. 
In  spite  of  the  union’s  continued  resistance,  by  February  the  majority  of  workers  had 
returned to work, effectively with the solution agreed upon by the jurado coming into 
effect.
1  
 
For the CNT wood workers’ union, and indeed for the CNT in Barcelona as a whole, the 
carpenters’ conflict became every bit as much about fighting against the jurados mixtos 
and what the UGT stood for as it did about winning material advances for workers. The 
union ran a vitriolic series of articles from the pages of Solidaridad Obrera against the 
UGT, the jurados, and, above all, against Largo. In December 1932 the union publicly 
advised that ‘neither the Delegado del Trabajo of the Generalitat, the jurados mixtos nor 
the authorities should bother sending us conciliatory notes nor invitations, since it will be a 
waste of time as they will all end up in the waste paper basket at our office’. Even before 
the jurado proposed a solution, the writings of the union’s junta and strike committee were 
focused  on  dismissing  the  jurados  as  having  any  legitimacy  in  the  conflict,  regularly 
emphasising that the employers ‘have to resolve the conflict directly with the workers and 
no-one else’. The UGT’s own wood workers’ union was unsurprisingly heavily criticized 
for what were interpreted as its attempts to derail the CNT strike and damage the material 
interests of the carpenters by presenting their own set of bases to the jurado.
2  
 
Solidaridad Obrera’s hostility towards the jurados mixtos became more pronounced as the 
conflict wore on.  References to the jurados and the ley del 8 de abril pervaded the union’s 
statements, all in conjunction with an assertion that the CNT would remain defiant against 
them and would not prevent the CNT winning the dispute on their own terms.
3 However, 
as the strike ran out of impetus in February, the cenetistas squarely pointed the finger at 
Largo and the jurados mixtos as being the reason why the conflict had lasted so long. 
According to an editorial published in Solidaridad Obrera on 14
th February 1933, ‘Largo 
Caballero, a collaborator of Primo de Rivera’ had prevented a solution being reached by 
coming between employers and the CNT. According to the paper, employers and the strike 
committee had reached an agreement and were ready to return to work until the Labour 
Minister had intervened as part of his ‘offensive against the Confederación Nacional del 
Trabajo’.
4 To a significant extent, this position must be seen as one of damage limitation 
and blame deflection in the face of a failing, protracted strike. The fact that the CNT had 
rejected  a  solution  created  by  the  jurado  for  the  sector  was  obscured  by  a  torrent  of  
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accusations that it had done nothing but meddle where it should not have been in the first 
place.  
 
In spite of the return of workers to work, the CNT attempted to maintain the strike, with 
the backing of the Local Federation. By this point the stakes had been raised far higher 
than the winning of new working conditions and regulations for the Barcelona CNT. At a 
meeting of the Local Federation on 26
th February, in agreeing to continue the strike and 
potentially extend it to other sectors, the delegate for the construction union asserted that 
the strike ‘was not about the conflict of a section, nor of a union, but of the UGT and the 
jurados mixtos against the CNT’.
5 The strike nominally continued on this basis, as did an 
insistence that the dispute had to be won through direct action and not through the jurados 
mixtos,  which  continued  to  be  a  ‘den  of  enchufados  that  are  hated  and  repudiated  by 
employers and workers’,
6 a claim made at a time when the majority of the industry was 
effectively working in accordance with the bases of the jurado. 
 
The CNT-led construction strike that began in April 1933 had many parallels with the 
carpenters’ strike in terms of the role that the jurados played in it. In April 1933 the CNT 
initiated a general strike in the industry, the goal of which was the creation of a new set of 
bases. The central demand was the creation of a six-hour working day, to help better share 
work amongst the 10000 unemployed workers in the sector. The conflict ultimately lasted 
over four months. During the conflict the CNT clashed with both the UGT construction 
union and the jurados mixtos. The conflict illustrated how committed both sets of militants 
were to working only through their own methods of handling industrial relations. It was 
also a prominent example of how, to both the CNT and UGT union leaders, the actions of 
their rivals were tantamount to collusion with the forces of reaction.
7  
 
The CNT’s strike began on 17
th April. The UGT’s union did not back the strike, with its 
members attempting to attend work as normal. At the same time as the CNT’s strike was 
launched,  the  UGT’s  construction  union,  which  unsurprisingly  had  considerably  fewer 
members than that of the CNT, presented its own set of bases to the industry’s jurado 
mixto, in the hope that the conflict could be resolved using its own methods of arbitration 
rather than through the need to strike. The CNT, however, resolutely refused to pass the 
dispute through the arbitration systems.
8  
 
Unlike in the wood workers’ strike, the sector’s employers were more willing to participate 
in the jurados. That they did so, placed into the general context of businesses in Spain  
 
132
opposing them, illustrates the extent to which they were not prepared to deal with the CNT. 
Whilst viewing this move by employers as a pretext for refusing the CNT’s demands, 
however,  the  CNT  ultimately  blamed  Largo  for  the  employers’  position.  In  a 
demonstration of their faith that direct action would otherwise have prevailed, Solidaridad 
Obrera asserted that had it not been for Largo ‘imposing himself and his miscarriage of the 
jurados mixtos from his ministry, the employers would have already opened discussions 
with us’.
9 The stage was therefore set for the CNT to fight the socialists on two levels: 
firstly against the UGT’s workers on the ground, and even more importantly against the 
jurados mixtos. 
 
For its part, the UGT in Catalonia was from the start highly hostile to the CNT’s strike, 
whilst at the same time wishing to present an alternative method of advancing the workers’ 
material position in the industry. Ugetistas writing in Cataluña Obrera argued that the 
strike had no purpose other than to ‘cover up’ the CNT’s ‘failure’ at the port, where an 
anarcho-syndicalist strike was during these days losing its momentum. In the eyes of the 
socialists, the strike only aimed to benefit the goals of the FAI, who were in turn serving 
the ends of the bourgeoisie by leading workers into an unnecessary strike.
10 The USC took 
an equally critical stance of the CNT’s strike in the pages of Justicia Social.
11  
 
In the first days of the strike, the CNT was bullish about its prospects.
12 However, the CNT 
and  the  employers  remained  deadlocked,  with  the  CNT  continuing  to  refuse  any 
involvement with the jurados. The occurrence of other, wider CNT protest actions, such as 
the general strike of May 1933, undoubtedly also caused the conflict to remain unresolved 
for longer, particularly as a result of the detentions of cenetistas and closure of its unions 
that resulted  from them. At the same time, the  UGT persisted in its negotiations with 
employers through the jurado mixto, but failed to reach an agreement, its demands for a 
seven-hour working day being rejected.  
 
The  Barcelona  construction  strike  took  a  crucial  turn  in  July,  when  Largo  imposed  a 
solution in his capacity as Labour Minister. Largo’s solution stipulated a forty-four hour 
working week and substantial pay increases.
13 Had the settlement been accepted at this 
point, the rivalry between the CNT and the UGT would have in fact served to the general 
benefit of workers in the sector. However, the CNT roundly refused to accept Largo’s 
settlement,  precisely  on  the  grounds  that  it  represented  an  imposed  solution  by  the 
socialists and an attack on direct action. The CNT’s view of Largo’s intervention was that 
after three months of conflict ‘when they had calculated that the strikers had arrived at the  
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extreme limit of physical resistance, when they thought hunger would defeat them’ Largo 
had  stepped  in,  having  ‘prepared  bases  behind  the  backs  of  the  [CNT]  union  and  the 
employers’. The argument of Solidaridad Obrera was a somewhat contradictory one in the 
respect that it seemed to imply Largo and the employers constituted a single bloc that 
sought to exploit the lengthy nature of the conflict, whilst also seeking to present Largo as 
someone  who  had  interfered  in  the  process  against  the  wishes  of  the  CNT  and  the 
employers.  The  paper  also  maintained  that  workers  were  united  in  their  rejection  of 
Largo’s ploy.
14  
 
The attempts of the UGT to use arbitration to solve the conflict had a knock-on effect of 
escalating  the  level  of  confrontation  on  the  streets  and  in  workplaces.  The  most  high-
profile  instance  of  violence  that  resulted  from  the  CNT’s  construction  strike  was  the 
murder of Francesc Llagostera, a ceramics worker and UGT member who was a worker 
representative on the jurados mixtos of the construction sector. On the evening of the 7
th 
July,  Llagostera  left  his  home  with  one  of  his  children.  In  the  street,  a  group  of  men 
grabbed him, separating him from his child, before shooting him several times.
15 There is 
little doubt that Llagostera was deliberately targeted and that his murder was premeditated; 
according to the Febus press agency the men had taken the trouble to find Llagostera’s 
jurados mixtos accreditation card before shooting him.
16 The socialist press were adamant 
that it was faístas who had committed the murder. The Catalan Secretariat of the UGT 
released a statement to the press on 10
th July in which they condemned the killing and 
presented it as another clear-cut instance of pistolerismo, linked to ‘the absurd construction 
strike, declared in the most favourable moments for the bourgeoisie’.
17   
 
The solidity of the strike had been damaged by July, with many workers returning to work, 
believing that a solution had been reached by Largo.
18 That this was the case illustrates 
how for many workers, the material outcome of the strike was more important than the 
methods by which the gains had been won or who had won them, factors which were 
paramount for committed cenetistas. In spite of their best efforts, the CNT construction 
union representatives had little choice but to enter into negotiations with employers in 
August, and on the 13
th of the month the solution formulated by the two parties was put to 
a  vote  at  a  CNT  assembly  of  construction  workers,  at  which  it  was  approved.  The 
negotiated solution they had reached was for a forty-four hour working week, but in terms 
of  its  pay  improvements  was  noticeably  less  than  that  which  Largo  had  attempted  to 
impose.  The  turnout  at  the  assembly,  according  to  Vega,  was  less  than  2000,  perhaps  
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indicating less of a commitment on the part of the workforce to the CNT’s handling of the 
conflict than Solidaridad Obrera had asserted throughout it.
19  
 
In some industries, the creation of a UGT union brought with it moves by its leaders to set 
up jurados mixtos, which in turn spurred on the cenetistas in the industry to attack their 
UGT  rivals  with  a  particularly  acute  sense  of  urgency.  As  mentioned  in  the  previous 
chapter, a UGT tram workers’ union was set up in Barcelona in 1932, a move which was 
met with the CNT’s transport union attempting to mobilize workers against it. However, 
such efforts to prevent a UGT presence amongst tram workers failed. Even worse, those 
involved with the foundation of the UGT tram section moved rapidly to bring about the 
creation of a jurado mixto for the sector. On 2
nd November 1932, Ponciano Alonso, one of 
the  key  militants  of  the  CNT  transport  union  during  the  Republic  and  the  Civil  War, 
published  an  article  in  Solidaridad  Obrera  which  comprehensively  attacked  both  the 
implementation  of  the  jurado  mixto  in  the  industry  and  also  carried  out  a  character 
assassination of Eduardo Gómez Benedicto, the socialist who spearheaded efforts to create 
the  UGT  union  in  the  sector.  Gómez  Benedicto  was  an  expert  in  ‘dirty  and  murky 
business’ who was ‘a traitor to the proletarian cause’ and, to top it all, had, according to 
Alonso, been an esquirol during the infamous La Canadiense strike of 1919. The veracity 
of  the  accusations  is  unfortunately  impossible  to  prove,  but  they  undoubtedly 
complimented very well Alonso’s efforts to discredit both the UGT and the jurados. He 
went  on  to  describe  the  arbitration  system  as  ‘the  absolute  negation  of  liberty  and 
proletarian defence’ and argue that those who had joined the UGT’s tram workers’ section 
were of an even lesser calibre than Gómez Benedicto and were ‘all esquiroles’. However, 
Alonso was also convinced that ‘the tram workers, united as a single man in the invincible 
CNT, will not step back in their social revolutionary march’, in spite of these attempts to 
set up a jurado for tram workers.
20  
 
A similarly combative outlook against the jurado was expressed at an assembly of tram 
workers held by the CNT transport union on 8
th November. Here, when the subject was 
raised, the jurados were denounced as ‘an instrument of capital and the state to kill the 
rebellious spirit and the rights of the worker’ and were a ‘dictatorial work’ directed against 
the proletariat by Largo. A cry of ‘no!’ was raised by the assembled workers in response to 
a militant asking if they would accept a jurado for their industry. Later on at the assembly, 
according to the report in Solidaridad Obrera, speakers ‘scathingly attacked the Unión 
General de Trabajadores for being an organism of traitors and esquiroles at the service of  
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the bourgeoisie and the state, miserably and cowardly tricking workers with promises that 
turn into hunger and misery, into imprisonment and crime’.
21  
 
Alonso published similar attacks on this new UGT presence amongst tram workers and the 
jurado that they were attempting to set up.
22 In spite of the hostility of both Alonso and the 
tram workers at the CNT assembly, however, the ugetistas did not appear to give up. In 
December  1932,  Gómez  Benedicto  went  to  Madrid,  along  with  another  leader  of  the 
UGT’s tram workers, where they met with Largo to discuss their jurado mixto, as well as 
meeting with UGT transport leaders from other cities in Spain. Moreover, in May 1933, 
the Socidedad de Tranviarios de Barcelona held an event to celebrate the first anniversary 
of the organization.
23  
 
This  hostility  towards  the  UGT  tram  union  and  the  jurados  that  it  promoted  was 
maintained as late as 1934. The nature of the criticism and the language deployed indicate 
a movement in disarray, reduced to making the most vitriolic attacks possible on perceived 
enemies. Solidaridad, the temporary replacement for Solidaridad Obrera following the ban 
on that paper, published an article on 24
th February in which the UGT tram union was 
attacked for presenting a set of bases through the jurado mixto. The rant against the UGT’s 
attempts to present new working conditions was nothing short of bizarre. The socialists 
were ‘traitors, as always’; according to the author ‘their dirtiness does not surprise us. They 
cannot infect us with it. Our epidermis is impermeable’. It also maintained the façade that, 
by this stage, the CNT’s transport union still commanded the loyalty of all tram workers, 
whilst that of the UGT represented an illegitimate minority.
24  
 
As has been demonstrated here, the CNT in Barcelona presented the jurados mixtos as an 
anti-worker aberration, and fought against the involvement of arbitration even if it would 
bring a faster solution to a conflict with the same material outcome. However, the idea that 
it did this purely out of a commitment to its principles, and not because arbitration was the 
strategy adopted by a rival, must be called into question. Both immediately before and 
during the Republic, various cenetistas in Catalonia were willing to accept the intervention 
of regional or municipal authorities into the resolution of conflicts. The case of Macià 
intervening on behalf of the CNT at the port in June 1931, outlined in chapter five, was not 
a one-off. Rider highlights the recurrent recourse, during the summer of 1931, a period 
which  marks  the  peak  of  the  CNT  winning  new  bases  for  workers,  by  its  unions  in 
Barcelona to accept solutions drawn up by the local authorities.
25 Furthermore, according 
to Martin Benjamin and Albert Balcells, from 1934, once the Generalitat had been given  
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greater power over industrial relations, some CNT unions accepted the interventions of 
Martí Barrera, a former cenetista who was appointed labour counsellor to the Generalitat.
26 
This willingness to accept arbitration hints not just at a certain pragmatism on the part of 
certain CNT union leaders, but also that the attacks on arbitrated solutions to conflicts were 
motivated as much by an organizational rivalry as they were by ideological tenets. Eulàlia 
Vega points out that from the spring of 1930, once the CNT was legalized, its unions 
attacked Libres and UGT rivals for using arbitration, when in many cases CNT militants 
themselves  had  been  using  such  mechanisms  during  the  dictatorship  when  they  were 
operating in other unions. Vega argues that this highlighted their wish to use the idea of 
arbitration as amounting to collusion with employers to discredit rivals; the same could, to 
a certain extent, be said of the CNT’s stance during the Republic.
27  
 
If the CNT became fixated on the jurados in some conflicts to the point where they would 
reject their settlements on principle and regardless of the terms they offered, then it was 
equally the case that UGT unions were at times fairly opportunistic in undercutting strike 
actions undertaken by the CNT from their moment of inception, drawing on the jurados 
mixtos in the process. A strike called by the CNT in the packaging sector in November 
1933  offers  an  example  of  how  Catalan  UGT  unions  sometimes  responded  to  CNT-
initiated conflicts. On the 26
th November the CNT’s graphic arts union held an assembly 
for workers involved in the production of paper and card packaging, at which it was agreed 
to call a strike after attempts to negotiate with employers over new bases de trabajo had 
not produced satisfactory results. The strike would take place with immediate effect. The 
UGT’s union for this field immediately released a statement to the press to let it be known 
that it did not support the strike due to the way it had been called – that is to say, not in 
accordance with the laws of the Republic in terms of notice given – and instructed its 
workers not to adhere to the strike.
28 Another reason given by the UGT union for this 
opposition was their belief that the CNT union lacked the sufficient numerical support to 
be in a position to call a strike in this fashion. It was not simply the case, then, that the 
UGT union did not support the strike, but that it actively wished to distance itself from it 
and  condemn  it.  At  the  same  time,  the  UGT  also  entered  into  negotiations  with  the 
industry’s employers, with a new set of bases being agreed via a jurado mixto in early 
December and the employers announcing to the CNT that these were the bases that they 
would be prepared to implement once they ended their strike.
29  
 
The  CNT  union  was  furious  with  the  UGT’s  handling  of  the  conflict,  publishing  an 
account of ‘ugetista treachery’ in Solidaridad Obrera on 3
rd December. The cenetistas  
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took issue with the accusation that they did not have sufficient worker representation to 
call the strike and attacked the UGT union leaders, as was to be expected, in terms of them 
being ‘opportunists’ and ‘enchufistas’ who were living off workers. The opportunity was 
also taken to declare that workers in this industry were against the reformist methods of the 
UGT and wholly backed the CNT.
30 Although it is difficult to know the precise balance of 
forces in this industry, it would appear that the UGT would have represented a minority, 
though not a tiny one, declaring one hundred members when it joined the UGT in August 
1930,  having  previously  been  an  autonomous  union.
31  The  CNT  union,  meanwhile, 
evidently had enough support to disrupt production significantly through its strike; in early 
December, departments in the Generalitat were unable to conduct normal business due to a 
lack of envelopes as a result of the conflict.
32  
 
Even  as  the  CNT  in  Barcelona  progressively  declined,  its  opposition  to  the  jurados 
remained  as resolute as ever. This manifested itself not just in the form of the labour 
conflicts in the construction and wood working sectors. The opposition in these months of 
decline also took the form of the CNT refusing to cooperate in any strike actions with other 
organizations of the left, in large measure due to these groups wishing to initially pursue 
conflicts  through  the  jurados.  In  1934,  for  example,  the  UGT  workers  in  the  fabric 
treatment sector sought the cooperation of the CNT for a conflict with employers in the 
sector. The ugetistas organized a meeting to suggest that they and the CNT co-ordinate 
their presentation of bases to employers. The minutes of the meeting reveal the evasive 
attitude taken by cenetistas to this suggestion, with the junta members rejecting the offer 
whilst stressing that they were not opposed to unity. The ugetistas were informed that a 
coordination of their efforts would be ‘problematic’ and were alerted to the different labour 
conflict methods adopted by the two organizations. The junta were keen to stress that they 
could  not  accept  any  ‘interventionism’  in  a  labour  conflict  and  that  all  CNT  labour 
disputes, by order of the organization’s statutes, ‘have to be carried out through direct 
action’. The UGT’s proposal of first seeking a solution from arbitration and then carrying 
out  a  strike  if  the  bases  were  not  accepted  was  rejected  by  the  CNT  junta.  For  the 
cenetistas, it was simply not permissible for a labour conflict to be fought outside of their 
own terms, while the ugetistas likewise insisted on first using arbitration, even if they 
showed slightly more flexibility by indicating a willingness to adopt direct action methods 
if negotiation failed. At the same time, the CNT junta sought to stress that it ‘has always 
and at all times done everything possible to bring about unity of action; it has never tired of 
asking  comrades  to  join  our  section’.  This  latter  statement  illustrates  that,  for  many  
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cenetistas in the era prior to October 1934, worker unity could only result from all workers 
being in the CNT.
33 
 
Outside  of  Barcelona,  there  is  also  some  evidence  of  the  jurados  playing  a  role  in 
interactions between the CNT and the UGT in the region. In Tortosa, the CNT found itself 
in 1933 and 1934 eclipsed by the UGT in terms of its membership levels. With the UGT 
the dominant worker entity, the jurados became an increasingly prominent feature in the 
town.  Nevertheless,  and  as  a  reflection  of  the  CNT’s  deep-rooted  opposition  to  the 
Republic’s arbitration measures, the CNT here staged a defiant stand against the UGT and 
the jurados, initiating strike actions against them. The UGT set up ten unions in Tortosa 
between the start of the Republic and October 1934.
34 The local UGT attempted to impose 
the  jurados  mixtos  and  their  settlements  on  employers.  Employers  in  the  construction 
sector refused to accept the bases de trabajo drawn up by the local jurados, and the UGT 
construction  union  accordingly  called  a  strike,  which  took  place  in  September  1933. 
However, it was not just employers who opposed the jurados here. The CNT were equally 
opposed to the settlement and the UGT’s campaign to impose it. The anarcho-syndicalists 
presented the UGT’s settlement as an attack on liberty of union affiliation, because as part 
of  the  work  distribution  element  of  the  agreement  workers  were  required  to  hold  a 
registration card from the jurados. Although the card was freely available to all workers, 
cenetistas in the town viewed the arrangement as an imposition of socialism. Mirroring 
Solidaridad Obrera’s interpretation of workers who accepted the jurados, El Socialista 
suggested that the workers who opposed the jurados in Tortosa were being manipulated by 
the bourgeoisie. The case of Tortosa illustrates how there was a degree of inevitability, 
when two unions with opposed methods attempted to occupy the same space, that one 
union would have to occupy a position that would align it with employers.
35  
 
In 1934 the CNT stepped up its efforts to overturn the jurados mixtos of the construction 
industry in the town. In late August, workers without the jurados mixtos registration were 
dismissed from a construction site. One of them, a cenetista named José Subirats, refused 
to accept the dismissal, and returned to work as normal the next day. The Guardia Civil 
were ultimately called in to remove him. This led to a delegation of CNT militants heading 
to the town hall to inform the Mayor that the CNT would initiate a general strike in the 
town  if  the  workers  were  not  readmitted.  The  Delegado  del  Trabajo  was  immediately 
called to the town to resolve the dispute, but was unable to break the deadlock, his offer of 
immediately  issuing  registration  cards  to  all  workers,  including  those  who  had  been 
dismissed, being refused by the cenetistas.
36 The CNT in the town then began to prepare to  
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mobilize  workers  against  the  jurados.  However,  in  a  reflection  of  the  heavy-handed 
treatment that was by this stage of the Republic routinely used against CNT organisms, the 
government ordered the closure of the CNT’s local headquarters and detained some of its 
militants.
37 The plight of the CNT in Tortosa was followed by the right-wing press, who 
used it as an opportunity to present the UGT in fairly similar terms as did Solidaridad 
Obrera. The pro-monarchist El Siglo Futuro, for example, took the CNT’s side, declaring 
that ‘the Casa del Pueblo of Tortosa opposes workers who do not belong to it working’.
38 
The cenetistas themselves were no less indignant, describing their socialist counterparts as 
‘despots of the working class’ and exhorting workers to ‘fight against this jurado mixto, 
against these cowardly socialists’.
39 The fight against the jurados mixtos in Tortosa made 
the transition from the local notices section of Solidaridad Obrera into its opinion pieces, 
where  the  situation  was  presented  as  being  that  the  local  socialist  movement  had  a 
stranglehold over the local government of the Esquerra.
40  
 
Esquirolaje 
 
One vital element of the dynamic of hostilities between the CNT and the UGT during 
labour conflicts in Barcelona was the issue of strike breaking. The linkage between the 
UGT and esquirolaje was made with regard to UGT unions across Spain, but was made 
especially  vehemently  with  regard  to  the  Catalan  UGT.  As  the  alleged  successor 
organization to the Sindicatos Libres, Solidaridad Obrera and CNT militants posited that 
strike breaking was one of the fundamental traits of the UGT in Catalonia. Solidaridad 
Obrera often reported that UGT workers were pressed into service as esquiroles during 
smaller CNT strikes, replacing striking CNT members. To give one example, during the 
course  of  a  strike  at  a  glass  workshop  in  January  1932,  the  junta  of  the  CNT  section 
coordinating the strike  asserted through the pages of the paper that the employers had 
undertaken ‘a recruitment of esquiroles in favour of the social detritus that is called the 
UGT’.
41 Accusations of strike breaking were often linked to the idea that Largo Caballero 
was coordinating an offensive against the CNT to destroy its unions, such as the strike that 
CNT cinema workers threatened to call in June 1931, outlined in the previous chapter.
42 
 
One complicating factor in judging the role that strike breaking played in the dynamic of 
CNT-UGT interactions in Catalonia is that the terms ‘esquiroles’ and ‘esquirolaje’ were 
used by cenetistas to describe instances of UGT members continuing their work when their 
CNT counterparts called a strike, which happened often, as well as using it in relation to 
instances  of  UGT  members  being  called  in  to  replace  striking  CNT  members,  which  
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happened  far  less  frequently  in  Barcelona.  These  were  qualitatively  two  very  different 
things, the latter being far more provocative than the former, but cenetistas tended to brand 
both as being esquirolaje. For example, during the construction strike of 1933, Solidaridad 
Obrera labelled the Catalan UGT as esquiroles simply for its initial stance of opposition to 
the conflict.
43 Often, therefore, it is unclear which meaning of the term is being deployed 
by cenetistas in their attacks, making it even more difficult to assess claims of esquirolaje, 
especially in smaller-scale strikes.  
 
What would appear to be the case is that the CNT’s claims regarding the extent of the 
Catalan UGT’s esquirolaje, in Barcelona at least, were overstated. To a certain degree, the 
CNT’s repeated denunciations of UGT esquirolaje in Catalonia were no more or less valid 
than those made against the CNT by other groups, such as the communists, in the event of 
a CNT union not supporting one of their strikes in this period.
44 In the case of the cinema 
workers’ conflict, the claim of strike breaking was made before a strike had even taken 
place.
45 Even Solidaridad Obrera admitted on some occasions that, whilst the UGT did not 
back a particular CNT strike, their organization did not provide labour to replace CNT 
strikers. However, according to cenetistas, that this was the case was due to the Catalan 
UGT having so few members, rather than it choosing not to provide strike breakers. The 
implication was therefore that the Catalan UGT did by default attempt to provide strike 
breakers, and was only prevented from doing this through a lack of support. For example, 
during the carpenters’ strike of late 1932, the CNT strike committee acknowledged that the 
UGT  wood  workers’  union  had  not  provided  strike  breakers  to  replace  CNT  workers, 
though this was put down to the fact that ‘the UGT is like a mythical legend, without 
stability  nor  real  substance.  It  is  a  phantasm’.  In  other  words,  its  non-provision  of 
esquiroles was only a result of it not having sufficient members to do so.
46 
 
Similarly, during the 1933 construction strike, in appraising the state of the conflict on 20
th 
April, Solidaridad Obrera presented the UGT as esquiroles for their public announcement 
of not supporting the strike, whilst also mockingly implying that the union in any case 
must  have  had  no  members  since  ‘there  is  not  a  single  esquirol’.
47  Based  on  its  later 
coverage of this conflict as it dragged on into June, had there been wide-scale deployment 
of UGT labour, it is certain that the anarcho-syndicalist press would have condemned it 
loudly and vociferously.
48 Indeed, the Catalan UGT itself expressed the concern that the 
CNT’s  strike  was  leading  to  the  hiring  of  workers  who  were  happy  to  act  as  strike 
breakers. The UGT also continued to maintain publicly that the CNT (or rather the FAI, 
which the Catalan socialists now judged to be totally in control of the union’s actions) in  
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its handling of the conflict had ‘offered an excellent service’ to contractors by giving them 
a pretext to erode union representation in the sector by hiring strike breakers.
49 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the extent of the CNT-UGT conflict there and its manifestation in 
the form of sectarian boycotts, the port was one of the key areas of Barcelona in which the 
accusation of strike breaking was most aggressively levelled at the UGT. As has been 
outlined in this part of the thesis, in July and October 1931, the UGT provided strike-
breaking labour for the two CNT strikes that took place there. As was also discussed in 
chapter six, during these conflicts the CNT accused the UGT of acting on behalf of Largo 
to  destroy  the  CNT  and  replace  it  with  the  UGT.  Though  not  termed  precisely  as 
esquirolaje, Solidaridad Obrera nevertheless argued, with regard to the October conflict, 
for example, that UGT port workers were ‘hypocrites and mercenaries’ who were working 
to serve the interests of employers at the port.
50. 
 
However, it is essential to bear in mind that the two strikes that took place at the port were 
inextricably  bound  up  with  the  CNT’s  attempts  to  marginalize  the  entire  UGT  port 
federation, as was discussed in chapter five. The July 1931 strike by the CNT, though 
aimed  at  implementing  a  new  system  of  contracting  workers  and  other  material 
stipulations, came just a month after the CNT had successfully banished the UGT from the 
port.  It  is  hardly  surprising  that  the  FEOP  would  be  willing  to  offer  its  members  to 
employers in such circumstances, especially as, in any case, the FEOP sought to bring 
about an arbitration system to handle the management of industrial relations at the docks. 
The calling of the strike so quickly after the imposition of the closed shop illustrates, on 
the part of the cenetistas, a certain naivety. Having forced all workers into the CNT – even 
if it was only a minority who actually needed forcing – it was certainly not very astute then 
to believe that these workers would not resent that manoeuvre, let alone stand firm in a 
strike convoked by the CNT. If the UGT had any case to answer over its response to the 
July conflict on the grounds that it was a strike designed to improve the material position 
of dockers, the same could not be said of the October 1931 conflict. On this occasion, the 
CNT’s boycott-cum-strike was directed entirely at the UGT. It was hardly surprising that 
the organization would provide members to replace striking cenetistas when the dispute 
was aimed squarely at removing the UGT from the port entirely.   
   
There was one further CNT-led strike at the port, which the UGT once again refused to 
back. By this juncture, the CNT was a fading presence at the port, through a combination 
of the spectacular backfiring of its July and October 1931 strikes there, the passing over of  
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some workers to the UGT and the general attritive effects of repression. The UGT, on the 
other hand, was the dominant union at the port. Nevertheless, the CNT transport union 
called a strike at the port in April 1933. The goals of this strike were an establishment of a 
fair system for distributing work, and an eight-hour day.
51 Once more, the FEOP provided 
replacement  labour  for  CNT  strikers,  and  the  conflict  collapsed.
52  On  this  particular 
occasion, the difficulty in judging the UGT’s actions stems from the fact that it was the 
larger union, and as such the FEOP leaders obviously would have felt incensed by the idea 
of a smaller union attempting to execute a strike that was effectively in opposition to the 
system that it had promoted, just as CNT union leaders became enraged by their much 
smaller  UGT  counterparts  attempting  to  resolve  disputes  through  arbitration.  This  was 
admittedly not a dynamic that occurred frequently in Barcelona during the Republic; the 
norm was rather a UGT minority refusing to back a strike by the CNT majority.  
 
Competing claims of legitimacy 
 
During strikes in which the CNT clashed with the UGT, a key part of the recriminatory 
accusations that publicly went back and forth between the two organizations was centred 
on which organization had the legitimacy to speak and act on behalf of workers in the 
industry in question. This occurred in particular when a conflict took on the dynamic of the 
CNT calling a strike, and the UGT then attempting to resolve the conflict in the industry 
through the use of the jurados mixtos. In such cases, cenetistas loudly accused the UGT of 
being too small to have the right to impose a jurado on an industry in which the CNT was 
the stronger union, extrapolating from this that the jurados themselves were illegitimate. 
This very perspective was put forward by the CNT during the carpenters’ strike of late 
1932. In fact, the criticism went much further, presenting the leaders of the UGT wood 
workers’ union as ‘bullshitters who try to make themselves out as wise, trying to trick 
workers with a few material gains which will be laughed out of every workshop’ and who 
were also trying to ‘spread confusion’ through their involvement in the conflict.
53  
 
The CNT’s construction union equally perceived the UGT and the jurados as illegitimate 
actors during the prolonged strike in the industry over the spring and summer of 1933. 
‘Who do the worker “members” who attend the meetings convoked by the jurado mixto 
represent?’  asked  the  front  page  of  Solidaridad  Obrera  on  22
nd  April.  The  answer, 
according to the paper, was that ‘they do not represent the construction workers, affiliated 
to  the  Confederación  Nacional  del  Trabajo’.  At  the  same  time,  the  paper  attacked 
employers in the industry for having instructed the CNT to present their demands through  
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the jurados and also of having accused the CNT construction union of having no influence 
amongst workers in the industry. Evidently for all sides involved in the conflict it was of 
paramount importance to present their opponents as having no support within the sector 
and therefore no legitimacy.
54 
 
The central accusation made by the CNT in such conflicts in which the UGT tried to 
intervene, then, was that the organization and its small unions were given, through their 
promotion  of  the  jurados  mixtos,  a  role  that  went  far  beyond  their  size.  Whilst  the 
accompanying rhetoric regarding their efforts amounting to collusion with the bourgeoisie 
or representing a direct attempt to destroy the CNT is more debatable, the claim itself 
certainly  has  an  element  of  validity  to  it.  With  regard  to  the  construction  strike,  for 
example, that there was by 1933 a jurado mixto established for this industry gave the UGT 
a stronger presence in it by allowing the socialist union publicly to present itself as having 
some method of resolving the dispute, in spite of its smaller size. 
 
Some cases of the UGT setting up unions in an industry and then proceeding to set up a 
jurado likewise illustrate the CNT’s fear that the arbitration would give somewhat parvenu 
UGT activists in an industry a disproportionate level of influence that would potentially 
undermine the CNT’s influence, which was based first and foremost on the strength of 
numbers of workers enrolled in the sindicatos únicos. The reaction of the CNT transport 
union’s militants to the creation of a UGT tram union and a jurado for that sector, outlined 
above, illustrates this. Looking at these developments from the cenetista perspective, it 
must have been galling and threatening to have expended a great deal of effort in building 
up a union that sought to represent the majority of workers in its field, only to then see 
those efforts potentially threatened by individuals with no substantial support amongst the 
workforce  making  moves  to  set  up  a  legally  binding  entity  that  would  govern  labour 
conflicts for all workers in the sector. Under such circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the cenetistas’ response to the UGT tram workers’ efforts was one of vitriolic hostility. 
 
For its part, the Catalan UGT had its own series of reasons why it regarded the CNT as not 
a legitimate representative of the working classes in the region. These were expressed not 
just during specific labour conflicts, but also on a more routine basis through newspapers 
connected to the Catalan UGT. The claim of illegitimacy was related to one of the central 
accusations made against the CNT by the Catalan UGT during the Republic, which was 
that the anarcho-syndicalist labour federation’s popularity was based upon coercion and 
intimidation of workers into joining the sindicatos únicos. The argument followed that  
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because its dominance in a particular sector was based on this deceit, it had no right to 
force workers into counterproductive and self-defeating strike actions. From the summer of 
1931, La Internacional routinely informed its readers of cases of workers ‘being coerced 
and attacked by those from the CNT, who wish to impose their will through any means on 
Catalan workers’.
55  
 
This  basic  interpretation  of  the  CNT’s  modus  operandi  served  as  the  main  basis  for 
justifying the Catalan UGT’s opposition to the CNT’s strike actions. The port was one key 
example of this. According to Desiderio Trilles, writing in La Internacional, the CNT’s 
initial supremacy at the port was a result of its coercion of workers, and as such the actions 
undertaken by the transport union did not reflect the will of the port workers.
56 Similarly, 
Catalan UGT organizers at times often dared to make the claim that their CNT rivals did 
not  even  represent  a  majority  at  all  in  some  industries,  even  taking  into  account  their 
recourse to intimidating workers into the organization. This claim was made by, amongst 
others, Adolfo Simó, with regard to the battle between the CNT and the UGT in the bakery 
industry,
57 and again at the port over the CNT’s April 1933 strike.
58  
 
The Catalan UGT’s claims of CNT illegitimacy are somewhat problematic, even if the 
proposition on which they are based, namely that cenetistas did resort to intimidation to 
gain members, does have some validity to it. There were clearly cases of workers being 
intimidated into joining the CNT, ranging from them simply being told that it would be in 
their interests to join the CNT all the way to outright threats of violence. However, the 
Catalan UGT’s interpretation of the CNT turned this aspect of its militants’ behaviour into 
being the sole reason for the CNT having members, when it was undoubtedly the case that 
a substantial amount of the CNT’s strength was based on a genuine popularity amongst 
workers, albeit one which diminished over the course of the Republic. For the Catalan 
UGT to claim that the CNT had no legitimacy whatsoever in its claims to be acting on 
behalf of workers was therefore partially disingenuous. That said, it must also be borne in 
mind that CNT union organizers often did their utmost, as outlined in chapter five, to 
prevent  the  presence  of  a  competing  UGT  union  in  their  sector.  Accordingly,  it  is 
impossible to know if UGT unions could have gained a more substantial level of grassroots 
support – and thus more legitimacy when it came to leading industry-wide labour disputes 
– had their unions had more freedom to promote themselves amongst workers from the 
outset of the Republic.  
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The negative impact of CNT-UGT hostilities on workers 
 
One aspect of some labour conflicts in Barcelona in which the CNT and UGT clashed was 
that it was ultimately employers who benefited from the inter-union rivalry, and workers 
who lost out in material terms. Employers were able to exploit the fact of the two labour 
federations attempting to solve labour conflicts separately from one another by being able 
to choose the union that they wished to negotiate with according to which one was likely to 
bring about a better deal. In the 1933 construction strike, for example, the employers were 
able to exploit the stand-off between the CNT and the UGT to ensure that the outcome of 
the conflict was one of minimal improvements. In July the employers were able to reject 
the terms imposed by Largo Caballero as a result of the CNT’s continued opposition to 
them; the conflict ultimately ended, as discussed, with a settlement that was inferior to that 
put forward by the Labour Ministry.
59 
 
Sometimes, employers were able to take advantage of the CNT’s aversion to the jurados to 
roll back  any material  gains that they had provided workers, with the CNT willing to 
accept  bases  that  were  inferior  to  those  that  had  been  previously  established  by  the 
jurados. This was the case in the wood working industry, where the CNT wood workers’ 
union ultimately got its revenge on its UGT rival over its intervention in the carpenters’ 
strike of late 1932 and early 1933, though certainly at an overall cost to workers in the 
industry.  In  August  1933  there  was  another  wood  workers’  strike.  As  in  the  previous 
conflict,  the  UGT  concurrently  presented  bases  to  the  jurado,  which  the  CNT  and 
employers  once  again  rejected,  in  the  latter  case  undoubtedly  because  they  realized  it 
would be to their advantage to negotiate directly with the CNT. Accordingly, the CNT 
struck a deal with employers, though it was a noticeably inferior one to that which the 
UGT had achieved through the jurado.
60 Writing in Justicia Social, the Secretary of the 
UGT’s wood workers’ union denounced the development as a connivance of the CNT 
union leaders with the employers in an attempt to undermine the jurados, in the process 
acting against workers’  interests in the sector.  The secretary derided the claims of the 
cenetistas  that  they  had  won  an  agreement  that  represented  the  ‘authentic  will’  of  the 
workers by asking ‘since when have wood workers had as their will to win a lower wage 
and have worse working conditions?’.
61  
 
Adolfo Simó of the UGT’s bakery union likewise complained of the CNT undermining the 
material  interests  of  workers,  and  thus  benefiting  employers,  through  its  opposition  to 
gains won by the UGT and through arbitration mechanisms. Writing in June 1931, Simó  
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claimed  that  ‘between  December  and  the  fall  of  the  monarchy,  the  fearsome 
revolutionaries of the único did everything they could to sabotage whatever La Espiga did 
to improve the living conditions of everyone in the sector’. According to Simó, the CNT 
leaders were willing to accept the same conditions that the representatives of the Libres 
had  done  so  that  they  could  gain  a  foothold  in  the  industry.
62  From  early  on  in  the 
Republic, the CNT and the UGT union were at loggerheads over the crucial issue of how 
to  interact  with  employers  in  the  industry.  The  CNT  were  unsurprisingly  insistent  on 
adopting an approach of direct action, whilst the ugetistas themselves wished to make use 
of the Republic to force the implementation of bases that they had been fighting for since 
the 1920s but which the Libres had hitherto blocked. La Espiga initially voiced their wish 
for an unspecified form of government intervention to force the bases to be adopted; they 
subsequently  came  to  be  strong  proponents  of  the  jurados  mixtos.
63  The  UGT  union 
remained publicly  critical of the methods of its CNT counterparts, claiming they  were 
making no progress whilst maintaining the sector in a state of conflict through a strike they 
launched in the industry in the summer of 1931.
64 As the CNT were continuing to negotiate 
with business owners in the summer of 1931, La Espiga gained the support of the local 
Delegado del Trabajo to bring about a new starting time for bakers, one of the key points 
of  conflict  in  the  sector,  with  night  work  having  been  previously  mandatory  until  this 
intervention.
65 
 
Through the Delegado del Trabajo and then the jurados mixtos, the UGT bakers gained the 
implementation of the bases that they had been campaigning for since the days of the 
monarchy. However, the CNT refused to accept these bases.
66 Instead, the leaders of the 
CNT and employers, in a meeting apparently brokered by the Civil Governor, came to an 
agreement on an alternative set of bases at the beginning of 1933 that were inferior to those 
agreed through the jurados. The 5am start that had been won through the jurados was 
revoked,  bringing  about  a  return  to  night  work.
67  Simó  indignantly  vented  his  anger 
through the pages of Justicia Social and Cataluña Obrera, claiming that ‘the CNT have 
played into the bourgeoisie’s hands’.
68   
 
Conclusions 
 
Where there was a UGT presence within Barcelona industries, its acrimonious co-existence 
with  the  CNT  often  complicated  labour  conflicts,  with  the  two  labour  organizations’ 
opposing  methods  and  agendas  conditioning  the  course  of  several  important  industrial 
disputes in the city. However, the UGT’s role in CNT labour disputes did not necessarily  
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conform to the accounts given by cenetistas. Although the CNT publicly claimed that their 
UGT rivals would provide strike breakers in virtually every strike that they could, the state 
of affairs was generally far more complex than this. Often the UGT simply refused to 
support a CNT strike rather than actively providing replacement labour for employers; on 
other occasions, strikes were themselves directed at the UGT, making their opposition to 
them  eminently  more  comprehensible.  However,  esquirolaje  tended  to  be  more  of  a 
symptom  of  the  more  fundamental  issue  of  the  jurados  mixtos  and  other  forms  of 
arbitration, which proved to be the primary cause of hostilities between the CNT and the 
UGT in Barcelona during labour conflicts. The method of winning a labour conflict, rather 
than the objective of receiving a positive material settlement of workers in the industry in 
question,  all  too  often  became  the  overriding  focus  of  several  highly  protracted  and 
acrimonious disputes.  
 
The issue of which organization – CNT or UGT – and which method of industrial relations 
–  direct  action  or  management  unionism  –  should  be  used  to  manage  industry-wide 
disputes  raised  the  deeper  question  of  which  organization  could  present  itself  as  the 
legitimate manager of dispute, and by what criteria. The CNT sought to stress the small 
membership base of the UGT, whilst the UGT countered that the CNT deployed a fairly 
violent form of majoritarianism vis-à-vis the participation of workers in its disputes. Whilst 
it is evident that the CNT took the attitude that all those in an industry that did not comply 
with its strike calls were esquiroles and thus merited targeting, it is also difficult not to 
have a certain empathy with the perspective of their militants during the sorts of disputes 
outlined in this chapter. Cenetistas had built a mass movement from the ground up, and the 
existence of arbitration systems potentially empowered individuals who were relatively 
unknown to have a decisive influence in the representation of all workers in the industry, 
assuming the arbitration mechanisms functioned correctly. Ultimately, though, the most 
consistent losers in labour disputes in which the CNT and UGT clashed were not either 
organization, but workers themselves.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that the broad outlines of the activities of the Catalan UGT 
with regard to labour conflicts for the most part corresponded closely to the ethos of Santos 
Julià’s description of ‘management unionism’ that was outlined in chapter one. As we have 
seen,  UGT  unions  in  Catalonia  that  became  embroiled  in  the  most  significant 
confrontations  with  the  CNT  did  so  as  they  attempted  to  pursue  industrial  relations 
according to the fundamental attributes of ‘management unionism’. Furthermore, as this 
chapter  and  chapter  six  have  also  highlighted,  unions  that  joined  the  UGT  during  the  
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Republic, such as the FEOP or the tram workers, did so first and foremost because they 
sought to manage labour relations through arbitration systems. Likewise, unions such as 
the bakers, construction and wood workers fell foul of the CNT in the course of practicing 
this form of unionism. CNT-UGT conflicts in Catalonia cannot be explained by the idea 
that the Catalan UGT was a reactionary front for Libres gunmen, or the execution of a 
Largo Caballero master plan to destroy the CNT, executed by pliant lackeys, as the CNT 
presented them to be. Instead, hostilities between the two unions in the region seem to have 
been the result, to a significant extent, of the same causes as the battles between CNT and 
UGT unions going on elsewhere in Spain, which were fuelled by the CNT’s direct action 
methods jarring against the union practices of the UGT. The key difference between CNT-
UGT  hostilities  in  Catalonia  and  those  elsewhere  was  therefore  not  so  much  the 
characteristics of the Catalan UGT as it was the CNT’s efforts to construct their socialist 
union rivals as being entirely reactionary and anti-worker, coupled with the cenetistas’ 
belief that, because they and the working classes were in their view synonymous, they 
could and should attempt to marginalize the Catalan UGT. 
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Chapter Eight: The CNT’s Alianza Revolucionaria Proposal to the UGT, 1936 
 
October 1934 and its consequences 
 
The  left’s  confrontation  with  the  right  over  the  course  of  1934  culminated  in  a  failed 
rebellion, led by the socialists, in October. Though it did fail, and in most areas was put 
down relatively easily, October 1934 would become a watershed moment for the Republic 
and above all for the Spanish left, due to a combination of the two-week stand made by 
workers in Asturias, which was a product of the joint efforts of the CNT and the UGT 
there, the severity of the repression that was enacted by the government in response to the 
uprising, and the general sense amongst the left that the right were willing and able to use 
force to impose an authoritarian regime.  
 
The event that led the socialists to launch the attempt at revolution was the withdrawal by 
the CEDA in late September of their support for the Radical government, which had been 
operating  as  a  minority  government  that  depended  on  CEDA  backing.  José  María  Gil 
Robles, the leader of the CEDA, now demanded the formation of a government that would 
include  CEDA  ministers.  A  new  cabinet  was  formed  on  4
th  October,  containing  three 
CEDA ministers. The socialists had argued since the beginning of 1934 that the entry of 
the CEDA into the government would mark the death of the Republic’s ideals and the 
beginnings  of  fascism.  But  the  socialist  leadership  lacked  the  conviction  to  make  the 
decisive call to bring about such a movement when it seemed certain that the CEDA would 
enter the government; for all the revolutionary rhetoric of the Caballerista faction and in 
spite of the practical preparations being drawn up, the socialists sought to put off taking a 
stand until the last possible moment.
1 As Preston points out, several days elapsed between 
the collapse of the government and the naming of the new cabinet, and it was widely 
expected that the new cabinet would contain CEDA ministers. Yet during these days Largo 
Caballero made no decisive preparations to prime his revolutionary movement, choosing 
instead to do nothing until the official announcement of the new government.
2 
 
The socialist coordination of the overall movement was severely lacking. The insurrection 
that took place in October 1934 was the culmination of several months of planning by the 
socialists, even if the preparations had consisted of little more than some attempts – often 
with only limited success – to procure  arms, and an exercise in  gathering information 
regarding which members of the movement’s grassroots would be willing to participate 
when the call came.
 3 The overall plan for the insurrection was for socialist militants across  
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the country to call general strikes and, if possible, take up arms to neutralize the state’s 
security apparatus when the call to do so came, and then await further instructions from the 
leadership  in  Madrid,  which  would  provide  central  coordination  for  the  nationwide 
movement.  The  overall  success  of  the  uprising  would  therefore  depend  on  events  in 
Madrid;  if  it  was  defeated  there,  no  alternative  way  of  coordinating  the  uprisings  that 
would take place in towns across the rest of Spain existed. 
 
On 4
th October, the socialists gave twenty-four hours’ notice of a general strike in Madrid. 
Although socialist unions, as well as some communist and anarcho-syndicalist forces, did 
strike, they crucially did not occupy the streets. Moreover, many socialist leaders were 
either arrested or went to ground, with no significant assault on the institutions of authority 
taking place.
4 The city that was supposed to be the nexus point of the revolution was 
therefore rapidly neutralized, even if some workers stayed on strike for up to a week.
5 
General strikes also took place in several other major cities, including Seville, Zaragoza 
and Valencia.
6 There were isolated instances of well-planned revolt and defiant battling 
against security forces, such as the armed takeover of the Centenillo mining area by UGT 
miners in Andalucía.
7 But individual acts of rebellion were ultimately in vain because they 
were not tied together by any overall coordination. Just as importantly, none of the general 
strikes took on a dimension of presenting a serious threat to the forces of order that a 
revolution would have required them to overthrow.  
 
The two regions in which insurrection occurred on a more significant scale were Asturias 
and Catalonia, though the nature and degree of success of the rebellions in these two zones 
were  very  different  from  one  another.  The  contrast  between  events  in  these  two  areas 
would prove to be particularly significant for the CNT and the question of its stance on the 
rest of the left. The essentially different configuration of political forces in Catalonia gave 
the  October  revolt  there  a  very  different  form  relative  to  the  rest  of  Spain.  Here,  two 
different forces coalesced to defy the government, though with little success. On the one 
hand the ERC potentially had much to lose were a government that closely followed the 
CEDA agenda to be formed. In the months immediately prior to October relations between 
the Generalitat and the institutions of the Spanish state had been severely strained after 
agricultural reforms passed by the Generalitat were overturned in Madrid. For the ERC, the 
government of the right in Madrid represented a real threat to the autonomy process. On 
the other hand, the non-CNT left in Catalonia, many of whose organizations had by this 
time coalesced in the Alianza Obrera, shared the interpretation of the socialists that the 
entry of the CEDA into the government would usher in the beginnings of a right-wing,  
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authoritarian state. Although relations between the ERC and the non-CNT left in Catalonia, 
namely the BOC, the treintistas and the USC- and PSOE- affiliated socialists were by no 
means uniformly good, they ultimately shared the common ground of viewing a more pro-
CEDA government as being far worse than what had gone before in the bienio reformista. 
Accordingly, on 5
th October the Alianza Obrera declared a general strike in Barcelona, 
with its local branches also declaring strikes or attacking the authorities in other towns in 
the region. On the 6
th Lluís Companys publicly declared Catalonia to be an independent 
state within a federal Spain.  
 
Crucially, the CNT did not share the perspective of the rest of the left in Catalonia that 
Companys’s  independent  Catalonia  was  worth  defending  for  the  good  of  the  working 
classes. As has been established already in this thesis, the organization presented a public 
stance of regarding the rest of the left and the Republicans as being every bit as reactionary 
and corrupt as the Radicals and CEDA. Consequently, when news of uprisings elsewhere 
came through, the ERC and the Alianza Obrera were on the same side, while the CNT 
looked on. Companys’s independent Catalonia was doomed from the moment it was born; 
the armed forces in Catalonia stayed loyal to the central state, quickly surrounding the 
Generalitat, and the general strike of the Alianza Obrera did not develop into any form of 
armed insurrection. Although in some localities strikes and resistance lasted as late as 10
th 
October, by the seventh the main thrust of the rebellion in Catalonia was over.
8 
 
Asturias was the sole case of a sustained insurrection being carried out in October 1934, a 
dramatic anomaly that bore no relation whatsoever to the ineffectual general strikes that 
characterized  the  rebellion  elsewhere.  Unlike  in  the  rest  of  Spain,  the  manpower  and 
resources of the CNT, the UGT and the communists were channelled into endeavours that 
were far more clearly revolutionary in scope than elsewhere. Instead of merely striking, the 
workers of the region took up arms. Indeed, the creation of communes in various areas of 
the region and the impressive fight put up against the armed forces mark the Asturian 
insurrection  as  arguably  the  most  significant  attempt  at  proletarian  revolution  through 
armed resistance in Western Europe since the Paris Commune.
9 With a fairly limited pool 
of arms, a sizeable proportion of which was simply dynamite used in the mining industry, 
workers in the region seized control of towns and villages from under Civil Guard control, 
before then fighting armed forces that had been sent to re-take control of the region for 
several days. Although not successful everywhere, the Asturian workers of the CNT, the 
UGT and the communists nevertheless managed to control sizeable areas of the region for 
almost two weeks, even if their efforts were ultimately doomed to failure due to the risings  
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elsewhere quickly collapsing. The rebellion in Asturias was greatly facilitated by the CNT 
and the UGT in the region working together in accordance with the Alianza Obrera that 
the  two  organizations  had  entered  into  in  March,  combined  with  the  fact  that  both 
organizations, unlike many of their counterparts elsewhere in Spain, were capable of and 
willing to confront the security forces with weapons.  
 
The uprising began late on the 5
th October, when thousands of cenetistas and ugetistas 
besieged the barracks of the Civil Guard in the principal towns of the region and in the 
mining region in the south of Asturias. The miners gained control of the port towns of 
Avilés and Gijón, villages and towns in the mining region, and also gained a precarious 
grasp on the centre of Oviedo. Over the following two weeks Asturias was to all intents 
and purposes a warzone, as workers organized into militias fought the army and Civil 
Guard  across  the  region.  On  several  occasions,  the  rebels  scored  surprising  victories 
against much more heavily armed and better trained opponents. However, there was  a 
tragic inevitability that the revolutionary forces were simply no match for the might of the 
army, especially once the Army of Africa, Spain’s only combat force, was dispatched to 
the  region  to  put  down  the  revolt  with  extreme  force.  General  Eduardo  López  Ochoa, 
commanding the main body of troops that were sent to the region, had 15000 soldiers and 
3000 members of the Civil Guard under his command. Mistakes were also made by the 
rebels, such as their failure to secure the port in Gijón, which allowed army detachments to 
disembark there, and their failure to decisively take Oviedo in the first days of the uprising. 
By 18
th October, the rebels had been pushed back to the southern mining region, and were 
forced  to  surrender.
10  Nevertheless,  that  the  unions  of  the  CNT,  the  UGT  and  the 
communists were able to fight off the full might of the armed forces for nearly two weeks 
was a feat that captivated the hearts and minds of the left worldwide, and would have a 
profound effect on the outlook of the Spanish left for the remainder of the Republic.    
 
The awe in which the actions of the Asturians were held was not just grounded in an 
admiration for their sheer bravery. Asturias was not simply a warzone during October; in 
areas held by the rebels, a revolutionary order, which in some respects foreshadowed the 
initiatives  of  the  CNT’s  social  revolution  in  the  early  months  of  the  Civil  War,  was 
fleetingly set up. Committees were set up to coordinate the administration of towns, and 
money was sometimes abolished. The specific systems that were set up varied from town 
to town, often reflecting the blueprints of revolutionary order held by whichever of the 
labour federations were dominant in the area in question.
11 Crucially, both the military 
efforts and the coordination of the communes were coordinated by the Alianza Obrera. All  
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left-wing forces in the region had shown a willingness to rise up, rather than the dynamic 
present in Catalonia, where CNT leaders had refused to back the Alianza. And although in 
reality there were disagreements between the different organizations that comprised the 
Alianza Obrera in the region over questions of arms distribution and whether to continue 
resisting certain defeat, the overriding lesson that was taken from the events of October 
was that with a united course of action, the Spanish proletariat could achieve what its 
political parties and labour federations had hitherto only dreamed of. As Ramón Álvarez 
Palomo, a cenetista militant from Gijón who participated in the insurrection, suggested 
fifty years after the insurrection, the key legacy of the rebellion belonged to ‘the CNT and 
the UGT, who created the pact that served as a foundation for the events that astonished 
the world and were the work of all the Asturian people’.
12  
 
Critically, however, as will be discussed later in this chapter, the CNT’s main press outlets 
such  as  Solidaridad  Obrera  remained  detached  from  this  entire  revolutionary  attempt. 
CNT participation across the country depended on the local leaders of the movement.
13 But 
because the overall uprising quickly came to be defined almost exclusively by the events in 
Asturias, this stance of indifference was taken as being indicative of the CNT’s overall 
response to the heroics of Asturias. As will be examined more closely later in this chapter, 
the organization’s overall public appearance of ambivalence in the face of the events of 
October would have significant consequences in terms of the criticisms that were levelled 
at the anarcho-syndicalist movement after the insurrection had been put down, with the 
movement being characterized by the Marxist left abroad as having deliberately refused to 
come to the aid of the Asturians by not rising in Catalonia.
14 
 
The divergent responses between how the CNT in Asturias and Catalonia responded to the 
socialists’ uprising reveal a clear difference in outlook between the cenetistas of the two 
regions, even if local particularities did play a role in shaping their respective responses. 
As Chris Ealham points out, the CNT in Catalonia had something of a case for refusing to 
countenance  alliance  with  the  ERC-controlled  Generalitat,  with  which  it  had  been  in 
conflict for much of the Republic and which it regarded as using the region’s institutions 
and security apparatus to subdue the CNT.
15 However, the CNT in Catalonia’s response to 
October was also unquestioningly one of rejecting the initiatives of the Alianza Obrera on 
the grounds of its animosity towards the organizations within it, which in the faístas’ view 
merely had designs on imposing a Marxist form of authoritarianism. The events of October 
put what had been previously two conflicting stances that had been expressed at CNT 
national plenums into revolutionary practice. Whereas the Asturian CNT followed through  
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with their belief in the necessity of joint action with the UGT in the context of the present 
moment – even if there were factions within the Asturian movement, in the form of a faísta 
minority, who disagreed with this stance
16 – the Catalan CNT’s view that the rest of the 
left were as fascistic as the right manifested itself in their refusal to back the alianza’s 
uprising.  
 
That this was the case should not serve as the basis of a simplistic assumption that relations 
between the CNT and the UGT in Asturias had always been good, and were free of the 
conflicts that characterized CNT-UGT interactions in Catalonia. These difficulties went 
beyond the aforementioned pockets of anti-Alianza faístas based in the region. The CNT 
and the UGT’s unions in Asturias were at loggerheads throughout the Republic, to a large 
extent based around the usual refusal of UGT unions to back CNT conflicts and cenetistas 
to accept the jurados. As Ángeles Barrio Alonso demonstrates, these disputes between 
cenetistas and ugetistas were deeply acrimonious.
17 What truly differentiated the Asturian 
and the Catalan CNT was that, unlike the cenetistas who dominated the movement in 
Catalonia, the majority of cenetistas in Asturias drew a distinction between differences in 
handling labour conflicts and the broader and much more urgent question of how to defend 
the working classes  – and even bring  about proletarian revolution – in response to an 
authoritarian right that was gaining rapid momentum. The faístas of Catalonia, however, 
did not view the UGT or the other actors of the left in such nuanced terms, either before 
October 1934, or, as this chapter will demonstrate, in the months afterwards. That this was 
the case makes it all the more intriguing that, as will be examined in this chapter, it would 
be  the  Catalan  CNT  which  would  set  the  CNT  on  the  national  level  onto  a  path  of 
proposing an alliance with the UGT in 1936. 
 
Of equal importance to the Asturian heroism in the following months was the repression 
that  followed.  In  Asturias,  the  Army  of  Africa’s  actions  in  re-captured  areas  was 
essentially that of occupying belligerents, with rebel workers being summarily executed – 
or at the least beaten and tortured – and cases of women being raped by soldiers. By the 
time the fighting was over 1100 Asturian workers were dead and another 2000 wounded.
18 
Once the rebellion had been finally suppressed, a more comprehensive clean-up of the left 
across Spain began. Military justice was applied in Asturias. Elsewhere, the majority of the 
premises of the labour federations and political parties of the left and the left republicans 
were closed, as were their newspapers, though Solidaridad Obrera escaped a long-term 
ban, unlike the papers of the socialist movement. In total, around 40000 people across 
Spain were imprisoned for having played a role in the October insurrections.
19 Amongst  
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these were some of the most prominent figures of the bienio reformista, including Largo 
Caballero and Manuel Azaña. Others, such as Indalecio Prieto, managed to escape abroad. 
The  psychological  impact  of  the  scale  and  intensity  of  the  repressive  response  of  the 
government on both the left and amongst the left Republicans cannot be underestimated. 
The imprisonment of activists in their tens of thousands by a government that was now 
controlled by those who were intent on undoing the most basic of reforms that so many had 
hoped for when the Republic had been founded provided proof, if any more was needed, 
that the right intended to destroy the ideals of 1931, crushing any opposition to these goals. 
 
In the months following on from October 1934, amongst large swathes of the left and left 
Republicans, the sentiment developed that, based on both the heroics  exhibited by  the 
unified  actions  of  workers  in  Asturias  and  the  brutality  displayed  by  the  right,  a 
fundamental change of approach to a common political foe at the other end of the political 
spectrum  was  necessary.  Whether  individuals  took  the  lesson  that  unity  could  bring 
revolution, or that disunity in the face of the right would lead to extinction, the majority 
came to the conclusion that a united front against the right needed to be found. Whether 
manifesting  themselves  in  the  creation  of  the  Popular  Front  in  early  1936,  the  CNT 
agreeing not to explicitly implore workers to abstain in the February 1936 election or the 
cooperation  of  CNT  and  UGT  unions  in  strike  activity  in  1936,  the  consequences  of 
October  1934  on  all  of  the  left,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  following  two  chapters,  were 
enormous. However, and as will also be seen in this part of the thesis, the fractures that 
pre-dated October 1934 continued to exist, and the forms and goals of unity envisaged by 
the various organizations and the factions within them never truly came to be agreed upon. 
 
In the short term, the events of October 1934 ushered in a period in which the left and 
Republican groups were largely silenced by the hard-line actions of the government of the 
right. And in the longer-term, the uprising and the reprisals that followed it would have an 
even  more  profound  effect  on  how  the  organizations  of  the  left  interacted  with  the 
Republic and with one another. But until elections were called at the end of 1935, the left 
and the Republicans could do little more than consider their next moves for when they 
emerged from under the shadow of repression. CNT leaders and militants could also not do 
much more than reflect on the past actions of their movement and what future direction the 
organization should take. One of the most fundamental changes that would come about 
when the CNT emerged with the rest of the left from the restraints placed upon it by the 
right-wing government was a totally new stance on the UGT.  
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The socialists after October 1934 
 
After  October  1934  it  is  difficult  to  speak  of  a  coherent  PSOE-UGT  position  on  any 
matters – even the agreement to join the Popular Front was fraught with difficulty and 
infighting  –  due  above  all  to  the  rapidly  developing  factional  splits  that  beset  the 
movement. These splits complicated not just the socialists’ wider stance on the issues of 
the Republic, the right and revolution, but also on how the movement positioned itself with 
regard to the questions of unity and relations with the CNT.  
 
The split within the socialist movement that began developing more openly in 1933 – but 
of course had existed in some form or another since much earlier – reached unprecedented 
levels after October 1934. Whilst the followers of Julián Besteiro continued to plough the 
same gradualist furrow, faithful to the tenets of Pablo Iglesias, it was the factions that lined 
up behind Indalecio Prieto and Francisco Largo Caballero that represented the two most 
important currents of opinion within the organization, but also increasingly conflicted with 
one another. For the Prietistas the revolutionary posturing prior to October and the event 
itself had been a tragic misadventure, the remedy for which was a reconciliation with the 
Republicans  and  a  consolidation  of  a  stable,  democratic  state.  For  the  Caballeristas, 
however, October 1934 merely confirmed the analysis that had initially led them to adopt 
such a confrontational stance against the government after November 1933, namely that 
proletarian participation in bourgeois democracy was a dead-end that would only lead to a 
capture of power by fascism.
20 
 
As will be discussed, the different perspectives of these latter factions would lead to both 
presenting different formulations and emphases on unity and alliances. However, in late 
1935  and  early  1936,  once  socialist  newspapers  were  in  publication  once  more,  both 
factions offered a reconciliatory hand to the CNT. Those more aligned to the Prietista 
position gravitated around El Socialista, whilst the Caballeristas set up, during the summer 
of 1935, their own paper, entitled Claridad. From its reopening, El Socialista attempted to 
forge a positive relationship with the CNT, with an eye firmly on the upcoming elections 
and with the goal of trying to dissuade the anarcho-syndicalists from running the same sort 
of  pro-abstention  campaign  as  the  one  they  had  promoted  in  the  1933  election.  In 
December 1935, the paper appealed to the organization to recognize the importance of the 
upcoming election, whilst being at pains to emphasize that it was not taking issue with is 
anti-politicism.
21 Solidaridad Obrera’s cordial response led El Socialista to express the  
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hope that a positive dialogue could be ‘the beginning of a brotherhood that the interests of 
the working class and the current circumstances require’.
22  
 
However,  there  was  certainly  recognition  on  the  part  of  El  Socialista  that  there  were 
definite limits to the extent of cooperation between the CNT and the socialist movement. 
Even before the February election victory for the Popular Front, the paper periodically 
voiced its displeasure at the criticisms against the socialists made by Solidaridad Obrera – 
even if they were made against Largo Caballero – on the grounds that they jeopardized the 
united front of the left in the context of the election battle.
23 El Socialista’s support for 
unity  was  not  tied  to  the  idea  of  a  revolutionary  alliance  or  the  fusion  of  different 
organizations – even though it was certainly in favour of the general premise of unity in the 
face of fascism – but was instead grounded much more in a support for the Popular Front. 
 
From its founding in the summer of 1935 until early 1936, the Caballerista paper Claridad 
in its editorials argued that the question of unity between the CNT and the UGT on the 
national level was a more complicated one than the ongoing issue of unification between 
the UGT and the CGTU on the grounds that the theoretical gap between anarchists and 
socialists was far greater than that which divided the Marxist camp, especially in terms of 
the difference it implied with regard to political activities.
24 Indeed, some of the paper’s 
editorials at the end of 1935 seemed to be faintly overwhelmed by the possibilities of 
bringing  about  a  unity  of  labour  organizations  in  the  short  term,  given  the  number  of 
ideological and organizational divisions between them.
25  
 
However, from the beginning of 1936, the paper turned its attention slightly more to the 
question of the UGT’s relationship with the CNT. This had much to do with the bombastic 
rhetoric  of  Largo  Caballero  upon  his  release  from  jail.  A  component  of  Largo’s 
revolutionary rhetoric during 1936 was based upon the idea of left-wing organizational 
unity, and a sub-theme of this was his assertion that outright fusion of the CNT and the 
UGT was possible. Largo announced in a front-page interview in Claridad that he would 
not be satisfied until ‘all the revolutionary Spanish proletariat is grouped together in one 
union’. In his public pronouncements, Largo was extremely – and arguably disingenuously 
– positive about not just the possibilities of some form of agreement between the CNT and 
the UGT, but also his willingness to bring it about, saying that ‘the UGT would be willing 
at any moment to name a commission, not just to mutually aid one another in any joint 
actions that might arise, but also to study immediately the grounds for a fusion’ of the CNT 
and the UGT.
 He also remarked that this fusion would be ‘as full and cordial as has been  
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that between the UGT and the CGTU’.
26 This latter assertion would have set alarm bells 
ringing in the ears of any cenetista, carrying the implication, intentionally or not, that the 
CNT would merely be absorbed into the UGT.  
   
The public courting of the CNT on the national level embarked upon by Largo needs to be 
placed into the context of his wider stance of 1936, which was one of making speeches that 
declared the imminence of proletarian revolution, whilst at the same time making virtually 
no preparations in this regard. Espousing a discourse of unity between the CNT and UGT 
had  similar  mobilizing  and  support-winning  functions  as  did  his  projection  of  a 
revolutionary message, not least because it implied that it would give the working classes 
the necessary collective strength to carry out revolution. And like his talk of proletarian 
revolution, it did not need to be backed by any actions. There is scant evidence that Largo 
had any intention of entering into a formal dialogue with CNT representatives, let alone 
any specific ideas of his own – other than a fanciful idea of the CNT dissolving into the 
UGT – on the matter of CNT-UGT unity.
27  
 
However, whilst it is clear that Largo’s public pro-unity stance over the CNT was part of 
his wider rhetoric of revolution, and ultimately without substance, it is also important to 
recognize that CNT-UGT relations did not constitute a central plank of the Caballeristas’ 
platform, rhetorical or otherwise, during 1936. As Helen Graham argues, Largo’s pursuit 
of a socialist convergence with the communists was a tactic deployed against the Prietista 
sectors of the socialist movement.
28 Largo’s rhetoric on unity with the CNT must also be 
seen as a part of this courting of the Marxist left. However, the bulk of Largo’s efforts 
centred  around  mobilizing  those  already  within  the  socialist  camp,  or  incorporating 
elements from outside it who would back his position, hence his backing of the fusion of 
the  UGT  with  the  CGTU  and  his  initial  support  for  the  fusion  of  the  socialist  and 
communist youth movements. The question of the CNT’s relationship with the UGT could 
only have ever had a very limited role in this strategy. Whilst speaking in favour of a single 
labour federation was a crowd-pleasing message, it did little towards helping bringing the 
balance of forces within the socialist movement in his favour. Consequently, whilst Largo 
did present himself as being in favour of a fusion of the CNT and the UGT at the national 
level, this was certainly not a major component of his platform during the months prior to 
the Civil War.  
 
This lack of an interest specifically in the CNT with regards to the contrasting positions on 
unity within the socialist movement was matched by a relative lack of consideration of the  
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anarcho-syndicalist labour federation within the UGT’s decision-making processes after 
October  1934.  In  December  1935  the  National  Committee  of  the  UGT  discussed  its 
participation in the Popular Front electoral alliance. At one point the discussion moved 
towards the matter of whether or not the CNT and the treintista organizations should be 
invited to participate in the Popular Front. Whilst some members of the Committee were in 
favour of at least making a gesture towards the CNT, others, such as Ramón Lamoneda 
and Luis Viesca, were deeply hostile to the idea of the CNT being included in any form of 
joint  action  with  the  UGT,  principally  motivated  by  what  they  viewed  as  the  CNT’s 
‘treachery’ of the October movement.
29  
 
Overall, then, the socialist movement had no formal position on the CNT to speak of after 
October 1934, with the question of relations between its labour federation and the anarcho-
syndicalists  playing  a  fringe  part  in  discussions  within  the  movement.  Nevertheless,  a 
general sentiment towards unity was publicly expressed by the movement, and in the case 
of  the  Caballeristas,  this  extended  to  calling  for  alliances  and  even  fusion  of  worker 
organizations, including the CNT, for the purposes of revolution. This espousal of unity 
was  equally  present  at  this  time  amongst  the  dissident  communists  and  the  Soviet 
communist parties.
30 In combination with the enthusiasm that developed for the Popular 
Front, the overall result was that from late 1935 onwards, virtually all of the left was 
promoting the idea of pan-left alliances and unity, whether to preserve the Republic, fight 
fascism or bring about proletarian revolution.  
 
The CNT after October 1934 
 
Although the CNT was badly damaged by the government onslaught against the left that 
occurred  from  October  1934,  it  was  still  able  to  publish  some  newspapers,  including 
Solidaridad Obrera. It was also possible for the organization to hold plenums over late 
1934 and 1935. For cenetistas, the most immediate priority was to keep the organization 
functioning in some form. However, it would have been impossible for no comment to 
have been passed on the events of October. This was equally the case with regard to the 
days of the uprisings, as well as over the course of 1935, when the left in both Spain and 
abroad busied itself with analysing the uprising. 
 
The  initial  analysis  of  October  1934  that  was  carried  out  in  the  pages  of  Solidaridad 
Obrera  certainly  did  not  view  the  insurrections,  neither  in  Catalonia,  Asturias,  nor 
anywhere  else,  as  particularly  heroic,  and  saw  them  as  having  not  been  fought  for  a  
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legitimate cause. In the immediate aftermath of the events – and indeed whilst workers in 
Asturias were still fighting the army – the stance taken in Solidaridad Obrera was that the 
loss of life was a tragedy, but that the CNT had made the right decision not to participate in 
the  uprising.  This  initial  analysis  was  unsurprisingly  carried  out  overwhelmingly  with 
regards  to  Catalonia;  in  October  full  information  about  events  in  Asturias  and  their 
ramifications  were  very  difficult  to  obtain  from  elsewhere  in  the  country.
31  On  10
th 
October an editorial on the front page of Solidaridad Obrera explained that ‘faced with a 
conflict that was not initiated by the CNT, and without it having common objectives with 
our  own,  it  was  logical’  that  the  CNT  did  not  back  the  revolutionary  movement  in 
Catalonia.
32 
 
Elsewhere in its immediate post-insurrection coverage, the paper voiced the argument that 
the uprising had failed because ‘without the participation of all the people, undertakings of 
such magnitude are impossible’.
33 This observation was undoubtedly made to imply that it 
was only the CNT who had the sufficient popular backing to carry out such an insurrection. 
Another article on 14
th October argued that  
 
the failed movement has served to show the lack of capability of those who were leading 
it. The boastfulness, conceit, lack of revolutionary technique and the absolute ignorance 
of the psychology of the people made it so that what could have been a triumph turned 
into a defeat.
34  
 
From October onwards, sectors of the Marxist left, both from Spain and other countries, 
publicly attacked the CNT for not having thrown its full organizational weight behind the 
various insurrectionary initiatives. The French communists in particular took up the cause 
of attacking the CNT and the FAI over their stance in October. Reporting on events in 
Spain, L’Humanité on 10
th October informed readers of the ‘treachery  of the anarchist 
leaders’.
35 This highly damaging – and in some respects distorted – depiction of their role 
was put forward in subsequent months, in tandem with the notion that ordinary workers in 
the CNT had in many  cases happily  united  with socialists and  communists during the 
movement.
36 Spanish socialists who fled to France were also publicly quoted in relation to 
the CNT’s non-participation in events outside of Asturias. Whilst in some cases, such as 
that of Indalecio Prieto, it is arguable that their words were presented as being more critical 
of  the  anarcho-syndicalists  than  they  may  have  been  to  fit  in  with  the  paper’s  overall 
interpretation of events,
37 others were more unequivocal, such as Margarita Nelken, who 
opined  that  ‘the  anarchist  leaders  have  always  betrayed  the  workers’  movement’  and 
suggested that they were in alliance with Alejandro Lerroux.
38 In an August 1935 report to  
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the AIT, the CNT National Committee wrote that it had expended much of its efforts after 
October  1934  fighting  a  propaganda  battle  against  the  ‘defamatory  campaign  by  the 
communists and socialists’.
39 
 
The faísta Diego Abad de Santillán’s newly launched Tiempos Nuevos took on the mantle 
of defending the CNT and the organization’s anti-alliance position. A key journalist and 
intellectual in the Argentinean anarcho-syndicalist movement, Abad de Santillán had only 
entered Spain in 1933, but quickly rose to prominence within the FAI.
40 The stance of 
Abad de Santillán and other key sectors in the CNT illustrates that the starting point for the 
turn towards endorsing a pro-alliance line between the CNT and the UGT that would occur 
in  early  1936  was  not  the  events  of  Asturias  in  October  1934.  Far  from  viewing  the 
rebellion in Asturias as a testament to the power of unity of action, Abad de Santillán 
depicted the events in the region as having been characterized by socialist and communist 
betrayal of the movement.
41 He conjectured that had the workers in Asturias successfully 
fended off the authorities, the socialists and communists, due to the authoritarian nature of 
Marxism, would have most likely turned their attentions towards destroying the anarchist 
strongholds of La Felguera and Gijón.
42 He also argued that Asturias was one of the few 
regions  where  libertarianism  was  the  minority  force  amongst  workers,  and  as  such 
cenetistas and faístas were forced to cooperate with socialists and communists, whereas 
elsewhere in Spain this would not be the case.
43 Overall, therefore, the faísta current of the 
CNT took the view that the events of October 1934 were not merely an invalid argument 
for pro-unity positions, but actively demonstrated the treachery of the Marxist left and thus 
the inadvisability of any cooperation with it whatsoever. This interpretation of October 
1934 was echoed in the CNT newspaper Revolución Social, which began to be published 
in Madrid in late 1934.
44 
 
Solidaridad Obrera for its part reprinted some of the articles on Asturias from Tiempos 
Nuevos,
45 as well as publishing articles by individual CNT unions or militants in which 
they drew attention to ‘low manoeuvres of the supporters of the false Alianza Obrera and 
of the much lauded frente único’
46 in their field of union activity, or argued more generally 
that the CNT could not ally with those ‘who have not abandoned their work tools’, which 
was to say those connected with political organizations.
47 At root, then, the rebuttal of 
alliances expressed in late 1935 was the same as it had been in the years leading up to 
October  1934.  As  1935  drew  to  a  close  and  the  possibility  of  an  election  became 
increasingly likely, this opposition to the alliance and unity movements being promoted by 
the rest of the left was modified to the effect that these sectors were promoting alliance for  
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their self-serving political ends of gaining electoral support. In an article on 28
th December, 
the paper noted the proliferation of alliance initiatives – from both left and right – arguing 
that  they  were  a  product  of  the  upcoming  election  and  that  all  were  essentially 
symptomatic  of  the  same  ill,  namely  that  of  politicians  manoeuvring  to  further 
themselves.
48  
 
The positions adopted in Solidaridad Obrera and Tiempos Nuevos were matched by an 
equally strong suspicion of unity initiatives amongst both the National Committee and the 
Catalan Regional Committee of the CNT. In June 1935 the Regional Committee produced 
a report for an AIT congress, at which one of the items for discussion was the position to 
be taken on ‘united fronts’. The committee wrote that 
 
we consider the frente único to be an incongruity that brings terrible results. The frente 
único is always proposed by political sectors in opposition to the ruling power, but the 
desire for this front disappears when the political parties proposing it come to enjoy 
office and impunity that the power of being in charge provides. Reason suggests to us to 
reject  this  course  of  action  because  it  is  a  chain  that  links  all,  from  the  Muscovite 
communists and the Largo Caballero and Prieto-style socialists, who have committed so 
many betrayals of the revolutionary and anarchist cause, to the most blatant fascists and 
the enemies of liberty.
49 
 
A similar position was expressed by the National Committee in its own report to the same 
AIT congress, reasoning that ‘expecting that we are going to fight with enthusiasm for a 
cause outside of our libertarian convictions, or that the authoritarians [i.e. Marxists] would 
collaborate towards our goals, is a fantasy’.
50  
 
Faístas outside of Catalonia remained similarly defiant in their stances on alliances. In 
Madrid,  where  the  anarchist  groups  of  which  the  FAI  was  composed  were  beset  by 
factional infighting, one of the key sources of division was the question of alliances, with 
some  continuing  to  maintain  a  staunchly  anti-socialist  position.  In  June  1935  the  anti-
alliance faction sent out a circular to the anarchist groups of the city in which they stated 
that ‘we do not believe in the possibility of realizing [an alliance] unless we agree to 
subordinate ourselves to the manoeuvres of the eternal traitors of the proletariat’.
51 In May 
1935  the  FAI’s  Regional  Committee  for  the  Paris  region  wrote  to  the  CNT  National 
Committee and the FAI Peninsular Committee to warn them of cases of cenetistas who had 
fled  Spain  attending  public  meetings  at  which  other  exiled  socialists  and  communists 
spoke. Such was their vigilance that even the presence of two cenetistas at a funeral that 
was also attended by Indalecio Prieto was deemed worthy of reporting.
52  
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The basic stance of defiance over the CNT’s actions in October and a position of continued 
hostility to alliances also had a decisive influence over the CNT’s formal decision-making 
processes during 1935. In November 1934 a plenum was held, at which only a handful of 
regions  were  present  due  to  the  effects  of  repression  on  the  organization’s  ability  to 
operate.  Here,  the  emphasis  was  almost  exclusively  on  attempting  to  re-erect  previous 
organizational structures across Spain and to attempt to allow CNT papers to return to 
publication.
53 But in June 1935 another national plenum was held, at which all regions 
except the Canary  Islands attended. At this meeting the key issues to the CNT at this 
juncture, namely alliances, healing the factional split with the treintistas and the calling for 
an  amnesty  for  social  prisoners  were  addressed,  albeit  in  limited  form.  Owing  to  the 
ongoing crackdown  against labour unions, the plenum was called with a fairly limited 
mandate, as the normal process of consultation of the CNT’s unions was impossible in the 
current political climate. Accordingly, the plenum decided instead to release a manifesto in 
which the above issues were mentioned, but in which it was made clear that positions on 
them would only be formulated with the proper consultation of the CNT’s unions. On the 
matter of alliances, the tone struck was one that expressed scepticism over the intentions of 
the rest of the left in proposing alliances, but which also conceded that sectors of the 
CNT’s grassroots may have been in favour of a more pro-unity position. The manifesto 
stated: 
 
On the part of those who shout from the rooftops for alliances, they are not fully aware of 
their  purposes,  and  neither  do  they  point  out  the  fundamental  motives  that  exist  for 
alliances  not  being  established  between  disparate  ideological  sectors.  We  sincerely 
believe that if the next elections were not close, neither the socialists nor Republicans, 
and much less the left-Republicans would be interested in speaking about alliances or 
united fronts. Despite being exhorted by some sectors to sign up to such campaigns, we 
have not paid heed to such requests out of respect for our ideas and above all because the 
bulk  of  the  confederal  organization  in  Spain,  except  for  the  Asturian  region  before 
October, declared itself, in principle, against any alliance. It is the sindicatos who will 
have to decide the path to follow.
54 
 
The manifesto illustrates, then, that even the events of October 1934 had not fundamentally 
altered the attitude, grounded in the movement’s anti-political ideas, of the most important 
leadership sectors within the CNT to the idea of alliance, even if there were certainly those, 
both within the grassroots and upper cadres of the organization, who had come to favour a 
change of stance. The attitude adopted in this manifesto is all the more significant given 
that, as will be discussed, just six months later a regional congress of unions in Catalonia 
proclaimed an openness towards a revolutionary alliance with the UGT.  
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The remobilization of the CNT from 1935 and the Popular Front election 
 
Following the lifting of legal constraints towards the end of 1935, the CNT’s unions began 
to reform and remobilize, as did those of the UGT. This process was accelerated by the 
election result of 1936 as it brought with it a belief that the unions would once again have 
the upper hand over employers. According to the calculations made at the organization’s 
congress in Zaragoza, held in May 1936, the CNT had at that moment 559000 members.
55 
If it is fairly clear that between the summer of 1931 and October 1934 the CNT as a 
national actor exhibited an avowed intention to sweep away the Republic with libertarian 
communism,  and  moreover  that  various  elements  of  the  organization  attempted 
insurrections  and  general  strikes  during  those  years,  the  prevailing  outlook  of  the 
movement in 1936 and until the start of the war is more difficult to gauge. The more 
established view of the CNT’s stance in the pre-war period is perhaps best summarized by 
Gerald Brenan’s assertion that the organization sought to keep up ‘the revolutionary tempo 
in  the  country  by  lightning  strikes’,
56  a  position  that  has  recently  been  challenged  to 
varying  degrees.
57  These  newer  analyses  point  out  that  the  movement’s  leaders  were 
interested first and foremost on consolidating the organization, with Jordi Getman-Eraso 
going as far as to argue that ‘the CNT persisted in its determination to defend the political 
status quo right up to the start of the Civil War’.
58 Whether anarcho-syndicalist militants 
were driven by a wish to defend the Republic specifically or were simply biding their time 
until the organization and the circumstances were right to attempt libertarian communism, 
it is clear that in early 1936 a key priority, especially in Catalonia, was a reunification with 
the treintistas.
59 And as the year progressed and political and social tensions mounted, 
emphasis in the CNT press moved increasingly away from general revolutionary rhetoric 
towards calling for preparedness for a fascist attack.
60 
 
Although the CNT’s leading militants would not have wished to admit it, the February 
1936 election contest was the event that really captured the public’s imagination and was 
the  main  focal  point  of  the  ever-more  open  confrontation  between  the  increasingly 
polarized left and right.
61 Towards the end of 1935, moves were made, spearheaded by 
Manuel Azaña, to form an electoral alliance between Republicans and the rest of the left. 
The Prietista wing of the socialist party was the most enthusiastically in favour of joining 
this alliance, and managed to steer the party into it. At the same time, the Communist Party 
had turned towards a pro-Popular Front direction. The Popular Front’s electoral platform 
was a fairly narrow one of promising amnesty for those arrested during the right’s tenure in 
power  and  a  promise  to  put  back  in  place  the  reforms  carried  out  by  the  Republican- 
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socialist government and since repealed by the right.
62 The right coalesced around its own 
electoral bloc, the Frente Nacional. Perhaps worryingly, from the point of view of some 
cenetistas, the Popular Front, in its electoral campaign, inspired a huge amount of interest 
on the part of the working classes. Crowds in their tens of thousands attended Popular 
Front rallies across the country, and the Republican and left-wing press spoke of little else, 
when they were not attacking the right. 
 
The phenomenon of the Popular Front and the adherence of the vast majority of the rest of 
the left to it presented a problem for the more radical factions that continued to be at the 
helm of the CNT. Whilst more moderate CNT regions and the treintistas were able to 
pragmatically  accept  the  idea  of  getting  behind  the  Popular  Front,  for  the  radicals  the 
Popular Front was a preoccupation because it was causing workers to place their hopes in 
political parties.
63 However, attacking the Popular Front outright would have been suicidal 
for the CNT. The battle with the right seemed so finely balanced that an attack on it by the 
CNT would have been presented by the rest of the left as tantamount to backing fascism. In 
the event, the CNT decided at a national plenum held in January 1936 not to sabotage the 
electoral campaign of the Popular Front coalition by agitating for workers to abstain in 
their propaganda, as they had done during the 1933 election.
64 Such restraint would have 
been  unthinkable  in  previous  years,  and  was  effectively  an  acknowledgement  that  the 
previous  stance  of  being  as  unyieldingly  hostile  to  the  left  as  well  as  the  right  was 
unworkable in the present climate.  
 
On 16
th February 1936, elections were held, at which the Popular Front coalition swept to 
victory in terms of the number of seats it gained, based on a relatively narrow victory in 
terms of votes cast. A turnout of seventy-one percent illustrates the extent to which the 
battle of left and right gripped the country.
65 The socialists were once more the biggest 
single  party  in  the  Cortes,  as  they  had  been  in  1931.  However,  as  a  result  of  the 
Caballeristas,  the  PSOE  did  not  participate  this  time  in  government.
66  Instead,  from 
outside of it, the Caballeristas continued to talk the rhetoric of proletarian revolution.
67 
The socialist leadership was so badly factionalized by this point that it is impossible to 
speak of a coherent socialist stance regarding its support or opposition to the Republic. The 
business of government was left to representatives of Republican parties, which simply did 
not have the same mass backing as did the socialists.  
 
Amongst much of the right, the electoral defeat effectively marked the end of any final 
attempts to participate in the Republic and a turn towards advocating an outright overthrow  
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of the system by force. Even before the election result, elements within the military were 
planning  a  response  to  a  Popular  Front  victory,  whilst  Gil  Robles  solicited  a  military 
intervention  after  the  election.
68  The  ranks  of  the  Falange,  youth  organizations  and 
paramilitaries swelled, and the battle between militants of the right and those of the left 
commenced  in  the  street.  Political  assassinations  became  increasingly  prevalent  from 
March onwards, with an estimated 269 political killings taking place between then and 
July.
69 
 
This political instability was equally matched by the social instability that was unleashed 
upon the election victory  of the Popular Front, in the form of land occupations in the 
countryside and strikes both there and in cities. There was understandably the expectation 
amongst the grassroots of the labour movement that the advantages gained – or in the case 
of rural reform, had been promised – should now be immediately be given back. However, 
with faith in the ability of the Republic to provide and safeguard these gains badly eroded, 
workers and peasants took the initiative instead at the grassroots level. In the countryside, 
the FNTT began to organize land occupations.
70 In the cities, CNT and UGT unions alike – 
the latter acting much more according to their own instincts in these months rather than 
according to a line of discipline laid down by the socialist leadership – made immediate 
demands and resorted to strikes to achieve them, even if, in the case of CNT strongholds, 
this propensity for strikes was in fact less strong than it had been in the first months of the 
Republic’s lifetime. As will be seen, in some instances these strikes were a product of joint 
action between CNT and UGT unions. 
 
The genesis of a new CNT position on the UGT 
 
If even in late 1935 Solidaridad Obrera was presenting a position of CNT hostility to any 
alliances with other organizations on the left, by the end of January 1936 it was heralding 
the prospect of a revolutionary, national CNT-UGT alliance. It is clear that the decisive 
change to turn the CNT as a national actor around from being flatly opposed to other 
organizations of the left to publicly proposing an alliance with the UGT emanated from 
Catalonia, the region that had been most consistently against such ideas throughout the 
Republic, including in 1935. The way in which the militants of Catalonia achieved this was 
through their own formulation of an alliance initiative with the UGT at a regional congress, 
combined  with  the  actions  of  the  Regional  Committee’s  representatives  at  a  national 
plenum  and  the  propaganda  efforts  of  leading  CNT  militants  from  the  region  and 
Solidaridad Obrera to promote the idea.  
 
169
 
The key turning point towards a pro-alliance position was the CNT’s regional congress, 
held at the end of January 1936. The handling of the question of relations with the UGT 
was,  like  much  of  the  rest  of  the  congress,  marked  by  eyebrow-raising  procedural 
irregularities.  The  congress  had  been  convoked  very  quickly,  meaning  many  CNT 
organisms did not have time to hold assemblies of their members to agree positions on the 
items on the agenda. In other cases, some unions were not able to attend at all as they were 
still shut. Some delegates at the congress complained about this. The conformity of the 
congress to CNT procedures was cast even further into doubt by the Regional Committee’s 
insistence that delegates were not allowed to reveal what procedures of consultation had 
been undertaken by the organizations they were representing in formulating the positions 
they expressed at the congress.
71 
 
It was on this basis that the question of the possibility of alliances with other organizations 
was handled.
72 Some delegates, in particular the purist anarchist faístas, questioned the 
validity of the issue of alliances being discussed in this forum, arguing that it was only a 
national congress that could decide such issues, a concern that was also voiced by the 
representative of the National Committee at the congress.
73 This was precisely the stance 
the Catalan representatives had taken at the national plenums in 1934. Now, however, the 
Catalan region saw fit to decide a national question at a regional congress. 
 
Aside from the position of declaring the discussion invalid, three basic other positions on 
the  question  of  alliance  were  revealed  when  each  delegate  voiced  an  opinion  on  the 
matter.
74 The simplest position, expressed by a significant minority of the delegates, was 
that there should be no form of pact or alliance with any other organizations on the left, as 
this would represent a negation of the CNT’s principles and the final goal of libertarian 
communism.
75  This  position  was  grounded  in  the  same  basic  premise  as  the  hitherto 
prevailing  anti-alliance  position  of  1933  onwards,  though  stripped  of  the  explicit  anti-
socialist sentiment that had characterized it prior to October 1934. At the other end of the 
spectrum, a sector of delegates exhibited not just a willingness for the CNT and the UGT 
to enter into a pact with one another, but also for a CNT-UGT alliance to be formulated 
through a process of negotiation. This position was thus fairly similar to that which the 
Asturian CNT had defended at the national plenums of 1934. The final main body  of 
opinion was that the CNT should enter into some form of revolutionary alliance with the 
UGT, but that any move towards alliances should be governed by some strict conditions so 
as  to  ensure  the  CNT’s  objectives  and  principles  were  not  compromised.  Many  also  
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stipulated that the pact could not bring about ‘authoritarian ends’ or be ‘with politicians’. 
For this current of opinion, any alliance with the UGT would have to bring the socialist 
labour federation into line with the anti-political principles of the CNT.
76 
 
What is highly revealing about this part of the discussion is that the Barcelona construction 
union gave a much fuller and more detailed position than all other delegations, with the 
exception of the Badalona manufacturing and textiles union. The Barcelona construction 
union was a stronghold of the radical tendency that was centred around Juan García Oliver 
and  the  Nosotros  group.  Nosotros  (formerly  Los  Solidarios)  was  perhaps  the  most 
influential – and infamous – of the grupos de afinidad, who earlier in the Republic had 
been at the vanguard of attempts to organize insurrections against the Republic. Its leading 
figures, such as García Oliver and Buenaventura Durruti, were unskilled workers, and had 
often  been  drawn  to  Barcelona  on  the  basis  of  it  being  the  epicentre  of  proletarian 
revolutionary  activity.
77  Their  comprehensive  plans  for  relations  with  the  UGT  in  the 
context of other delegates offering only vague ideas hint strongly that the García Oliver 
faction was using the congress to impose a newly formulated position on the question of 
CNT-UGT  relations,  a  perspective  taken  by  Felipe  Alaiz  in  his  complaint  to  Federica 
Montseny in a February 1936 letter of the congress being ‘captured by the new orientations 
of  [García]  Oliver  and  company’.
78  Alaiz  and  Montseny  belonged  to  what  is  often 
considered a ‘purist’ current of anarchism, for which the CNT’s adherence to anarchist 
theory was paramount. What set them apart from the militants of Nosotros was that, as 
middle-class intellectuals, they were not involved in the unskilled unions that formed the 
backbone of the Catalan CNT. The two sides of the debate over relations with the UGT in 
Catalonia were represented by these two radical currents. While the purists viewed any 
willingness to ally with the UGT as compromising anarchist theory, García Oliver and his 
followers would put forward a formula, via the construction union, that would attempt to 
make  an  alliance  proposal  with  the  UGT  that  would  not  negate  their  anti-political 
convictions.  
 
The  construction  union argued  that  the  current  climate  had  compelled  the  socialists  to 
‘undertake a revolutionary line if they did not wish to lose control of their members’, 
though this was not to say the socialists were at this point genuine revolutionaries. To the 
contrary, they were exhibiting ‘a double personality’ by talking the rhetoric of revolution 
whilst also ‘signing a pact with the bourgeois left’. The CNT needed to ‘pose them the 
dilemma: either with the bourgeoisie or with the people’. This would be done through 
proposing a revolutionary pact with the UGT. Part of this pact would require all workers to  
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join the CNT or the UGT to facilitate their collective ability to bring this revolution about, 
an idea that would subsequently be promoted by García Oliver and his allies.
79   
 
After  each  delegate  had  outlined  their  opinions,  a  team  was  named  to  create  a  draft 
resolution on the question of relations with the UGT. The Barcelona construction union 
was part of the team. The resolution that was drafted was clearly influenced by the ideas 
that the construction union had brought to the congress, with the alliance proposal that they 
presented also seeking to satisfy the stipulations of those who opposed the idea of the CNT 
entering into an alliance with ‘authoritarians’ or ‘politicians’. The resolution stipulated that 
the UGT recognized that a revolutionary destruction of the current regime was the only 
viable option for the Spanish proletariat, and that as a consequence it would need to break 
all ‘political and parliamentary collaboration with the bourgeoisie’. The resolution also 
empowered the Regional Committee to request that an alliance proposal with the UGT be 
discussed at the next national congress. The resolution ended with the demand that all 
autonomous unions join either the CNT or the UGT.
80  
 
At  the  same  time  as  the  unions  of  Catalonia  were  agreeing  upon  a  formula  for  a 
revolutionary  alliance  of  the  labour  federations,  the  representatives  of  the  regional 
committees of the CNT and the National Committee were meeting in Madrid to discuss the 
orientation of the organization in the present moment. There were two key issues which 
they discussed that would have a direct bearing on the matter of the CNT’s relationship 
with the UGT: the issue of the CNT’s stance on the upcoming election, and the matter of 
the agenda for an upcoming national congress. With regard to the second of these, all 
regions were agreed on the need to discuss the issue of alliances at a national congress, 
partly because some had strong views on the matter, and partly because all were agreed 
that public disagreements on the matter had been going on for too long and that a definitive 
solution to the matter was required.
81  
 
However, it was through the discussion of the CNT’s stance on the upcoming election that 
the  Catalan  CNT  put  forwards  its  ideas  for  a  revolutionary  CNT-UGT  alliance. 
Unsurprisingly the discussion of the election hinged around whether or not the CNT should 
formally support the Popular Front, or indeed whether it should make a concerted effort to 
promote abstention, as it had done in the 1933 election. It was in discussing this element of 
the CNT’s stance on the election that the Catalan delegate informed the plenum of the 
agreement reached on alliances at the regional congress. The proposal was put forward to 
the plenum in the form of arguing that the CNT should promote such an alliance, whilst at  
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the same time running, if not an outright pro-abstention campaign, then at least one that 
denounced the validity of political participation and process.
82  
 
In other words, Catalonia was proposing that the CNT should offer a revolutionary alliance 
to the UGT that rejected any cooperation with political organizations or the Republic’s 
political process, and that all unaffiliated workers should join the CNT or the UGT as part 
of this, whilst at the same time campaigning against worker participation in the upcoming 
election.  The  revolutionary  alliance  was  being  used,  in  effect,  as  an  alternative  to 
supporting  the  Popular  Front.  The  idea  was  largely  rejected  by  other  delegates. 
Nevertheless, the Catalan delegate’s contribution to the discussion certainly indicates that a 
CNT-UGT  revolutionary,  anti-political  alliance  was  used  by  a  faction  of  the  Catalan 
leaders to compete against the Popular Front coalition. 
 
At  the  end  of  the  Catalan  regional  congress,  a  selection  of  the  region’s  most  famous 
militants spoke about the resolution on revolutionary alliance with the UGT. The majority 
of the keynote speakers, such as Juan García Oliver, Buenaventura Durruti and Manuel 
Pérez had not participated in the congress as delegates, but it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion  that  it  was  them,  rather  than  the  congress  delegates,  who  had  played  the 
decisive role in creating the new position on the UGT. Their speeches reveal a mentality of 
believing that it was the Catalan region that determined the CNT’s overall relationship 
with  the  UGT,  with  the  agreement  on  alliances  created  at  the  regional  congress  being 
treated virtually as a fait accompli. All the speakers promoted not just the premise of an 
alliance with the UGT under which the UGT would abandon political activities, but also 
promoted the related idea of all workers joining the CNT or the UGT. In the words of Juan 
Doménech, those who did not do this would be ‘traitors to the revolution’. Some speakers 
also  directly  addressed  UGT  members  in  telling  them  that  their  organization  could  no 
longer  endorse  the  Republic  and  the  support  of  it  by  socialist  politicians,  and  instead 
needed to unite with the CNT to bring about revolution.
83  
 
Solidaridad Obrera’s first presentation of the congress agreement on alliances came in the 
form of a publication on its front page of the resolution on 28
th January. The resolution was 
billed by the headline as ‘an agreement of historical transcendence’.
84 The front page of the 
paper  on  30
th January  1936  gave  further  attention  to  the  pact  proposal,  as  well  as  the 
congress’s position in favour on the upcoming election, which was effectively an explicit 
rejection of political methods that stopped just short of instructing workers not to vote. The 
headline  highlighted  that  the  congress  had  simultaneously  approved  a  rejection  of  the  
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political process, whilst at the same time stating that: ‘The CNT proposes solutions: A 
CNT-UGT revolutionary pact, which is to say a coincidence in an insurrectional line [and] 
the abandonment of all political activity’. What is also worth noting about the editorial’s 
presentation of the alliance agreement was that it spoke of it as though it were something 
that  would  now  be  carried  forward  on  a  national  level,  which  is  to  say  it  gave  the 
impression  that  the  Catalan  regional  congress’s  agreement  on  the  matter  meant  that  it 
would automatically become a national-level goal for the CNT.
85  
 
In the weeks following on from the regional congress, both Solidaridad Obrera and the 
region’s leading militants continued to promote the CNT-UGT alliance from the congress. 
It is crucial to stress, however, that they were very specific in terms of how they promoted 
the alliance, insisting that it was a national-level alliance, with exclusively revolutionary 
ends, and that it amounted to a rejection of political means and also required the entry of 
all  workers  into  either  the  CNT  or  the  UGT.  On  31
st  January  1936,  for  example,  the 
headline of the front page of Solidaridad Obrera proclaimed: ‘Worker! Your place is in the 
union! The end of slavery depends on the alliance without politics of the CNT and the 
UGT’.
86  On  1
st  February,  its  front  page  argued  that  all  the  problems  of  exploitation 
experienced  by  the  working  classes  would  continue  regardless  of  which  party  was  in 
power, but that ‘all these problems will disappear if workers put their strength behind the 
unions’.
87 The alliance proposal thus became tied up in attempts to convince workers that 
the CNT’s anti-political stance was the correct one by the alliance and the revolution it 
would bring being presented as the final outcome of workers abandoning political parties 
for unions. Meanwhile, the paper also emphasized through its editorials the need for all 
workers and union entities to be within the CNT or the UGT, with groups that remained 
outside  the  two  labour  federations  being  branded  ‘parasitic  forces  in  the  workers’ 
movement’.
88  
 
At  the  same  time  as  Solidaridad  Obrera  endorsed  a  CNT-UGT  alliance  along  these 
aforementioned lines, the CNT’s most influential militants from Catalonia also spread the 
same  message  at  CNT  propaganda  meetings.  For  example,  speaking  in  Santander  in 
February, Juan Doménech promoted alliance between the CNT and the UGT, ‘but to carry 
out a revolution that liberates us all’. Doménech told his audience that the previous years 
had  illustrated  that  neither  the  CNT  nor  the  UGT  alone  could  bring  about  revolution 
individually, and that the way forward was for the two organizations to expand through all 
workers joining one or the other according to their natural ideological affiliations, before 
then entering into the pact as outlined by the Catalan region’s congress and carrying out a  
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revolution that would not prejudice the ideological principles of either labour federation.
89 
It would appear that, based at least in part around the lead taken by militants in Catalonia, 
cenetistas  from  other  regions  also  started  to  promote  the  same  line  of  argument.  In  a 
meeting in Madrid in February, for example, a local militant spoke of ‘the sincerity of the 
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, which not fearing the responsibility of the crossroads 
of the current moment, has not hesitated for an instant to throw a fraternal line out to our 
brothers of the UGT’, a claim based on the alliance offer made at the Catalan regional 
congress, which the militant claimed would be the basis of the alliance of the two labour 
federations.
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Following on from the January 1936 regional congress in Catalonia, less than three months 
after the Popular Front’s electoral victory, came a CNT national congress, held in Zaragoza 
at the beginning of May 1936. It was here that the formula for CNT-UGT revolutionary 
alliance that had been created in Catalonia at the start of the year would become the CNT’s 
official, national position on the UGT.  
 
Part of the team of delegates who had drawn up the draft proposal that was a basis for 
discussing CNT-UGT relations at the congress were attached to the same Catalan unions 
whose delegates at the January 1936 regional congress had been involved in formulating 
the resolution on alliance with the UGT at that congress. The draft resolution that was 
drawn up was critical of the UGT’s past actions, especially with regard to its role during 
the  Republic.  Not  only  was  the  UGT  held  responsible  for  the  divisions  amongst  the 
working classes in the draft resolution’s preamble, it was also argued that had this division 
not existed the Spanish working classes would have inevitably committed themselves to 
revolution. The preamble concluded that the lessons of the preceding years demonstrated 
‘the  inevitable  necessity  of  unifying  the  Unión  General  de  Trabajadores  and  the 
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo in revolutionary action’.
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Having established that an alliance of some form with the UGT was necessary to bring 
about revolution, the draft resolution then outlined how alliance with the UGT would be 
brought about and what its goals were. It insisted that the revolution that the alliance would 
bring about would ‘completely destroy the social and political regime that regulates the life 
of the country’. However, the draft resolution contained no detail as to precisely how the 
alliance  would  bring  revolution  about,  nor  how  an  alliance  would  be  structured  and 
organized. More significant than this, however, was the first point of the draft revolution, 
which generated a significant amount of debate at the congress. This point stated that   
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the UGT, on signing the revolutionary alliance pact, will explicitly recognize the failure 
of the system of political and parliamentary collaboration. As a logical consequence of 
this  recognition,  it  will  cease  to  offer  any  type  of  political  and  parliamentary 
collaboration to the ruling regime.
92  
 
In the key respect that this revolutionary CNT-UGT alliance would be an anti-political one, 
the alliance proposal formulated at this congress would fundamentally follow that which 
had been agreed upon at the Catalan regional congress.
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The discussions of the pact led to the expression of broadly the same three positions on the 
matter as those that had emerged at the Catalan regional congress, with the most purist 
anarchist  delegates  arguing  that  the  proposal  would  compromise  the  CNT’s  libertarian 
principles,
94 the delegates from Asturias most forcefully supporting the idea of alliance but 
rejecting the notion that the proposal placed demands on the UGT to turn its back on 
political participation, and other delegates supporting the draft resolution in its original 
form.
95  On  the  surface,  therefore,  three  seemingly  irreconcilable  positions  regarding 
revolutionary  alliance  with  the  UGT  were  expressed.  However,  it  would  have  been 
virtually impossible for the congress to have concluded without a firm position on alliance 
being  taken  that  presented  the  CNT’s  credentials  as  a  champion  of  unity.  As  several 
delegates pointed out, the general atmosphere amongst workers was for there to be greater 
unity between the CNT and the UGT, and within the Confederation the majority were in 
favour of some form of alliance proposal being created. Unsurprisingly, therefore, a final 
stance regarding alliance with the UGT was reached relatively quickly, in spite of the 
seeming difference of positions.  
 
It was Juan García Oliver, representing the Barcelona manufacturing and textile union, 
who  proposed  the  amendment  to  the  draft  resolution  on  Alianza  Revolucionaria  that 
succeeded in reconciling the different positions amongst the majority who were in favour 
of  some  form  of  alliance  proposal  being  made.
96  Whilst  the  first  article  of  the  draft 
resolution  insisted  that  the  UGT  formally  renounce  its  recourse  to  political  methods, 
García Oliver proposed the insertion of an additional article that would apparently place 
the overall process of negotiation of an alliance between the two labour federations onto a 
more consensual footing. The additional article clarified that the preceding points of it 
were ‘provisional’ and that the UGT at its next congress could draw up its own proposals 
for an alliance with the CNT. The addition of this point managed to satisfy both those who 
demanded  that  alliance  with  the  UGT  be  linked  to  the  UGT  turning  its  back  on  any  
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involvement in the political sphere and taking to the street to bring about change and those 
who did not wish to deter the UGT from an alliance that could bring about revolution, or 
give  them  a  pretext  to  accuse  the  CNT  of  derailing  unity  initiatives.  Essentially  the 
additional  article  reframed  the  whole  of  the  rest  of  the  resolution  so  that,  whilst  it 
continued to demand that the UGT rectify its erroneous participation in politics, the whole 
basis for alliance was in fact open to negotiation. Consequently it is difficult not to see the 
resolution ending up as a fudge that was designed to achieve consensus but in the process 
created a somewhat confused and contradictory end result.
97 With the approval of this 
proposed amendment, discussion of the Alianza Revolucionaria at the Zaragoza congress 
quickly came to a close, with the resolution being approved.
98 The proposal marked a 
watershed moment in the history of the CNT, and a particularly crucial turning point in 
terms of its official stance on the UGT during the Second Republic. Never before had the 
CNT on the national level formulated an offer of alliance of this nature to the UGT. The 
proposal set a precedent that would be referred back to by the CNT during the Civil War as 
its apparent blueprint for proposing a wartime alliance with the UGT.
99  
 
The outcome of the Zaragoza congress was heralded in the CNT press as a groundbreaking 
initiative that would lead the Spanish proletariat towards revolution. Solidaridad Obrera 
took the lead of the alliance resolution made at Zaragoza in May and promoted the notion 
of CNT-UGT alliance. On its front page on 10
th May, the headline thundered: ‘Not one 
minute more! The CNT and the UGT can, and must, end with the fascists and with the 
danger of a possible installation of fascism in Spain. We cannot wait another minute!’.
100 
On  13
th  May,  an  editorial  in  the  paper  declared  that  the  Alianza  Revolucionaria  ‘has 
resolved  a  problem’,  arguing  that  the  formula  for  alliance  drawn  up  at  the  congress 
represented a definitive solution to a long-unresolved question. As in January, the defining 
aspect  of  this  formula  for  alliance  was  it  having  a  purely  revolutionary  goal  and 
represented  workers  achieving  revolution  without  political  leaders.
101  As  the  paper 
emphasized later in May, ‘Alianza Revolucionaria, yes; but outside the fluctuations and 
flirtations of political parties and without the interference of jefes and leaders’.
102  
 
There  are  some  important  aspects  of  the  CNT’s  historically  unprecedented  change  of 
stance over the UGT that are worth commenting on here.  Firstly, it is important to stress 
that the final outcome was a proposal that, by virtue of its preamble that criticized the most 
basic tenets of socialist principle, namely a participation in political systems and political 
parties, not to mention made a demand for the UGT to break political connections, was not 
grounded at all in any serious consideration of what the UGT would consider to be an  
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acceptable  starting  point  for  alliance  negotiations.  The  additional  amendment  that  was 
added to the resolution at the eleventh hour that implied that the demand that the UGT 
break its political ties was merely provisional was no more than a concession to those 
within the CNT who had been campaigning, since 1934, for an alliance with the UGT and 
who believed this could only be possible if certain aspects of anarchist principles were put 
on hold. The Alianza Revolucionaria proposal was essentially an articulation of the CNT’s 
own revolutionary goals and ideological principles that downplayed their incompatibility 
with those of the UGT, so that it both satisfied the spectrum of opinion within the CNT 
without appearing to alienate the UGT.  
 
Secondly, it is important to emphasize the organizational procedures and decision-making 
mechanisms through which the new stance had come about. The alliance proposal was not 
a product of the regions of the CNT that had been most consistently in favour of a CNT-
UGT pact. To the contrary, it was the historically most anti-alliance region of Catalonia 
that  spearheaded  the  initiative  and  ensured  it  became  national  policy.  True  enough,  at 
Zaragoza the traditionally pro-alliance elements of the organization did back the resolution, 
even if they did have misgivings about the initial insistency on the UGT being forced to 
break  political  ties.  However,  that  they  and  the  García  Oliver  faction  came  round  to 
endorsing  the  same  position  is  a  testament  to  the  particularities  of  the  CNT  decision-
making  process  –  through  which  carefully-worded  resolutions  could  satisfy  different 
factions, as occurred at the February 1934 plenum – and of a convenient convergence of 
the two groupings’ positions as a result of the new fervour for alliance exhibited by the 
García Oliver grouping, rather than the proposal representing a belated triumph for the 
unity position that the Asturians had defended since 1934.  
 
For the agreement drawn up at Zaragoza was by-and-large that which had been created at 
the January 1936 regional congress in Catalonia. The Catalan regional congress set the 
CNT  on  a  path  towards  a  dramatic  shift  in  its  stance  on  the  UGT  and  alliances.  The 
initiative  launched  at  this  regional  congress  was  then  converted  into  a  concerted 
propaganda campaign by Solidaridad Obrera and leading CNT militants from the region to 
promote  the  idea  of  an  exclusively  revolutionary,  anti-political  CNT-UGT  alliance. 
Initially it would seem that this had been done so that the CNT could fight the Popular 
Front by other means; but even after the election, García Oliver and his allies played a key 
role in ensuring that their unity formulation prevailed in Zaragoza. Such a rapid change of 
position is, to say the least, surprising, and cannot simply be explained because the idea of 
a  revolutionary  alliance  of  the  labour  federations  would  fit  the  CNT’s  anti-political  
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principles. Quite why the most historically anti-UGT region would actively seek to turn the 
organization’s  position  on  the  UGT  on  the  national  level  is  a  question  that  will  be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
 
The ability of an influential grouping of militants in Catalonia to turn around the entire 
stance  of  the  organization  on  the  matter  of  alliances  –  even  if  certain  sectors  of  the 
organization were already open to or outright in favour of a revision – illustrates not just 
the malleability of the CNT decision-making process, but also the willingness of those who 
were in the organization to abuse process to suit their own ends.  In  1934 the Catalan 
delegates  at  national  plenums  argued  that  only  a  national  congress  could  discuss  the 
question of the CNT’s stance on alliances; in 1936 they saw fit for their own region to 
formulate a position on behalf of the entire organization. As in 1934, Catalonia was able to 
determine the CNT’s national-level stance on alliances; whilst in 1934 it had achieved this 
through  an  insistence  on  procedure  and  principles,  in  1936  it  achieved  it  through  a 
disregard for them. 
 
Thirdly, the outcome of the congress was based on a contradictory set of ideas regarding 
proletarian unity,  alliance proposals  and revolution. At the congress, the idea that  ‘the 
people’,  ‘the  working  class’  or  ‘the  proletariat’  wanted  unity  and  were  also  innately 
revolutionary was repeated by delegates throughout the discussion, except for those allied 
to the most classical anarchist position. The location of the desires for  both unity  and 
revolution, then, was believed to be the whole Spanish working class, which is to say it 
was  not  bound  up  to  any  particular  organization,  but  was  in  fact  a  desire  that  existed 
outside of ideologies or organizational agendas. At the same time, however, the method 
that was put forward for achieving this unity and in turn revolution was linked explicitly to 
not just a formal alliance with the UGT, but one that emanated from the leaderships of the 
two organizations. The CNT-UGT alliance would be drawn up by the National Committee 
of the CNT picking a delegation that would enter into negotiations with another delegation 
picked by the UGT leadership. It was therefore very ambiguous as to how such a pact 
would tap into this sentiment for unity  amongst the masses. That such a contradiction 
existed hints that the alliance proposal that was formulated was not, for some cenetistas, 
the attempt to bring about proletarian unity that it was ostensibly supposed to be. As will 
be discussed in the next chapter, this ambiguity as to precisely what role the grassroots of 
the organization would play in this process of CNT-UGT convergence would subsequently 
serve to be a major problem for those leading militants, especially those from Catalonia, 
who had encouraged this idea of a revolutionary alliance between the CNT and the UGT,  
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but  were  simultaneously  opposed  to  localized  cooperation  between  CNT  and  UGT 
organisms. 
 
Finally,  it  must  be  highlighted  that,  although  the  national  congress  agreed  to  send  a 
proposal for a revolutionary alliance to the UGT leadership, the initiative was by no means 
unanimously  supported.  Moreover,  the  most  concerted  opposition  to  the  new  alliance 
stance emanated from Catalonia, in spite of the fact that it was also from this region that 
the impetus towards putting the CNT on a pro-alliance footing had been engineered. This 
somewhat paradoxical situation was indicative of a split that developed amongst faístas, 
with the ‘purist’ anarchists – in particular those whose sphere of activity was the printed 
word, such as Federica Montseny and Felipe Alaiz – maintaining an abhorrence towards 
the notion of the CNT debasing its libertarian principles by reaching out to authoritarian 
Marxists,  whilst  so-called  ‘anarcho-Bolshevik’  figures  such  as  Juan  García  Oliver  and 
Buenaventura Durruti, who were the protagonists of CNT protest actions and insurrections, 
drew up a new strategy of advocating a CNT-UGT anti-political alliance. But while the 
latter grouping may have successfully negotiated the decision-making mechanisms of the 
organization to implement their position, this did not change the fact that there were still 
militants  in  Catalonia  who  remained  strongly  opposed  to  alliance.  The  Hospitalet  de 
Llobregat  delegate  led  the  charge  against  the  alliance  proposal  in  Zaragoza,  and  a 
significant number of delegates at the regional congress expressed opposition to any form 
of alliance with the UGT.
103 The purists’ leading figures were also equally opposed. Felipe 
Alaiz, for example, refused to write for Solidaridad Obrera as a result of the alliance 
proposal produced at the regional congress, complaining that as a result of it ‘the socialists 
will establish themselves in Catalonia’.
104 Alaiz’s fears would come to be shared with an 
increasingly large proportion of the anarcho-syndicalist movement in Catalonia, including 
those who had masterminded the organization’s change of strategy in the first place.  
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Chapter Nine: The Return to CNT-UGT Hostilities on the Eve of the Civil War 
 
The socialist response to the Alianza Revolucionaria proposal 
 
An important stumbling block in the way of a convergence between the CNT and the UGT 
in  1936  was  the  position  held  on  the  matter  by  the  socialist  leadership,  who,  without 
rejecting the CNT’s Alianza Revolucionaria proposal outright, in practical terms gave it 
short  shrift.  The  editorial  writers  of  El  Socialista,  representing  the  more  moderate 
tendencies of the socialist movement, were rather lukewarm towards the unity proposal 
formulated by the CNT at Zaragoza.  In an  admittedly polite  fashion,  the El Socialista 
editorial that appraised the CNT’s Alianza Revolucionaria proposal essentially dismissed it 
as unviable. As was to be expected, a substantial proportion of its doubt was based on its 
displeasure at the clauses of the proposal which demanded a socialist disavowal of the 
political  route.
1  The  moderate  factions  of  the  socialist  movement  were  thus  openly 
unconcerned  with  the  possibility  of  an  alliance  between  the  CNT  and  the  UGT,  an 
unsurprising  stance  given  that  their  goals  in  1936  were  certainly  not  to  direct  their 
resources towards a revolutionary activity, and instead continued to hope that the political 
channels of the Republic could remain open to them.  
 
In spite of the different factional positions that El Socialista and Claridad represented, the 
latter was approximately as tepid in its response to the CNT’s alliance proposal as was the 
former,  though  admittedly  for  slightly  different  reasons.  Claridad  lamented  that  the 
agreement made at Zaragoza shied away from the more fundamental issue of unity and 
fusion of workers’ organizations, instead of a mere alliance of them.  As mentioned in 
chapter eight, in his pronouncements on unity Largo on occasion argued in favour of a 
fusion of the CNT with the UGT; the criticism of the Alianza Revolucionaria proposal was 
very  much  in  tune  with  this  proposed  objective.  It  would  be  unwise  not  to  consider, 
however, that the paper’s lack of endorsement of the alliance proposal may have been 
motivated at least in part by a more basic wish of not handing a propaganda victory to 
another organization by endorsing it. For the paper to have applauded a CNT initiative 
would  have  undoubtedly  run  the  risk  of  undermining  attempts  to  position  Largo  as  a 
champion of proletarian unity.
2  
 
The indifference of the two main socialist factions to the CNT’s Alianza Revolucionaria 
proposal was matched by a lack of interest given by the socialist leadership to the idea in 
their decision-making processes. No substantial discussion of the proposal took place. The  
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receipt of the proposal was briefly discussed at a meeting of the Executive Commission on 
21
st May 1936. However, this discussion did not go beyond agreeing that the proposal 
would be examined fully at a later stage by the National Committee and at a future UGT 
congress.
3 Whilst this response was a fully necessary one, given that it would have been 
impossible  for  the  Executive  Commission  to  have  entered  into  a  potentially 
groundbreaking agreement with the CNT at national level without some consultation of the 
organization’s membership, it is certainly also the case that the Executive Commission 
appear to have been in no hurry at all to bring about this consultation so as to provide a 
response to the CNT as fast as possible. In May 1936 the political and social situation of 
the Republic was highly volatile and rapidly shifting. In such a context, the idea of making 
no efforts to facilitate a speedier discussion of the question of alliance with the CNT and 
instead integrate it into the ordinary procedural framework of the upcoming November 
congress  can  only  be  interpreted  as  being  a  result  of  a  lack  of  interest  on  the  UGT 
leadership’s part to discuss the matter. The matter was essentially put on the back burner, 
and no-one within the UGT leadership appears to have had any objections to this.  
 
Unity as rivalry 
 
However, in many respects the socialist leadership’s indifference to the alliance proposal 
played into the hands of certain sectors of the CNT. For some within the CNT – especially 
those based in Catalonia – the appeal of launching the idea of an alliance with the UGT 
was, from the start, in fact a strategy to compete with the UGT.
4 CNT leaders were well 
aware of the potential of a public pro-unity stance as a method of boosting the CNT’s 
popularity, even before the Alianza Revolucionaria proposal had been formulated at the 
Zaragoza  congress.  In  March  1936,  the  National  Committee  sent  out  a  circular  to  the 
regional committees which gave details of the agenda for the upcoming national congress. 
On  the  matter  of  Alianza  Revolucionaria,  the  National  Committee  emphasized  the 
importance that the idea of unity held to the working classes, and accordingly warned those 
who were hostile to pro-unity positions to take care, when formulating a position on the 
matter ‘not to clash with popular sentiments by declaring  a firm hostility towards this 
slogan that inspires numerous proletarians’.
5  
 
The possibility that an alliance proposal with the UGT could be used not just to appeal to 
popular  sentiment  in  favour  of  unity  but  also  to  undermine  the  UGT’s  own  unity 
credentials was raised at the Zaragoza congress as the alliance question was being debated. 
The delegate for the Barcelona fishermen, in defending the draft proposal on unity, did not  
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do so based on the premise that the UGT’s leaders would be reliable alliance partners, 
claiming that, ‘we must not let ourselves be taken in by the sectarianisms and prejudices by 
the leaders of Marxism, who have a bourgeois mentality, and do not want the CNT and the 
UGT to come to an understanding’. Rather, the desire to take the initiative over an alliance 
was based on proving that it was the Marxist left and not the CNT who were against unity: 
‘We do not want to give the pretext to the [socialist] leaders to say to us that we did not 
want an alliance’.
6  
 
However,  it  was  after  the  Alianza  Revolucionaria  proposal  was  formulated  that  this 
perspective really came to the fore amongst some CNT leaders. Unsurprisingly this idea 
was  not  voiced  publicly,  but  is  clearly  visible  in  the  private  correspondence  of  CNT 
members in positions of responsibility within the organization. In a letter written at the end 
of May regarding his impressions of the disposition of workers towards the CNT, Manuel 
Pérez, one of the writing staff of Solidaridad Obrera, opined that ‘I am sure that if the 
UGT  rejected  the  Alianza  the  masses  would  flow  towards  us’.
7  A  similar  view  was 
expressed by the Regional Committee of the central region when writing to the National 
Committee  on  27
th  May.  The  Committee  reported  that  in  propaganda  meetings  in  the 
region they had made promoting the Alianza ‘a question of honour’ and spoke in favour of 
it at propaganda meetings. However, the Committee made it clear that they did this ‘not 
because we believe that [the UGT] will agree to it, since they have no honesty within 
them’.
8  
 
This ulterior motive for championing alliance with the UGT is not something that has thus 
far been brought out in studies of the CNT. Instead, historians sympathetic to the CNT 
have commented on the importance of the putative gesture, arguing that it illustrated a 
genuine desire on the part of the CNT as a whole to enter into alliances with the UGT.
9 
Meanwhile, other historians have simply taken the wording of the alliance proposal at face 
value.
10  Such  superficial  appraisals  miss  perhaps  the  most  important  point  about  the 
alliance proposal. For it was, for those who truly mattered in the CNT – the propagandists 
and  the  militants  who  could  exert  control  over  assemblies  and  congresses  –  a  vehicle 
through which the CNT could be promoted by tapping into pro-unity sentiment, not to 
mention through which the UGT as an organization and its leaders could be discredited.
11 
 
As  mentioned  in  the  previous  chapter,  there  was  a  significant  level  of  opposition, 
especially amongst Catalan militants, to the Alianza Revolucionaria proposal as it was 
being discussed. Amongst the National Committee and some regional committees, above  
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all that of Catalonia, the sending of the Alianza Revolucionaria invitation to the UGT 
Executive  Commission  certainly  did  not  lead  them  to  become  better  disposed  to  a 
convergence of the CNT and the UGT, least of all on the level of presenting a united 
propaganda  front.  In  fact,  following  the  Zaragoza  congress,  the  Catalan  Regional 
Committee,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  some  other  regional  committees  such  as  the  central 
region,  became  more  wary  of  the  prospect  of  uncontrolled  shows  of  CNT-UGT  unity 
across the country. An instance of a prominent cenetista from Cádiz sharing a platform 
with  Largo  Caballero  in  May  sent  the  Catalan  Regional  Committee  on  the  offensive 
against CNT militants cooperating with ugetistas on a propaganda level. On 24
th May, a 
propaganda rally was held in Cádiz, organized by the UGT’s graphic arts federation. As a 
UGT-organized event, Largo was the main speaker, and Vicente Ballester, a key figure 
amongst the Andalusian CNT movement, also spoke at the rally, telling the crowd that the 
CNT  was  willing  to  bring  about  the  unification  of  the  proletariat  because  it  held  ‘the 
general interests of the Spanish revolution above all others’. Ballester’s presence at the 
rally clearly served to boost Largo’s pro-unity credentials, as Claridad’s extensive and 
enthusiastic coverage of the event indicates.
12  
 
However, the National Committee, various regional committees and even some individual 
unions  were  quick  to  express  their  horror  at  Ballester’s  actions.  It  would  not  be  an 
overstatement to classify the ‘Ballester affair’ as a scandal in CNT circles, particularly 
amongst militants in Catalonia. Before the national congress, the National Committee had 
instructed  militants  not  to  participate  jointly  with  UGT  individuals  or  organisms  in 
propaganda  events,  on  the  grounds  that  it  would  compromise  the  fairness  of  the 
deliberations on the matter of Alianza Revolucionaria at the congress by pre-empting any 
agreement made there.
13 Responding immediately to Ballester’s appearance with Largo, 
the  National  Committee  released  a  public  statement  that  stated  that  the  ban  on  joint 
propaganda with the UGT was still in effect, in spite of the congress now having taken 
place. Indeed, although the justification for the original ban on joint propaganda with the 
UGT was explicitly based around the upcoming congress, the National Committee argued 
that the agreements subsequently made at the congress in fact ‘strengthened’ that ban, on 
the  grounds  that  at  the  congress  the  ‘apolitical  principles’  of  the  CNT  had  been 
reaffirmed.
14 This justification, which perhaps referred to the discussion on the definition 
of libertarian communism which took place at the congress, was fairly tenuous and seems 
to have been the product of a National Committee that was seeking to carefully control any 
shows of unity with the UGT. The National Committee also contacted the Cádiz Local 
Federation to demand an explanation of the incident.
15 The Local Federation held a local  
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plenum at which it agreed that its and Ballester’s actions had been justified, and that it 
would reject any punishment handed down to it.
16 The National Committee arranged for 
the case to be discussed at the next national plenum, with a view to sanctions being made 
against the Local Federation, but the outbreak of the war intervened before any plenum 
could be held.
17  
 
The National Committee was not the only leading body within the CNT that expressed a 
disapproval of Ballester’s actions. Within a day of the event being reported in the press the 
Barcelona wood workers’ union sent a telegram to the National Committee to demand that 
Ballester be punished.
18 The Regional Committee of the central region also wrote to the 
National  Committee  to  voice  their  anger  at  Ballester.
19  However,  it  was  the  Catalan 
Regional Committee that was most enraged by the Ballester affair. Its anger did not merely 
lead to it protesting to the National Committee, but to it also actively pursuing the Cádiz 
Local  Federation  over  the  matter,  especially  after  the  Local  Federation  tried  to  justify 
Ballester’s actions. The Regional Committee contacted the National Committee on more 
than one occasion to press for a national plenum to be held to determine a punishment for 
the Cádiz cenetistas.
20 It also rejected any justifications of the incident on the part of the 
Cádiz Local Federation, which argued that it had authorized Ballester’s attendance at the 
meeting, that the meeting had been arranged before the National Committee’s April ban on 
joint propaganda with the UGT, and that it was not for other organisms of the CNT to 
control its actions, an argument that tallied with the anti-authoritarian principles of the 
organization.
21  Solidaridad  Obrera  even  refused  to  publish  a  statement  by  the  Local 
Federation to argue its case.
22  
 
Indeed, this defiant stance provoked the Catalan Regional Committee to contact the Cádiz 
Local Federation directly and rebuke them for their actions. Showing a certain lack of self-
awareness regarding its own actions, the Regional Committee interpreted the gaditanos’ 
refusal to repent for their actions as an attempt to impose their stance on joint propaganda 
activities with the UGT on the rest of the organization. The Committee advised the Cádiz 
cenetistas that their stance was damaging the CNT in Catalonia by ‘favouring the growth 
of other syndical organizations which we have no reason even to show tolerance towards’. 
The Committee elaborated on this claim by outlining their interpretation of the balance of 
power  within  the  workers’  movement  in  Catalonia.  Acknowledging  that  they  had  no 
knowledge  of  the  situation  in  Cádiz,  the  Committee  mentioned  that  it  ‘imagines  that 
circumstances  oblige  you  to  treat  the  UGT  as  equals’,  a  statement  that  reveals  an 
underlying  assumption  that  compulsion  was  the  only  reason  that  cenetistas  would  
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cooperate  with  their  UGT  counterparts,  echoing  the  stance  taken  by  Diego  Abad  de 
Santillán  regarding  the  events  of  Asturias  in  October  1934.  But  in  Catalonia,  the 
Committee argued, treating the UGT as equals ‘neither interests us and nor do we accept it, 
because  we  know  only  too  well  the  elements  that  the  socialist  labour  federation  have 
cultivated in Catalonia’.
23 
 
Julián Casanova rightly highlights that during the Civil War the top committees of the 
CNT came to assert a fairly heavy-handed – possibly even authoritarian – control over the 
grassroots of the organization, something which went against the premise of grassroots 
autonomy on which the libertarian movement was supposed to be based.
24 The handling of 
the  question  of  cooperation  between  CNT  and  UGT  organisms  in  early  1936  by  the 
National  Committee  and  the  Regional  Committee  –  some  of  whose  members,  such  as 
Mariano Vázquez, would run the National Committee during the war – illustrates that this 
shift towards top-down control of the grassroots was in fact underway before the war had 
started, with the Catalan leadership in particular viewing itself as having the authority to 
intervene  in  the  activities  of  grassroots  where  they  were  deemed  to  be  breaking  CNT 
principles, something that in practice amounted to imposing a line of discipline on the 
base. In a similar vein to the irregular and loaded decision-making process through which 
the CNT’s new stance on the UGT was brought about, the management of the CNT’s top 
committees of interactions with the UGT reveals that the CNT was not the non-hierarchical 
organization that freed its members from being dictated to which it styled itself to be. If the 
responses of the National Committee and the Catalan Regional Committee are anything to 
go by, the leaders of the CNT in early 1936 acted in a manner that was not dissimilar to 
that which they had so vociferously attacked the UGT leadership over in the past, in the 
respect that they attempted to oppose a line of discipline from above and to overturn the 
decisions made by organisms at the grassroots level.    
 
The Catalan CNT and the UGT 
 
The  Catalan  leadership’s  stance  on  the  Ballester  affair  was  just  one  facet  of  a  wider 
exasperation on the part of the Regional Committee in response to other manifestations of 
CNT-UGT cooperation across Spain. The Committee responded to these developments, 
like it did with the Ballester affair, by attempting to put a stop to them, either through 
exerting pressure on the National Committee or by contacting the CNT organisms involved 
directly.  In  June  the  UGT’s  Sindicato  Nacional  Ferroviario  and  the  CNT’s  Federación 
Nacional de la  Industria Ferroviaria reached a  pact to fight for a new set of bases de  
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trabajo and the reinstatement of workers who had been sacked following October 1934. 
The Regional Committee wrote to the National Committee to protest at the actions of the 
CNT’s rail federation.
25 Similar protests were lodged to the National Committee by the 
Catalan  leadership  over  the  CNT’s  initial  cooperation  with  the  UGT  in  the  Madrid 
construction strike in June, a conflict which will be discussed later in this chapter. Based 
on an erroneous belief that the cenetistas of Madrid had endorsed government arbitration 
as  a  result  of  their  cooperation  with  the  UGT,  the  Regional  Committee  called  on  the 
National Committee to try to intervene and bring these CNT organisms into a disciplinary 
line demanded by the Catalan leaders.
26 
   
The Ballester affair and the two aforementioned labour conflicts were for the Regional 
Committee  part  of  a  wider,  highly  troubling  phenomenon.  With  regards  to  CNT-UGT 
cooperation in labour conflicts, the Regional Committee believed that it was unwise for 
CNT unions to ‘enter into circumstantial pacts with the UGT, because from these our 
principles  and  tactics  will  be  disrupted’.  The  Madrid  construction  strike  was  used  as 
evidence of this scenario, with the committee saying that what had been a ‘good group of 
militants’ had been led astray by the UGT.
27 On more than one occasion the Regional 
Committee explicitly outlined its rationale for opposition to CNT organisms entering into 
localized  cooperation  with  their  UGT  counterparts,  as  well  as  chastising  the  National 
Committee for not having explicitly forbidden them itself. On 30
th May, for example, the 
Regional Committee wrote to the National Committee to complain that a recent National 
Committee manifesto had permitted such agreements, arguing that  
 
the affirmation that unions can reach an understanding with the UGT over economic and 
local questions will have the result that they become generalized in such a way that there 
will be a confusion of organizations, and that there will be no possibility of making 
minorities in workplaces join the CNT, “because [the UGT] is the same [as the CNT]”.
28  
 
For the Catalan leadership, then, localized cooperation with the UGT had to be stamped 
out as it ran the risk of damaging the CNT’s own chances of reorganization and expansion. 
The Regional Committee took this stance to such an extreme that it even argued that the 
appearance  of  official  CNT  statements  in  Claridad,  as  well  as  being  damaging  in  the 
respect that it would give off the impression that CNT members read the paper,
29 would 
also damage the popularity of the CNT by associating it with an organization that ‘tries to 
take  our  members  from  us,  just  as  we  try  to  take  theirs’.
30  The  Regional  Committee 
remained  committed  to  its  position  on  cooperation  with  the  UGT,  telling  the  National 
Committee on 22
nd June that ‘circumstantial pacts made with the UGT will only be to our  
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detriment’.
31 As can be seen, these objections voiced by the Regional Committee were all 
grounded first and foremost in organizational considerations – the fear that the CNT could 
lose existing and potential members to a rival – and not ones of anarchist or syndicalist 
principles. 
 
The  Regional  Committee’s  agenda  of  attempting  to  dissuade  grassroots  militants  from 
closer ties with their UGT counterparts, as well as repeatedly putting forward the message 
that workers in Catalonia should feel compelled to join the CNT and that the alliance 
resolution did not place the organizations on an equal footing, was articulated through 
several  sternly  worded  and  prominent  articles  in  Solidaridad  Obrera.
32  The  paper  told 
workers, for instance, that the alliance did not ‘imply a confusion of functions nor ideas, 
nor  an  abandonment  of  principles,  which  always  must  be  defended,  above  everything 
else’.
33 Such clarifications soon came to be expressed with far more emphasis than did 
promoting the alliance itself. 
 
That this was the prevailing position amongst the Catalan leadership must be considered 
alongside the fact that it was also the leading lights of the CNT in Catalonia who drew up 
the  idea  for  the  Alianza  Revolucionaria  with  the  UGT.  For  them,  the  question  of  an 
alliance with the UGT was simply not one that had a legitimate place in the realm of 
grassroots cooperation or with aims that were only of a limited scope. There continued to 
be an assumption on the part of the Catalan leadership that, at root, the CNT was still a 
rival  of  the  UGT,  and  that  any  lower-level  cooperation  would  jeopardize  the  CNT’s 
fortunes in winning this rivalry. The Alianza Revolucionaria proposal was not formulated 
by the Catalan cenetistas as the starting gun for a free-for-all of CNT-UGT convergence, 
but  rather  a  process  to  be  strictly  controlled  from  above  which  required  other,  more 
spontaneous forms of CNT-UGT unity to be halted. For an ideological current that had 
previously  prized  the  idea  of  spontaneous  revolutionary  cooperation  at  the  foot  of  the 
barricade,  this  position  was  somewhat  contradictory,  and  reflects  the  fact  that  for  the 
promoters of the Alianza Revolucionaria the primacy of the CNT could not be sacrificed to 
such ideals. And by July the Regional Committee had almost discounted even cooperation 
coming about through a process controlled tightly from above, pointing out in a letter to 
the National Committee that that ‘the reality is that as time passes the UGT has not made a 
resolution’ on the proposal.
34 
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Cooperation and hostilities between CNT and UGT unions 
 
The fear of cooperation between CNT and UGT unions in Spain expressed by the Catalan 
CNT elite was not merely  a figment of their imagination,  and nor was it limited to a 
handful of instances of cooperation. Although Solidaridad Obrera, as will be discussed, 
chose to focus on confrontations between CNT and UGT unions, thus obscuring examples 
of  CNT-UGT  cooperation,  such  instances  did  occur  across  Spain  in  1935  and  1936, 
principally outside of Catalonia. To a large extent, this cooperation was made possible by 
the fact that UGT entities in some regions and industries were willing to resort to strikes 
without attempting first to go through arbitration mechanisms, thus removing the central 
barrier  between  themselves  and  their  CNT  counterparts  when  it  came  to  industrial 
relations. In December 1935, the metal unions of the CNT and the UGT in Vigo jointly 
went on strike.
35 In March 1936, CNT and UGT sailors in Valencia formed a joint strike 
committee in a conflict against Altos Hornos de Vizcaya.
36 In Valladolid in March, the 
CNT and the UGT jointly carried out a strike in the face of the intransigently anti-union 
attitude of employers in the province.
37 
 
In some cases, cooperation between CNT and UGT organisms went beyond the confines of 
the  joint  presentation  of  demands  to  employers,  becoming  focused  instead  on  protest 
actions against the local authorities. The CNT and UGT in Cádiz engaged in a particularly 
strong  process  of  spontaneous  convergence,  as  José  Luis  Gutiérrez  Molina  has 
highlighted.
38 In April, the CNT and the UGT in the town jointly called a general strike in 
support of an ongoing strike at the shipyard. The strike resulted in the swift resolution of 
the conflict, and understandable jubilation amongst the working population. The report 
submitted to Solidaridad Obrera by the cenetistas of Cádiz regarding the joint general 
strike with the UGT was one of the few that appeared in the paper during these months 
which truly celebrated grassroots-level unity between workers in the CNT and the UGT, 
emphasizing that the strike represented a major milestone in the unification of the local 
proletariat and a key factor in the victory.
39  
 
Even in some areas of Catalonia a change in attitude towards the UGT could be detected, 
though  often  this  did  not  extend  beyond  individual  workplaces.  In  March  1936,  for 
example, the crew of a freighter, who were variously affiliated to the CNT, the UGT and 
an autonomous union, jointly went on strike in the face of their employer attempting to cut 
the level of staff.
40 Similarly, CNT and UGT peasants around Mataró jointly entered into 
conflict in April 1936 to enforce previously agreed pay and conditions arrangements.
41 In  
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Reus in May 1936, the CNT and the UGT’s employees on the tram that linked the town 
with Salou jointly went on strike to force the tram company to dismiss two employees who 
had formerly worked in the Guardia Civil and the Carabineros respectively. Like other 
conflicts  in  Catalonia  in  which  CNT  and  UGT  militants  worked  together  at  this  time, 
although there was mention of the fact of cooperation, there was no particular effort made 
in the reporting of the events in the CNT press to present this cooperation as indicative of a 
trend of further CNT-UGT convergence or something that in itself was worth celebrating.
42  
 
However, cases of cooperation between the CNT and the UGT in Catalonia were certainly 
not  symptomatic  of  a  fundamental  shift  in  how  CNT  union  organizers  in  the  region 
regarded  their  UGT  counterparts.  Even  after  January  1936,  when  the  CNT  unions  of 
Catalonia had agreed that their organization should carry out a revolution in tandem with 
the  UGT,  in  many  cases  cenetistas  across  the  region  continued  to  regard  their  UGT 
counterparts with the same contempt that they had between 1931 and 1934. 
  
The most notable continuity between the outlook of grassroots cenetistas between 1931 
and the post-October 1934 period was a continuing belief that the CNT could be the only 
organization in which workers could organize themselves. Writing about the process of 
rebuilding the CNT in Vic in December 1935, a local militant commented in Solidaridad 
Obrera  that  ‘the  workers  of  Vic  organize  themselves  within  the  CNT,  or  they  do  not 
organize themselves within any other union’.
43 Similarly, in March 1936 a member of the 
CNT’s construction union in Barcelona argued, through an article in Solidaridad Obrera, 
that ‘only the CNT and the construction union will be able to get your moral and material 
gains’.
44 Sometimes this attitude was linked explicitly to a suspicion of UGT counterparts. 
For  instance,  the  metro  section  of  the  Barcelona  transport  union  asserted  that  workers 
needed ‘to understand that there was no other way to make gains nor moral and material 
improvements  other  than  within  the  Confederación  Nacional  del  Trabajo,  the  only 
organization that represents a real guarantee for workers’, in the context of warning them 
of ‘the manoeuvres of the UGT elements as they look towards the next electoral battle’, the 
stimulus of this accusation being the publication by UGT metro workers of a manifesto 
calling for the unity of workers in the industry.
45 
 
The cenetistas of San Feliu de Llobregat were similarly flatly opposed to any attempts to 
accommodate the UGT in their locality after the regional congress. At the beginning of 
April, the CNT’s local construction union held a meeting, at which militants and members 
discussed the development of a group of workers in the town attempting to set up a UGT  
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union. Those who spoke were strongly opposed to the development, which, according to 
the  report  published  in  Solidaridad  Obrera  ‘cannot  be  anything  other  than  a  divisive 
manoeuvre against the workers, and in consequence in favour of the capitalists’.
46  
 
Cenetistas in Tarragona were equally opposed to the possibility of a UGT presence in their 
town. Indeed, their opposition, as expressed by one of the local militants from Tarragona in 
Solidaridad Obrera in May 1936, was an explicit rebuttal of the argument that ‘workers 
must join one of the two labour federations’. The reason this line was erroneous, according 
to the contributor, was that ‘the UGT is not the same as the CNT; the UGT is detrimental 
to workers’. The event that had prompted this venting of frustration stemmed from the 
UGT’s backing of a recruitment system for the construction industry based on a list of 
names administered by the Delegado del Trabajo. The fear on the part of the cenetistas was 
that if workers thought that joining the UGT was as acceptable as joining the CNT, they 
might join the socialist  union, thus perpetuating the recruitment systems that the CNT 
opposed.
47 
 
Cenetistas in the Barcelona construction sector appear to have been particularly opposed to 
the possibility of workers joining the UGT. At the end of May 1936, members of the union 
adopted the tactic of disrupting the assembly of an autonomous union of plasterers, at 
which the principal issue of discussion was to be whether the union should join a labour 
federation, with the goal of ensuring they joined the CNT. These attempts went as far as 
criticizing the UGT’s industrial relations methods and shouting down the junta of the union 
as it attempted to discuss options other than joining the CNT.
48 Such activities by the 
Barcelona  construction union are particularly worth drawing attention to given that, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, it was this union that had presented the idea to the 
January 1936 regional congress that all workers should join the CNT or the UGT in a bid 
to strengthen the revolutionary potential of an anti-political CNT-UGT alliance. From the 
actions of the construction union and several other CNT entities in the region, it would 
appear  that  the  official  adoption  of  this  position  did  not  translate  into  the  UGT  being 
allowed to have a presence in Catalonia. Just two months after the regional congress the 
Barcelona construction union released a manifesto to assert that suggesting that it was 
acceptable for workers to join the UGT was a divisive ploy and was designed to prevent 
the unity of workers in Catalonia. This was not so much an attack on the basic message of 
workers joining the CNT or the UGT to carry out revolution as espoused by figures such as 
Juan  García  Oliver  so  much  as  a  clarification  that  the  message  did  not  mean  that,  in  
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Catalonia  at  least,  where  the  CNT  regarded  itself  as  dominant,  it  was  acceptable  for 
workers to choose the UGT over the CNT.
49  
 
In  the  months  immediately  before  the  war,  the  themes  of  esquirolaje,  arbitration  and 
legitimacy  to  handle  conflicts  that  were  discussed  in  chapter  seven  showed  signs  of 
returning  to  become  a  key  stimulus  for  hostility  between  the  CNT  and  the  UGT  in 
Catalonia. In June 1936, the junta of the CNT’s food union vehemently attacked the UGT 
as a result of UGT members continuing to work at a chocolate factory at which the CNT 
had  called  a  strike.  The  junta’s  response  to  these  events  in  Solidaridad  Obrera  was 
virtually indistinguishable from how CNT juntas of other Barcelona unions attacked the 
UGT between 1931 and 1934. Workers were warned that the UGT, not just the specific 
union involved but the organization as a whole, were ‘eternal traitors’ who were ‘using the 
same  low  methods  as  ever’.
50  In  July,  the  CNT  barbers  attacked  their  UGT  rivals  for 
having negotiated new bases for the sector through the ‘usual comedy’ of the jurados 
mixtos. As well as questioning the legitimacy of the UGT representatives in carrying out 
this  task,  since  ‘it  has  been  a  long  time  since  they  have  picked  up  work  tools’  the 
agreement that they had won was also roundly criticized for being worse than the one that 
had been in place beforehand. Just as seriously, the agreement had provision for creating a 
list of workers that would require individuals to get an official work card, a move that the 
CNT union interpreted as meaning that ‘anyone who is not fascist’ would be unable to 
work in the sector.
51 That same month, the wood workers’ union launched a stinging attack 
on the Catalan UGT in response to the UGT’s wood workers’ union attempting to hold a 
public assembly to discuss the creation of a set of bases to be presented to employers, 
inviting the CNT to attend and asking them to participate in the venture. The cenetistas on 
the junta of the wood workers’ union were incensed that the ‘grupito’ of the UGT union 
were trying to organize a conflict in the industry, believing this to be the job of the CNT, 
and certainly not one that it would be willing to go about with the UGT as a joint partner.
52  
 
As 1936 progressed, it was clear that the overall trend in Catalonia with regard to CNT-
UGT interactions was of a steady return to the levels of acrimony that had characterized 
the  first  three  years  of  the  Republic.  By  July,  several  CNT  unions  in  Barcelona  were 
openly accusing their UGT counterparts of treachery. The petrol workers in the CNT’s 
transport union made this very accusation against the ‘politicians and jefecillos’ of the 
UGT, who had entered into agreement with employers to continue working during a CNT 
strike in the sector. The strike committee accused them through the pages of Solidaridad 
Obrera of being motivated to provide scab labour because they were ‘always at the service  
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of the interests of the bourgeoisie and politics’ as well as ‘having the aim of knocking 
down the CNT’. Similar accusations were made on the very same day by CNT metro 
workers.
53 It was a similar story outside of Barcelona. By July, the CNT in Badalona had 
grown tired of the developing UGT movement there, and sent a warning to them through 
the  CNT  press.  Reminding  the  UGT  that  the  workers  of  Badalona  had  ‘always’  been 
affiliated to the CNT, a local militant spoke of how the UGT in the town ‘uses coercion as 
a norm, and repugnant political orientations are inserted into its propaganda meetings’ as 
well as accusing the ugetistas of routinely attacking the CNT at public meetings.
54 This 
overall trajectory of return to hostilities and the notion that cooperation between the CNT 
and  the  UGT  in  Catalonia  was  impossible  was  most  clearly  articulated  by  the  wood 
workers’ union in July, who bluntly informed their UGT counterparts through Solidaridad 
Obrera that ‘we do not want to work jointly, because we know what you are like’.
55 Such a 
stance illustrates that the assumption that CNT-UGT grassroots tensions were simply a 
result of a clash between the two movement’s traditional approaches to strikes does not tell 
the whole story.  
 
Solidaridad Obrera’s leader writers and the region’s leading propagandists were equally 
keen to express the notion that the UGT was not welcome in Catalonia. At a rally in Lérida 
in April 1936, Juan García Oliver lamented to the crowd that ‘not only has [the UGT] not 
answered our requests [on Alianza Revolucionaria], but it is trying to organize unions in 
the face of those of the CNT’ and ‘dismember our organizations’. It was an ambition that 
the UGT must drop, according to García Oliver, because, ‘Catalonia has been and will 
continue to be confederal’.
56 In July, Solidaridad Obrera published a comment piece on 
the UGT in Catalonia in which it argued that the UGT had ‘always been an outsider in 
Catalonia, with no rooting in the soul of the Catalan proletariat’. The piece even made the 
claim, echoing those of the pre-October era, that the Catalan UGT was even recruiting ‘the 
same elements who the yellows previously took on’, including ‘all those who have come 
from the Libres’.
57 
 
It is possible that Catalan cenetistas’ fears that the UGT would gain ground in Catalonia if 
the idea was put forward that the two labour federations were equally valid were fuelled in 
part by a growth of the UGT in the region over the course of 1936. It is generally accepted 
by scholars that the UGT experienced a very rapid growth in Catalonia during the Civil 
War, even if this growth is sometimes simplistically put down to being a result of the petite 
bourgeoisie  ‘saving  themselves’  from  the  CNT’s  social  revolution.
58  What  is  less  well 
known, however, is that the socialist labour federation grew at a fairly rapid rate in the  
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months immediately prior to the war.
59 This growth was all the more surprising given that, 
from the end of 1935 and until just before the outbreak of the war, the upper echelons of 
the  Catalan  UGT  were  in  disarray,  with  different  factions  vying  for  control  of  the 
organization’s  apparatus.
60  Although  no  overall  figure  exists  for  prior  to  the  war, 
immediately  after  the  outbreak  of  the  conflict  the  Catalan  UGT  had  86000  members 
according  to  Pere  Gabriel’s  calculations,  a  figure  nearly  double  that  of  its  peak 
immediately  before  its  spring  1934  schism.
61  The  indicator  of  Catalan  UGT  growth 
deployed  in  chapter  five  of  this  thesis  also  highlights  an  unprecedented  growth  of  the 
organization  in  this  period.  Between  26
th  September  1935  and  16
th  July  1936,  the 
Executive  Commission  registered  sixty-eight  new  unions  in  the  region,  with  13257 
members  in  total  where  a  membership  figure  was  given.
62  Of  these  entries,  the  most 
revealing is that of a 6000-strong manufacturing and textiles union from Barcelona in early 
July.
63 This sector was traditionally one of the CNT’s core constituencies of support, and 
whilst the UGT’s union was not rivalling the 1931 membership peak of 30000 of its CNT 
counterpart,  by  May  1936  the  CNT  union’s  membership  had  fallen  to  14500.
64  It  is 
certainly not inconceivable that a proportion of those who had left the CNT ultimately 
joined the UGT union in 1936. 
 
Part of the reason for the rapid growth of the Catalan UGT could be put down to the 
organization’s new-found willingness to adopt a more aggressive stance in strikes. It was 
argued earlier in this thesis that between 1931 and 1934 the activities of the Catalan UGT 
corresponded closely to those of other UGT unions in Spanish cities in terms of its unions 
seeking first  and foremost to work with arbitration systems.  It seems that in 1936 the 
Catalan UGT also underwent the same changes in its outlook on labour conflicts as did 
UGT unions in other Spanish cities in the respect that, whilst not rejecting the possibilities 
of the jurados mixtos, many UGT unions were more than prepared to convoke strikes. For 
example, in July the UGT’s packaging workers in the lumber industry decided to call a 
strike to demand a new set of pay and conditions. However, at the same time the CNT’s 
own section of its wood workers’ union was in the process of negotiating a new deal with 
employers, meaning it had to publish a notification in Solidaridad Obrera for workers to 
disregard  the  UGT’s  own  strike  call,  a  reversal  of  the  usual  dynamic  of  UGT  unions 
counselling against joining CNT strikes as they attempted to persist with negotiations.
65 
Even the UGT’s more skilled, niche profession unions appear to have embraced this more 
forthright approach to labour relations. In May, for instance, the UGT’s mosaic makers’ 
union in Barcelona contacted its corresponding CNT section in the construction sindicato 
único  with  an  invitation  to  join  them  in  presenting  a  new  set  of  bases  to  employers,  
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counselling their CNT counterparts that ‘we workers must not remain disunited in our 
struggle because this will only benefit capitalism, which we must all work together to bring 
down as it is the true yoke of our oppression’.
66 
 
As has been discussed in this chapter, the period following the end of the bienio negro 
brought  with  it  instances  of  CNT  and  UGT  local  actors  cooperating  with  one  another 
qualitatively and quantitatively as they had never done before during the Republic. Often 
this cooperation was restricted to specific labour conflicts, but in some cases, such as in 
Cádiz,  the  convergence  was  more  closely  integrated  into  the  battle  against  the  right. 
However, it was equally the case that there was also a concurrent trend of CNT and UGT 
unions in Spain coming into conflict with one another in a manner that had echoes of the 
most hostile times of the bienio reformista. Crucially, these events were picked up on by 
the CNT and socialist press far more so than the instances of cooperation.  
 
In Oviedo in December 1935, for example, a strike was called in the construction industry, 
partly to demand the release of local prisoners. The conflict had initially been entered into 
jointly by the CNT and the UGT, but the UGT representatives then withdrew their support 
for it. According to the strike committee, this was because the leader of the UGT’s national 
federation  of  construction  workers  de-authorized  the  conflict.  Elements  of  the  local 
socialist party had apparently also intervened to ensure the release of UGT members, on 
the condition that they returned to work. All this led, as had happened so frequently in 
previous years, to accusations of ‘cowardice’ and ‘treachery’ being levelled at the UGT 
leaders in the sector.
67 
 
The waiters’ strike in Madrid was another area in which CNT and UGT unions clashed. 
Here, the CNT’s waiters’ union agreed to strike, but its UGT counterpart refused to second 
the call. The conflict was given more coverage than instances of CNT-UGT cooperation 
were in Solidaridad Obrera, with the paper suggesting that the UGT were returning to ‘the 
tactics of the past’. The conflict was one of a selection of clear-cut instances of hostilities 
between the CNT and the UGT, all of which were given prominence in the CNT’s paper, 
seemingly as part of an effort to imply that, on the level of industrial relations, the UGT 
had inexorably returned to the very same methods that had made it the CNT’s greatest 
enemy in the first years of the Republic.
68 
 
The CNT’s waiters in Madrid decided to press ahead with the strike despite the CNT’s 
refusal  to  back  it.  The  coverage  of  the  conflict  in  Solidaridad  Obrera,  which  was  
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disproportionate  relative  to  the  nationwide  significance  of  the  strike  itself,  was  firmly 
anchored in the premise that the UGT had betrayed the waiters by refusing to participate in 
it. In a manifesto released by the strike committee and published in the paper, the leaders 
of the UGT’s hospitality union were accused of ‘having no scruples over betraying the 
exploited and the oppressed’. The anti-fascist credentials of the socialists was mocked as 
they were branded as ‘not hesitating to put themselves on the side of the fascists’ as a 
result of their opposition to the CNT strike. The UGT union leaders were also labelled as 
‘guardians of the bourgeoisie’.  Indeed, the strike committee’s public statements on the 
strike were focussed first and foremost on attacking their UGT counterparts in terms that 
suggested that the entire socialist movement was treacherous and collaborationist. In this 
fundamental respect, the conflict and the CNT’s interpretation of it and the UGT’s role in it 
were  no  different  to  countless  conflicts  that  took  place  during  the  first  years  of  the 
Republic.
69 
 
In some cases, CNT unions started out cooperating with their UGT counterparts, only to 
then enter into disagreement with them over handling the conflict in question. This was the 
case in Bilbao in April 1936, where the CNT entered into a conflict in the construction 
industry  with  the  UGT  and  Solidaridad  de  Trabajadores  Vascos  (STV),  the  Basque 
nationalist labour federation, with a strike committee formed out of the three organizations 
being set up. However, the CNT representatives then left the strike committee after their 
UGT and STV counterparts voted in favour of accepting a solution to the conflict drawn up 
by the Civil Governor. Setting up their own strike committee, the CNT then decried the 
‘low’ attempts made by the UGT and STV committee to instruct workers to disregard the 
CNT’s own committee.
70 It was a similar story elsewhere in the Basque Country, where the 
CNT initially entered into another construction conflict with the UGT in San Sebastián in 
May. However, in the words of the CNT organizers involved, throughout the three weeks 
of the conflict ‘we have only been able to clearly ascertain one thing: the malice of the 
elements who call the shots from the UGT against the wishes and the agreements of the 
strikers and of their own members’. The basis for this accusation was that, after the conflict 
had been called, local  UGT leaders attempted  to intervene in it by trying to impose a 
solution that they had negotiated with the Civil Governor.
71 The CNT’s gastronomy union 
in Málaga was left similarly outraged by the local UGT leadership in June, condemning 
them as ‘arriviste’ politicians who were holding back workers after they forbade the UGT 
hospitality workers from accepting the CNT’s offer of presenting bases to employers with 
them.
72 The CNT’s interpretation of these events was almost identical to one of the key 
threads of the CNT’s discourse on the UGT since the start of the Republic, namely that its  
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leaders  interfered  in  conflicts,  in  the  process  betraying  the  aspirations  of  the  workers 
involved in them.  
 
What  is  most  significant  about  Solidaridad  Obrera’s  coverage  of  labour  conflicts 
involving the CNT and the UGT during 1936 was that it prioritized coverage of CNT-UGT 
hostilities at the grassroots level over instances of cooperation between CNT and UGT 
unions. As discussed, there were a number of conflicts during 1936 in which CNT and 
UGT unions either jointly presented terms to employers, or in which one union seconded 
the strike call of the other. And yet Solidaridad Obrera paid relatively little attention to 
these cases and instead gave far more coverage to incidents in which the UGT was seen to 
be deploying the same methods as it had earlier in the Republic, damaging the CNT’s own 
handling of conflicts in the process and presenting this as being detrimental to the interests 
of workers in the conflicts in question.  
 
The coverage afforded to the Madrid construction strike of June and July 1936 highlights 
this tendency to emphasize instances of conflict over cooperation. The CNT and the UGT 
construction unions had initially entered into the conflict jointly, having presented bases to 
employers  together  in  May.  The  conflict  began  on  1
st  June,  with  Solidaridad  Obrera 
referring to the ‘perfect unity of action’ that it represented.
73 Initially, the two unions had 
created separate sets of demands, and the socialist union leaders had wished to put theirs 
through the jurados. However, under grassroots pressure, they reluctantly agreed instead to 
allow  the  conflict  to  be  pursued  the  CNT’s  way,  with  the  strike  committee,  in  the 
perspective  of  cenetistas  at  least,  committed  to  pursuing  the  conflict  to  its  conclusion 
through direct action.
74  
 
After a month of deadlock, however, the government attempted to force a solution to the 
conflict by setting up a jurado mixto for it, with the local socialist leaders agreeing to 
participate in it. The UGT had somewhat unilaterally attempted to bring a close to the 
strike, something their CNT counterparts were unsurprisingly incensed about given that it 
had effectively cut out the CNT as a leading element of the strike. The claim made by 
Claridad  that  the  CNT  only  refused  to  accept  the  solution  to  the  conflict  because  it 
emanated from the state, and was thus a knee-jerk, dogmatic response, was certainly not 
one that the CNT appeared to accept.
75 Indeed, Claridad was roundly dismissive of the 
CNT’s complaints, insisting that were the conflict to continue to be fought through direct 
action, it would inevitably end in total defeat for the workers.
76  
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Solidaridad Obrera immediately took a far closer interest in the conflict once it became 
apparent that the CNT and UGT there were at odds regarding how to handle the conflict. 
The UGT’s actions were reported as ones of outright ‘treachery’ in Solidaridad Obrera, 
with José García Pradas, one of the paper’s correspondents in Madrid, devoting a series of 
lengthy  articles  to  outlining  this  betrayal  in  detail.  García  Pradas  came  to  present 
developments  in  the  conflict  almost  exclusively  as  a  set  of  attempts  by  the  socialist 
leadership to betray the CNT, such as their advice to UGT members not to attend the 
assembly convoked by the CNT for construction workers to decide how to proceed with 
the strike after the UGT leaders had made an agreement through the jurados.
77 The CNT 
claimed  to  have  the  overall  backing  of  workers  in  the  industry  to  continue  the  strike; 
though it is difficult to gauge the precise split of opinion, it would certainly seem that the 
larger proportion of workers did back the CNT’s position. By this point, for Solidaridad 
Obrera, there continued to be an emphasis on worker unity attached to the conflict; but 
now this unity was presented as workers jointly backing the CNT and rejecting the UGT.
78 
It  is  important  to  note,  however,  that  although  Solidaridad  Obrera  was  openly  hostile 
towards the UGT’s actions in Madrid, presenting the UGT there as essentially treacherous, 
it did come out strongly against the instances of violence that developed after some UGT 
members  returned  to  work,  demanding  that  workers  from  both  sides  desisted  from 
attacking one  another.
79  This explicit rejection of worker-on-worker violence had been 
largely absent in the CNT press in previous years. 
 
At  the  same  time  as  emphasising  instances  of  CNT-UGT  conflict  over  cooperation, 
Solidaridad Obrera also started to return to the same interpretations of the UGT that had 
dominated the CNT press between 1931 and 1934. For example, throughout the pre-war 
period  of  1936,  the  paper  drew  attention  to  instances  of  UGT  unions  abandoning  the 
socialist labour federation to join the CNT, just as it had done between 1931 and 1934. In 
November 1935, for example, a militant in Sevilla proudly reported on how workers were 
‘deserting’ the UGT and the communist labour federation in the city as they became aware 
that the CNT was ‘the only [organization] that defends their interests’.
80 In April 1936, the 
paper celebrated telephone workers in Santander leaving the UGT for the CNT.
81 Local 
leaders  of  the  UGT  continued  to  be  presented  in  such  terms  as  ‘opportunists’
82  or 
‘jefecillos’.
83 
 
The national leaders of the UGT were equally accused of unaccountably controlling the 
destiny of the workers within the UGT. In April, Solidaridad Obrera went on the attack 
against Largo Caballero’s continual public promotion of unity whilst no practical steps  
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were taken by the UGT to bring it about.
84 Similarly, Largo’s role at the head of the UGT 
was also attacked in June 1936, with an editorial in the paper hoping that ‘the workers of 
the Unión General de Trabajadores go over Largo and his minions’ heads’ to accept the 
CNT’s  alliance  proposal,  a  desire  that  contradicted  both  the  fact  that  the  CNT  had 
presented its proposal specifically to the UGT national leadership and the paper’s support 
for the currents within the CNT that were attempting to prevent  grassroots CNT-UGT 
cooperation.
85 Indeed, from June onwards, Solidaridad Obrera significantly stepped up the 
frequency of its attacks on the socialist leadership, often linking its criticisms to their non-
response to the Zaragoza Alianza Revolucionaria proposal.
86 Whilst these challenges laid 
down to the UGT over its lack of concrete reply to the CNT proposal undoubtedly partly 
articulated  the  frustrations  of  some  cenetistas  who  genuinely  hoped  the  two  labour 
federations would work towards an alliance, it must also be highlighted that making such 
public accusations corresponded to the agenda of those who hoped to discredit the UGT by 
exposing  its  lack  of  commitment  to  an  alliance  with  the  CNT.  In  effect,  Solidaridad 
Obrera was helping to carry out the final part of this strategy. 
 
On the part of the socialists, from late spring onwards there was likewise a creeping return 
to the sorts of criticisms and attacks that it had directed at the CNT between 1931 and 
1934. By July 1936 both El Socialista and Claridad, in spite of their own differences, had 
adopted a roughly similar stance in their presentation of the CNT as a national movement, 
which was characterized by a very restrained re-articulation of the sorts of criticisms that 
had  been  made  in  socialist  discourse  of  the  CNT  throughout  the  earlier  years  of  the 
Republic. These criticisms were made in response to the activities of  CNT organisms, 
especially those in Madrid during the construction strike held there. Claridad went as far 
as criticising the CNT’s refusal to accept the settlement of the jurado in the conflict under 
the  heading  of  ‘the  myth  of  direct  action’;
87  their  stance  over  the  strike  was  likewise 
described as ‘suicidal and fratricidal obstinacy’.
88 Whilst the tone adopted was nowhere 
near as hostile as that of El Socialista between 1931 and 1933, an outright rejection of the 
CNT’s  methods,  not  just  for  the  conflict  in  question  but  on  a  general  level,  was 
unmistakable.  
 
In any case, even before the construction conflict in Madrid Claridad had to a degree 
lapsed  into  the  critical  discourse  against  anarchism  and  syndicalism  from  a  theoretical 
standpoint that had historically been so characteristic of Spanish socialism. In late May 
1936, the paper published a couple of different articles of this nature. One labelled the 
CNT’s commitment to direct action as ‘mistaken’ and in doing so described direct action  
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as  ‘seeing  in  constant  and  staggered  strikes  not  just  a  legitimate  method  of  obtaining 
economic improvements, but also a debatable procedure of agitation and promoting the 
union’.
89  In  another  editorial  the  paper  hit  back  at  the  criticism  of  socialism  and 
communism that was expressed at the same time in Solidaridad Obrera, in the course of 
which  anarchist  objections  to  the  notion  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  were 
dismissed.
90 At the same time the paper maintained its rhetorical commitment to promoting 
both  alliances  in  general  and  also  unity  specifically  between  the  CNT  and  the  UGT, 
seemingly with little consideration of how public criticisms of the most fundamental tenets 
of CNT practice would be perceived by cenetistas. Nevertheless, the temptation to revert to 
the discourse of yesteryear proved to be too strong for the socialists as well as the anarcho-
syndicalists. As Santos Juliá argues, the socialist left, for all its rhetoric on unity, did not 
fundamentally alter its negative interpretation of anarcho-syndicalism between 1934 and 
1936.
91 
 
Conclusions 
 
By the time an uprising against the Republic seemed imminent, the CNT and the UGT on 
the national level and between many sections of their grassroots were well on their way to 
returning  to  the  same  open  hostilities  that  had characterized  their  relationship  between 
April 1931 and October 1934. The socialists failed to show any interest in the Alianza 
Revolucionaria  proposition  of  the  CNT,  and  as  Helen  Graham  highlights,  offered  no 
alternative proposal.
92 The actions of the CNT leadership reveal that they were not so 
much interested in signing an alliance with the UGT as much as they were in exploiting the 
notion of unity for their own organizational interests. Privately, members on the CNT’s top 
committees, staff at Solidaridad Obrera and a whole host of militants expressed the belief 
that the proposal that they had formulated could be used to win members from the UGT 
and also discredit the UGT leadership. But it was the leading lights of the Catalan CNT, 
who had masterminded the Alianza Revolucionaria initiative, who proved themselves to be 
most cynical in their use of the question of CNT-UGT unity. The region’s leaders did their 
utmost to prevent grassroots fraternization between the CNT and the UGT across Spain, 
citing the goals of the Alianza Revolucionaria and the agreed procedures to bring it about 
as a pretext to try and prevent CNT unions acting in tandem with UGT counterparts. At the 
same time, cenetistas in Catalonia, in spite of their launching of a strategy of instructing all 
workers  to  join  the  CNT  or  the  UGT  according  to  their  preferences,  were  singularly 
unwilling to accept the expansion of the UGT in their region. The attitude of many CNT 
militants  in  Catalonia,  and  also  some  elsewhere  in  Spain,  reveals  that  a  significant  
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proportion of the CNT held fundamentally the same anti-UGT mentality, grounded in the 
same assumptions and beliefs, as they had held since the start of the Republic and even 
before. As a manifestation of this, the press of both movements chose to focus on instances 
of hostility between the CNT and the UGT, presenting them in the same terms as those 
deployed  between  1931  and  1934,  rather  than  promoting  cases  of  cooperation.  Across 
Spain, there were unquestionably instances of CNT and UGT militants converging, not just 
over labour conflicts, but also in terms of their overall outlook on the possibilities of CNT-
UGT unity, as José Luis Gutiérrez Molina has illustrated with regard to Cádiz.
93 But these 
were decisively pushed into the background by the efforts of the most influential sectors of 
both the anarcho-syndicalist and socialist movements. 
 
If one event highlights the risky game both the CNT and the UGT were playing in adopting 
this approach of simultaneously espousing unity whilst treating the other movement as a 
rival, it is the bloody events that occurred in Málaga in June, stimulated by a conflict in the 
food production industry, where the CNT had called a strike but their UGT counterparts 
refused to second it. Beginning with the murder of a socialist, over the following few days 
Málaga was beset by tit-for-tat murders of socialist, communist and anarcho-syndicalist 
militants. CNT and UGT leaders in the city hastily convoked a meeting to attempt to bring 
an end to the violence, with representatives from Madrid and Barcelona travelling to the 
region to assist. El Socialista, Claridad and Solidaridad Obrera all produced front-page 
editorials  appealing  for  calm,  with  each  warning  that  such  actions  would  either  help 
provoke a fascist takeover or were deeply unwise in the context of the mobilization of the 
extreme  right.
94  Whilst  these  newspapers,  as  discussed,  sought  to  draw  attention  to 
instances of grassroots rivalry, and even used them to discredit the other labour federation, 
neither side wanted the rivalry to lead to a civil war within the proletariat, nor give a 
pretext  for  a  right-wing  grab  for  power.  This  essentially  contradictory  labour  of 
simultaneously  trying  to  discredit  or  criticize  rival  organizations  whilst  maintaining  an 
overall  united  front  with  them  against  a  common  enemy  would  become  a  much  more 
frequent – and dangerous – aspect of the left’s behaviour during the war. 
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Chapter Ten: CNT-UGT Interactions in Igualada, 1931-1936 
 
This chapter will provide an analysis of interactions between the CNT and the UGT in 
Igualada, a town approximately seventy kilometres west of Barcelona. Although it would 
be unwise to suggest that CNT-UGT interactions in all Catalan towns followed precisely 
the same path as those of Igualada given the level of variation between different localities 
in important factors such as the relative sizes of the local CNT and UGT movements at the 
start  of  the  Republic,  there  is  little  to  suggest  that  interactions  between  the  two 
organizations  in  the  town  were  unrepresentative  or  exceptional.  Certainly  the  CNT 
movement  here  corresponded  in  terms  of  the  ideas  its  militants  espoused  in  their 
propaganda and their methods of fighting labour conflicts to the Catalan CNT archetype. 
As  such,  Igualada  serves  as  a  suitable  town  to  use  as  the  subject  of  a  case  study  of 
grassroots-level CNT-UGT interactions. The more specific focus of the chapter will allow 
the CNT and UGT’s struggles with one another to be examined with a much greater level 
of  context  and  detail.  Above  all,  the  local  CNT  movement  can  be  reconstructed  more 
thoroughly, especially with regard to highlighting the role the local cenetistas believed that 
their  movement  played  amongst  the  igualadí  working  classes  and  their  level  of 
commitment to defending their local organization and the cause they associated with it. In 
addition to studying interactions between the CNT and the UGT specifically in Igualada, 
the chapter will study how the local militants of the CNT saw the wider national and 
regional narratives of CNT-UGT interactions as relevant to their own interactions with the 
UGT in Igualada, as well as how far their stances on the UGT as a national actor and a 
presence in Catalonia matched those outlined in the previous chapters of this thesis. 
 
The Igualada working classes and the CNT 
 
Igualada had a population of 13871 in 1931.
1 The town expanded over the first third of the 
twentieth century, stimulated by the expansion of the town’s industrial sector.
2 Like many 
towns in Catalonia, Igualada experienced a large industrial growth in particular during 
World  War  One.  The  two  industries  most  predominant  in  Igualada  were  leather  and 
textiles, in particular cotton.
3 According to figures provided by Soledad Bengoechea, by 
1922  in  Igualada  there  were  250  leather  processing  businesses,  employing  some  3000 
workers.
4 The cenetista militants of Igualada were closely associated with this industry, 
with many of the Local Federation’s most active militants working or having previously 
been employed in the sector. The textile industry experienced a boom in Igualada over the 
late-nineteenth  and  early-twentieth  centuries,  but  began  to  stagnate  towards  the  end  of  
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World War One. By 1922 there were seventeen textile factories in Igualada, employing 
approximately 3000 workers.
5 As is to be expected, the town also had a local construction 
industry.
6  
 
The  key  development  in  the  Igualada  workers’  movement  was  the  formation  of  a 
Federación Local Obrera affiliated to the International Workingmen’s Association during 
the politically turbulent years of 1868 to 1874. This Local Federation and its constituent 
sections  were  guided  by  a  Bakuninist,  communalist  philosophy.
7  This  organization 
remained  in  existence  until  1885;  its  paper  La  Federación  Igualadina,  which  was  in 
publication  from  1883  to  1885,  bore  the  slogan  of  ‘Anarchy,  Federation  and 
Collectivism’.
8 
 
By the turn of the twentieth century trade unions began to form again in Igualada after a 
period of repression at the end of the nineteenth century; once more they were guided by 
anarchist ideas, but also incorporated newer syndicalist principles as well. According to the 
recollections of Joan Ferrer, who was the Igualada CNT’s leading militant throughout the 
1930s, a significant proportion of the protagonists of this new movement were some of the 
main  militants  of  the  old  Federación  Local  Obrera,  who  provided  organizational  and 
ideological guidance to a new generation of labour activists.
9 The ideas of these unions 
were  transmitted  locally  through  their  paper  El  Obrero  Moderno.
10  Though  not  of 
anywhere near the size or strength that the CNT would attain in 1919, the nucleus of the 
unions and militants that would ultimately go on to form this organization had by this point 
been formed.  
 
Delegates from Igualada’s leather union were present at the founding congress of the CNT 
in 1910.
11 The Igualada unions were therefore connected to the CNT from the moment of 
its founding. Over the course of the 1910s, these unions would consolidate within the 
CNT, culminating in the spectacular growth of the local organization at the end of the 
decade. Nineteen-ten was also the year in which Joan Ferrer joined the local CNT at the 
age  of  fourteen.
12  Over  the  course  of  the  1910s  many  of  the  individuals  who  would 
comprise the key core of militants of the CNT during the Republic and the war, such as 
Ángel Amenós, Daniel Alcaide, José Anselmo, Ramón Guitart and José Cuatrecases, also 
began  their  long  associations  with  the  Local  Federation;
13  many  of  these  figures  were 
signatories  of  the  petition  by  the  CNT  made  to  the  Mayor  in  April  1931  for  legal 
restrictions on their union to be removed.
14 
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The trajectory of growth for the Igualada CNT corresponds to a large degree to that of the 
organization in Barcelona, with the organization remaining a small core of militants until 
World  War  One,  then  subsequently  experiencing  a  moderate  increase  in  membership 
between 1916 and 1918, and then finally experiencing a massive growth in its popularity in 
1919.
15 According to the organization’s own figures, local membership ballooned from 
1607 members in 1918 to 5600 at the end of 1919.
16 Given that the local population of 
Igualada at this time was 12512, this figure, though perhaps exaggerated, demonstrates the 
importance of the CNT in Igualada.  To a very large extent, then, in 1919 the Igualada 
CNT represented the working classes of Igualada almost in their entirety, and could call on 
an unprecedented level of collective strength in local labour conflicts.  
 
The combination of the Igualada CNT’s spectacular growth and brief preponderance in the 
1910s with the fact of many of the militants of the re-founded CNT of 1930 belonging to 
the earlier incarnation of the CNT is highly important when considering the position taken 
by  the  Igualada  CNT  over  a  nascent  UGT  presence  in  the  town  during  the  Second 
Republic. Joan Ferrer makes it clear in his memoirs that he viewed the CNT as having a 
long-standing historical lineage in Igualada. In the view of Joan Ferrer, the re-founded 
CNT  of  1930  was  ‘indisputably  the  home  of  the  igualadí  worker’.
17  Like  the  CNT 
elsewhere in Catalonia, its militants viewed their organization and the local working class 
as synonymous.  Just as importantly, Ferrer viewed this implantation of the CNT in the 
town being a result of not just the receptiveness of the local working classes to anarchist 
and syndicalist ideas, but specifically down to the efforts of himself and a dedicated group 
of  militants  who  joined  the  organization  in  the  1910s  and  had  continued  struggling 
throughout the dictatorship to ensure the movement’s survival in the town.
18 As will be 
seen, the Igualada CNT were resolutely opposed to the possibility of the UGT developing a 
presence in Igualada during the Republic; this stance was undoubtedly in part a product of 
the sacrifices and commitment that the movement’s militants had made over the course of 
decades, in combination with their interpretation of their organization being the current 
manifestation of a decades-long lineage of the local working classes’ union organization. 
 
It is difficult to identify any significant union alternatives to the CNT and its antecedents 
that existed in Igualada until the contentious arrival of the Sindicatos Libres in Igualada in 
1920, which was aided by the authorities and employers as it was elsewhere in Catalonia.
19 
However, there did exist another convergence point for workers in the town, though not a 
trade union organization, which outdated the CNT by several decades. This entity was the 
Ateneu Igualadí de la Classe Obrera. Set up in 1863, this was for the most part a cultural,  
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educational and social institution, though according to Bengoechea also offered advice and 
encouragement to workers in the event of labour conflicts. The Ateneu in the 1910s had a 
membership of roughly 1000.
20 It was founded on the notions of worker liberation through 
education  and  personal  betterment  and  inter-class  cooperation  rather  than  the  anarcho-
syndicalist emphasis of violent class conflict. The Ateneu offered a very different vision of 
society  and  the  possible  role  of  the  working  class  in  it  to  the  anarcho-syndicalist 
alternative,  and  that  it  continued  to  flourish  even  after  the  CNT  had  set  up  their  own 
alternative Ateneu in 1918 shows that although the CNT were the only significant labour 
union, their doctrine was not the only one endorsed by sectors of the Igualada working 
class.
21 However, it seems highly likely that the UGT had no representation in Igualada 
before the Second Republic. Miquel Termens i Graells states categorically that the UGT 
did not exist in Igualada prior to the Second Republic;
22 David Ballester makes no mention 
of a local federation in Igualada in this era.
23 There appears to be no documentary trace of 
a UGT presence in Igualada before the Second Republic. 
 
When the CNT returned to some form of legality in 1930, the CNT in Igualada began to 
rebuild  and  take  in  new  members  extremely  quickly,  as  happened  in  towns  across 
Catalonia.  The  Sindicatos  Libres,  in  which  many  former  cenetistas  had  been  enrolled, 
quickly began to disintegrate.
24 As in previous eras, the strongest sections of the Igualada 
CNT at the beginning of the 1930s were its textile, leather and construction unions, with 
metal, transport and woodworking unions also having significant membership levels.
25 The 
Local Federation’s newspaper, El Sembrador, went into publication on 15
th June 1930, 
first on a bi-weekly basis and then weekly from mid-1931. Overall, it is clear that the CNT 
militants  of  Igualada  had  spent  the  1920s  waiting  for  the  moment  in  which  their 
organization could be rebuilt, and in the latter days of the Monarchy and the early months 
of the Republic they set about this task with considerable success.  
 
According  to  Eulàlia  Vega,  the  Igualada  CNT  Local  Federation  was  among  the  more 
efficient of the CNT local federations in Catalonia in terms of its abilities to organize the 
local workforce and conduct the internal business of the organization, such as meetings 
and assemblies.
26 By June 1931, the Local Federation had a total of 5100 members, with 
this figure representing the peak for the CNT in Igualada before the war.
27 This figure is 
comparable with that of December 1919, and as such represents an impressive rebuilding 
of the organization in a relatively short space of time. According to Vega, in late 1931 
seventy-five  percent  of  Igualada’s  working  classes  were  enrolled  in  the  CNT.
28  The 
Igualada  CNT’s  activities  in  the  first  months  of  the  Republic  consisted  principally  of  
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concentrated verbal and written propaganda campaigns to expand the organization, and 
also entering into labour conflicts across all industries to gain new pay and conditions 
agreements, with all eight of the Local Federation’s constituent unions initiating strike 
activity in 1931.
29  
 
However, the level of dominance that the CNT initially enjoyed was to an extent illusory. 
By 1932, the organization began to lose members and suffer the effects of government 
repression. The effects of the factional split within the CNT movement would also play a 
decisive role, ultimately leading to a split in the local organization. A loss of enthusiasm on 
the part of the local workforce must also be considered an important factor in the decline in 
membership. By April 1932 the membership of the Local Federation had fallen to 3230 
members; by March 1933 it was as low as 1245.
30 As Vega highlights, this represents a 
seventy-five percent decline in membership from the June 1931 levels. The most marked 
decline was experienced by the textile union, the membership of which fell from 3700 
members in June 1931 to just 400 in March 1933.
31 Part of this decline, particularly in 
textiles and leather, can be attributed to the schism that took place in the Igualada CNT in 
1934.
32 The collapse in membership shows that, to a large extent, the CNT in Igualada was 
held together by a small nucleus of committed militants, who had only temporary success 
in  winning  the  bulk  of the  workforce  over  to  their  cause,  rather  than  the  organization 
enjoying committed widespread support. This was a state of affairs acknowledged and 
publicly lamented in El Sembrador in December 1933.
33 At the same time, however, for 
the local militants who witnessed this decline in their organization after both the decades 
they had committed to the organization and the initial, rapid expansion of it, the situation 
must have been particularly exasperating. Like militants all around Catalonia whose CNT 
organisms experienced the same setbacks, there must have been a temptation to look to 
exterior forces – above all competitors to the CNT – to blame.    
 
The Igualada CNT and their general perceptions of the UGT, 1931 to 1934 
 
Although the Igualada CNT did come into direct contact with a nascent local wing of the 
UGT over the course of the Second Republic, it is important to recognize that this more 
tangible type of contact was not the only way in which the Igualada CNT interacted with 
the UGT. As members of a national labour federation that articulated goals that had a 
nationwide impact it is also important to recognize that the Igualada cenetistas viewed the 
UGT and the CNT’s relationship with it as something of relevance far beyond the confines 
of their town.   
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El Sembrador’s stance on the UGT on the national level was to a very large extent the 
same as that of other CNT newspapers from across Spain which have been outlined earlier 
in this thesis. The following excerpt of an editorial from El Sembrador, referring to Largo 
Caballero –  who was used to personify  the UGT as  a  general entity  in El Sembrador 
attacks, in much the same way that he was in Solidaridad Obrera – serves as a good initial 
orientation of the line taken towards the UGT and its national figureheads throughout the 
period 1931 to 1934: 
 
We have known for some time about [Largo’s] actions and life. We know that he 
belongs  to  the  Unión  General  de  Trabajadores  (?),  and  that  he  is  one  of  its  key 
members. We are not ignorant of the reformist qualities of this organization, nor the 
bourgeois or reformist character that drives it. We remember the unconditional support 
provided by this gentleman during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. We do not know 
to exactly what height or depth his statist socialism permits him to go; because in the 
politics  of  the  state  moral  flexibility  is  so  dilated  that  anything  can  be  justified  or 
approved, no matter how unjustifiable it may appear.
34 
 
Like the rest of the CNT press, the anti-UGT line of El Sembrador would only intensify in 
the following months. The Telefónica strike of the summer of 1931 marked the first point 
that  the  UGT  on  the  general  level  came  under  sustained  attack  in  the  pages  of  El 
Sembrador. In line with Solidaridad Obrera’s interpretation of events, the UGT as a whole 
was  presented  as  intentionally  betraying  the  CNT.  In  the  midst  of  the  conflict,  El 
Sembrador advised its readers that ‘who takes the prize in the field of treachery is the 
UGT’.
35  
 
Like Solidaridad Obrera, El Sembrador argued that the socialists in government were out 
to crush the CNT and replace it with the UGT. The paper’s editorials made statements such 
as ‘by the order of a democratic government, the CNT will be made illegal because this 
suits the enxufistes of the UGT’.
36 Similarly, a May 1933 editorial spoke of CNT resistance 
to  ‘legislation  designed  to  destroy  our  labour  federation  to  favour  the  interests  of  the 
primates  of  socialism’.
37  Largo’s  jurados  mixtos  came  under  particularly  heavy  attack, 
being represented as a method of the socialist leadership to repress the CNT and receiving 
comparison with the arbitration schemes of Mussolini’s Italy.
38 These depictions of the 
UGT  on  the  national  level  remained  prominent  throughout  the  bienio  reformista  and 
continued after it, with the paper proclaiming Largo as ‘lackey of yesterday’s dictatorship 
and today ex-minister of the Republic’,
39 and blaming the UGT ministers’ activities in 
government for the rise of the right.
40    
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It is important to consider why the UGT on the national level was such a target for El 
Sembrador’s hostility. The most obvious answer, and certainly not an incorrect one, is that 
the UGT and its leaders were playing an important role in damaging the CNT through 
repression, and fully endorsed policies which were anathema to the CNT’s ideology, such 
as the jurados mixtos. However, this on its own is not a fully satisfactory explanation. As 
highlighted here, the vast majority of El Sembrador’s anti-UGT line was a replication of 
that which was produced in Solidaridad Obrera. It is unlikely that the local paper repeated 
Solidaridad Obrera’s line because local militants would have otherwise not been exposed 
to it. Nor is it the case that attacks on Largo Caballero and on the UGT as a whole were 
made because the Igualada CNT was experiencing any particularly acute local competition 
from the UGT. As will be discussed later, the local UGT movement, when it did begin in 
1932, was very small. Moreover, El Sembrador’s attacks on the UGT took place from 
virtually the first days of the Republic, before the UGT had even the smallest presence in 
the town. 
 
Rather, one of the key reasons the UGT as a national actor was given such heavy coverage 
in  the  Igualada  CNT’s  propaganda  is  due  to  the  pivotal  function  it  played  in  the 
organization’s  promotion  of  the  CNT  in  the  town.  The  UGT  when  presented  in  a 
generalized  fashion  in  cenetista  discourse  was  an  embodiment  of  everything  the  CNT 
opposed, and so served in the propaganda of the Igualada CNT as a negative counterpoint 
against which the CNT could be presented as the only valid representative of the working 
classes. This function is recurrent throughout the local paper’s articles that attacked the 
UGT. Articles in El Sembrador that argued that the UGT was attempting to destroy the 
CNT, such as its attacks on the Ley de Orden Público,
 also promoted the CNT as being 
synonymous with the working classes and referred to the CNT method of direct action as 
the only legitimate course of action.
 41 In an editorial entitled ‘Two Socialisms’ the UGT 
and  Largo  were  attacked  at  length,  before  providing  the  counterpoint  that  ‘we  are 
socialists,  but  anarchist-socialists.  We  possess  a  confederal  organism  of  libertarian 
tendency which truly represents the exploited class of Spain: the Confederación Nacional 
del Trabajo’.
42 Similarly, in August 1931, José Cuatrecases argued that 
 
in  parallel  to  the  repressive  methods  that  are  deployed  against  the  CNT,  the  UGT 
receives favourable treatment. Why? To divert the revolutionary spirit of the workers 
towards reformist causes. The Spanish proletariat, organized in the CNT, must move 
forward, in spite of  all  the repressions and all the crises that have been provoked, 
towards the destruction of the oppressive system.
43 
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The fact that such a heavy emphasis was placed on criticizing the UGT as part of an 
attempt to promote the CNT in a town with such a negligible UGT presence as Igualada 
demonstrates just how important a function the UGT on  a  general level played in the 
discourse of CNT militants. Even in Igualada, where the role of these attacks as a means of 
attacking a local UGT rival was largely redundant, the UGT was a key element of the local 
militants’ discourse. For the local cenetista militants the UGT on the general level was not 
just one of the key props of the system the CNT sought to overthrow; its mention was also 
a key method of asserting that the CNT was the only legitimate working class organization. 
Even in the areas of Catalonia that had the strongest historical connections to the CNT, the 
UGT – if only as a notional entity – was therefore deeply rooted in the consciousness and 
discourse of the local militants. 
 
The  Igualada  CNT’s  public  stance  on  the  question  of  alliances  was  also  a  direct  re-
articulation of Solidaridad Obrera’s stance on the matter. Joan Ferrer passed comment on 
several occasions on the issue of anti-fascist unity. In September 1933, for example, he 
opined  in  El  Sembrador  that  the  current  anti-fascist  unity  initiatives  were  unworkable 
because they were led by organizations that had proven themselves to be hostile to the 
CNT and workers.
44 Likewise, Ferrer also shared Solidaridad Obrera’s line that the CNT 
was not opposed to working with other members of the left, on the condition that this unity 
came about spontaneously and in the course of revolution:   
 
Revolutionary unity? For us it is no longer necessary that we be invited to a unity of 
this sort. Because we never fail. If a revolutionary movement does arise, they will meet 
us in the street. We make revolutionary unity at the foot of the barricade.
45 
 
Interactions between CNT and UGT grassroots in Igualada, 1931 to 1934 
 
Before examining the hostilities between the CNT and the UGT in Igualada after UGT 
unions started being founded in the town from 1932, it would be worthwhile to consider 
first the Igualada CNT’s more general position regarding workers who were seen to be 
dissenting from the Local Federation. Throughout the period stretching from the start of 
the  Republic  until  October  1934,  the  Igualada  CNT  on  various  occasions  ran  public 
campaigns which targeted non-unionized workers in a particular industry or workplace in a 
bid to force them to join the CNT. These campaigns typically entailed an initial naming 
and shaming of the targeted workers in El Sembrador, followed by the threat of some form 
of boycott. On 11
th July 1931, for example, the paper published the following warning to 
the employees of the Manuel Arolas electrical workshop:  
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We have invited [these] workers on more than three occasions to join our union and 
they have always refused. Since they refuse to cooperate in our syndical task, the least 
that us workers in the CNT can do is likewise refuse to cooperate in any works in 
which these workers are involved, which is to say: boycott them.
46  
 
Similarly, in January 1934, an article in El Sembrador attributed to ‘a group of waiters’ 
sent a warning out to the employees of a local bar who had left the CNT. Publishing the 
names of the individuals in question, the article warned them ‘not to forget that we have 
sufficient influence to have you replaced [in your jobs] with men more sensible and more 
willing to fulfil their duties to the workers’ cause’. The message ended with a warning to 
the bar owner that ‘a boycott of your establishment would be very appropriate for you if 
you try and provoke conflicts’.
47 As can be seen in these two examples, not joining the 
CNT was effectively equated with opposing it, and as such aggressive measures such as 
these  were  deemed  acceptable  to  counteract  reluctant  workers.  These  examples  also 
demonstrate  that  the  priority  for  CNT  organizers  was  to  recruit  workers  into  their 
organization  as  though  it  were  a  form  of  natural  obligation  for  the  working  classes, 
regardless of whether the workers in question endorsed the CNT’s principles or methods.  
 
The minutes of the Igualada CNT’s leather goods union also hint at the possibility that 
inflammatory accusations were even at times levelled at cenetistas by one another. At one 
meeting of the leather goods union, one CNT member was accused by another of ‘being 
stained with bad conduct and betrayal of [his] colleagues to the boss’.
48 At another meeting 
an argument erupted when it emerged that the father of two members of the union was 
working in the Casa Vich, a workplace which the CNT were boycotting. The sons of this 
individual attempted to defend their father, in the process finding themselves coming under 
attack from other militants.
49 In this particular case, family ties conflicted with union ones. 
Such incidents can only have alienated some workers from an organization in which they 
were the subject of accusations such as collaboration with the bourgeoisie.  
 
This combination of hostile campaigns directed at those who did not adhere to the CNT’s 
activities and the fact that individuals within the same union were prepared to accuse their 
fellow cenetistas of yellow practices suggests that in no small measure, due to the labour 
practices of the Igualada CNT and the attitudes of its individual members, a certain level of 
divisiveness  and  mistrust  was  present  amongst  workers  in  Igualada.  It  seems  highly 
probable that although the CNT was by some distance the strongest labour organization in 
Igualada,  this  status  was  maintained  at  a  cost  of  sectors  of  the  workforce  inevitably  
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harbouring some form of antipathy towards the organization, and others becoming a target 
of public criticism.  
 
The  first  instance  of  definite  CNT-UGT  interaction  in  Igualada  came  about  in  the 
construction industry. It stemmed from attempts by the CNT to regulate the control of the 
allocation  of  work  in  the  Igualada  building  trade  as  a  solution  to  the  widespread 
unemployment experienced by workers in this sector. The CNT initiated a scheme through 
which  work  would  be  distributed  evenly  amongst  workers  in  the  industry,  which  was 
formalized in an agreement negotiated with employers. However, nine workers attached to 
the Casa Cinto business refused to adhere to the CNT’s scheme, with the business refusing 
to  share  its  work  with  unemployed  cenetistas.
50  These  workers  had  previously  been 
members of the CNT.
51 A boycott in an attempt to marginalize these workers was made by 
the Local Federation of the CNT.
52 On 6
th February, the workers of the Casa Cinto who 
were  refusing  to  accept  the  CNT’s  work-sharing  scheme  were  named  publicly  in  El 
Sembrador, along with a full account of their ‘shameful’ activities.
53 Regular updates on 
the campaign against these workers were then published in the paper, including requests 
for readers to ‘comply as they should in the conflict against the Casa Cinto’.
54  
 
Initially, this campaign against the Casa Cinto began as much as one against the owner of 
the  company  as  it  was  the  workers  who  continued  to  work  for  him  and  in  so  doing 
undermined the CNT’s work-sharing scheme.
55 However, once the builders of the Casa 
Cinto  had  joined  the  UGT  by  February  1932  the  course  of  CNT-UGT  interactions  in 
Igualada took a markedly more tense turn, with the looming prospect of violence between 
cenetistas  and  the  ugetista  builders.
56  This  already  tense  situation  was  inflamed  even 
further when, in August 1932, a bricklayers’ strike was called in the town by the CNT over 
pay and conditions.
57 The UGT bricklayers ignored the call and continued to work, and 
UGT members from nearby Pobla de Claramunt were also brought in as strike-breakers.
58 
El Diari d’Igualada in its reporting of the strike indicated that more than one workplace 
remained operational due to UGT labour, raising the possibility that other workers outside 
the Casa Cinto joined the UGT so that they could continue to work.
59  
 
Unfortunately,  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  precise  details  of  incidents  of  physical 
confrontation between cenetistas and the ugetistas of the Casa Cinto; both parties made a 
series of accusations and counter-accusations of attempts at violence by their opponents. El 
Sembrador for its part refuted all accusations against cenetistas made by ugetistas via the 
pages of El Diari d’Igualada, whilst accusing the ugetistas of committing similar acts of  
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aggression.
60 For  example, in April 1932 the CNT publicly  accused the  local UGT of 
preparing to usher in an era of pistolerismo in the town, stating that ‘some strike-breakers 
from the UGT’ had acquired ammunition for pistols, for use against ‘the workers of the 
CNT’.
61  Nevertheless,  the  accusations  themselves  made  by  the  CNT  and  the  language 
employed in presenting the local ugetistas of the construction industry reveal much about 
the nature of interactions between the two groups. For example, a September 1932 edition 
of El Sembrador carried the following account of an altercation between cenetistas and 
ugetistas from the Casa Cinto at the height of the bricklayers’ strike: 
 
There was a light skirmish between a turncoat of the CNT, a professional esquirol 
affiliated to the trash of the Igualada UGT [and] worker at the Casa Cinto and a group 
of  our  comrades,  who  with  kind  words  informed  him  of  the  ignoble  role  he  was 
playing, which he answered with insulting arrogance. But what shows the rotten core 
of the ugetistas of this town is that following on from this event and over the course of 
the night, they waited near the home of an important comrade of ours with the benign 
intention of blowing his brains out.
62 
 
In the case of this incident it appears certain that some form of altercation did take place, 
given that the incident was reported to the police on behalf of the individuals in the UGT 
as an assault by the cenetistas.
63 However, the charges against the cenetistas were later 
dismissed in court, diminishing the likelihood that an actual assault took place.
64  
 
In December 1932 CNT-UGT hostilities reached their apex when there was an explosion 
in the premises of the  Local Federation of the CNT, apparently  at a time designed to 
coincide  with  a  meeting  of  the  CNT  construction  union.
65  In  covering  the  story  in  El 
Sembrador, Joan Ferrer conveyed the indignation of the local cenetistas, presenting the 
incident  as  a  continuation  of  a  historical  campaign  of  terrorism  against  the  CNT 
perpetrated  by  ‘enemies  of  ours  in  the  form  of  workers,  but  in  reality  traitors  to  our 
cause’.
66 The culprits were specifically identified by the paper as ‘mental deficients’ and ‘a 
gang of ugetistas’ whom the CNT’s construction union had already reported to the police 
for their links to an armourer.
67  
 
The  interactions  between  the  CNT  and  the  UGT  in  the  construction  industry  were 
undoubtedly the most high-profile and intense of the CNT-UGT interactions in Igualada, 
with  the  dispute  with  the  Casa  Cinto  workers,  intensified  greatly  by  the  town’s 
bricklayers’  strike,  running  on  from  the  spring  of  1932  into  1933.  The  nature  of  the 
cenetistas’ stance over the nascent UGT and its activities in the construction industry was a 
curious  mixture  of  rhetorical  and  physical  aggression  and  also  victimhood.  Whilst  no  
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explicit message was made that the UGT nucleus in construction should be destroyed, the 
nature of the CNT’s attacks and the emphasis on the yellow, violent and anti-working 
classes nature of these workers made it clear that this was their intention, even if it was not 
formulated into a definite plan of attack. Moreover, it is clear that the cenetistas were 
willing to confront physically ugetistas at their workplaces and in the street to prevent 
them working and to intimidate them with the goal of breaking their allegiance to the 
UGT. At the same time, however, much of the discourse on the construction workers was 
focused on illustrating their anti-CNT – and by extension anti-worker – violence. In doing 
this, the CNT-UGT conflict in construction was presented as a case of ugetistas in fact 
waging a campaign of violence to extinguish the CNT, this violence being presented as 
‘[their] only possible argument against the workers of the CNT’.
68 In effect, the local UGT 
was presented as pistoleros and strike-breakers cut from exactly the same cloth as the 
Sindicatos  Libres,  with  direct  comparisons  at  times  being  made.
69  Although  the  truth 
behind the accusations of violence on either side is difficult to establish, there does appear 
to have been a degree of weight to the general accusations of yellow practices on the part 
of the UGT construction workers, given their refusal to participate in the work sharing 
agreement, their subsequent role as strike-breakers in a local construction dispute, as well 
as the further provocation of the use of UGT workers from outside Igualada as strike-
breakers in the town. 
 
The other main area in which the CNT came to interact with the UGT during the Second 
Republic  was  in  the  printing  industry.  In  late  April  1933,  it  was  announced  in  El 
Sembrador that the town’s print workers had joined the UGT.
70 In addition to attacking the 
printers, the decision was also taken to boycott the local print works, and from henceforth 
El  Sembrador  was  printed  in  Manresa.
71  By  any  measure,  this  decision  to  boycott 
immediately the local print works because its employees had joined the UGT was a drastic 
course of action, and demonstrates the lengths to which the local CNT militancy were 
willing  to  go  to  prevent  the  spread  of  the  UGT.  An  important  difference  between  the 
defection of the printers to the UGT and the incidents in the construction trade was that on 
this occasion the printers for a time defected en masse, rather than a minority of them 
joining the UGT whilst the CNT continued to dominate the industry.
72 The circumstances 
of their departure were therefore different, and not based around a dissident minority who 
could be accused of strikebreaking. And yet the Igualada CNT’s reaction to the defection 
of  the  printers  was  of  equal  vehemence.  El  Sembrador  informed  its  readers  that  ‘the 
employees of Igualada’s printworks have joined the UGT, the union of strikebreaking.  
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These “workers”, who suffer from the defects of Carlism, Catholicism, vileness and others 
besides, want to honour the ranks of Spanish socialism with their useless presence’.
73 
 
The ugetistas in this sector were sufficiently well organized and connected to the regional 
UGT hierarchy as to have published information about their battle with the cenetistas in 
the  UGT’s  regional  paper  Cataluña  Obrera.  It  is  therefore  possible  to  gauge  their 
interpretation of events more accurately than in the case of the construction industry. And 
in the judgement of these ugetistas, they were locked in a battle to free themselves from a 
tyrannical  organization  that  would  resort  to  any  measure  to  force  them  to  join  it.  The 
ugetista  print  workers  recounted  that  ‘such  is  the  phobia  that  dominates  their  [the 
cenetistas’] minds, they have had no qualms about using all different types of coercion to 
try  and  win  over  the  print  workers.’  The  print  workers  went  on  to  describe  how 
representatives of the CNT attempted to enter into negotiations and also threatened the 
bosses of the town’s print works to make their employees join the CNT. According to this 
account  the  pressure  applied  by  the  bosses  to  make  these  workers  join  the  CNT  only 
resulted in them joining the UGT en masse. It could not be argued in this situation, then, 
that  the  decision  of  these  workers  to  join  the  UGT  was  one  done  as  a  measure  of 
collaboration  with  the  bourgeoisie,  as  could  be  argued  in  the  case  of  the  construction 
industry. These ugetistas also argued that ‘unfortunately for [the workers in Igualada not 
yet in the UGT] they let themselves be dominated by the coercion that they suffer on a 
daily basis at the hands of these ominous and lying anarcho-syndicalists’.
74  
 
What is perhaps most intriguing about the printers joining the UGT was the reaction of the 
CNT to the speedy return of the printers of one print works to the CNT fold. This was an 
event which seems to have come about through pressure exerted by the CNT on the bosses 
of the business, and is also a fairly clear demonstration of the overall dynamic in Catalonia, 
discussed in chapter five, of the CNT being able to prevent the growth of the UGT in the 
region. Having decried the printers as traitors and enemies of the working classes, the 
Igualada CNT took a triumphalist stance over the return of a portion of these workers to 
the CNT: 
 
The workers of the Miranda printworks (we don’t know if of their own free will or 
through the urging of their bourgeois, though it is likely to be the latter), have sought to 
join  our  organization.  The  graphic  arts  workers,  who  have  little  enthusiasm  for 
defending  themselves  through  their  own  effort  (due  to  their  selfish  mentality)  had 
trusted their desires for improvement in the enchufistas in the UGT. We would like to 
advise the workers of the Miranda printworks that it would be very uncharitable of 
them to affiliate to the CNT for solely selfish, material reasons.
75   
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The reaction of the CNT militants to the print workers rejoining the CNT also suggests that 
the hostility to the UGT in this case was based around sectarian, organizational rivalry 
more than it was around any ideological principle. The Igualada cenetistas were adamant 
that the print workers, including those who had opted to join the CNT from the UGT, were 
traitors to the working classes and reactionaries; yet they still elected to admit them to their 
organization. For an organization that presented itself as the only possible representative of 
the  revolutionary  working  classes,  the  admission  of  such  suspect  characters  seems 
somewhat  incongruous,  and  points  to  the  likelihood  that  for  the  Igualada  CNT  the 
recruitment of members of the local workforce against their will was seen as a legitimate 
method of building their organization.  
 
In common with other CNT organisms in Catalonia, the cenetistas of Igualada linked their 
attacks on local UGT rivals to wider discourses on the UGT that were produced by the 
anarcho-syndicalist movement. For example, the idea that the UGT in Catalonia was a 
replacement for the Sindicatos Libres served to prejudge and undermine the legitimacy of 
these local rivals before any account of their actions was given. It was announced that 
while  the  print  workers  had  adhered  to  ‘the  UGT,  the  union  of  strike-breakers’;  these 
‘cowards’  had  historically  belonged  to  ‘the  Sindicato  Libre  or  the  fiefdom  of  Largo 
Caballero, according to the circumstances’.
76 The broader discourse on the UGT was used 
to provide proof of the dangerousness of these local rivals that did not require an account 
of  their  actions  locally.  It  was,  in  effect,  used  for  ad  hominem  attacks  on  the  local 
ugetistas. 
 
The  local  cenetistas  viewed  the  implantation  of  a  UGT  entity  in  Igualada  as  being  a 
product of their wider interpretation of the UGT on the national level having an agenda of 
attempting to impose the UGT in areas where it had no influence. Joan Ferrer recounts that 
the  attempt  to  set  up  the  UGT  in  Igualada  was  spearheaded  by  outsiders  who  were 
historically unconnected to the local workers’ movement. Noting that Manuel Villar, the 
local UGT leader, was a Galician with no knowledge of Catalan,
77 Ferrer also states that 
‘with Vila Cuenca [regional leader of the UGT in Catalonia] and a few print worker lads 
who we would like to believe acted in good faith, Villar had started the “Igualada” UGT, 
taking  as  for  its  base,  its  “masses”,  the  strike  breakers  of  the  Casa  Cinto’.
78  Ferrer 
maintains in his memoir that towards the UGT the population of Igualada had always been 
‘indifferent,  if  not  averse’.
79  These  accusations  were  also  made  in  the  pages  of  El 
Sembrador with reference to the Casa Cinto dispute, with the paper claiming the affiliation  
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of these workers to the UGT was a result of the direct intervention of Vila Cuenca, referred 
to as ‘the viceroy of the UGT in Catalonia’ in the dispute.
80 
 
Cenetistas in the leather industry also viewed the emergence of the UGT in the town as 
some form of manoeuvre enacted by those outside the local workers’ movement with a 
view to challenging the CNT. Their discussion of this matter stemmed from a boycott 
campaign  they  ran  against  the  Casa  Vich  workshop,  during  the  course  of  which  a 
contingent of workers, who had formerly been members of the CNT, began to work in the 
Casa Vich, against the instructions of the CNT.
81 The militants of the CNT’s leather union 
were  concerned  that  these  individuals  had  some  connection  to  an  emerging  UGT 
movement in the town. In turn, they saw this local UGT movement as linked to wider 
attempts by the local bourgeoisie and the UGT in general to implant the UGT in the town. 
At a meeting of the union on 20
th April 1932, José Rios, who was one of the men who was 
charged with the alleged assault on the UGT builders, in discussing the case of the Casa 
Vich alluded to ‘individuals that act in the UGT’ who were ‘traitors of the working class’.
82 
Another militant in explaining the presence of a local UGT organism argued that it was a 
‘vehicle of Largo Caballero’.
83  
 
This position of viewing the UGT in Igualada as a product of individuals from outside the 
town who were connected to the local bourgeoisie and the regional and national UGT 
hierarchy was a product of the local CNT’s presentation of itself, as discussed previously, 
as a movement with which the local working classes had a strong historical and spiritual 
bond, whilst also arguing that all other union movements that had been attempted in the 
town were a product of outside forces that had intentions of undermining the emancipation 
of  the  working  classes.  This  rationale  on  the  CNT’s  part  is  to  a  substantial  degree 
invalidated  by  the  fact  that  the  local  CNT,  through  methods  such  as  boycotting  of 
businesses where workers would not affiliate to the CNT, attempted to ensure that no 
movement other than the CNT could emerge locally. Those who dissented from the CNT 
were subject to public attack; under such circumstances it was inevitable that a separate 
union movement could not have been produced locally. Indeed, the local militants had in 
certain respects operated as what could be considered ‘outside influences’ within certain 
sectors of the local working classes. The case of the print workers was a clear-cut piece of 
outside interference. The campaign against these workers, all of whom defected from the 
CNT, was not initiated by cenetista print workers, of which there were none at this point. 
The pressure exerted on the management of the print works further emphasizes the CNT’s 
role as an outside influence in this instance to recruit members.  
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Moreover, Joan Ferrer and the other local cenetistas’ premise that the initial organization 
of a UGT entity in Igualada by outsiders automatically invalidated the UGT as a legitimate 
local union also requires closer scrutiny. For in making this assertion, the local militants 
betrayed much about their understanding of what rights and agency individuals had to 
choose their union affiliation. The cenetistas appear to have somewhat illogically reasoned 
that,  just  because  the  first  steps  to  organize  the  UGT  were  taken  by  individuals  not 
historically connected to the local working class labour movement, this meant that the 
individuals who chose to join this movement and break away from the CNT were not 
entitled to make or capable of making a decision to affiliate to that movement themselves. 
The case of the print workers in particular demonstrates that there was a definite local 
agency amongst certain local workers to join the UGT, rather than them somehow being 
co-opted or tricked by outsiders into doing so. However, the leading CNT militants did not 
view the local working classes as entitled to make their own choices as to which labour 
organization they joined.  
 
After October 1934 
 
Following the October 1934 uprising, the Igualada CNT entered into a period of greatly 
reduced activity until the end of the bienio negro. Even before October, however, the CNT 
in Igualada had become a shadow of its former self, ravaged by a collapse in membership 
and  the  effects  of  the  factional  schism.
84  After  the  end  of  the  bienio  negro,  the  local 
organization  began  to  rebuild,  though  not  with  as  great  a  momentum  as  it  had  at  the 
beginning of the Second Republic. The organization was reduced to a single union as late 
as January 1936; El Sembrador never returned to publication. The level of documentary 
evidence relating to the Igualada CNT and the local workers’ movement more generally is 
far scarcer in this period of the immediate pre-war than for either the wartime period or the 
first years of the Second Republic. It is particularly difficult to put together a detailed 
picture of either the local UGT or the CNT’s interactions with it. Indeed, the local CNT’s 
main rivalry was against the autonomous unions in the town, in particular those with links 
to the POUM and which had been formed as a result of the factional schism that had beset 
the  CNT  earlier  in  the  Republic.  Through  Solidaridad  Obrera  and  other  papers,  local 
militants  wrote  of  the  threat  that  these  organisms  posed  to  the  unity  of  the  working 
classes.
85  
 
What can be ascertained, however, is the Igualada CNT’s participation in the process that 
began in Catalonia in January 1936 to change the CNT’s national-level stance towards the  
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UGT to one of calling publicly for Alianza Revolucionaria. The Igualada CNT sent Joan 
Ferrer to this congress – though it is not known if the organization had held a meeting 
beforehand to agree positions on the items on the agenda, as was the case with many other 
CNT organisms – and the minutes of the congress record Ferrer as arguing that ‘a pact 
with  the  UGT  is  necessary,  but  with  the  formal  agreement  of  moving  towards  the 
destruction of capitalism and the state’, with this agreement taking place ‘on the national 
level’.
86 In other words, the Igualada CNT’s position on the matter of CNT-UGT alliance 
was closely matched to the position agreed upon by the regional congress, as well as the 
later agreement reached on the matter in Zaragoza. What this position held by the Igualada 
CNT reveals about the local organization, especially when taken into consideration with 
their violently hostile line against the UGT on the general level during the period 1931 to 
1934,  is  that  the  local  militants  largely  followed  the  prevailing  trends  within  the 
organization with regards to their position on the UGT on the national level. Previously, 
the  local  militants  had  enthusiastically  endorsed  and  replicated  the  anti-UGT  line  of 
Solidaridad Obrera; now they were following the prevailing line of promoting a fairly 
undefined notion of a ‘national’ revolutionary alliance with the UGT on the condition that 
it was for the purpose of revolution and libertarian anti-state ends.  
 
The little documentation on the Igualada CNT in 1935 and early 1936 makes it difficult to 
say  with  certainty  whether  the  local  militants  had  undergone  this  shift  in  stance 
independently of the rest of the CNT in the region, or whether they simply followed the 
line put forward by García Oliver and his allies. However, an article written by Joan Ferrer 
in Terra Lliure just before the regional congress would suggest it was the latter. In the 
article Ferrer set out his opinion on ‘united fronts, syndical unity and workers’ alliances’. 
Ferrer did not attack the UGT, arguing that it was one of the two ‘traditional’ strands of the 
Spanish  labour  movement.  However,  Ferrer’s  overriding  argument  was  that  alliance 
initiatives were the preserve of communist movements, who used them to divide the unity 
of the working classes. Exactly what Ferrer’s thinking on CNT-UGT relations was prior to 
the  regional  congress  is  therefore  somewhat  ambiguous.  On  the  one  hand  his  ideas 
correspond to those that would prevail at the congress of instructing all workers to join the 
CNT or the UGT; yet at the same time he hardly seemed to be endorsing the idea of an 
alliance between the two organizations.
87 Given that Ferrer showed little inclination to 
promote  a  CNT-UGT  alliance,  and  indeed  questioned  the  intentions  of  pro-alliance 
campaigns,  it  would  therefore  seem  likely  that  the  Igualada  CNT’s  stance  on  national 
CNT-UGT relations was at root one of siding with the regional consensus on the matter. 
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It does not appear that the Igualada CNT in early 1936 adopted an as aggressively sectarian 
stance as it had between 1931 and 1934. Although the local movement was critical of the 
autonomous unions of the town, it did not run the sorts of campaigns against them as it had 
done to UGT unions or workers who refused to join the CNT. Indeed, the CNT’s leather 
union actually cooperated with its autonomous-poumista counterpart in a conflict against 
employers  that  took  place  over  the  course  of  the  spring  of  1936.  From  April  the 
autonomous and CNT leather goods unions began to draw up a new set of pay and working 
conditions for leather goods workers in Igualada. In May the conditions were presented to 
the  Employers’  Association.  An  agreement  was  not  forthcoming,  and  so  a  strike  was 
called. The formulation of the workers’ demands and the subsequent labour dispute were 
handled jointly by the CNT and the autonomous unions. In May and June public meetings 
arranged jointly by the CNT and the autonomous union were held in Igualada.
88 
 
However, this instance of cooperation should not be viewed as indicative of a fundamental 
shift in stance with regards to the primacy the local CNT viewed itself as having over the 
local  union  movement.  Through  its  notices  in  Solidaridad  Obrera,  local  militants 
continued to attack the leaders of the local autonomous unions and the POUM movement 
with which they were associated, arguing repeatedly that through not rejoining the CNT 
they were damaging worker unity in the town.
89 At the same time, the few references the 
local  militants  made  to  the  local  UGT  –  whose  members  continued  to  be  in  the 
construction and printing industries – were not indicative of any efforts to reconcile with a 
rival, even if they suggested a certain acceptance that the local CNT was not in a position 
to stop them. In March the CNT construction union agreed to exclude the Casa Cinto 
workers from their attempts to renegotiate bases for the industry with employers.
90 In July, 
the  militants  mocked  the  efforts  of  the  UGT  print  workers  to  bring  about  improved 
working conditions in their industry, suggesting that their adherence to the jurados mixtos 
was holding them back.
91 Just two months earlier, they had accused the UGT printers of 
attempting to prevent workers from joining the CNT, an accusation that is unfortunately 
impossible to verify.
92 Even if the Igualada CNT had endorsed the idea of a national CNT-
UGT alliance, and likewise cooperated with a rival union in a labour dispute, it would 
appear that its leading militants still held the same attitude, on the eve of the war, that the 
CNT was the only legitimate entity in the town. 
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Conclusions 
 
Overall, the experience of the Igualada CNT during the Second Republic was similar to the 
overall trajectory of the CNT in Catalonia during these years. This was as much the case 
with its growth, decline and factional squabbles as it was with its stance on the UGT. At all 
times throughout the Republic, the militants of the Igualada CNT closely followed the 
prevailing consensus of the rest of the organization in Catalonia. The endorsement of the 
anti-UGT line between 1931 and 1934, as we have seen, suited the Igualada CNT, serving 
as a rhetorical device through which it could promote itself to the working classes of the 
town. The stance of the Igualada CNT on national level CNT-UGT relations in 1936 shows 
the  extent  of  the  detachment  between  the  national  and  local  levels  of  UGT  activity 
amongst cenetistas in Catalonia. The CNT in Igualada had only exhibited hostility to the 
local UGT movement, viewing it as reactionary and anti-worker, yet at the same time its 
members were prepared to endorse a national-level volte face on the UGT.  
 
With regard to the Igualada CNT’s interactions with the UGT in the town, it is clear that, 
throughout  the  Republic  and  even  on  the  eve  of  the  war,  the  local  cenetistas  had  an 
unwavering belief in the unique place they felt that their organization held in the town, 
based on what they saw as a deep historical and spiritual bond with the local working 
classes. Their commitment to the CNT was not just based around the ideological posits of 
anarcho-syndicalism, but was in fact also deeply rooted in the specific role of the CNT in 
Igualada and the years of commitment of local militants to the movement. Joan Ferrer and 
his fellow militants were also spurred on by the past successes of the CNT in organizing 
the local workforce, particularly in 1919, not to mention the initial influx of workers into 
the CNT in 1930 and 1931. 
 
It is this combination of factors that explain the lengths to which the Igualada cenetistas 
would go to enrol workers in their organization and to fend off what they saw as the 
‘outside’ threats of other possible organized labour movements in the town. The cenetistas 
held the belief that it was the basic obligation of workers in the town to be in the CNT. 
And although an impressively large number of workers enrolled in the CNT at the start of 
the Republic, merely acquiring a membership card and having a deep commitment to the 
ideals, principles and methods of the organization were two different things. This conflict 
between cenetista expectations and the actual commitment of the workforce as a whole to 
the CNT led the local CNT movement to adopt highly strong-arm measures against those 
who did not conform to their expectations through the running of public boycotts and  
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naming-and-shaming campaigns. At the same time, even those who were in the CNT could 
potentially find themselves pilloried if they were seen to have a loyalty that conflicted with 
their duties as a CNT member.   
 
These  different  layers  of  the  Igualada  CNT’s  interactions  with  the  UGT  were  a  key 
ingredient in the recipe for disaster that was the relationship between the labour federations 
during the war. The Igualada CNT would enter the conflict with a nominal support for the 
idea of alliance with the UGT on the national level, yet in their own locality only regarded 
the UGT with suspicion, often attempting to exclude it from the political and economic 
administration  of  the  town.  At  the  same  time,  the  aggressive  stance  adopted  by  the 
Igualada cenetistas earlier in the Republic helps suggest that there were likely to have been 
workers who were rather reluctantly in the CNT or who would become alienated from it. 
In the context of compulsory union membership during the war, this legacy of divisions 
and hostilities undoubtedly contributed to the mutual antipathy that characterized relations 
between the CNT and the UGT in the town during the war, not to mention the rapid growth 
of the socialist labour federation in the town.
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Conclusions 
 
General conclusions 
 
The CNT entered the Republic with a hostile stance towards the UGT; on the eve of the 
Civil War the organization was, by and large, rapidly on its way to returning to that very 
same position. In spite of the monumental events of October 1934 and the effects they had 
on turning the left towards voicing pro-unity positions, viewing the peacetime Republic as 
a  whole,  and  notwithstanding  notable  exceptions,  in  particular  the  Asturian  CNT,  the 
forces that exercised a  most influential role in the CNT – its leading  militants and its 
newspapers – not to mention significant sectors of its grassroots militants, retained the 
same basic stance of viewing the UGT, both in terms of its leaders and its unions, as rivals 
and even enemies. 
 
The hostilities that characterized much of the interactions between the CNT and the UGT 
during the Second Republic, at both national and grassroots levels, were not the product of 
the CNT’s decision-making processes. It was only when considering the ideas of alliance 
with the UGT that a position on the socialist labour federation was discussed; the rest of 
the time, the attacks on the UGT that appeared in the CNT press and the hostilities between 
the organizations’ unions were not a pre-meditated strategy. To a significant extent, they 
were  simply  carried  over  from  the  previous  decade,  though  admittedly  intensified 
substantially by the events of the first years of the Republic, and above all by the socialists’ 
legislation and their apparent complicity in government repression of the CNT. Although 
the hostile stance of the CNT during this period was based to a significant extent around 
both these events and differences of theoretical underpinnings and principles and different 
approaches to industrial relations, it is clear that they were also based around a much more 
emotive set of criteria, most notably the entrenched idea that socialists were ‘traitors’ and 
had the intent of undermining the working-classes. Guided by such sentiments, the CNT 
and  its  militants  by  default  adopted  a  resolute  hostility  towards  the  UGT,  making  the 
formulation  of  an  anti-UGT  stance  take  place  outside  of  the  organization’s  decision-
making procedures. 
 
What did fundamentally change between 1931 and 1936, however, was the willingness of 
the CNT to enter the fray of voicing a pro-unity position on the national level as part of its 
organizational  strategy,  just  as  the  other  organizations  of the  left had  started to do, to 
greater or lesser extents, in different fashions and with different degrees of opportunism,  
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from 1933 and 1934. Somewhat perversely, the discourse of unity was one of the key 
vehicles through which the rivalries between the different organizations of the Republic 
attacked one another during the Civil War; the precedents for championing unity in this 
way must be seen as having been established in the pre-war period. For the CNT, however, 
its use of the unity question immediately prior to the war would have especially important 
ramifications during the conflict; throughout the CNT would make a great deal of use of 
the idea of alliance with the UGT as it attempted to navigate the treacherous political 
waters of the wartime Republic.   
 
Although there were sectors of the CNT who promoted the idea of alliance with the UGT 
because they viewed an alliance of the two labour federations as being a necessary pre-
requisite for either the overthrow of capitalism or a defence against fascism, the CNT’s 
moves  towards  a  pro-alliance  position  were  in  fact  the  product  of  factions  within  the 
movement who had never adopted such a perspective. Instead, they viewed the idea of 
unity  as  something  that  could  be  exploited  to  boost  the  popularity  of  the  CNT  at  the 
expense of the UGT. That the CNT could produce a formal position on alliance that was in 
reality designed to undermine the organization at which the alliance was ostensibly aimed, 
especially  considering  that  there  were  in  fact  genuine  pro-alliance  sectors  in  the 
organization and that by the admission of leading cenetistas workers in general seemed to 
be enthused by the idea of unity, illustrates the bankruptcy of the CNT’s decision-making 
process. The organization, both in 1934 and 1936, produced positions that were designed 
to appear as being in favour of alliance with the UGT, and were in part designed to placate 
those in the movement who were, but which in reality served to mask an anti-alliance 
agenda of the dominant factions of the organization. To a large extent, this state of affairs 
was  due  to  the  Catalan  CNT  having  a  decisive  influence  over  the  organization  at  the 
national level. The Catalan CNT was the most virulently anti-UGT region of the anarcho-
syndicalist movement, and yet it played a decisive role in determining the stance that the 
national movement took on the UGT throughout the Second Republic.  
 
Even before the UGT’s own handling of CNT-UGT interactions is fully taken into account, 
it is clear the CNT and the UGT were overall no closer to any meaningful unity in July 
1936 than they had been in 1931. The only major difference was that by July 1936 both the 
CNT and the UGT publicly spoke in favour of the idea of unity of the organizations of the 
left. Some sectors within the CNT certainly were in favour of reaching an alliance with the 
UGT, as undoubtedly were many ordinary workers, but their position had effectively been 
neutered by the pro-alliance posturing that the Catalan CNT imposed on the organization.  
 
230
In Catalonia, CNT militants at the helm of unions and local federations, not to mention the 
elite militants of the region, generally took the view during the Republic – a view that was 
expressed frequently to the workers of the region – that their opposite numbers in the UGT 
were the embodiment of a yellow, reactionary unionism that was designed to destroy the 
CNT and the workers’ movement. Although the Catalan UGT has not been the primary 
focus of the research presented here, this thesis has highlighted that the CNT’s depiction of 
the UGT in the region  was a misleading one,  with the organization being much more 
similar to the UGT elsewhere in Spain in the respect that it was not simply a haven for 
yellow  workers,  but  to  a  large  extent  was  driven  by  workers  who  bought  into  the 
‘management  unionism’  model,  in  the  process  leading  them  into  conflicts  with  the 
strongest CNT presence in Spain. 
 
The cenetistas of Catalonia adopted their stance against the Catalan UGT because, at root, 
they believed that the CNT was the only legitimate workers’ organization in Catalonia and 
also viewed the CNT and the working classes as synonymous. As the study of Igualada 
above all demonstrates, this belief was a result, as much as any ideological commitment, to 
the unwavering dedication of cenetistas to building up a local movement in their milieu, a 
commitment in many cases that stretched back to the 1910s and/or had forced operating in 
clandestinity  or  even  jail  or  exile  upon  them.  This  belief  empowered  cenetistas  in 
Catalonia, between 1931 and 1934 to attempt, in effect, to eradicate the UGT from the 
region, recurrently making use of practices such as boycotts and verbal threats against 
workers seeking to join the UGT and disruptions of meetings, not to mention running a 
sustained campaign through CNT propaganda to depict the Catalan UGT as nothing more 
than a haven for pistoleros and vehicle for Largo Caballero’s attempts to destroy the CNT. 
The  extent  of  militant  consensus  on  this  approach  was  such  that  as  a  practice  it  was 
widespread and routine – almost a reflex action towards the creation of UGT rivals – but 
was not the product of any formal strategy created in the movement’s decision-making 
process. As much as any factors cited in existing studies of the workers’ movement for the 
failure of the UGT amongst workers in Catalonia – a perception that to an extent needs 
questioning, given the growth of the organization throughout the Republic – such as the 
unsuitability of employer-worker relations in industrialized Catalonia to UGT methods, it 
is also the case that a significant factor in the (relative lack of) growth of the UGT in the 
region was the campaign undertaken by cenetistas to marginalize UGT organisms. 
 
Whilst such sectarian tactics were generally not adopted in 1936, due to the looming threat 
of a full conflict with the right leading to a recognition that physical sectarian confrontation  
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against workers would be deeply damaging to wider working-class interests, CNT militants 
in Catalonia still held fundamentally the same view that the UGT was an illegitimate entity 
in Catalonia. That they did so, when considered in conjunction with the fact that it was 
these militants that had variously formulated, actively endorsed or agreed to go along with 
a plan for proposing a national alliance with the UGT, illustrates the true intentions of the 
alliance proposal they drew up in early 1936. 
 
However, in spite of the hatred of the UGT expressed by cenetistas in Catalonia, it is clear 
that the UGT – and especially the anarcho-syndicalist construction of the UGT – served a 
crucial function for the anarcho-syndicalist movement. The presentation of the UGT – on 
the national level as attempting to destroy the workers’ movement, and in the region as 
being a haven for reactionary gunmen – was used heavily to attempt to mobilize workers 
behind the CNT’s cause, as well as serving as something of an ‘anti-CNT’ through the 
depiction  of  which  the  CNT  could  be  presented  as  the  only  legitimate  workers’ 
organization, and indeed the only entity that would save workers from this reactionary 
menace. Even in Igualada, a town with no UGT presence until 1932, and probably fewer 
than one hundred members until the outbreak of the war, the CNT movement made heavy 
use of its construction of the UGT to mobilize workers behind the CNT.  
 
The CNT and the UGT in the Civil War 
 
It almost goes without saying that the outbreak of the Civil War had a profound effect on 
the Second Republic, with the state’s existence becoming defined by its struggle against 
the nationalists and its positioning all over the world as the international focal point of the 
battle against fascism. The war also had equally profound consequences for the two labour 
federations,  and  especially  the  CNT.  Quite  apart  from  the  implications  of  the  Social 
Revolution undertaken by the CNT in Catalonia and other regions and the organization’s 
initial hegemony in Catalonia, not to mention its allegiance to a state that it had for so long 
railed against, both the CNT and the UGT found, on a practical level, that their everyday 
roles  changed  completely.  Having  been  vehicles  for  protecting  workers  in  a  capitalist 
system, the labour federations found themselves playing a pivotal role in the management 
of the Republic’s economy and wartime production. Whilst this thesis cannot provide a full 
account of CNT-UGT interactions during the wartime, especially with regard to Catalonia, 
where the configuration of the left changed so rapidly, it can highlight that, crucially, there 
were  important  continuities  between  the  pre-war  period  and  the  war  which  to  a  very  
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significant extent conditioned how the CNT interacted with the UGT between July 1936 
and the end of the conflict. 
 
The  most  fundamental  aspect  of  the  CNT’s  relationship  with  the  UGT  that  has  its 
foundations in the pre-war years was that, with the exception of its very first months, the 
CNT  adopted  throughout  the  war  a  national-level  strategy  of  publicly  promoting  an 
alliance with the UGT. In the first two months of the war, the CNT press temporarily went 
quiet on the matter of alliance with the UGT. With the CNT at this point occupying a 
pivotal role in the defence of the Republic and the mobilization of militias against the 
Nationalists, the CNT in Catalonia was as coherent and secure a force as the state or any 
other organization. Moreover, the movement in its stronghold and birthplace was firmly 
engaged in furthering the Social Revolution that it had set in train during the first days of 
the uprising. Although privately some leading CNT figures felt wary that this position 
would be eclipsed, the public position adopted was nevertheless one of viewing Social 
Revolution as the method through which the war would be fought.
1 This meant that, in 
these first few months, the anarcho-syndicalists did not promote an alliance with the UGT. 
However, its response to the situation was grounded in one important premise of the pre-
war months, namely that the ongoing execution of the Social Revolution would be carried 
out through the convergence of all workers into the CNT and the UGT, which would in 
turn  ensure  that  political  organizations  would  be  swept  away.  The  CNT’s  newspapers 
argued that the Spanish working classes would ‘through their own free and spontaneous 
determination join together in one of the two existing federations: the UGT or CNT.’
2 This 
would ultimately fulfil the anarcho-syndicalist movement’s long-term goal that political 
parties ‘will all have to disband. Because politics, once the fascist insurrection has been 
defeated, will no longer have a reason to exist’.
3 In the first months of the war, then, the 
CNT’s outlook on the future of what it presented as an enduring Social Revolution was 
grounded in the ideas regarding workers joining the CNT and the UGT that had been 
presented  by  García  Oliver  and  his  allies  in  Catalonia  at  the  January  1936  regional 
congress. 
 
However, later in September, the Zaragoza Alianza Revolucionaria proposal was brought 
back into the CNT’s public message in response to the political manoeuvring that took 
place over the formation of a new government. Having played such a fundamental role in 
foiling the July uprising, bringing the movement a leading position in Catalonia, there were 
concerns  amongst  the  leadership  that  the  formation  of  a  government  with  socialist, 
communist and Republican participation in the context of the Republican state recovering  
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from its initial meltdown would put the brakes on the Social Revolution. An alliance of the 
CNT and the UGT was thus proposed by the CNT as a direct alternative to a Popular Front 
government, much as the Catalan CNT had hoped to present a revolutionary CNT-UGT 
alliance as an alternative to the Popular Front coalition in early 1936. A CNT plenum 
agreed to propose a ‘National Defence Council’ as an alternative to Largo’s cabinet, which 
would be dominated by the CNT and the UGT. The September plenum formulated the 
following position: 
 
The  CNT  proposed  the  revolutionary  alliance  at  its  Zaragoza  Congress.  Today  it 
redoubles its efforts towards this and believes that if the Confederación Nacional del 
Trabajo and the UGT do not understand one another the Revolution will be diverted off 
course and fail. Spain cannot be led by party politics in these decisive moments, but only 
by a national bloc of those who are struggling at the front and in the rearguard.
4 
 
In  addition  to  the  formulation  of  this  stance  by  the  leadership,  Solidaridad  Obrera 
published  editorials  to  promote  the  ideas  of  a  National  Defence  Council  and  a 
revolutionary  alliance  between  the  CNT  and  the  UGT.
5  However,  the  initiative  was 
rejected by both the UGT leadership and the rest of the Republican side, and the CNT 
ultimately  agreed  to  join  Largo’s  government  alongside  PSOE,  PCE  and  Republican 
politicians.
6 
  
However, what was in the autumn of 1936 essentially a gambit by a relatively bullish CNT 
evolved over the course of the war into a prop on which the CNT increasingly relied to try 
and  maintain  some  form  of  influence  in  the  governing  of  the  Republic.  In  1937  the 
Republican side’s public façade of unity in the face of a common enemy would unravel. 
Against a backdrop of setbacks at home and in the diplomatic arena, an ever escalating war 
of words broke out amongst the different organizations of the left, with the communists at 
the centre of much of the infighting. The CNT and the communists were at loggerheads 
over a whole range of issues that were fundamental to the war effort, foremost amongst 
them  collectivizations  and  the  organization  of  the  armed  forces.  To  counteract  the 
communists, the CNT deployed a strategy of publicly calling, once again, for an alliance 
between itself and the UGT. This sustained propaganda campaign repeatedly presented 
CNT-UGT unity as being a panacea solution that would wrest power away from political 
parties, allow the Social Revolution to continue and, as a consequence, lead to victory in 
the war. 
  
 
234
It was agreed at a February 1937 national plenum that it was ‘essential’ for the CNT to 
come to come to ‘an understanding’ with the UGT, with the National Committee being 
given the authority to try and bring this about with the UGT leadership.
7 But even before 
February, the CNT National Committee had written to the UGT Executive in the hope of 
arranging  a  meeting  with  them.
8  Initially  the  National  Committee  found  it  difficult  to 
convince the UGT leaders that a meeting that excluded representatives of political parties 
would be wise, with a meeting of CNT and UGT delegates not taking place until April. 
Although this meeting led to the elaboration of some shared positions on the economic 
management of the war effort, the National Committee warned that PCE members ‘with 
posts in the UGT are torpedoing an understanding’ between the labour federations.
9 The 
crises of May 1937 made this overall process irrelevant.  
 
Although little progress was made in actually  bringing  about an  alliance, the anarcho-
syndicalists were keen to publicly promote the idea as much as possible. The key issues 
that  appeared  on  the  front  pages  of  the  CNT  press  in  the  first  half  of  1937  were  the 
question of how to consolidate the Social Revolution in the face of attacks on it, and the 
need for unity between the CNT and the UGT. These two objectives were presented as 
being, at root, one and the same. According to the CNT’s public stance, the CNT and the 
UGT were the only organizations that could guarantee both victory in the war and the 
prosperity of the Social Revolution. Solidaridad Obrera argued that ‘the Revolution and 
the War demand an immediate alliance between the CNT and the UGT’.
10 It implored the 
UGT to join it in taking power.
11 Above all, the CNT press identified a CNT-UGT alliance 
as the ‘only efficient antidote’ to fight the enemies of the Social Revolution.
12 The CNT 
also argued that the politicians of the Republic – in particular the communists – were 
seeking at all costs to prevent an alliance between the labour federations because ‘everyone 
knows that the alliance of the worker organizations will bring the effective consolidation of 
the Revolution. The enemies of this [Revolution] will do everything they can to ruin the 
proposals  for  alliance  that  strengthen  the  workers’.
13  The  CNT’s  position  on  unity 
simultaneously served as a vehicle for discrediting its political rivals through suggesting 
that they opposed unity, whilst also suggesting that the CNT and the UGT stood united 
against these enemies of unity.  
 
The Republic’s political nadir came in May 1937, through a combination of days of street-
fighting in Barcelona between pro- and anti-Soviet communist factions, and then through 
the  fall  of  the  Largo  Caballero  government  and  the  subsequent  acrimony  over  its 
replacement. These events all gravely damaged the influence of the CNT in the Republic;  
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by June its representatives were out of both the national government and the Generalitat. 
The CNT’s leaders pinned their hopes for fighting against this tide on an alliance with the 
UGT. 
 
Following the ejection of the CNT and the UGT from the government the CNT began a 
propaganda offensive that attacked the new government led by Juan Negrín and voiced 
solidarity with the UGT. Once again the idea of a CNT-UGT alliance was used to this end. 
The National Committee instructed the CNT’s organisms that they should with ‘absolute 
homogeneity’ promote ‘UGT and CNT as a guarantee of victory’ and ‘exalt the figure of 
Largo  Caballero  as  a  guarantee  of  impending  victory’.
14  Consequently,  throughout  the 
political  crisis  and  in  the  following  months,  the  front  page  of  Solidaridad  Obrera 
recurrently called for a pact between the labour federations.
15 The CNT’s pro-unity line in 
these months amounted to an attempt to win the UGT’s backing in standing in opposition 
to the new  government, a strategy agreed upon by the CNT’s leadership at a national 
plenum held on 23
rd May. At the plenum it was agreed to place unequivocal support behind 
the UGT and ‘to gain agreement with the UGT to jointly take up the task of opposition to 
the government’.
16 
 
This strategy of forming an alliance with the UGT was based around the calculation, made 
by the National Committee, ‘that Largo Caballero will emerge victorious from the battle 
within the UGT’ that broke out between himself and the communists after May; a defeat 
for Largo would inevitably render the strategy meaningless.
17 Making this gamble was 
something that would be deeply lamented a year later.
18 This strategy of hoping Largo 
would emerge victorious and thus bring the UGT into an alliance with the CNT was still 
being followed in August 1937, with the National Committee offering progress reports on 
his efforts to regional delegates at a national plenum.
19 Its ultimate result was the creation 
of a national liaison committee between the CNT and UGT leaderships in July 1937, a 
development that would neither save Largo Caballero in his bid to stave off being ousted 
from the UGT nor rescue the CNT from its isolation. 
 
Although  the  CNT’s  attempts  to  build  an  alliance  with  the  UGT  in  1937  were  based 
fundamentally around fighting back against the ascendant communist movement and the 
marginalization of the CNT that this ascendancy brought about, seeking an alliance with 
the UGT in fact once more formed the basis of the anarcho-syndicalist labour federation’s 
strategy for seeking to come in from the cold once communist dominance over both the 
government and the UGT had been secured by the end of 1937. At the start of 1938 the  
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CNT’s  public  stance  towards  the  new  pro-communist  UGT  leadership  that  had  ousted 
Largo  Caballero  became  much  more  conciliatory.  The  anarcho-syndicalist  leadership, 
through the CNT press, indicated a desire to negotiate a pact with the UGT. However, this 
new initiative was entirely different from those that had been proposed in 1936 and 1937. 
Rather  than  being  framed  as  being  a  pact  that  would  further  the  Social  Revolution  or 
banish politicians, the new pact would be based around 
 
the necessity of an agreement on regulations for the economic development of industries 
on a national level. The solutions must not refer to doctrinal disparities of principles or 
tactics, but questions of work, which are the same for everyone.
20 
 
This strategy of seeking to bring the CNT into an alliance with the UGT based around the 
labour federations playing a largely practical and logistical role in the Republic reflected a 
change in perspective in the organization towards viewing the revolutionary battle as lost, 
and  that  in  such  circumstances  it  would  be  preferable  to  play  a  secondary  role  in 
government to prevent further losses than to remain permanently marginalized, a stance 
that was put forward by the CNT’s delegates to the AIT congress of December 1937.
21 
After negotiating over the course of January and February, the national leaderships of the 
CNT  and  the  UGT  signed  the  Pact  of  Unity  in  March  1938.  This  was  heralded  by 
Republican and the communist propaganda as a great victory for proletarian unity and a 
source of strength that would turn the course of the war in the Republic’s favour.
22 For the 
CNT, however, the pact was a measure of how far its original agenda of the early days of 
the war had been put out of reach.  
 
After  the  CNT-UGT  pact  was  signed  in  March  1938,  the  CNT  leadership  turned  its 
attention  to  ensuring  that  the  terms  of  the  pact,  especially  those  relating  to  economic 
management, were fully implemented. From the moment the pact was signed, the National 
Committee instructed CNT unions and local federations to pressure their UGT counterparts 
into seeking to implement its terms on the local level as soon as possible.
23 It was a process 
the National Committee found frustrating, reporting to the CNT national plenum of June 
1938 that the implementation of the pact was not proceeding as hoped,
24 and also writing 
to the UGT National Executive in August to complain about what it perceived as a lack of 
UGT interest in the functions of the national CNT-UGT liaison committee.
25  
 
It is also worth noting that though the pact was at root a pragmatic measure to maintain 
some level of CNT influence, even with this objective in mind the National Committee still 
saw it as an opportunity to present the negotiations of the pact as offering the CNT the  
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opportunity to win over UGT unions into the CNT through its pro-unity stance, with the 
National Committee even instructing the grassroots in March 1938 to criticize the UGT 
leaders in front of their UGT colleagues in the hope that this would place pressure on the 
leadership to make the pact more revolutionary.
26 Likewise, to try and implement the pact, 
the National Committee resorted to the same tactic, leading to a strong private rebuke from 
the UGT leadership.
27 There was thus a continuity with the 1931 to 1936 period throughout 
the war regarding the CNT leadership’s handling of relations with the UGT, namely that it 
was willing to use the question of CNT-UGT alliances to undermine the UGT’s leadership. 
 
Overall, then, the events of 1931 to 1936 conditioned to a significant extent how the CNT 
interacted with the UGT over the course of the Civil War. On a most basic level, the turn 
towards an ostensibly pro-alliance strategy at the beginning of 1936 was a key aspect of 
how the CNT fought its political battles on the national level. Although the pro-alliance 
stance  was  adapted  and  evolved  in  response  to  changing  circumstances,  virtually 
throughout the entire war the CNT turned to some form of militating for a CNT-UGT 
alliance. The idea of an alliance was put to use for a wide range of purposes in accordance 
with present circumstances, including variously using the idea to discredit political rivals, 
further the Social Revolution and present it as the model for running the Republic, and 
simply seeking to retain some influence. The change in the ideas underpinning CNT-UGT 
alliance, not to mention some of its side effects, such as the improbable lionizing of Largo 
Caballero,  are  indicative  of  the  extent  to  which  the  CNT  struggled  to  cope  with  the 
political infighting that beset the wartime Republic. The reliance throughout on the same 
basic response to all situations of suggesting a CNT-UGT alliance demonstrates the lack of 
options that an anti-political movement had when it found itself forced into the political 
arena.  
 
                                                 
1 The message given out by the leadership in Catalonia was somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, the 
delegates for Catalonia insisted at a meeting of the National Committee held on 29
th July that the CNT-FAI 
had total control of Catalonia. The argument was put forward, in spite of the reservations expressed by other 
delegates, that if CNT militias captured Zaragoza, libertarian communism would be a certainty. Catalonia 
presented itself to the rest of the CNT as having total ‘hegemony’ (IISG CNT 79B ‘Acta de la reunión del 
comité nacional celebrada el día 29 de julio 1936’) On the other hand, on 23
rd July 1936, Catalan CNT held a 
plenum, at which Juan García Oliver’s proposal to ‘go for everything’ and declare libertarian communism 
instead of cooperating with other organizations was rejected, a stance which in García Oliver’s view 
highlighted that the social revolution was already doomed (García Oliver, El eco de los pasos, pp. 184-190). 
2 Solidaridad Obrera, 11 September 1936 
3 Solidaridad Obrera, 11 September 1936 
4 Solidaridad Obrera, 1 October 1936 
5 Solidaridad Obrera, 25, 27 September, 2 October 1936 
6 Claridad, 30 September 1936 
7 IISG CNT 51B1 ‘Acuerdos del pleno nacional de regionales celebrado durante los días seis, siete, ocho y 
nueve de febrero de 1937’  
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8 IISG CNT 69A4 Letter from the CNT National Committee to the UGT Executive Commission, 05 
December 1936 
9 IISG CNT 51B2 Minutes of the CNT National Plenum, 15 April 1937 
10 Solidaridad Obrera, 10 March 1937 
11 Solidaridad Obrera, 10 March 1937 
12 Solidaridad Obrera, 27 April 1937 
13 Solidaridad Obrera, 2 May 1937 
14 CDMH P/S Barcelona 1345 Undated document authored by CNT National Committee 
entitled ‘Documentos que se citan en el informe sobre la tramitación de la crisis’ 
15 See, for example, Solidaridad Obrera, 6, 23 June, 11 July 1937 
16 CDMH P/S Barcelona 932 ‘Actas del Pleno Nacional de Regionales, extraordinario, del 
movimiento libertario, celebrado los días 23 y sucesivos de Mayo de 1937’ 
17 CDMH P/S Barcelona 932 ‘Actas del Pleno Nacional de Regionales, extraordinario, del 
movimiento libertario, celebrado los días 23 y sucesivos de Mayo de 1937’ 
18 IISG CNT 34A1 Minutes of the CNT National Plenum, 02 August 1938 
19 IISG CNT 36D3 Minutes of the CNT National Plenum, 07 August 1937 
20 Solidaridad Obrera, 25 January 1938 
21 Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, Informe de la Delegación de la C.N.T. al Congreso Extraordinario 
de la A.I.T y resoluciones del mismo (Barcelona : Sección de Información, Propaganda y Prensa C.N.T. 
Comité Nacional, 1938), p. 43 
22 See, for example, Treball, March 1938; Ralph Bates, Unidad proletaria U.G.T.-C.N.T.: las dos poderosas 
sindicales españolas (México: Sociedad de Amigos de España, 1938) 
23 IISG CNT 34B1 CNT National Committee Circular no. 5, 13 March 1938 
24 IISG CNT 36D5 Report by the National Committee to the National Plenum, 10 June 1938 
25 IISG CNT 69A4 Letter from the CNT National Committee to the UGT Executive Commission, 27 August 
1938 
26 IISG CNT 34A1 Minutes of the CNT national plenum, 18 January 1938; IISG CNT 51C2 Circular from 
the National Committee, 03 March 1938 
27 IISG CNT 69A2 Letter from the UGT National Executive to the CNT National Committee, 05 November 
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